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And so it seemed 
As he came closer 
My final moment 
Wife’s love over1 
     
 
 
1. My Claim 
 
This thesis is born of the question: why do women suffer domestic violence 
disproportionately to any other group? Why does it continue, in the same form, with the same 
degree of pain, without rebate? And, if the same harm occurs over and over again, consistent 
through generations and uniform across borders, why then has the international community not 
yet developed effective means to address it? 
 
This thesis attempts to find a legal answer. This is prefaced, however, by the 
acknowledgement that the law is only one tool in an array of mechanisms, such as health, 
economics, and politics, which, if properly combined, could alleviate the pain and difficulties 
experienced by many victims of domestic violence. 
 
The area of law to which I look is international human rights law. My initial motivation for 
considering public international law arose from the repetition of similar forms of domestic 
violence around the globe. All over the world women suffer the same type of violence at the 
hands of their intimate partners and they endure the same feelings of helplessness and isolation 
when looking to the state for protection. If such violence is universal, it seems then, so too 
should be the solution. 
 
I propose in this thesis that international law, if properly fashioned, can be used effectively as 
part of this solution. In particular, I maintain that the authoritative enunciation of a norm against 
domestic violence in international law can improve the way states address domestic violence. I 
do not propose that individual abusers should be tried by international law. My focus instead is 
on the extent to which states fail consistently to alleviate domestic violence. This is important 
because many legal systems appreciate neither the exigency of extreme forms of domestic 
violence, nor the extent to which women as a group are disproportionately victims of this 
violence.2 
 
                                                
1 Anon 
2 Acts of violence against women by male intimates has been documented literally throughout the world.  Although 
reported statistics differ, some maintain that within a twelve month period as many as 50% of women around the 
world report being hit by their intimate partners.  For a list of authorities indicating that domestic violence is 
perpetrated predominantly by men against women throughout the world see Annexure One hereto. 
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The result of this lack of appreciation is an almost universal failure to police, prevent and 
punish domestic violence effectively.3 Due to the socialized normalcy of domestic violence, very 
few cases are reported or actually prosecuted. Where prosecutions do proceed, victims will often 
drop their complaints either because they have reconciled with, or because they fear 
recrimination from, their abuser.4 Given the disjuncture between the reality of domestic violence 
and the inefficacy of many legal systems to address it, a revision of the law vis-à-vis domestic 
violence is needed. Both national and international legal systems are in need of change. 
 
This thesis proposes that the international community should adopt a clear and authoritative 
articulation of a legal right against extreme and systemic forms of domestic violence and a 
corresponding duty of states to help remedy such violence. This proposition is made on the basis 
that international law currently does not contain an effective articulation of this right, and that 
adopting effective global standards in international law for addressing such violence would help 
improve state enforcement of this right. 
 
Under the current state of international law, it is difficult to convince states to prioritize its 
resources and infrastructures to protect abused women. Articulating clear and effective global 
standards in international law for addressing extreme forms of domestic violence would provide 
an important and practical benchmark against which domestic state legislation could be 
evaluated and re-shaped. Formulating such global standards could place pressure on states to 
take basic remedial steps against such violence, such as enacting legislation that allows for 
restraining orders to be made at the same time as a maintenance order, or creating accessible 
shelters, which will accommodate the divergent needs of women, including their children.5 
 
2. The Appropriateness of International Law to Address Domestic Violence  
 
The movement to recognize domestic violence as a human rights violation is a recent 
development in international law. Five decades ago, after World War II, the persecution of 
women did not receive specific attention in the Nuremberg or Tokyo tribunals but, rather, was 
subsumed into the general horror of the crimes committed against Jews, ‘Gypsies,’ homosexuals, 
the disabled and other targeted groups. For the most part, violence against women was 
considered a private matter, perpetrated by individuals over whom the state had no authority. 
 
However, over the last 50 years, evolutions in international law, combined with a truly 
remarkable struggle by the feminist movement, have changed the way human rights lawyers see 
violence against women. The principle of state sovereignty – the notion that what happens within 
the borders of a state remains its exclusive concern – also started to wane, and the community of 
                                                
3 Carin Benninger-Budel, Violence against Women:  for the Protection and Promotion of the Human Rights of 
Women, 10 Reports / Year 2000, 25 (2000) at 341-409 [hereinafter CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL] (describing violence 
by men against female intimates whom states failed to assist). See also the information in Annexure One hereto. 
4 See for example, CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra notex, at 25 (“Traditional notions of womanhood and family 
[in Armenia] as well as fear of the perpetrator, often prevent women from reporting these crimes. The family is seen 
as a private area of life and therefore any violence that occurs in the family is kept private as well.”). 
5 The details of these steps are described in chapter two. See, for example, World Health Organization, World Report 
on Violence and Health 99 (2002) [hereinafter World Report on Violence and Health] (“…societies with the lowest 
levels of partner violence were those that had community sanctions against partner violence and those where abused 
women had access to sanctuary, either in the form of shelters or family support.”). 
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nations began holding states accountable for the way they treat their citizens. The core values of 
dignity, equality, physical integrity, and freedom from fear, were refined. International law 
began to recognize the peculiar way in which violence and sexism intersect, and how violence 
against women is used as a technique of subordination, a method of inculcating a culture of fear, 
and an instrument that impedes women’s ability to flourish. As a result, previously lawful actions 
are now categorized as human rights violations, and, patterns of behavior, once condoned, are 
now condemned. 
 
Three specific manifestations of violence against women provide good examples of actions 
which, today, receive specific condemnation in international law. These manifestations are the 
mass rape of women during war time (“mass rape”); the cutting of women’s and girls’ genitalia 
(“FGC”); and, the trafficking of women and children (“trafficking”). Based on the development 
of international law and the efforts of academics and activists, mass rape is now admonished as a 
particular crime against humanity and an unlawful instrument of war.6 FGC and trafficking, 
while enjoying less mainstream and high profile admonishment, have also achieved international 
recognition, condemnation and regulation.7 
 
Domestic violence is the fourth manifestation of violence against women developing in 
international law. This is not my view alone. There are many who maintain that domestic 
violence is prohibited by the same overarching principles of international law that apply to mass 
rape, FGC and trafficking. Innumerable reports are emerging, indicating that domestic violence 
is the most common form of violence perpetrated against women; that it is one of the major 
                                                
6 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. ROME STATUTE OF THE INT’L CRIM. 
COURT, art. 7, § 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
The Rome Statute places an obligation on states and combating parties to refrain from and prevent “[r]ape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity.” See also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998) [hereinafter 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu] and Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), 
paragraph 437 [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Kunarac]. See also article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute (defining war 
crimes as, inter alia, “[c]ommitting rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach 
of the Geneva Conventions.”); and, article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute (defining a crime against humanity as “acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack” including “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.” 
7 Trafficking is prohibited in several instruments, including the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in 
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 96 U.N.T.S. 271, entered into force July 25, 1951 
[hereinafter Trafficking Convention]; the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and two 
optional protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, GA Res. 55/25 (Nov. 15 2000) [hereinafter 
U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime]. For a brief discussion of this instrument see Sean D. 
Murphy, International Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 407 (2001) 
[hereinafter Murphy, International Trafficking in Persons]. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS & 
POLICIES WORLDWIDE, (Anika Rahman & Nahid Tubia eds., 2000) [hereinafter FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A 
GUIDE TO LAWS & POLICIES]. FGC was prohibited specifically in article 2(a) of the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence against Women, G.A. res. 48/104, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993) 
[hereinafter DEVAW] (referencing female genital cutting in the definition of violence against women). Id. Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, U.N. ESCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 (1996) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women] (submitted 
by Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/85).  
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international health risks for women; and, that women suffer domestic violence more than any 
other group.8 
 
However, there are also theorists, lawyers and activists who are not convinced. They agree 
that domestic violence is horrible, but propose that it is not of the same substance and gravitas as 
other human rights violations. The skeptic may balk at the comparison between the mass rape of 
thousands of women and the perception of one-off incidents of spousal abuse. The skeptic may 
ask also how domestic violence is different from other crimes in society which are not regulated 
by international law, such as common assault and battery. And, understandably, this skepticism 
is accompanied by an intuitive resistance that so private a phenomenon should be treated by so 
public a remedy. 
 
In some respects the skeptic is correct. For example, there are differences between domestic 
violence and the war-time context of mass rape, which is accompanied by a breakdown in order; 
the power of organized crime which traffics women around the world; and, the longevity of the 
mental and physical disorders that result from FGC. However, as this thesis demonstrates, when 
one looks in detail at the harm suffered by women at the hands of extreme forms of domestic 
violence, the parallels between such violence and the associated lack of state protection, and with 
that associated with mass rape, FGC and trafficking, are disquieting. Each of these forms of harm 
is epidemic and, sadly, there has been a grand failure on the part of governments to meet the 
needs of these victims. International law is responding appropriately in respect of mass rape, 
FGC, and trafficking. I propose that it do the same in respect of domestic violence. 
 
I argue that extreme forms of domestic violence qualify as human rights violations 
enforceable in international law because: the rights violated are fundamental and universal; the 
societal system of explicit and implicit gender discrimination in many states makes women 
particularly vulnerable to violence; and, while this vulnerability ought to trigger greater state 
assistance, instead of proactive protection, there is a flailing legal system, placid apologies, and, 
all too often, abandonment.  
 
Moreover, in terms of sheer international scale, domestic violence is the most common form 
of violence perpetrated against women internationally; it is one of the greatest international 
health risks for women; and, it is inflicted on women more than any other group in society. This 
thesis proposes that these factors are sufficient to distinguish extreme cases of domestic violence 
from other social crimes, which are dealt with solely through national criminal laws. This reality 
necessitates the selection of extreme cases of domestic violence for identification, clarification 
and codification by international law.9 
 
Finally, as regards the intimacy of the relationship between the victim and the violator, such 
intimacy is no reason for not using international law to address domestic violence. International 
law is not confined to addressing actions committed by state actors. International human rights 
law already requires governments to intervene in many private settings, including the private 
                                                
8 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra notex, at *. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the 
first Special Rapporteur for violence against women, maintains that all states have an international obligation to 
prevent domestic violence. See Annexure 1 hereto. 
9 This is the phraseology of Professor Harold Hongju Koh. 
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activities of its citizens in cases of labor practices, child abuse, religious intolerance and racial 
discrimination, and to protect its workers, children and religious and racial minorities from 
violence committed by other individuals and non-state actors. 
 
The same imperatives should be placed on governments in respect of domestic violence. This 
thesis will show that, contrary to our expectations, local and state agencies are not taking 
appropriate measures to help protect against domestic violence or effectively to assist the victims 
of such violence. Therefore, as with other cases of epidemic violence, which consist in the 
violation of people’s fundamental and universal rights, international law can, and should, be used 
to compel states to take basic legislative steps to help remedy such violence, to adopt applicable 
policies to enforce such legislation, and to assess continuously the efficacy of their domestic 
violence programs. 
 
3. The Efficacy of International Human Rights Law   
 
Even if one accepts that domestic violence is a violation of international proportions, 
justifying the intervention of international law, a number of new questions may arise for the 
skeptic. 
 
First, the skeptic may be concerned that international law is a weak body of law, proving 
ineffective especially in the realm of human rights. One of the primary criticisms of international 
law, apart from those based on sovereign immunity, relates to its lack of enforcement capability. 
This thesis acknowledges that international human rights law lacks traditional enforcement 
mechanisms and has failed in many ways. However, even if the criticisms of international law 
are correct (which I do not reject in toto), setting legal standards at a global rather than a purely 
national level remains a prevalent practice. This is because enforcement by an international body 
is not the only way in which international law operates in national systems. The successful 
implementation of international human rights law can occur also through an informal, ad hoc, 
incorporation of international legal principles in judicial, legislative and non-governmental 
activities. 
 
On this basis, this thesis proposes that articulating a clear and authoritative international legal 
right against extreme and systemic forms of domestic violence and creating a set of core 
minimum obligations required of states to uphold that right, would help bring real change to bear 
in favor of domestic violence victims. Such measures, for example, could enable non-
governmental organization to challenge their governments in national courts. An individual or an 
organization or both (depending on the rules of the jurisdiction) could appeal to their courts to 
compel governments to meet their international legal obligations by adopting minimum 
legislative standards and/or improving the implementation of anti-domestic violence legislation 
through increased allocation of resources. Adoption of such standards could also facilitate 
applications for asylum for the more desperate of domestic violence victims. 
 
Second, the skeptic may question how international law, so clearly driven by political 
agendas, could ever benefit abused women. While acutely aware of the political vicissitudes that 
drive international law, my objective is to delineate canonic standards that could be employed 
when the political climate is agreeable. Therefore, this thesis approaches international law on the 
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basis that international human rights law does not operate solely through international courts and 
enforcement agencies. International law works also through the conversion of norms and mores 
into legal statements, and the enunciation of such legal statements on a supra level, which filter 
down into government practices, non-governmental efforts and individual activity. In this way, 
international norms, once articulated, have the potential to infiltrate and improve the individual 
lives of women irrespective of the then current international political climate.10 
 
Third, the skeptic may wonder, if there is evidence of domestic violence in international law 
already, what more needs to be done. This thesis proposes that current international legal 
standards are inadequate. While there are international treaties, which, through interpretation and 
extrapolation, can be said to prohibit domestic violence implicitly, such legal standards are at an 
inadequately general level of abstraction, as recognized by the subsequent condemnation of 
trafficking, mass rape, FGC, enforced disappearances and other forms of harm through more 
specific international standards.  
 
In addition, while international instruments, such as U.N. declarations and statements by 
U.N. agencies, contain more direct prohibitions against domestic violence, such prohibitions do 
not articulate adequately a corresponding responsibility of states to take steps to remedy such 
violence, and are not as absolute and categorical as other condemnations of human rights 
violations in international law. The international community currently is in the process of 
articulating a new norm regarding domestic violence. However, this norm has not yet developed; 
it is in an embryonic state and requires maturation, both in substance and in authoritative 
endorsement. 
 
Moreover, there is a tendency in international law to place women’s rights within a category 
which exists apart from mainstream human rights.11 This separation between women’s and 
human rights would not be problematic if women’s rights received the same attention as 
mainstream human rights. However, as Radhika Coomaraswamy, the former U.N. special 
rapporteur for violence against women, points out, there is a “refusal to accept the values in and 
of themselves: an ideological resistance to human rights for women.”12  
 
It has been argued that human rights are perceived as male rights and in order for women’s 
rights to achieve a more general status, this perception must be debunked.13 To this end, the 
terminology of international instruments and the priorities of the international community needs 
to change to be more inclusive of women. For these reasons, this thesis critiques the current 
                                                
10 See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 
626 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home].  
11 See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelly Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 
AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Feminist Approaches to International Law] (arguing that women’s rights in 
international law have been marginalized). 
12 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Women, Ethnicity and the Discourse of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 39, 40 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994). 
13 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE 
DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 36 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) [hereinafter Schneider, 
The Violence of Privacy] and Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private 
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1993) [hereinafter Romany, Women as 
Aliens] (confirming the male-centric structure and application of international law). 
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international law on domestic violence and proposes ways in which the most private of violence 
requires a clearer and more effective public response. 
 
Finally, the skeptic may ask whether all forms of domestic violence are appropriate for 
regulation at international law. My answer is no. The thesis does not propose that all forms of 
domestic violence should be addressed in international law. The term domestic violence 
encompasses a wide range of conduct, from a one-off slap to long-term systematic physical and 
psychological abuse. Rather, this thesis proposes that international law can, and should, be used 
only to address and mitigate forms of domestic violence that fall at the more serious and 
systemic end of the spectrum of violence, which I refer to as “systemic intimate violence.” 
 
4. The Meaning of Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
This thesis revises the legal definition of domestic violence to reveal its true nature. It does 
not use the traditional terms ‘family violence,’ ‘domestic violence’ or ‘violence at home’ because 
a significant component of the harm emanates directly from the failure of states to provide 
appropriate resources and infrastructure to help remedy such violence, which is not evident in 
these labels. In addition, words such as ‘family’ or ‘domestic’ limit the violence spatially or fail 
to translate the real danger inherent in the harm.14  
 
As will become clear, most government agencies misunderstand the nature of domestic 
violence, with the result that domestic violence becomes repetitive, cyclical and, due to the lack 
of appropriate punitive measures, endorsed. This approach of inertia and ignorance on the part of 
states becomes systemic and the intimate violence, which we perceive as private, develops a very 
public dimension. For this reason, I adopt the expression ‘systemic intimate violence’ to refer to 
the violence between intimates which I maintain should be addressed in international law. I use 
this phrase because, while the violence occurs between intimates, it continues unchecked by the 
state and the state becomes a silent agent, a participant in the pain and an entity partly 
responsible for its perpetuation. 
 
Systemic intimate violence also is a narrower subset of violence than ‘domestic violence’ 
generally. I define “systemic intimate violence” as meaning repetitive emotional or physical 
harm, or the threat thereof, committed between intimates, which forms a continuum of violence 
from which the victim, due to his or her isolation and/or incapacitation, is unable to procure 
traditional legal assistance.15 It therefore has the following characteristics: the existence of an 
                                                
14 See Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE 
VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 11, 26-7 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) 
[hereinafter Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”] (explaining that the word “domestic” in domestic violence 
causes state officials to trivialize the violence. For example, the United States’ emergency number officials, 911, 
have a tendency to give a lower priority to calls labeled ‘domestic violence.’). Others have preferred a wider 
definition to include a broad range of violence against women. See, for example, MARIJKE VELZEBOER; MARY 
ELLSBERG; CARMEN CLAVEL ARCAS; CLAUDIA GARCIÁ-MORENO, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE HEALTH 
SECTOR RESPONDS 4 (Pan American Health Organization & Path (Program for Appropriate Technology in Health) 
2003) [hereinafter VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE HEALTH SECTOR RESPONDS] (using the term ‘gender-based 
violence’ “to refer to the broader range of acts that women and girls commonly suffer from intimate partners and 
family members, as well as individuals outside the family.”). 
15 This definition is based on a review of academic and legislative definitions from a variety of national jurisdictions. 
This methodology was adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case of 
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intimate relationship between adults; severe harm, physical or emotional or the threat thereof; a 
continuum of violence; and, the absence of effective state assistance. The combination of these 
factors creates a severe form of harm, which, in the face of endorsed impunity by the state, 
results in its systemic nature. 
 
For the remainder of this thesis I use the term ‘domestic violence’ to refer to current laws and 
theories and the term ‘systemic intimate violence’ to refer to the type of violence that I propose 




5.1 Chapter One 
 
The first chapter of this thesis consists of three parts. The first provides a brief description of 
systemic intimate violence and summarizes the deficiencies in international law as regards such 
violence. Part two examines the history and development of violence against women and 
domestic violence in international law. Finally, having mapped the background to current 
international law on domestic violence, the third part provides a detailed overview of the 
instruments in international law which regulate domestic violence and, by highlighting their 
deficiencies, proposes certain remedies. 
 
5.2 Chapter Two 
 
Chapter two, also consisting of three parts, describes the internationalizing elements of 
systemic intimate violence and the content of the state’s duty to address it. 
 
Part one goes into more detail about the meaning of systemic intimate violence and the 
reason why this label is necessary and appropriate. The second part, examining the right to be 
free from systemic intimate violence, is a detailed break down and analysis of each element of 
systemic intimate violence. The third part is a description of the proposed international and 
national obligations to protect women from systemic intimate violence and the positive steps, 
which, I propose, are requisite for states to satisfy their international legal obligation to protect 
women from systemic intimate violence. 
 
5.3 Chapter Three 
 
Chapter three confronts the skeptic’s query that systemic intimate violence cannot constitute 
an international human rights violation. Drawing on international jurisprudence and the 
philosophy of law, this chapter articulates three factors which, combined, transform the interests 
of individuals into internationally protected human rights. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 38 I.L.M. 317, 352-53 (ICTY 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija], cited by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra notex, at paragraph 437. See MARYLAND INST. FOR 
CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. OF LAWYERS, INC., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: HANDLING THEM EFFECTIVELY IN 
CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT, 5 (2001) [hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: HANDLING THEM EFFECTIVELY] 
(recognizing that domestic violence encompasses both physical and psychological behavior that occurs in various 
types of adult intimate relationships). 
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Chapter three begins with a collation of theories as to what constitutes an international 
human right. Based on these views, I identify four elements which must pertain in order for an 
‘interest’ to qualify as an international human ‘right.’ These elements are: (1) fundamentality; (2) 
universality; (3) vulnerability; and, (4) state accountability. I then apply these elements to the 
definition of systemic intimate violence, and conclude that systemic intimate violence qualifies 
as an international human rights violation. 
 
5.4 Chapter Four 
 
Based on the analysis in chapter three that there is an international human right to be free 
from systemic intimate violence and a concomitant international obligation on states to uphold 
that right, chapter four provides the theoretical substantiation for imposing responsibility on 
states for the conduct of private citizens.  
 
Chapter four begins with a brief historical overview of the law of state responsibility, 
showing how it has developed to include international obligations of states vis-à-vis their own 
citizens. The chapter then analyses the elements of generic international obligations and shows 
how each component of the principles of state responsibility can be applied to impose an 
international obligation on states to take the positive steps outlined in chapter two to help prevent 
and remedy systemic intimate violence. 
 
5.5 Chapter Five  
 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I argue that international law is an effective source of law, 
and makes a real and practical difference to individuals. Through a process of norm infiltration, 
international human rights law translates values and aspirations into legal rights, enforceable 
before national courts and respected in national institutions.  
 
The first part of the chapter describes the debate regarding the efficacy and validity of 
international law. It describes the theories which support and reject international law and 
concludes that there is sufficient evidence that international law operates through non-coercive 
compliance, a theory which I proceed to apply to systemic intimate violence. 
 
The second part of the chapter demonstrates that the non-coercive compliance theory 
operates in three ways. First, international law has an expressive function in that it articulates the 
content of rights and duties, with which states consistently comply. Second, it has an 
implementing function, in that international law rules are implemented through the combined 
activities of international bodies, non-governmental organizations and government agencies. 
Finally, international law has an expansive function whereby it tracks the development of social 
norms and translates these into legal imperatives. Through these three mechanisms, I propose 
that international rules regarding systemic intimate violence can be applied nationally for the 





6.1 Theories of Domestic Violence 
 
There are many definitions of domestic violence. The legal definition one adopts depends 
largely on the underlying explanation for the occurrence of domestic violence.16 There are two 
broad categories of thought on the causes of such violence. Some theorists view domestic 
violence as a purely individual, pathological phenomenon, which should be addressed on a case 
by case basis (what I call the ‘individual theory’). The second body of thought views domestic 
violence as a communal problem, which exists by virtue of social and political structures, which 
must be amended to end the abuse (what I call the ‘social theory’). I choose a combination of 
these theories to examine systemic intimate violence for the reasons discussed below.  
 
The individual theories, in their most narrow form, explain domestic violence with an 
individually oriented approach, focusing on the “individual psychological character of the 
abuser,” her/his childhood experiences, socio-economic circumstances and other factors specific 
to her/his life.17 A less narrow version of these theories, the socially-oriented perspective, 
examines abuse with reference to the effect of social externalities on the individual, such as 
social status, racism, alcohol abuse or unemployment.18 
                                                
16 Amnesty International points out that the definition of domestic violence one adopts “influences the choice of 
measures that are considered relevant and effective to prevent and combat men’s violence against women.” 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEN’S VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
SITUATION IN SWEDEN, 6 (19 April 2004), available at http://www2.amnesty.se/svaw.nsf/mvaw/$File/mvaw.pdf 
[hereinafter Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden]. For a description of the different approaches 
towards studying domestic violence, see Michael P. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: 
Two Forms of Violence against Women, JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, VOL. 57, NO. 2, 283, 283-4 
(1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism] (distinguishing between the family violence perspective and the 
feminist perspective of domestic violence). See also Heimer, Gun; Lundgren, Eva; Westerstrand, Jenny; Kalliokoski, 
Anne-Marie, Captured Queen Men’s Violence against Women in “Equal” Sweden – a Prevalence Study, 16-17 
(Åströms tryckeri AB, Umeå, 2002), translated by Julia Mikaelsson and Geoffrey French available at 
http://www.brottsoffermyndigheten.se/informationsmaterial/Captured%20queen.pdf/Captured%20Queen%20.pdf 
[hereinafter the Captured Queen Report]. Both the Captured Queen Report and the Amnesty International Report on 
Intimate Violence in Sweden refer to these theories. Amnesty International refers to the structural perspective, the 
individually oriented approach, the system theory and the ecological model. Id., at 6. 
17 See  the Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 14 (describing the individualistic theory as linking “the violence 
to the individual violent man, who is regarded as ‘mad’, ‘sick’ or ‘deviant’ in some other way, and the explanation 
of his violent actions is sought in his personality. Inherent in this approach is the concept of violence as consisting of 
isolated, deviant deeds committed by special, abnormal men. Possibly too, the women subjected to violence may be 
regarded as deviant in some way, for example, as ‘inadequate’ or ‘provocative.’”). The Captured Queen Report also 
describes the explanation of family violence that focuses on the individual psychological character of the abuser 
“who is regarded as ‘mad’, ‘sick’ or deviant’… and the explanation of his violent actions is sought in his 
personality. Inherent in this approach is the concept of violence as consisting of isolated, deviant deeds committed 
by special, abnormal men… Alongside this perspective, a socially-oriented perspective has had a strong influence on 
the understanding of men’s violence to women… From this angle of approach the spotlight falls on the social 
conditions applicable to the perpetrator of the violence, such as social exclusion, alcohol abuse or unemployment. 
The two perspectives may also be combined, such as when the ‘social heritage’ is linked to so-called re-
victimization.’” Id. See also Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra notex, at 6. 
18 See Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 15 (describing how these “circumstances, whether they exist now or 
were present during the man’s childhood, are presumed to cause his violent behaviour.”). There are a range of 
theories within the individual approach. For example, the so-called “systems theory” links the violence to the 
structure of the family and the relationships between the family members, without regard to externalities such as 
gender disparity. In terms of this theory, “the ‘special violent family’ is placed at the centre and related to the family 
and its structure, its discords and imbalance. The systems theory models of explanation concentrate on the balance 
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The second group of theories, the social theories, rejects the specification of “a set of definite 
characteristics and criteria for abused women and abusing men.”19 Rather, the violence is seen in 
the context of social structures and organization, both explicit, such as the way laws operate, and 
implicit, such as the different gender roles and concomitant power dynamics in society.20  
 
I adopt a combination of these theories in understanding domestic violence. The combined 
view is often referred to as the ecological model, which examines the integration between social 
structures, individual characteristics and the dynamics of the relationship in question.21 The 
ecological model imports elements of all the theories, viewing domestic violence as “a 
multifaceted phenomenon grounded in the interplay between personal, situational and socio-
cultural factors.”22 
 
I choose to integrate the theories of domestic violence because neither the individual nor the 
social bodies of thought is satisfactory alone. Viewing domestic violence from a purely 
individualistic approach excludes characteristics about the nature of the violence and leads to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
between individual members of the family, the parties being regarded as fairly equal whereas systematic power 
imbalance between men and women is ignored.” Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 15. Some theorists adopt a 
combination of these perspectives, linking the ‘social heritage’ of the abuser to his current behavior. 
19 For example, the structural theory. See Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra 
notex, at 6. 
20 This is similar to the feminist perspective, which examines the violence purely from a gender point of view. See 
Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 15, (explaining that the “fact that men subject women to violence may be 
regarded from a structural perspective as an expression of male superiority which may manifest itself in actual 
physical attacks on women, but also in less drastic phenomena such as sexual harassment or verbal abuse.”). 
21 See Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra notex, at 6. See also Good Practice in 
Designing a Community-Based Approach to Prevent Domestic Violence, Expert Paper Prepared by Lori Michau, 
Raising Voices, Kampala Uganda, for Violence against Women: Good Practices in Combating and Eliminating 
Violence against Women, Expert Group Meeting, Organized by the U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women 
in collaboration with U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 17 to 20 May 2005, Vienna Austria, at 2 (stating that the 
“Ecological Model demonstrates that violent behavior grows out of a complex interplay of individual, relational, 
communal and societal dynamics. It asserts that violence does not occur as a result of one factor in one of the four 
spheres of influence, but is rather more complex with multiple factors within different spheres influencing a person’s 
attitudes, behavior and choices...”). See also VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE HEALTH SECTOR RESPONDS, supra 
notex, at 5 (taking into account the characteristics of the individual perpetrator, the relationship, the community and 
society. Social factors include “[n]orms granting men control over female behavior; acceptance of violence as a way 
to resolve conflict; notion of masculinity linked to dominance, honor or aggression; rigid gender roles.”).  
22 See  Ellsberg, Mary, Peña, Rodolfo, Herrera, Andrés, Liljestrand, Jerker, Winkvist, Anna, Candies in Hell: 
Women’s Experience of Violence in Nicaragua, Social Science & Medicine 51 (2000), 1596-1597, available at 
www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed [hereinafter Candies in Hell]. This model contains four concentric spheres: (1) 
in the inner circle are the individual characteristics of the victim and abuser. These characteristics include witnessing 
violence as a child, alcohol abuse, poor or no education and a deficient level of income; (2) the second circle refers 
to the immediate circumstances in which the abuse takes place. Typical factors include male economic- and 
decision-making authority in the family; (3) the third circle considers the social and institutional environment in 
which the family power structure is determined. This contains family, work, neighborhood and social connections, 
confirming a strong connection between “isolation and lack of social support at both the individual and society 
level;” and, (4) the outer circle “includes the dominant cultural views and attitudes that permeate the society at large. 
It includes laws, social and economic policies and cultural norms… Numerous studies from around the world have 
suggested that violence against women is most common in societies where gender roles are rigidly defined and 
enforced, and where the concept of masculinity is linked to toughness, male honour, or dominance.” Id. 
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creation of erroneous stereotypes.23 This has the tendency to exculpate the social infrastructures 
that allow the harm to continue unchecked.24 At the same time, however, the characteristics of 
abusers should not be abandoned in toto. Understanding personality types facilitates the 
improvement in the design and application of legal mechanisms. For example, if an abuser has a 
respected public profile, is well known or holds a religious office, he may be more concerned 
about his image and therefore more open to reform.25 On the other hand, someone who has been 
in jail before or has contacts in the police or judicial system may have less respect for court 
orders and injunctions.26 
 
We cannot change abusive behavior of human beings but we can redesign the legal and 
social structures that exist to mitigate it. To this end, I adopt an analysis of domestic violence 
that takes into account the social, legal and political contexts.27 
 
6.2 Country Analyses and the Selection of Jurisdictions 
 
This thesis makes three claims which rely on empirical proof. First, I claim that systemic 
intimate violence exists worldwide. Second, I claim that almost all states fail to address systemic 
intimate violence adequately. Finally, I claim that notwithstanding the failure of states to 
                                                
23 Two of the common misconceptions of abusers are that abusive men emanate from a particularly low income or 
minority class or suffer from some dysfunctional/medical condition such as deviant behavior, mental illness or 
alcoholism. See Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra notex, at 28 (proposing that 
stereotypes are not useful and noting that “…eight out of ten women who stated that they had been subjected to 
violence in their current relationships were married to/living with a man born in Sweden. Two thirds of the women 
… indicated that their husband/partner was gainfully employed and 23 per cent reported that their husband/partner 
held a university degree. A majority (83 per cent) of the men who had abused their current wife/partner were 
reported to consume alcohol once or twice week (sic) or less frequently”). Amnesty International explains that in 
Sweden, men “of foreign origin are often identified as being especially prone to subject women to violence; it is ‘in 
their culture.’ When Swedish men abuse their girlfriends, partners, wives or daughters, the violence is often 
explained in terms of adjustment problems, mental illness, deviant behaviour or alcoholism.” Id., at 29. The 
Captured Queen Report dismisses the stereotype that violence is perpetrated by immigrants with a patriarchal 
heritage. It appears that eight out of ten women who have been “subjected to violence in their present relationship 
are married to or cohabiting with a man who was born in Sweden.” Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 72-3. 
The Captured Queen Report also indicates that violence takes place irrespective of class or immigrant status, 
indicating that the “notion that men commit violence against a particular type of woman, and that most of these men 
are immigrants, alcohol abusers or Ill-educated is a myth.” Id., at 76. 
24 Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra notex, at 29 (noting that stereotyping is 
problematic because the “myths serve to relieve the perpetrator of his responsibility for the acts of aggression, while 
the abused woman is turned into an accomplice.”. 
25 Joanne Fedler, Lawyering Domestic Violence Through the Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993 —An 
Evaluation After a Year in Operation, S. AFR. L.J. 231, 250 (1995) [hereinafter Fedler]. Fedler categorizes abusers 
into three personality types. This type of abuser would fall into category A or B, a category that is ‘controllable’ by 
the state. 
26 Id. This is a type C abuser. In such cases many victims see suicide or murder as their only alternatives. Id. at 251. 
The system theory too is deficient since it “concentrates on the balance between individual members of the family, 
the parties being regarded as fairly equal whereas systematic power imbalance between men and women is ignored.” 
Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 15. 
27 Amnesty International has adopted the view that the “causes of gender-based violence have certain common 
roots” and that men’s violence against women does not occur “in a vacuum but feeds on societal perceptions, values 
and attitudes, as well as on explicitly or implicitly discriminatory forms of behaviour that lead to the subordination 
of women and the superiority of men in society.” Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, 
supra notex, at 6-7. 
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alleviate the difficulties surrounding systemic intimate violence, the practice of states 
demonstrates that the evolution of international human rights law has in fact led to improved 
state responses to systemic intimate violence. To substantiate these claims, I rely on the 
definitions, reports and statistics of systemic intimate violence in Mexico, Sweden, and 
Nicaragua, and, to a lesser extent, the United States and South Africa.28 
 
I have not undertaken independent on-site studies. Rather, I have relied on the work of a 
significant number of reputable agencies, which have better resources, and the integrity and 
standards of investigatory methodology. The empirical evidence, in other words, already exists. I 
have drawn on this in substantiation of my claims. I selected these jurisdictions in the following 
manner. 
 
As a point of departure, I examined countries which have signed and ratified the Convention 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women (hereinafter referred to as “CEDAW”), with the 
exception of the United States, which has not signed CEDAW.29 Because this thesis examines 
domestic violence in international law, it is necessary to examine countries which have engaged, 
to varying degrees, in international law. I therefore narrowed the selection of countries to those 
which have submitted more than one report to the CEDAW committee, which CEDAW member 
states are required to do every four years. By comparing earlier and later CEDAW reports, I was 
able to determine the extent to which a state’s laws vis-à-vis systemic intimate violence had 
improved, deteriorated or stagnated. 
 
In particular, I focused on countries that have submitted more than one report before and 
after the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (hereinafter referred to 
“DEVAW”) was adopted in 1993, this being the first time violence against women was 
recognized officially as an international human rights violation.30 The analysis of a state’s 
                                                
28 I use this methodology based on the approach of the ICTY. The ICTY, in determining the definition of rape, 
turned to national jurisdictions for such definitions, since there was no definition in international law. See Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac, supra notex, at paragraph 439 (“As observed in the Furundžija case, the identification of the relevant 
international law on the nature of the circumstances in which the defined acts of sexual penetration will constitute 
rape is assisted, in the absence of customary or conventional international law on the subject, by reference to the 
general principles of law common to the major national legal systems of the world. The value of these sources is that 
they may disclose ‘general concepts and legal institutions’ which, if common to a broad spectrum of national legal 
systems, disclose an international approach to a legal question which may be considered as an appropriate indicator 
of the international law on the subject. In considering these national legal systems the Trial Chamber does not 
conduct a survey of the major legal systems of the world in order to identify a specific legal provision which is 
adopted by a majority of legal systems but to consider, from an examination of national systems generally, whether 
it is possible to identify certain basic principles, or in the words of the Furundžija judgement, “common 
denominators”, in those legal systems which embody the principles which must be adopted in the international 
context.”) 
29 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/830 (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter 
CEDAW] (establishing the Committee, “[f]or the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation 
of the present Convention”). I refer to the Convention as ‘CEDAW’ and its committee as the ‘CEDAW committee.’ 
For a list of States which have signed and ratified CEDAW, see 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. See also Parties who have entered reservations to CEDAW, 
available at, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm. 
30 DEVAW, supra notex. See Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Fiftieth 
Session A/50/38 31 May 1995, available at http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/ga/cedaw/14/a50--38.en [hereinafter 
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CEDAW report before and after DEVAW allowed me to assess whether the internationalization 
of domestic violence had made a useful contribution to that country’s efforts to remedy domestic 
violence, and therefore whether such internationalization could provide a useful means in the 
future. 
 
In addition to the information I obtained from comparing a state’s past CEDAW reports, I 
used information from so-called “shadow” reports, which are submitted to the CEDAW 
committee by non-governmental bodies. These reports provide objective insight into a country’s 
practices, bringing the CEDAW committee’s attention to facts which are usually absent from the 
state’s official CEDAW report. The existence of shadow reports, therefore, narrowed my 
selection of countries to those about which I could gain objective and factual insight. To ensure 
the accuracy and reliability of these reports I used the work of reputable non-governmental 
organizations, whose investigations detail and justify their own methodology, accountability and 
accuracy according to accepted standards for gathering data.31 
 
From the countries which fulfilled these criteria, I selected countries which represent diverse 
socio-economic and political circumstances. I chose Nicaragua as a developing country, 
experiencing acute poverty and having emerged from a relatively recent conflict. I analyzed 
Sweden as a highly developed state, with an advanced economy and a society reputed for its 
egalitarianism. Finally, I examined Mexico as a hybrid between these two extremes, with an 
emphasis on constitutional and democratic governance but with a reputation of “machismo” and 
violence. I supplemented these country analyses with less formal evidence from South Africa 
and the United States and piecemeal evidence from other countries throughout the world. 
 
In considering the development of Nicaragua’s approach to systemic intimate violence I 
examined Nicaragua’s first, fourth and fifth reports to the CEDAW committee which were 
reviewed in 1987 and 2001 (when reports four and five were considered by the CEDAW 
committee).32 I obtained additional information from four independent studies on domestic 
                                                                                                                                                       
CEDAW Fiftieth Session]. Specifically, Article 5 of DEVAW, supra notex, enjoins the UN bodies and other 
international organizations to include the protection of women from violence in their respective fields of 
competence.  
31 I refer to the work of organizations which have worked together with the United Nations and analogous 
institutional and regional bodies. Within specific countries, I have used reports of organizations whose work has 
been used and/or acknowledged by the aforementioned international organizations and bodies. These guidelines 
narrowed the pool of countries for selection. For example, a report on domestic violence in Sweden describes the 
method of obtaining information for the survey and statistics on which it is based. Captured Queen Report, supra 
notex, at 16-17. In the description of the methodological foundations used, it discusses the various forms of harm 
that constitute domestic violence, including physical violence, threats of violence and sexual violence and the way 
that such information can get lost in translation if not properly understood and phrased. 
32 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Session, General Assembly 
Official Records (A/42/38) 15 May 1987, paragraphs 169-213, pages 34-39 [hereinafter CEDAW committee Forty-
Second Session]. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Twenty-fourth 
Session (15 January – 2 February) and Twenty-fifth Session (2-20 July 2001), General Assembly Official Records: 
Fifty-Sixth Session Supplement No. 38 (A/56/38) 2001, paragraphs 277-318, pages 72-74 [hereinafter 2001 
Nicaragua CEDAW Report]. The CEDAW committee considered the fourth and fifth periodic reports of Nicaragua, 
which covered the period from 1991to 1998. This report covers both the fourth and the fifth periodic reports of 
Nicaragua, submitted to CEDAW in terms of article 18 on 28 August 1998 and 9 September 1999 respectively. See 
the Fourth Periodic Report of Nicaragua: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Distr.: 
General 28 August 1998 English Original: Spanish, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under 
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violence in Nicaragua. In 1998, in celebration of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, several 
United Nations agencies launched a campaign to stop violence against women in the Caribbean 
and Latin America.33 This resulted in the 1998 UNDP Report on Violence against Women.34 An 
analysis of gender-based violence in Nicaragua formed part of this report, providing a series of 
relevant statistics.35 Based upon these findings, three subsequent high-profile reports were 
undertaken, which form part of this analysis, namely, the 2000 Candies in Hell Report;36 the 
2001 OMCT CEDAW Shadow Report;37 and, the 2002 RHR Nicaragua Report.38 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fourth Periodic 
Report of State Parties, Nicaragua [hereinafter Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report] and Fifth Periodic Report of 
Nicaragua: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Distr.: General CEDAW/C/Nic/5 9 
September 1999 English Original: Spanish, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 18 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fifth Periodic Report of State 
Parties, Nicaragua [hereinafter Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report]. 
33 See UNIFEM-UNDP-UNFPA-UNICEF-UNAIDS-UNHCR-UNHCHR-ECLAC, A Life Free of Violence: It’s 
Our Right, United Nations Inter-Agency Campaign on Women’s Human Rights in Latin America and the 




36 Candies in Hell, supra notex, at 1595-1610. The Candies in Hell report provides sophisticated insight into 
domestic violence in Nicaragua. In collaboration with Sweden, the study combined the narrative of two survivors of 
domestic violence and used them to interpret the statistical data gathered in a manner similar to that of the Swedish 
report on domestic violence. The study was conducted in the municipality of León because, as it “shares general 
characteristics with the rest of the Pacific Coast of Nicaragua, in which the majority of the Nicaraguan population is 
located, it is likely that data are representative of at least the Pacific Coast region.” Id at 1595 and 1607. The 
location of the research, the substance of the questions and the formation of the sample population are indicators of a 
high standard of research ethic. The survey comprised 488 women between the ages of 15 and 49. In addition, “[i]n-
depth interviews with formerly battered women were performed and narratives from these interviews were analyzed 
and compared with the survey data.” Id. at 1595. This type of collaborative effort, together with the detailed 
methodological approach, confirms the reliability of the information and demonstrates an attempt to meet 
respectable standards of accountability and accuracy. In compiling the report, 488 women were interviewed and 360 
of the interviewees had been married or had cohabited with a man at some point (either before or during the 
currency of the interview). Among women who had been married, 188 or “52% reported having experienced 
physical partner abuse at some point in their lives. Median duration of abuse was five years. A considerable overlap 
was found between physical, emotional and sexual violence, with 21% of ever-married women reporting all three 
kinds of abuse. Thirty-one percent of abused women suffered severe physical violence during pregnancy. The 
latency period between the initiation or marriage or cohabitation and violence was short, with over 50% of the 
battered women reporting that the first act of violence took place within the first 2 years of marriage.” Twenty per 
cent of the ever-married women reported “experiencing severe violence during the previous 12 months.”  
37 OMCT World Organization against Torture, Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women by Nicaragua, 2001, researched and written by Luisa Pérez-Landa, supervised and 
edited by Carin Benninger, submitted to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
twenty-fifth session, 2-20 July 2001, available at http://www.omct.org/pdf/vaw/NicaraguaEng2001.pdf [hereinafter 
OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua]. 
38 Reproductive Health Response in Conflict Consortium, Post-Conflict Situation in Nicaragua, A Desk Study 
Overview, Melinda Leonard, available at http://www.rhrc.org/pdf/nicaragua.pdf, in If Not Now, When? Addressing 
Gender-based Violence in Refugee, Internally Displaced, and Post-Conflict Settings A Global Overview, 117 120-
121 (Jeanne Ward, ed.) 2002 [hereinafter RHR Nicaragua Report]. 
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The following reports are discussed in the analysis of Sweden’s laws vis-à-vis domestic 
violence: the 1984 CEDAW Report;39 the 1993 CEDAW Report,40 the 2000 CEDAW Report;41 
the 2002 Captured Queen Report,42 and the 2004 Amnesty International Report on Intimate 
Violence in Sweden.43 
 
In analyzing the development of Mexico’s approach regarding violence against women, I 
considered three reports made by the government of Mexico to the CEDAW committee in 1984, 
1998 and 2002.44 I augmented this information with reference to two shadow reports in 1997 and 
2002, and a report to the Organization of American States regarding the violence against women 
in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua in 2002.45 These documents reveal that prior to 1994 there is no 
evidence of a specific policy or legislation to protect women from gender-based violence. After 
1994, however, violence against women begins to appear on the agenda of Mexico as a 
component of achieving gender equality. Towards the end of the 1990s, it appears that Mexico 
improved its domestic violence laws but at the same time there is an increase, either in the 
reporting or in the actual rate of violence against women. 
 
                                                
39 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Volume I (second session) Official 
Records: Thirty-Ninth Session Supplement No. 45 (A/39/45) June 27 1984 at page 31-36, paragraphs 200-245 
[hereinafter 1984 CEDAW report]. 
40 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations: Sweden 
(1993), paragraphs 474 – 522, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cedaw/sweden1993.html, provided by 
the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library [hereinafter CEDAW Concluding Observations: Sweden]. 
41 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Distr.: General, 18 December 2000, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties, Sweden, at 32, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N00/802/05/IMG/N0080205.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Fifth 
Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW]. 
42 Captured Queen Report, supra notex (describing the results of a study involving 7,000 respondents who answered 
an extensive questionnaire sent to a random sample of 10,000 women from the general population in Sweden, 
between the ages of 18 and 64. The study, conducted between October 1999 and January 2000, examined women’s 
experiences of physical violence, sexual violence, threats of violence, controlling behavior and sexual harassment). 
See also Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra notex. 
43 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra notex, at 25. 
44 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at page 12-15, paragraphs 67-89; Report of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions, General Assembly Official Records: Fifty-
Third Session Supplement No. 38 (A/53/38/Rev.1) 14 May 1998, paragraphs 354-427, pages 32-36 [hereinafter the 
1998 CEDAW report]; Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Twenty-
Sixth Session (14 January – 1 February 2002) Twenty-Seventh Session (3 – 21 June 2002) Exceptional Session (5 – 
23 August 2002), General Assembly Official Records: Fifty-Seventh Session Supplement No. 38 (A/57/38/Rev.1) 6 
August 2002, pages 205-212, paragraphs 410-435 [hereinafter the 2002 CEDAW report]. 
45 Center for Reproductive Rights (formerly the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy), Women’s Reproductive 
Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, 1997, available athttp://www.crlp.org/pdf/sr_mex_1297_eng.pdf [hereinafter, 
Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report]; Letter from the Center for Reproductive Rights 
(formerly the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy) to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), June 19, 2002, entitled, Supplementary Information on Mexico Scheduled for Review 
by CEDAW in August, 2002, available at http://www.crlp.org/pdf/sl_mexico_eng_2002.pdf; and, Report to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights OAS, The Situation Of The Rights Of Women In Ciudad Juárez, 
Mexico: The Right To Be Free From Violence And Discrimination, Organization of American States 
EA/Ser.L/V/II.117 Doc. 44 7 March 2003 Original:  Spanish, available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/chap.vi.juarez.htm [hereinafter OAS Report on the Situation of Women 
in Ciudad Juárez]. 
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On this basis, I concluded that the internationalization of violence against women was 
followed by an improvement in each of the Mexican, Nicaraguan and Sweden government’s 
approach towards systemic intimate violence and by an increase in the exposure of violence 
against women in those countries. 
 
6.3 Feminist Theory and Domestic Violence 
 
In the analysis of domestic violence, I take into account the concerns expressed by feminist 
theorists that the study of violence against women can perpetuate the perception of women as 
victims, weak and dependent.46 I engage certain issues in the feminist theory debate regarding 
violence, victimization and the broad objective of improving lives of women. My objective is to 
contribute to the process in international law, whereby “women are brought within the purview 
of humanity” for purposes of creating a legal order.47 
 
I do not insist that domestic violence is more or less serious than reproductive rights, 
employment equity or other manifestations of gender inequality. I propose only that, as one of 
the many issues facing women, systemic intimate violence persists and requires attention, as one 
of the primary causes of injury to women.48 
 
                                                
46 See Karina Michael Waller, Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and International Law: How the Rise of Intrastate Ethnic 
Conflicts has Rendered International Human Rights Laws Ineffective, Especially Regarding Sex-Based Crimes, 9 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 621 (2001). This debate also arose in the context of the ICTY’s criminalization 
of mass rape under international criminal law. See James R. Mchenry III, The Prosecution of Rape under 
International Law: Justice That Is Long Overdue, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. 1269 (2002) [hereinafter Mchenry, The 
Prosecution of Rape under International Law] (describing the work of the ICTY “fully codified women as legally 
equal to men in the human community, but it did not unfairly single women out as a weaker gender in need of 
special protections, nor did it establish a victimology for women in rape cases.”). 
47 See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1269 and 1274 (acknowledging 
the argument that describing women as victims may “inappropriately portray women simply as weak and 
defenceless individuals.”). Mchenry argues that the decisions of the tribunals “simply bring women into an equal 
position as men under international law, vis-à-vis their status as innocent civilians… rather than reinforcing tired 
stereotypes about women and their weakness and vulnerability during war, the decisions by the tribunals, especially 
the Kunarac decision by the ICTY, actually make women more fully members of the international community and 
subject to the same prosecutions as men.” Id at 1302. See in general Pamela Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert 
Testimony on the Battered Women’s Syndrome, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 485 (1998); A Renee Callahan, 
Will the ‘Real’ Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In Search of a Realistic Legal Definition of Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 117 (1994).  
48 See Human Rights Watch, Global Report on Women’s Human Rights, § 6, at 
http://www.hrw.org/about/projects/womrep/ [hereinafter GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
notex] (“Domestic or family violence is one of the leading causes of female injuries in almost every country in the 
world and it accounts in some countries for the largest percentage of hospital visits by women.”) See for example the 
Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 15 (describing the structural perspective of violence against women as “an 
expression of male superiority which may manifest itself in actual physical attacks on women, but also in less drastic 
phenomena such as sexual harassment or verbal abuse. On this view, the violence to which men subject women not 
only expresses superiority but also helps to re-create it and to shape men’s and women’s conceptions of what being a 
man or a woman means.”) I extrapolate this conclusion to show how integrated discrimination is. Harm to women 
exists not only in violence but also in the labor force, education and health care. It pervades racial discrimination, 
poverty and politics. Therefore, choosing the one component of violence, specifically domestic violence, is not an 
attempt to delineate domestic violence as a more serious threat to women than any other, but rather it is an attempt 
to tackle one specific manifestation of the broader reality of gender discrimination. 
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I focus on women who suffer domestic violence, and are unable to escape it, as a result of 
gender-based differentiation.49 I refer to the abuser as male and the victim female.50 While 
children, the elderly and men suffer from such harm, I have not included them within this 
analysis of systemic intimate violence because it is the coalescence of violence and 
discrimination that occupies this thesis.51 I seek to explain the absence of effective legislation 
against domestic violence with reference to sex and gender discrimination, highlighting “the role 
gender plays in the etiology of domestic violence.”52 As such, I acknowledge, but do not focus 
on, the numerous other groups that suffer similar forms of abuse, such as the disabled, the elderly 
                                                
49 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 25 (2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER] 
(“That women are sometimes violent in intimate relationships does not diminish the importance of discerning the 
role gender plays . . . [when considering the make-up of domestic violence].”). 
50 See Jennifer M. Mason, Note, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic Violence: A Proposal for Implementing an 
Exception to Welfare Time Limits, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 621 (1998) [hereinafter Mason, Buying Time for 
Survivors of Domestic Violence] (using feminine pronouns to refer to survivors of domestic violence in recognition 
of the high incidents of violence against women). See also Kristin A. Kelly, Domestic Violence and the Politics of 
Privacy, CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2003, footnote 1 at 165 (describing her decision to use the feminine pronoun 
to refer to victims and the masculine to designate perpetrators as “based on two factors. First, although it is true that 
women are sometimes the perpetrators of violence in the home, in both heterosexual and homosexual relationships, 
it remains the case that the vast majority of individuals who are seriously injured or killed by domestic violence are 
female. Second, the perpetration of domestic violence by men against women involves patterns of domination that 
are directly tied to the victim’s gendered status”). Consider HARVEY WALLACE, FAMILY VIOLENCE LEGAL, 
MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 180 (Pearson Education, Inc., 2005) [hereinafter WALLACE, FAMILY 
VIOLENCE] (indicating that women have fewer capabilities to escape than men. Wallace acknowledges that family 
violence against men exists, probably more than is imagined, however, he explains that he uses the female to denote 
the victim because “the abuse visited on women is more severe and long-lasting than the type of abuse men suffer. 
Additionally, research has shown that men have far greater opportunities to leave the abusive situation than 
women.”). See Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1993) [hereinafter Harvard Law Review, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence] (noting that 
the gendered dyad does not “reflect a particular bias; rather, it simply reflects the statistical reality of domestic 
violence.”). Id. This assumption is based on studies which “indicate that women are more than ten times as likely as 
men to be the victims of domestic violence.” Id. In reality, the discrepancy may be narrower as the reporting of 
domestic violence by men is undermined by the overwhelming humiliation associated with the social stigma of male 
weakness. 
51 See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: HANDLING THEM EFFECTIVELY, supra notex, at 5–6.  While the plight of 
children who suffer indescribable harm remains a reality, its recognition in international law has been achieved and 
as such the discussion falls outside the purview of this article. There is no doubt that domestic violence includes 
violence by women against men. The statistics most likely are underreported, perhaps even more so than those of 
violence against women, since the stigma of assault by women on men is certainly charged and will dissuade 
reporting to the police. For a discussion of the way in which male-on-female violence differs from female-on-male 
violence, see Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra notex, at 285 (explaining that statistics obtained in general 
national surveys differ dramatically from those obtained from shelter populations. Johnson maintains that the 
distinction lies in the fact that “the two information sources deal with nearly nonoverlapping phenomena. The 
common couple violence that is assessed by the large-scale random survey methodology is in fact gender balanced, 
and is a product of a violence-prone culture and the privatized setting of most U.S. households. The patriarchal 
terrorism that is tapped in research with the families encountered by public agencies is a pattern perpetrated almost 
exclusively by men, and rooted deeply in the patriarchal tradition of the Western family.”). This leads to the 
inescapable and alarming conclusion that “[d]omestic violence is not gender-neutral.” Rhonda Copelon, Intimate 
Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 116, 120 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) [hereinafter  
Copelon, Intimate Terror]. 
52 Id. 
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and non-human animals.53 While I emphasize the mooring of domestic violence in “its historical 
roots of gender subordination and feminist activism,” I do not dismiss or trivialize other forms of 
violence.54 They simply fall outside the narrow purview of this thesis. 
 
A common question is whether the term ‘victim’ or ‘survivor’ should be used when referring 
to a woman who suffers abuse.55 The concern is that the word ‘victim’ connotes a pernicious 
perception of weakness and vulnerability, which perpetuates the subjugated status of women.56 
On the other hand, the word ‘survivor’ is problematic in its implied commentary on those women 
who either kill or are killed as a result of their abuse, who leave their abusive partners, or who 
otherwise escape their abuse.57 Using this term risks implying that women who do not escape 
their abuse are failures, weak or in some way they consented to the abuse.  
 
In reality a woman who does not flee and ‘survive’ is no weaker than the one who does.58 
Therefore, while neither term is ideal, I choose to refer to women in domestic violence situations 
as victims and to the process of harm as victimization on the basis that this terminology is less 
judgmental.  In no way is the term ‘victim’ used to suggest inferiority or weakness.59 Where 
necessary, I refer to ‘survivors’ of domestic violence to denote that the cycle of violence is over. 
                                                
53 Id. at 70–71 (noting that elder abuse is “vastly underreported”). For a discussion of elderly abuse worldwide see 
World Report on Violence and Health, supra notex, at 125-145. 
54 Id. at 28.  Some academics have denounced this connection, arguing that “[o]ne should not assume that a special 
explanation is required when men hit women.  The study of violence against women belongs under the study of 
violence, not gender.” RICHARD B. FELSON, VIOLENCE & GENDER REEXAMINED 4 (2002) [hereinafter FELSON, 
VIOLENCE & GENDER REEXAMINED].  I hope to demonstrate that indeed there is a special component to violence 
against women that distinguishes it from non-gender-based violence.  In making this distinction, however, I do not 
attempt to minimize the cruelty of other forms of social violence.  My purpose simply is to focus on the violence 
that affects women because of their gender and why the laws of their countries fail adequately to protect them. 
55 Compare Mason, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic Violence, supra notex, at 622 (using the term ‘survivor’ 
instead of ‘victim’ in reference to “both . . . women who are currently being abused and who have been abused in 
the past”), with U.N. CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN IN THE FAMILY at 14, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHA/2, U.N. Sales No. E.89.IV.5 (1989) [hereinafter U.N., 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY] (using the term “victim” as a contrast to the concept of an “assailant”). 
The label designated to people who experience intimate violence can have a number of repercussions. See, for 
example, Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 18 (providing reasons why some women may not report their 
abuse due to “a strong inner resistance against identifying themselves as ‘battered women’ and regarding their 
husbands/partners as ‘abusers’”). 
56 Cf. SCHNEIDER, supra notex, at 60–62 (grappling with the use of the phrase “battered woman” to describe a 
survivor of domestic violence); see FELSON, VIOLENCE & GENDER REEXAMINED, supra notex, at 136, 190 (allowing 
that in the case of rape, a trend has developed which labels women “‘rape survivor[s],’” thus obviating a sense of 
passivity which necessarily accompanies the term “‘victim’”). 
57 Lenora Ledwon, Diaries and Hearsay: Gender, Selfhood, and the Trustworthiness of Narrative Structure, 73 
TEMP. L. REV. 1185, 1188–89 & n.23 (2000) (opting for use of the term “‘victim’” rather than “‘survivor’” in a study 
dealing, in part, with the use of battered women’s diaries in court and explaining that this is because “many of the 
women involved in these cases do not, in fact, survive”). 
58 If any significant inroad is to be made into the occurrence of systemic intimate violence, it is necessary to avoid 
superimposing guilt onto or deflecting responsibility towards the innocent. 
59 A victim is defined as, “a person subjected to oppression, deprivation, or suffering.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2550 (1993).  The term victim also describes, “[a] person or thing destroyed or 
sacrificed in the pursuit of an object, or in gratification of a passion.” Dictionary.com, at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=victim (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).  To victimize is “to treat someone in an 
intentionally unfair way.”  Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Definition, Victim, at 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=88208&dict=CALD&desc=victim (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
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There also is an important debate regarding the use of the label ‘battered woman.’ The so-
called battered women’s movement brought domestic violence into the legal spotlight, focusing 
on the extremity of the harm that occurs within a private (and ostensibly safe) context. However, 
the term ‘battered woman’ has been criticized since many women who endure violence at the 
hands of their intimate partners, do not perceive themselves as ‘battered.’60 The connotation of 
‘battery’ implies a repeated physical act of extreme aggression, and does not lend itself to 
experiences of non-physical terror, abuse and rape. As a result, many abused women who need 
protection may not consider themselves ‘battered’ and therefore do not pursue legal assistance. I 
avoid using the term ‘battered women’ for these reasons.61 
 
7. Final Introductory Comments 
 
Worldwide, one in three women has been beaten, coerced into unwanted sexual relations, 
or abused—often by a family member or acquaintance.  
 
At the start of the 21st century, violence kills and harms as many women and girls 
between the ages of 15 and 44 as cancer.  
 
The costs to countries—in increased health care expenditures, demands on courts, police 
and schools and losses in educational achievement and productivity—are enormous.  
 
In the United States, the figure adds up to some $12.6 billion each year. 62 
 
United Nations Population Fund 
 
This thesis is not an attempt to change human nature. I do not maintain that an amendment of 
laws, policies or government will change the fact of domestic violence. Rather, it is an attempt to 
change the way our communities and states respond to the predicament in which so many 
women find themselves. State institutions cannot stay the blow of a violent fist. However, once 
charged with the knowledge of such violence, they can provide an effective response, a place for 
recuperation, the facilities for rehabilitation and an expression of remorse and condemnation of 
such violence. Such measures would radically change the experience of the victim, limiting her 
pain to the period of the violence and not a moment beyond. To that end, this thesis attempts to 
lay the foundation and analysis for how international law can, and should, be used to place 
greater pressure on states to help remedy systemic intimate violence. 
                                                
60 [Note: Martha Minow]  
61 See Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra notex, at 284 (indicating that the “terminology of the battered wife is 
also objectionable on the grounds that it shifts the focus to the victim, seeming to imply that the pattern in question 
adheres to the woman rather than the man who is in fact behaviorally and morally responsible for the syndrome.” 
The importance of terminology is evident also from the debate about the label ‘female genital mutilation.’ See 
Kirsten Bowman, Comment: Bridging the Gap in the Hopes of Ending Female Genital Cutting, 3 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L. 132 [page 5] (2005) (“The term was coined by a community that wanted to ensure their ability to convey both 
the true physical consequences of the procedure and that it not be associated with male circumcision… However, in 
perpetuating the use of this term western feminists have failed to recognize the shame and hurt they place on the 
communities that practice the procedure.”). 












“The twentieth century will be remembered as a century marked by violence. It burdens 
us with its legacy of mass destruction, of violence inflicted on a scale never seen and 
never possible before in human history…  
 
Less visible, but even more widespread, is the legacy of day-to-day, individual suffering. 
It is the pain of children who are abused by people who should protect them, women 
injured or humiliated by violent partners… This suffering… is a legacy that reproduces 
itself, as new generations learn from the violence of generations past, as victims learn 
from victimizers, and as the social conditions that nurture violence are allowed to 
continue. No country, no city, no community is immune. 
 






Part A: Introductory Comments 
 
 
1. Description of this Chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the current international law on domestic violence. 
This chapter begins with a summary of the claim I make in this thesis as a whole that the current 
state of international law vis-à-vis domestic violence is adequate and requires reform. I describe 
the history of women’s rights in international law, chronicling the development of violence 
against women. I then narrow the focus of the discussion to the current law on domestic 
violence.64 I describe the primary sources (i.e. regional and international treaties), secondary 
                                                
63 Nelson Mandela, Foreword to World Report on Violence and Health, Summary, World Health Organization 
Geneva. 
64 For the purposes of determining the history and status of domestic violence in international law, I consider various 
United Nations documents, including: treaties; resolutions; decisions; and, other U.N. official records. In 
international law, U.N. documents may constitute the equivalent of legislation in national legal systems. For a 
general discussion of such documents, their authoritative weight and importance see 
http://www.lib.msu.edu/foxre/unres.html. Treaties are the most authoritative instruments in international law, as they 
document the express consent of nations. See section 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute] and the discussion in chapter four in this regard. Resolutions and decisions are part of the 
official records of the U.N. which “constitute the primary documents submitted to or issued by the main U.N. bodies 
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sources (i.e. declarations, U.N. reports and resolutions), and academic authority, which take the 
view that domestic violence is an international human rights violation. I then discuss the legal 
status of these institutions, summarize the content that is applicable to systemic intimate 
violence, and provide an appraisal of their efficacy and/or shortcomings.  
 
2. The Claim 
 
There is evidence in international law of a prohibition against domestic violence. However, 
the existing international law addressing domestic violence is vague and amorphous, subject to 
dispute, and requires development. This is so primarily for three reasons.  
 
First, there is no specific and independent international prohibition against systemic intimate 
violence. Most of the support for a prohibition on violence against women exists in so-called 
customary international law (“CIL”). The debate regarding the content, rules and very legitimacy 
of CIL is extensive.65 Therefore, CIL, as the sole authority for a norm against systemic intimate 
violence, is neither authoritative nor without contention.  
 
Where “strong” CIL exists, violence against women is merged with general principles 
relating to equality. In the last two decades, the high rates of violence against women globally 
have appeared on international human rights agendas. Based on three decades of testimony, fact 
finding, lobbying and law making, the former Special Rapportuer on Violence against Women, 
the United Nations Secretary-General and several others have referred to domestic violence as a 
human rights violation.66 However, these statements are made in relation to other international 
law themes, usually discrimination against women as a whole. Whereas mass rape and 
trafficking, for example, have been recognized as independent categories of human rights 
violations, systemic intimate violence usually is raised as an example of the broader category of 
                                                                                                                                                       
at a given session or year.  They usually consist of 3 parts:  meeting or plenary records; supplements which contain 
resolutions and decisions, and reports of major U.N. bodies, committees and commissions as well as the budget and 
financial reports; and annexes, reprints of related or other important documents. (Official Records may also be 
issued by other U.N. agencies or conferences).” Resolutions are “are formal expressions of the opinion or will of 
U.N. bodies. They consist of two clearly defined parts, a preamble and an operative part.  The preamble generally 
recites the considerations on the basis of which action is taken, an opinion expressed or a directive given. The 
operative part states the opinion of the organ or the action to be taken.  These opinions can often be useful when 
doing the equivalent of a legislative history.” See http://www.lib.msu.edu/foxre/unres.html. Decisions “are formal 
actions, other than resolutions, dealing with non-substantive or routine matters such as elections, appointments, the 
time and place of meetings and the taking note of reports.  They are sometimes also used to record the adoption of a 
text representing the consensus of members of a given organ on a question.” See 
http://www.lib.msu.edu/foxre/unres.html. “The General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social 
Council, and the Secretariat are usually considered the major bodies of the UN... The International Court of Justice 
is also considered a main body…” See http://www.lib.msu.edu/foxre/unres.html. Subsidiary U.N. bodies include the 
International Law Commission, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, which are subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly, “and their reports, including 
decisions or resolutions adopted, are issued as Supplements to the Official Records of the General Assembly. See 
http://www.lib.msu.edu/foxre/unres.html.  
65 For a discussion of the deficiencies in CIL see Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000). I 
develop this discussion in chapter four below. 
66 Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, Declaration 1994/45, adopted on 4 March 1994 [ hereinafter the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women]. 
 35 
gender discrimination. While systemic intimate violence certainly is a form of inequality and 
gender-based violence, this thesis proposes that treating such violence solely as part of this 
general catch-all category is insufficient, and that systemic intimate violence requires 
independent and specific approbation to avoid the creation of laws that “suffer from ‘radical 
indeterminacy, ethnocentrism or patriarchy.”67 
 
Second, domestic violence, as it is currently understood, occupies a very narrow place in 
international law. Although violence against women is on the international agenda, only recently 
has the topic started to permeate political, health and economic discussions.68 Articulating a right 
against domestic violence will not end such violence, without a corresponding redistribution of 
power and a review of power structures, both within and outside familial institutions.69 This 
approach, therefore, in order to be meaningful, requires the attention of mainstream international 
and national bodies. 
 
Finally, the precise nature of systemic intimate violence, the international obligation of states 
to prevent it, and the jurisprudential principles underlying it are under-theorized. The current 
legal rationale substantiating these issues is piecemeal, and existing recommendations to states to 
ameliorate domestic violence are uniformly repetitive and usually too broad to be of much use. 
This thesis therefore proposes that international legal jurisprudence requires a comprehensive 
discussion of the elements of systemic intimate violence which internationalize such violence; 
the steps states must take to stop it; whether it is theoretically possible to use international law to 
remedy such an intrinsically personal harm; and, finally, whether it is at all beneficial to turn to 
international law as a solution. 
 
These practical, policy and academic deficiencies need to be remedied. This thesis provides a 
few tentative suggestions with the hope that this discussion will broaden and manifest into 
effective changes. First, an independent and specific prohibition against systemic intimate 
violence must be adopted and developed in international law. Second, the ramifications of 
systemic intimate violence must be incorporated into the political, economic and health-related 
components of international dialogues.70 Finally, the right to be free from such violence requires 
greater theoretical substantiation, and the corresponding duty of states to help remedy such 
violence requires more meaningful and practical direction. These thoughts are discussed further 
in chapter two. 
                                                
67 Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of CIL, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 46 (1998) (citing John 
Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 85 (1996) ). 
68 For a discussion of the criticisms of the rights discourse see Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra 
notex, at 635 (describing the various criticisms of emphasizing rights of individuals in a system of competing rights 
and the potential to marginalize women’s rights). See also VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE HEALTH SECTOR 
RESPONDS, supra notex, at 2-3 (describing the importance of integrating health with other sectors to end gender-
based violence, including domestic violence). 
69 For example, the right to development only recently focuses on the needs of women. When the right was 
originally formulated the “subordination of women did not enter the traditional calculus” of determining the causes 
of underdevelopment and the contribution of women to the informal economy has been analyzed only in the last 
decade. See Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra notex, at 639-641. 
70 See Violence against Women: The Health Sector Responds, supra notex, at 7 (“…intervention by health providers 




In order to analyze the development of international law and women’s rights, however, it is 
necessary to understand the different authoritative weight given to the various sources of 
international law.  
 
3. Sources of International Law 
 
This section discusses the following questions regarding the sources of international law. In 
light of the fact that the world community has no parliament or legislature, how do rules of 
international law come about?71 And specifically, how do we determine if a rule prohibiting 
systemic intimate violence exists in international law? 
 
There are four generally accepted sources of international law: treaties; CIL; the general 
principles of law as recognized by civilized nations; and, legal jurisprudence, which 
encompasses judgments of international tribunals, jurisprudence of nations, and the teachings of 
respected academics. These are codified as sources of international law in the statute of the 
International Court of Justice.72 
 
The first, and most authoritative, is the law that is made by international conventions. 
International conventions, otherwise known as treaties, are the culmination of an agreement 
between two or more nations.73 The agreement to behave in a specific manner becomes a law 
that is binding on the consenting parties. There are several types of treaties: bi-partite treaties 
between two nations; regional treaties between several nations in a geographic area; pacts 
between nations with similar interests or requirements; and, international treaties between a 
multitude of states.  
 
International treaties are the most authoritative sources of international law because they 
establish rules by the express agreement of the contracting parties. States expressly accede to the 
principles contained in the treaty, thereby making a commitment to fulfill specific legal 
obligations. These treaties are not automatically binding on states which do not sign them unless 
                                                
71 See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1994) (indicating that neither “the United Nations 
nor any of its specialized agencies was conceived as a legislative body.” He points out, however, that U.N. bodies 
“act like legislatures by adopting lawmaking treaties and declarations of law.”). 
72 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, supra note 10, provides that the court shall use the following sources of international 
law: “a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.” See also the description of law to be applied by the International Criminal Court in terms of article 21(1) of the 
Rome Statute, which includes first the Rome Statute itself, second, where applicable “treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict and third, as 
a last resort, general principles of law derived from national legal systems.” Rome Statute, supra note 9. 
73 See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (1994) (describing the origin and development of 
“norm-creating” treaties in the U.N. system). 
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the provisions of the treaty already are, or become, rules of CIL (a phenomenon which I discuss 
further below).74  
 
The second source of international law is CIL, which involves the process by which certain 
norms become international law by virtue of states acting customarily in accordance with those 
norms. There is much debate surrounding this source of law. In light of the fact that most of the 
analysis of systemic intimate violence falls within the scope of CIL, the nature of CIL and its 
complexities, are discussed under a separate heading below. 
 
The third source of international law is the general principles of law recognized by so-called 
‘civilized’ nations. Apart from the unhappy connotations of “civilized nations” with colonialism 
and racism, this source of law is generally not contentious. Essentially, it is a reference to a 
collection of norms that underpin many legal systems.  
 
Finally, judgments of international tribunals, scholarly works and the jurisprudence of other 
nations have been used as interpretive or guiding sources of international law.  
 
Throughout this thesis I refer to all four sources of international law to substantiate my claim 
that there is evidence of a norm against systemic intimate violence in international law, which 
requires development. However, in light of the fact that there is no treaty governing systemic 
intimate violence per se, it is necessary to consider other sources of international law to 
determine its status in international law. For this reason, I turn to CIL.75  
 
In the following section I provide an examination of the theory of CIL and conclude that, 
slowly developing in CIL is a principle against systemic intimate violence, but that it has not yet 
concretized. A final effort is needed to solidify the CIL status of systemic intimate violence as an 






                                                
74 Some maintain that rules of CIL can emerge by virtue of the treaty negotiation process , even before the treaty is 
signed. See Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of CIL, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44 (1998) citing 
Louis Sohn, “Generally Accepted” International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1986). 
75 It is important to note that there is also a range of rights that exists irrespective of explicit state consent, known as 
jus cogens norms. These norms qualify as international rules by virtue of their content, which is deemed to be so 
fundamental that consent is not a pre-requisite to their binding nature. These rules are known as ‘peremptory norms’ 
or ‘jus cogens” rules. An exception to the requirement of consent is made in the case jus cogens rules on the basis 
that the value in question is so fundamental that it is a precondition to our humanity and, therefore, no derogation 
therefrom is lawful. While there is no authoritative list of peremptory norms, the following are examples of 
generally accepted jus cogens norms, namely, the prohibition against torture, crimes against humanity, slavery, 
genocide and piracy. See also the description of law to be applied by the International Criminal Court in terms of 
article 21(1) of the Rome Statute, which includes first the Rome Statute itself, second, where applicable “treaties and 
the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict and third, as a last resort, general principles of law derived from national legal systems.” Rome Statute, 
supra note 9. I do not claim that systemic intimate violence is a violation of a jus cogens norm and, therefore, I focus 
exclusively on CIL.  
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CIL has been described as “international custom” which is “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.”76 In order for a practice to amount to a rule of customary international law 
there must be uniform and constant usage of the practice, which is recognized by countries as a 
rule of international law (opinio juris sive necessitates, hereinafter referred to as “opinio 
juris”).77 An example of CIL is the principle that warring states will not capture the trading ships 
of the enemy state.78  
 
For the most part, CIL is ambiguous since it lacks the clarity and express consensus of 
binding treaties and relies instead on “widespread state practice and opinio juris – a sense of 
legal obligation.”79 Moreover, CIL is voluntary and it is generally accepted that it can develop 
absent “express, universal consent.”80 At the same time, states are endowed with the ability to 
dissent from a rule of CIL. This is known as the principle of the “persistent objector” and 
provides that if a state has objected persistently to a rule of CIL during the course of the rule’s 
emergence such state is not bound by this rule. The dissent does not negate the legality of the 
rule vis-à-vis other states. It simply does not bind the objecting state.81 Therefore, a balance must 
be struck because, while individual consent is not required, states are allowed to express their 
rejection of a principle of CIL through the process of a ‘consistent objection.’ This has been 
described as “a delicate, indeed precarious, equilibrium between opposite concerns: on the one 
hand, to permit customary rules to emerge without demanding the individual consent of every 
state; on the other hand, to permit individual states to escape being bound by any rule they do not 
recognize as such.”82 
 
                                                
76 Article 38(b) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 10. 
77 Article 38(b) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 10, provides that the court shall use “international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law.”  See also Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) [hereinafter Paquete Habana] 
emphasizes that the conclusion of treaties and the adoption of certain practices by states are evidence of the 
existence of a customary international law. 
78 See Paquete Habana, supra note 488.  
79 Andrew Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory of International Law, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLITICS, 58, 70 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005) (Foundation Press, New York) 
[hereinafter Guzman]. Guzman suggests a new interpretation of customary international law as consisting of “legal 
norms whose violation will harm a country’s reputation as a law-abiding state.” Id., 70-71. The obligatory nature of 
a rule of customary international law is a subject element. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 319 (1995/1996) 
[hereinafter Hannum]. See also W. Michael Reisman, Jonathan I. Charney: An Appreciation, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 23, 23 (2003) (referring to the mental element of opinio juris sive necessitates, Reisman warns 
against the confusion of Latin phrases as the attempt by lawyers “to conceal their confusion behind a solemn and 
pretentious Latin phrase.”). 
80 Slama, supra notex, at 626, citing Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent 
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 469 (1985).  
81 There is also a wealth of debate regarding acquiescence to rules of CIL and whether that constitutes consent or 
non-dissent, as the case ma y be. See Slama, supra notex, at 627-8. 
82 Slama, supra notex, at 626, citing Weil, Towards Relative Normativity In International Law?, 77 AM.J. INT’L L. 
413, 433-34 (1981). 
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Given the high degree of violence against women condoned by states, and the persistent 
reluctance of states to intervene to mitigate such violence, it is difficult to assert either that states 
act consistently to prevent systemic intimate violence, or that they believe they have a customary 
legal obligation to do so. Therefore, the existence, or not, of a rule against systemic intimate 
violence in CIL, depends on one’s interpretation of CIL.83 
 
4.2 Two Elements of CIL 
 
CIL is said to consist of two elements: (1) the conduct element which is the consistent 
practice of states; and, (2) the mental element, known as opinio juris, which is the state’s belief 
that what it is doing is obligatory.84 Therefore, certain norms become international law if states 
consistently behave with the understanding that they are under a legal obligation to act 
accordingly.85  
 
The elements of CIL raises a number of questions: how many states must practice a rule in 
order for it to become law; the inverse of this is applicable too; that is, it is unclear how many 
states are required to show that there is not a principle of CIL; how does one determine the 
presence or absence of opinio juris; what if states agree that a rule is law but fail to comply with 
its requirements; is there a difference between what states say and what they do as far as 
evidencing CIL and which is weightier, custom or opinio juris; is it appropriate to use CIL to 
determine human rights law, especially given the circularity of the elements of CIL when 
determining whether new law has been created; and, how in fact do we recognize the principles 
of CIL?  
 
4.3 Identifying the Rules of CIL 
 
There is no accepted process of identifying CIL. However, there are many theories as to what 
constitutes CIL.86 These can be divided into traditional theories and principles of ‘new CIL.’ 
                                                
83 This is so because CIL consists of two elements, namely (1) the practice of states and (2) the subjective opinion or 
belief of states that they are obliged to comply with the norm in question. Usually, this is determined by looking at 
the general and consistent practice of states. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 (2000). 
84 See Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986) (“It is universally 
agreed that ‘usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law’ constitute one of the main sources of 
international law.’… Ordinarily, a rule is considered generally accepted when it is supported by constant practice of 
states acting on the conviction that the practice is obligatory.”). 
85 Within these norms, there are certain legal rules or peremptory norms, which have been identified as binding on 
all nations, irrespective of whether or not a state has consented thereto. I do not discuss this as it is unlikely at this 
stage that one can argue that non-violence against women is such a peremptory norm or ‘jus cogens’ rule. An 
exception to the requirement of consent is made in the case jus cogens rules on the basis that the value in question is 
so fundamental that it is a precondition to our humanity and, therefore, no derogation is lawful. While there is no 
authoritative list of peremptory norms, examples of generally accepted jus cogens norms are the prohibition against 
torture, crimes against humanity, slavery, genocide and piracy. 
86 See Reisman, D’Amato’s articulation theory: A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
74-87 (1971) (arguing that articulation of compliance with international law is the surest way of determining the 
existence of opinio juris); Weisburd’s theory of opinio juris as evidenced by sanctions, Weisburd, CIL: The Problem 
of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 10 (1988) (arguing that opinio juris exists when a state acknowledges 
that an opposing state has a right to question its conduct and a duty to repair its breach. The focus, therefore, is on 
the state’s belief regarding the consequences which ought to follow a breach of an international rule); Cheng’s 
theory of “instant custom,” Chen, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “instant” International Customary 
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Traditional theories examine the balance between custom and opinio juris. There are three 
dominant views on this issue.  
 
The first view is that opinio juris is the primary or only relevant element. Some view custom 
as “merely the immediate and spontaneous revelation of the common popular sentiment.”87 
According to this view, custom can exist by virtue of the psychological element alone. In 1965, 
Bin Cheng argued that if opinio juris can be established conclusively, there is no need for “usage 
at all in the sense of repeated practice.”88 This became known as “instant custom,” a term which 
contradicts the intuitive temporal component of CIL and the sense that it develops over a long 
period of time. 
 
The second view articulates the opposite, prioritizing custom over opinio juris. On the other 
extreme, some maintain that the belief that a custom is legal in nature is not necessary and that 
usage is the sole element of CIL.89 In opposition to instant custom, therefore, these theorists 
argue that usage is the most important, or indeed the only, element in the formation of custom.90  
 
The third view is a medium of the two, requiring a combination of both the mental and 
physical elements. This view is attributed to Gény’s theory that opinio juris, the psychological 
element, is necessary to determine whether a usage is motivated by a legal or social reason.91 The 
combination of the two elements is evident in an investigation by the International Law 
Commission, which revealed that there are five elements to CIL:  
 
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation falling 
within the domain of international relations; (b) continuation or repetition of the practice over 
a considerable period of time; (c) a conception that the practice is required by, or consistent 
with, prevailing international law; (d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States … 
                                                                                                                                                       
Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23, 46-47 (1965) (arguing that a rule of CIL may be developed instantly by the 
articulation of the belief that a particular norm constitutes CIL); and, Goldsmith’s and Posner’s positive theoretical 
account of CIL, Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of CIL, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) and Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on CIL, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 191 (2001) (arguing that “CIL emerges 
from nations’ pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage.”) Id at 191. This is countered by the 
traditionalist defense of Detlev F. Vagts, International Relations Looks at CIL” A Traditionalist’s Defence, 15 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 1031(2004). For a description of the status quo of the theory on CIL see Jo Lynn Slama [note], Opinio 
Juris in Customary International Law, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603 (1990) [hereinafter Slama]. See also Louis B. 
Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986) (noting that “the methods of 
developing new rules of CIL have greatly changed since the Second World War. These changes have not been 
imposed on states by any external authority; they are the result of a voluntary acceptance by states of the need to 
adapt the methods of law creation to the needs of the rapidly growing and changing world community.”).  
87 Slama, supra notex, at 613 (citing Puchta and Savigny in describing the historical evolution of the principle of 
opinio juris in CIL). She also cites A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1971). 
88 Slama, supra notex, at 615. 
89 Slama, supra notex, at 614. 
90 Slama, supra notex, at 615-616. She cites Kelsen, Principles of International Law 450-51 (R. Tucker ed. 1966). 
91 Slama, supra notex, at 614 (1990) (describing the development of opinio juris in CIL). 
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[and the establishment of] the presence of each of these elements … by a competent 
international authority.92  
 
A further description proposes a four part test for CIL: “(1) state practice – the ‘quantitative’ 
element; (2) opinio juris – the ‘psychological’ element; (3) the norm must be adhered to by a 
majority of ‘specially affected’ states – the ‘qualitative’ element; and (4) the practice must be 
continued over some period of time – the ‘temporal’ element.”93 
 
Despite the various formulations, it is possible to conclude that the two components of CIL 
are linked inextricably and this combination remains applicable.94 However, there are several 
flaws with this formulation, which need to be taken into account.  
 




First, the psychological element of CIL creates circular reasoning when trying to determine 
the existence of new CIL. Requiring a psychological component begs the question, “[h]ow can 
custom create law if its psychological component requires action in conscious accordance with 
law pre-existing the action.”95 In other words, how do we determine if a rule is new by looking 
retrospectively at states’ practices and asking if they thought they were bound by the rule at the 
time, if the rule in fact did not exist at the time? Such circularity appears to constitute a fatal flaw 
in this approach. Some commentators argue that, for new law to be created, it is not necessary to 
believe one is complying with a legal norm but rather than states perform in a manner because 
they regard their conduct as “obligatory” or “right.”96 Nonetheless, the circularity involved 
renders this examination, at best, vague.97 
 
 
                                                
92 Slama, supra notex, at 616, citing Hudson, Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, 2 Y.B. 
INT’L L. COMM’N 24, 26 (1950). 
93 Slama, supra notex, at 617-618. Slama cites the formula for custom creation summarized by Professor Dennis 
Arrow and based on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and prevailing international law scholars. 
Arrow proposes a four part test. 
94 The third theory has been expressed in various ways. For example, the legality of a custom, according to 
Blackstone, is determined with reference to seven requisite elements namely,[t]he custom must: (1) have been ‘used 
so long, that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary’; (2) be continued without interruption; (3) be peaceably 
acquiesced in; (4) be reasonable; (5) be certain in its terms; (6) be accepted as compulsory; and (7) be consistent 
with other customs.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 75-76, cited by Slama, supra notex, at 610-611. 
95 A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1971) cited by Slama, supra notex, at 621. 
See also Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of CIL, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44 (1998) (“A 
positivist account of customary law locates its normative force in the voluntarism that gave it birth. Thus custom, 
that curious (and circular) amalgam of “state practice” and opinio juris, binds because states have agreed to be 
bound by it”). 
96 Slama, supra notex, at 621 (citing Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 307 (1952)). 
97 The same criticism applies to the formulation of CIL by the International Law Commission. This formulation, 
while combining the mental and physical requirements, does not clarify the circularity confusion, that “if a practice 
must be consistent with prevailing international law in order to be deemed customary law, how does a new rule of 
custom ever emerge? Furthermore, what is acquiescence? How much acquiescence is necessary for it to be deemed 
‘general?’ What ‘other states’ must acquiesce?” Slama, supra notex, at 617. 
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How Many States? 
 
How many states are needed to raise a norm to a principle of CIL? Sohn maintains that 
“[o]ne of the major elements determining the obligatory character of a particular rule of 
customary international law is its generality… ‘what is sought for is a general recognition among 
states of a certain practice as obligatory.’”98 Sohn proposes that two main factors have to be 
taken into account: “first, express acceptance of the rule by a reasonable number of states 
belonging to various regional groups and representing different political, economic and 
ideological approaches; second, acquiescence by other states.”99 
 
A sensible response is that there must be a modicum of generality about the norm evidenced 
by a reasonable number of states from a variety of regions. Complete universality, however, is 
not required and the fact that a few states object to the establishment of a new rule or to a 
revision of an old one does not prevent the birth of the rule.”100  
 
When Does the Persistent Objector Become the Norm? 
 
According to some academics, there is more evidence of “deviations from purported CIL 
norms, and very little ‘general and consistent state practice.”101 If this is the case, at what point 
do the deviations become the norm, requiring a change in the content of the law? For example, if 
all states practice racism and we disregard the mental element, would racism become a principle 
of CIL? This is an obvious nonsense and is addressed by Blackstone’s original requirement that 
there are certain practices that are right (i.e. lawful) and others that are wrong (i.e. unlawful). 
However, while it is clear that the consistent practice of racism (or corruption or arms dealing) is 
not lawful, can we say the same about a norm against systemic intimate violence? This is unclear 
and can be clarified only with reference to a combination of both custom and opinio juris, which 
is the prevailing theory today.102 
 
4.3.2 New Theories 
 
Recently, new theories regarding CIL have developed. This so-called “new” CIL recognizes 
as constituting CIL the rules “from rights and principles proclaimed in international human rights 
instruments that have their basis in the Charter of the UN and other treaties of a universal 
character.”103 These rules may be evident from:  
 
                                                
98 Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1986). 
99 Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1986). 
100 Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1986) (noting that 
“[o]ne of the major elements determining the obligatory character of a particular rule of CIL is its generality…  It is 
not clear how generally accepted the practice of the states must be, but universality is not required.”). 
101 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on CIL, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 191-2 (2001). 
102 Slama, supra notex, at 616. 
103 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON AND DAVID STEWART, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
NUTSHELL, 395 (West Group, 2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL]. See also Oscar 
Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 3 (1994) (noting that “some treaties such as codification 
conventions express preexisting customary law.”). 
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diplomatic correspondence, policy statement, press releases, the opinions of official legal 
advisers, official manuals o legal questions,… executive decisions and practices, … comments by 
governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation, 
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international 
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and 
resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly.104  
 
Members of the U.N. have indicated that U.N. declarations (which I describe in greater detail 
below) “may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States,” although 
the components of custom and opinio juris are still required to endorse the declaration, either at 
the time of its creation or later.105  
 
In 1969, The International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases held that 
treaty provisions could qualify as customary international law provided the provision is of a 
“fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a 
general rule of law.”106 As Slama points out, however, the International Court of Justice gave 
little guidance regarding when a principle might be deemed to be of a “fundamentally norm-
creating character.”107 
 
Professor Schachter notes that “a large area of international regulation has been developed by 
the specialized [U.N.] agencies.”108 Schechter’s theory of the creation of authoritative 
international obligations, based in part on the New Haven school, is summarized by Professor 
Koh as:  
                                                
104 BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 5. See also Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 1073, 1074 (1986) (noting that “a resolution of an international organization, adopted by consensus, or a nearly 
unanimous decision, may declare that a rule has become generally accepted.”). There is evidence of at least a 
discussion in international law that gender based violence within intimate relationships is a human rights violation. 
See Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 4 (indicating that violence in intimate 
relationships is a human rights violation and that it is the “responsibility of states to take all the necessary steps to 
combat violence against women, regardless of whether the violence takes place in the public or the private sphere 
and irrespective of who the perpetrator is. It is incumbent upon all states to respect, protect and enable women to 
assert their human rights, to prevent violence and to investigate and punish the perpetrators. Furthermore, it is the 
responsibility of the state to support abused women and provide them with adequate protection”). 
105 Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1986) (citing a 
Memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610, para. 4, quoted in 34 U.N. 
ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc. E/3614/Rev. 1 (1962)). 
106 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (W.Ger. v. Den.) (W.Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 41-42. The court in the 
continental shelf case was discussing whether the equidistant principle might be said to be a rule of customary 
international law. To determine whether or not this was fundamental it considered: (1) the fact that the treaty 
provision regarding equidistance was secondary to the “primary obligation to effect delimitation by agreement;” 
[42-3] (2) the fact that the equidistant principle was subject to a “special circumstances” exception, which raised 
“further doubts as to the potentially norm-creating character of the rule;” [42-3] and, the fact that the treaty in 
question permitted reservations eroded the fundamental nature of the equidistant principle. North Sea Continental 
Shelf Case (W.Ger. v. Den.) (W.Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 42-43. Slama extracts three factors from this case 
which can be used to determine whether a particular principle is of a “fundamentally norm-creating character” 
necessary to have a binding obligation: “(1) Whether the principle involved imposes a primary obligation; (2) 
Whether the principle is subject to any exceptions; or (3) Whether a state may exclude itself from the obligation of 
the principle by an expression of its intent not to be bound by such.” Slama, supra notex, at 651. 
107 Jo Lynn Slama [note], Opinio Juris in Customary International Law, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 650 (1990). 
108 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 5 (1994). 
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(1) the designation of a behavioral requirement; (2) the indication that persons with competence 
and authority have made the designation; (3) an indication of the capacity and willingness of 
those concerned to make the designated requirement effective; (4) transmittal of the requirement 
to the target audience; and (5) creation in the target audience of psychological and operational 
responses that indicate that the designated requirement is regarded as authoritative and hence, as 
likely to be complied with in the future.109  
 
Some have proposed that the activities of NGOs should be regarded as contributing to the 
expansion of CIL.110 Others maintain that declarations are not CIL but comprise “a new body of 
international law, ‘declarative’ international law,” which are rules that, lacking one of the two 
elements of CIL, are “declared as law by a majority of states but not actually enforced by them, 
or rules that are both practiced and accepted as law, but only by a minority of states.”111  
 
In general, new CIL potentially emerges from the U.N. system and its interaction with the 
international community. 
 
4.4 Applying the Theories to Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
4.4.1 Traditional Theories 
 
If one takes the view that CIL exists, and is evidenced, only by consistent usage and the 
concomitant belief that the usage is required by law, how does one know which states at what 
time complied with which principle? There are mechanisms that could provide an answer, for 
example, by looking at the laws, customs and behavior of every state within a delineated time 
frame and drawing a conclusion about the customary nature of the practice.  
 
However, if we were to adopt this modus operandi to determine whether systemic intimate 
violence is a violation of a principle in CIL, the answer is likely to be – it depends. Traditionally, 
there have been very few states which have created law around domestic violence. However, 
increasingly, and only recently, more and more states are adopting legislation prohibiting 
domestic violence and acknowledging the responsibility of the state to quell such violence. If one 
focuses on the latter development, then one could conclude that states in fact are consistently 
acting against systemic intimate violence, as required for a determination under CIL.  
 
                                                
109 Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 300, 307 (1968), in Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 footnote 113 (1997) [hereinafter 
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law]. 
110 Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of CIL, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44 (1998) citing Isabelle 
Gunning, Modernizing CIL: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 211 (1991). However, Charlesworth 
poses the important question whether “the increased participation of non-state actors in the generation of customary 
norms [will] affect compliance with those norms.” Id. Moreover, to the extent that non-state actors are contributors 
to the creation of CIL, their role “has the effect of generating weak norms on a wide variety of topics, so that 
compliance is neither particularly demanding nor particularly responsive to the problems the norms were designed to 
address.” Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of CIL, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 45 (1998). 
111 See Hiram E. Chodesh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 87, 89 (1991) (arguing that “declarative law is not accepted as law by a generality of states.”). . 
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One then would have to ask whether these states are addressing systemic intimate violence 
with the belief that such action is required by law. Once again it is possible to argue both ways. 
Many states which adopt anti-systemic intimate violence legislation actually incorporate 
reference to CEDAW, DEVAW or other international instruments into the legislation. This 
certainly links the conduct of the state to an international law imperative and evinces some 
mental belief that the legislation is at least conduct in compliance with international law. 
However, the absence of a reference to international law in such national legislation does not 
necessarily mean that the state does not deem itself bound by a principle of international law. 
Moreover, it might be possible to argue that the original states which implemented anti-systemic 
intimate violence legislation did so out of an internal motivation and, as the norm or ‘custom’ 
developed, subsequent states reformed their laws with the belief that there is a legal requirement.  
 
Add to this broil the fact that, even where states have systemic intimate violence legislation, 
the violence continues. If a state allows high levels of systemic intimate violence, irrespective of 
the existence of anti-violence legislation, is this evidence of a persistent objector or does it mean 
that there really is no custom against systemic intimate violence? 
 
Finally, to whom do we look to represent the mind of the state? Do we look to the motivation 
of the government and, if so, which administration? If the government is not democratically 
elected, do we accept its actions as custom even though it may be acting without the 
endorsement of its people?112 As will be discussed below, this is an important question as regards 
countries which practice overt gender discrimination. Do women endorse these governments 
and, if not, is that relevant to the formulation of CIL? 
 
While it is largely accepted that there is a norm prohibiting sex discrimination, the obligation 
this imposes on states in respect of systemic intimate violence is less clear.113 Not all states 
would agree that they have an international obligation to protect women from systemic intimate 
violence:114 some states may present economic justifications for their omission to prevent 
                                                
112 Goldsmith and Posner argue that in many instances the perception that nations followed CIL from a sense of 
legal obligation, was incorrect and that there was a coincidence of interest or coercion which motivated the state’s 
behavior and not compliance with international law.  Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on CIL, 
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 192 (2001). 
113 One indication of this is the fact that CEDAW is the most widely ratified international treaty. However, at the 
same time, it also has the highest number of reservations, indicating a divergent approach to what gender 
discrimination and equality entail. 
114 See the Castle Rock case, supra note 678. See also Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, supra note 
597, at 9 (“Most states agree that men and women should enjoy formal equality under the law. Yes states often 
regard substantive equality … as less universal.”). 
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disproportionate levels of violence against women;115 other states acquiesce to violence against 
women based on the politicization of religious beliefs.116  
 
This raises an important policy question. Can we really look for human rights norms in CIL? 
If CIL depends on the practice and opinio juris of states, and states are run by governments 
which may (and often do) act at odds with the human rights or needs of their citizens, can we 
really determine the rules of CIL with reference to state behavior?117 For example, in 1998 the 
CEDAW Committee noted that despite the efforts of many countries, “overall global 
discrimination is worsening.”118 On a strict interpretation of CIL, there is little evidence of state 
practice to support the claim that systemic intimate violence is prohibited in CIL. On the other 
hand, if we apply “new CIL” then we can conclude that, based on the international statements 
regarding domestic violence, there is a rule against systemic intimate violence, notwithstanding 
the dearth of state practice. 
 
4.4.2 New Theories 
 
The quandary is mitigated slightly if one accepts that CIL may be evidenced by U.N. 
resolutions, declarations and treaty provisions i.e. new CIL.119 This is because of the range of 
international declarations and statements which prohibit intimate violence, and which I describe 
below. 
 
                                                
115 It has been argued that “the family is ‘naturally’ a realm of hierarchy and even injustice.” Susan Moller Okin, 
Inequalities between the Sexes in Different Cultural Contexts, in WOMEN, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT A STUDY OF 
HUMAN CAPABILITIES 274, 279 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter Okin]. However, 
one argument is that States and the international community have a dearth of female representatives, this being the 
reason for the existence of any lack of consensus as regards women’s rights. See Margareth Etienne, Addressing 
Gender-Based Violence in an International Context, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 139 [page 7] (1995) (“The 
underrepresentation of women as heads of state, lawmakers, armed military personnel, and international decision-
makers reveals their lack of control over power and resources globally. The absence of women in these positions 
shapes the definition of human rights, to the detriment of women.”)  
116 It is doubtful, however, that religious justifications for violence against women would withstand international 
admonishment, not least of all because the so-called religious justification is not accepted by many practitioners of 
such religions. For a detailed discussion of the way in which religious extremism targeted women in countries such 
as Afghanistan and Pakistan, see JAN GOODWIN, THE PRICE OF HONOR MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT THE VEIL OF SILENCE 
ON THE ISLAMIC WORLD (Revised Edition, Plume Printing, 2003) [hereinafter GOODWIN]. Goodwin argues that these 
approaches to women are not all consistent with the teachings of the religions in question. See GOODWIN, supra note 
594, at 74 and 79. 
117 This is underscored by the theory of Goldstone and Posner who argue, based on case studies, that there is little, if 
any, evidence of multilateral cooperation and most cooperative conduct “was best modeled as a series of embedded 
bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas rather than as genuine multilateral cooperation” and was not based on a sense of legal 
obligation. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Further Thoughts on CIL, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 191-2 (2001). 
118 [Note: Citation to follow] get original quote. This is from Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT’L LAW. 637, 642 (1999). 
119 This has been described as “new” CIL. See Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 454-5 
(2000) (describing advocates of new CIL as wanting to “expand CIL to include norms articulated in non-binding 
resolutions by the majority of states at international fora and to norms in multilateral treaties even though not agreed 
to by all.”). There are three legal arguments which hold that “resolutions may be authoritative evidence of binding 
international law”: (1) they are “authentic” interpretations of the U.N. Charter; (2) they are affirmations of 
recognized customary law; or, (3) they are expressions of general principles of law accepted by states. Oscar 
Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 3 (1994). 
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In general, these documents give us an objective benchmark and provide probative evidence 
of the mental element of states and U.N. resolutions and declarations may well evidence the 
existence of a CIL norm against systemic intimate violence. In fact, this is where we find the 
bulk of ‘authority’ for most of the international law against violence against women. This view 
of CIL is particularly compelling where resolutions or declarations are made unanimously. 
However, it has been cautioned that “[e]ven a UN declaration adopted unanimously will have 
diminished authority as law if it is not observed by states particularly affected.”120 
 
It is also possible that what we may perceive as non-endorsement of a norm is in fact non-
compliance with a norm due to the failure to “operationalize it – to develop concrete guidelines 
and procedures for determining when the norm is being complied with and when it is not.”121 
Therefore, the degree to which states do not protect women against systemic intimate violence is 
not a sign that an international norm does not exist, but rather that the norm is poorly 
implemented.  
 
The views of new CIL proponents are well supported but they remain contentious. While 
“new CIL” has found support in recent decisions of the International Court of Justice, it is 
criticized for evidencing neither custom nor opinio juris.122 This, of course, is correct – hence the 
term “new CIL.” However, whether or not this is accepted as CIL, remains a debate and not a 
conclusion.  
 
If new CIL does not apply, then there is no international norm against systemic intimate 
violence.123 However, as John Locke states, “[w]hat form of viciousness would be not only 
permitted, but necessary, if the example of the majority were to give us law.”124 
 
4.5 Is Systemic Intimate Violence an International Human Rights Violation By Virtue of 
CIL? 
 
I propose that the international community is in the process of creating a customary 
international norm against systemic intimate violence. This is an immature norm, only recently 
emerging and requiring nurturing, formulation and application. 
 
This is based on the following proposal regarding CIL. This thesis looks to both the conduct 
of states, and the psychological motivation behind such conduct, when determining that there is a 
right under CIL to be free from systemic intimate violence. 
 
However, how we interpret each element is changing and we can use many of the sources 
proposed by new CIL to interpret the direction of state behavior and their concomitant intention. 
For example, it may be possible to argue that many states are practicing a usage against gender 
discrimination, with the necessary cognitive element that such usage is required by law (we can 
                                                
120 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 3 (1994). 
121 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 75. 
122 Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 484-5 (2000). 
123 For a discussion of the legal status of resolutions and declarations, see Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 
AM. J. INT’L L. 3 (1994) (maintaining that resolutions “embody declarations of principles and rules of international 
law” and “as a result regarded as especially significant when adopted without dissent.”). 
124 LOCKE, supra notex, at 179. 
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call them ‘states A’). However, there may be an equal number of states operating according to 
very explicit principles of gender discrimination (we can all these states ‘states B’). If we use 
international instruments to interpret the traditional elements of CIL, it is possible to conclude 
that a treaty such as CEDAW represents a common belief against gender discrimination and, 
therefore, the behavior of states B is non-compliance with the norm and not evidence of the non-
existence of the norm in CIL. 
 
The change in approach is necessary and inevitable for the following reasons. First, the 
institutions of international law only came into existence effectively after 1945 and, therefore, 
their norm-creating potential could not have been a factor in traditional determinations of CIL. 
Second, globalization and information technology have publicized the needs of the individual, 
which may be entirely inconsistent with their state’s conduct. For the purposes of international 
human rights law, which is dedicated to the individual, the voice of such individual may trump 
the conduct of her/his state. 
 
The potential for a high degree of international consensus can be found also in the wide range 
of literature, reports, investigations and theories regarding domestic violence, evincing a move 
towards the popular recognition of the right to be free from systemic intimate violence. Whether 
the norm is articulated by states’ governments, non-governmental organizations or international 
representatives and entities, states and international organizations around the world are turning 
their attention to the economic cost, social disruption and personal violation caused by systemic 
intimate violence. This at least indicates a degree of international consensus. 
 
Within the strict framework of international law, it is unclear how one would categorize the 
international instruments against systemic intimate violence. Perhaps they are a sign of the 
expanding sources of international law or perhaps they are not laws but evidence of norms, 
which are developing into rules, notwithstanding the contrary behavior of states. This is a 
discussion that will occupy theorists for many years. As Charlesworth states, CIL is “a 
dangerously manipulable, unbearably light source of international norms. But custom also has 
utopian potential.”125  
 
The development of CIL is fluid and temporal. The resolutions, declarations and other 
international institutions against systemic intimate violence are really only two decades old. 
Therefore, I propose that there is evidence of an emerging, embryonic rule against systemic 
intimate violence in international law. The evidence is piecemeal and unsophisticated but it 
exists and, in order to achieve indisputable clarity, the rule against systemic intimate violence 
needs to be (1) specifically defined; (2) incorporated into mainstream international law; and (3) 
properly theorized according to the strict principles of international law. 
                                                
125 Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of CIL, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44 (1998) (demonstrating 
the ways in which CIL is simultaneously insubstantial and substantial). 
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Part B: Women’s Rights in International Law:  
The History and Current Status Quo 
 
 




International human rights law prohibits the violation of certain rights. A list of inviolable 
rights appeared for the first time in 1948, in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (hereinafter “the UDHR”).126 The UDHR, a declaration and not a treaty, became a 
reflection of CIL, encompassing a list of mandatory norms that apply to all nations. The UDHR 
was followed by the two rights covenants, namely the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (hereinafter “the ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Social, Cultural 
and Economic Rights (hereinafter “the ICESCR”), dealing with civil and political rights, and 
socio-economic and cultural rights respectively.127 
 
Based largely on the events of World War Two and the Holocaust, the rights articulated in 
these instruments reflect “the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights” of all 
people.128 In the course of the last thirty years, however, many have claimed that this list of 
norms fails to target the specific types of harm experienced by women. 
 
Theorists have argued that women are abused as a group, and endure a particular version of 
harm relating to their gender, which intersects with their ethnicity, race or religion. While the 
provisions of the UDHR arguably could be extrapolated to apply to situations of gender-based 
violence and discrimination, some maintain this is insufficient and does not “provide the type of 
special protection women need by virtue of the different nature of their body and reproductive 
functions.”129 In light of the fact that extrapolation of UDHR norms does not provide adequate 
                                                
126 UDHR, supra note 4. 
127 ICCPR, supra note 4. International Covenant on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 
[hereinafter the ICSCER]. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 2-3 (1994) (confirming that 
U.N. human rights treaties are regarded as “new customary law or recognized general principles of law with respect 
to some of the rights expressed.”). 
128 Preamble to the UDHR, supra note 4. For a brief discussion of the development of human rights in international 
law see MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, AND LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD 
PUBLIC ORDER THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 4-5 (New Haven and London, 
Yale University Press, 1980) [hereinafter WORLD PUBLIC ORDER] (“From demands for physical security and 
inviolability of the person, with freedom from cruel and inhuman treatment and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
confinement, a progression may be noted to demands for freedom of conscience and religion, of opinion and 
expression, and of association and assembly.”  
129 See Surya P. Subedi, Protection of Women against Domestic Violence: The Response of International Law, 
E.H.R.L.R. 6 587-606, 592-3 (1997) (arguing that the accumulation of international human rights law does not 
“contain specific measures for the protection of women against violence within the house and the community and 
violence during times of peace.”). See also Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Esq, Domestic Violence as a 
Human Rights Issue, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 15 (1993) 36-62, 39 (describing the inadequacy of international 
law to prevent violence against women). 
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protection for women, many called for more precise and express rights for women.130 The last 
thirty years, therefore, have seen the development of international instruments, bodies and 
organizations, which address specifically the rights of women in international law.131 
 
From an institutional point of view, the demarcation of women’s rights began as early as 
1946, when the U.N. established the Commission on the Status of Women (hereinafter 
“CSW”).132 The CSW is a division of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the entity 
responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the ICESCR. The administrative division 
of the CSW, the Division for the Advancement of Women, is responsible for some of the major 
developments in women’s rights in international law and exists today as an effective body.133  
 
The most important development for women in international law, however, was the 
adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(hereinafter “CEDAW”) and the creation of the CEDAW Committee to oversee its 
enforcement.134 CEDAW, adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in 
                                                
130 For a comprehensive discussion of the history of women’s rights in international law, see Arvonne S. Fraser, 
Becoming Human:  The Origins and Development of Women's Human Rights, The Johns Hopkins University Press 
1999, originally published in 21 Human Rights Quarterly 853 (1999), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/becominghuman/#ArvonneFraser.  
131 See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 612-652. 
132 For a discussion of the history of this organization see Peace Women, Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom, U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ecosoc/CSW/CSWindex.html [hereinafter Peace Women]. See also Division for the 
Advancement of Women, Commission on the Status of Women: Overview, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/ [hereinafter CSW Overview]: “The Commission on the Status of Women 
(CSW) was established as a functional commission of the Economic and Social Council by Council resolution 11(II) 
of 21 June 1946 to prepare recommendations and reports to the Council on promoting women's rights in political, 
economic, civil, social and educational fields. The Commission also makes recommendations to the Council on 
urgent problems requiring immediate attention in the field of women's rights. The object of the Commission is to 
promote implementation of the principle that men and women shall have equal rights. The Commission's mandate 
was expanded in 1987 by the Council in its resolution 1987/22. Following the 1995 Fourth World Conference on 
Women, the General Assembly mandated the Commission to integrate into its programme a follow-up process to the 
Conference, regularly reviewing the critical areas of concern in the Platform for Action and to develop its catalytic 
role in mainstreaming a gender perspective in United Nations activities.” 
133 See Peace Women, supra note 18. In 1972, the division was upgraded to the Branch for the Promotion of 
Equality for Men and Women under the then newly created Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian 
Affairs of the United Nations Office in Vienna. See Division for the Advancement of Women: Brief History, 
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/daw/. The Division for the Advancement of Women acted as the 
substantive secretariat for the Beijing Conference in 1995, the largest conference in the history of the United 
Nations, and was responsible for the preparations for the three previous World Conferences on Women (Mexico 
1975, Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985). See The United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 
China, September 1995, Action for Equality, Development and Peace [hereinafter Beijing Conference]. For 
information about the Beijing Conference see http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/. 
134 CEDAW. This was not the first treaty addressing one specific right or group of people: the same had been done 
in the prohibition of racial discrimination and would continue in respect of refugees, torture, children’s rights and 
the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples.  See Convention against Racial Discrimination, supra note 3; Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons on 28 July 1951, convened under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
429(V) of 14 December 1950, entered into force on 22 April 1954, in accordance with Article 43; Torture 
Convention, supra note 5; Children’s Convention, supra note 7; Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991. 
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1979, envisions the eradication of discrimination against women. CEDAW was followed by a 
range of global and regional declarations, recommendations and comments addressing various 
rights of women, resulting in a body of international law that deals exclusively with the needs 
and well-being of women.135  
 
These instruments and bodies developed several major themes concerning women’s rights. 
This jurisprudence includes health, reproductive and family rights, political and legal 
representation, economic and employment equality, the eradication of prostitution and cultural 
stereotypes, education, and safety. These themes have been addressed in international law with 
varying degrees of success. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I focus solely on the right to 
personal safety from systematic intimate violence, with a view to showing the deficiencies in the 
international laws used to enforce that right. The following section, therefore, discusses the 
history of the measures taken in international law to address domestic violence specifically. 
 
5.2 Violence against Women in International Law  
 
Domestic violence was one of the earliest forms of gender-based violence to generate 
international action.136 In the early 1970s, the U.N. General Assembly proclaimed 1975 as 
International Women’s Year, which was expanded to the United Nations Decade for Women 
from 1975 to 1985.137 During this period, three of the four world conferences on women were 
                                                
135 Convention on the Nationality of Women, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 4, 38, entered into force Aug. 29, 1934; 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force July 7, 1954; CEDAW, supra 
note 21; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 54/4, 
annex, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000), entered into force Dec. 22, 2000 
[hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol]; Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and 
Armed Conflict, G.A. res. 3318 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); 
DEVAW, supra notex; Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995) &. A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration]; Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. 
No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), entered into force Sept. 9, 2003 [hereinafter the Trafficking 
Protocol]; United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and 
Trafficking, E/2002/68/Add.1 (2002); Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on 
International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1a(2) of the 1951 Convention 
and Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002); the creation of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, supra note 1; Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil 
Rights to Women, 1438 U.N.T.S. 51, entered into force March 17, 1949; Inter-American Convention on the 
Granting of Political Rights to Women, 1438 U.N.T.S. 63, entered into force March 17, 1949; Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (1994), 
entered into force March 5, 1995 [hereinafter the Convention of Belem Do Para]; and, the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa [hereinafter the Banjul Charter]. 
136 See Information Note, the Division for the Advancement of Women, United Nations Work on Violence against 
Women, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/news/unwvaw.html [hereinafter Division for the 
Advancement of Women Information Note]: “Initially the development of policy within the United Nations with 
regard to violence against women was concentrated on violence against women in the family.” 
137 Division for the Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23: “In 1972, the General Assembly, in 
its resolution 3010 (XXVII), proclaimed 1975 International Women's Year, to be devoted to intensified action to 
promote equality between men and women, to ensure the full integration of women in the total development effort 
and to increase women's contribution to the strengthening of world peace.” 
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held, namely in Mexico, Copenhagen and Nairobi (Beijing being the most recent, was help in 
1995).138  
 
The first World Conference on Women was held in Mexico in 1975. The World Plan of 
Action adopted at this conference “did not refer explicitly to violence, but drew attention to the 
need for the family to ensure dignity, equality and security of each of its members.”139 It is clear 
that violence against women was not on the radar of international law at this stage and, when 
CEDAW was adopted four years later in 1979, violence against women was not incorporated 
into the original text.140  
 
At the second World Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980, however, reference 
was made to family violence, and the conference participants adopted a resolution on “battered 
women and violence in the family.”141  
 
At the third World Conference, which took place in Nairobi in 1985, violence against 
women was a far more prominent theme, emerging as “a serious international concern.”142 The 
                                                
138 See the Third World Conference on Women, Nairobi 1985, Report of the World Conference to Review and 
Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace Nairobi, 
15-26 July 1985, available at http://www.earthsummit2002.org/toolkits/women/un-doku/un-conf/narirobi.htm, 
paragraph two [hereinafter the Nairobi Principles]: “The World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the 
Objectives of the International Women's Year, 1/ adopted by the World Conference of the International Women's 
Year at Mexico City in 1975, was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 3520 (XXX). The General 
Assembly, in that resolution, proclaimed 1976-1985 the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development 
and Peace.” 
139 Division for the Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23. 
140 The document was aimed at preventing discrimination  against women and not violence against women. 
141 Division for the Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23. 
142 Division for the Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23. See the Nairobi Principles, supra 
note 25. Some of the specific references to violence against women include: the requirement that governments 
“undertake effective measures, including mobilizing community resources to identify, prevent and eliminate all 
violence, including family violence, against women and children and to provide shelter, support and reorientation 
services for abused women and children” (Paragraph 231); the demand for “[i]mmediate and special priority … to 
the promotion and the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to sex, the full application of the rights of peoples to self-determination and the elimination of colonialism, neo-
colonialism, apartheid, of all forms of racism and racial discrimination, oppression and aggression, foreign 
occupation, as well as domestic violence and violence against women” (Paragraph 245); the acknowledgement that 
violence against women “exists in various forms in everyday life in all societies. Women are beaten, mutilated, 
burned, sexually abused and raped. Such violence is a major obstacle to the achievement of peace and the other 
objectives of the Decade and should be given special attention. Women victims of violence should be given 
particular attention and comprehensive assistance. To this end, legal measures should be formulated to prevent 
violence and to assist women victims. National machinery should be established in order to deal with the question of 
violence against women within the family and society. Preventive policies should be elaborated, and 
institutionalized forms of assistance to women victims provided.” (Paragraph 258); and, that because of the increase 
of gender-based violence, governments “must affirm the dignity of women, as a priority action. Governments should 
therefore intensify efforts to establish or strengthen forms of assistance to victims of such violence through the 
provision of shelter, support, legal and other services. In addition to immediate assistance to victims of violence 
against women in the family and in society, Governments should undertake to increase public awareness of violence 
against women as a societal problem, establish policies and legislative measures to ascertain its causes and prevent 
and eliminate such violence in particular by suppressing degrading images and representations of women in society, 
and finally encourage the development of educational and re-educational measures for offenders.” (Paragraph 288).  
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Forward-looking Strategies adopted by the conference linked peace and equality to the 
eradication of violence against women in both the public and private spheres.143  
 
Meanwhile, one year prior to Nairobi, in 1984, the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
passed resolution 1984/14 on violence in the family.144 Based on this resolution, a year later the 
U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 40/36 on domestic violence, inviting states to “take 
specific action urgently in order to prevent domestic violence and to render the appropriate 
assistance to the victims thereof.”145 The resolution also called for U.N. research on domestic 
violence “from a criminological perspective to formulate distinct action-oriented strategies…”146 
The resolution laid the foundation for compelling legislative reform. At this stage, however, the 
resolution “invites” member states, inter alia, to enact and implement criminal and civil 
legislation, to provide temporary shelter relief for victims, to curb domestic violence through a 
process of education and research, and to improve the accessibility of social, legal and health 
services.147 The resolution was not authoritative and mandatory, using the language of invitation 
and suggestion; however, it did lead to an Expert Group Meeting on Violence in the Family in 
1986, focusing on the manner in which women are affected by domestic violence.148  
 
                                                
143 “The conference included violence as a major obstacle to the achievement of development, equality and peace, 
the three objectives of the Decade.” Division for the Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23. See 
the Nairobi Principles, supra note 25. Some of the specific references to violence against women include: the 
requirement that governments “undertake effective measures, including mobilizing community resources to identify, 
prevent and eliminate all violence, including family violence, against women and children and to provide shelter, 
support and reorientation services for abused women and children” (Paragraph 231); the demand for “[i]mmediate 
and special priority … to the promotion and the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to sex, the full application of the rights of peoples to self-determination and the elimination 
of colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, of all forms of racism and racial discrimination, oppression and 
aggression, foreign occupation, as well as domestic violence and violence against women” (Paragraph 245); the 
acknowledgement that violence against women “exists in various forms in everyday life in all societies. Women are 
beaten, mutilated, burned, sexually abused and raped. Such violence is a major obstacle to the achievement of peace 
and the other objectives of the Decade and should be given special attention. Women victims of violence should be 
given particular attention and comprehensive assistance. To this end, legal measures should be formulated to prevent 
violence and to assist women victims. National machinery should be established in order to deal with the question of 
violence against women within the family and society. Preventive policies should be elaborated, and 
institutionalized forms of assistance to women victims provided.” (Paragraph 258); and, that because of the increase 
of gender-based violence, governments “must affirm the dignity of women, as a priority action. Governments should 
therefore intensify efforts to establish or strengthen forms of assistance to victims of such violence through the 
provision of shelter, support, legal and other services. In addition to immediate assistance to victims of violence 
against women in the family and in society, Governments should undertake to increase public awareness of violence 
against women as a societal problem, establish policies and legislative measures to ascertain its causes and prevent 
and eliminate such violence in particular by suppressing degrading images and representations of women in society, 
and finally encourage the development of educational and re-educational measures for offenders.” (Paragraph 288).  
144 May 24 1984. 
145 Article 2 of U.N. General Recommendation A/RES/40/36 29 November 1985 96th Plenary Session [hereinafter 
U.N. General Recommendation 40/36]. 
146 Article 3 of U.N. General Recommendation 40/36, supra note 31. Article 5 also calls for inter-agency support for 
domestic violence within the U.N. 
147 Article 7(a) of U.N. General Recommendation 40/36, supra note 31. 
148 See Division for the Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23.  
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In 1989 the U.N. released a report on Violence against Women in the Family, which is one 
of the significant marks of change in the international legal landscape.149 The report established 
four important factors. First, it described domestic violence as a problem in almost every 
country, giving it an international profile.150 Second, domestic violence was cited as one of the 
more serious causes of ill-health amongst women, thereby linking it to the existing international 
right to health. Third, the report established that domestic violence is not random but is 
“associated with inequality between women and men, and strategies to perpetuate or entrench 
that inequality.”151 
 
Finally, the report initiated a change in the emphasis in international law from protection of 
the family to protection of individuals within the family. Many human rights instruments 
promote the protection of the family unit as the “natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”152 As far as systemic intimate violence is 
concerned, the family is the location of the harm. The emphasis on the protection and sanctity of 
the family unit in basic international human rights instruments sheds some light on the tendency 
of so many people to see all family activity, including intimate violence, as a private issue, 
falling outside the purview of the law. Therefore, the report, by acknowledging that domestic 
violence is both a manifestation of discrimination against women and a perpetuating force of 
gender inequality, helped to mitigate some of the exaggerated respect for the family unit.153  
 
In 1990, the U.N. General Assembly adopted General Resolution 45/114 on domestic 
violence, which noted the “serious lack of information and research on domestic violence 
globally and the need for exchange of information on ways of dealing with this problem.”154 This 
resolution was nuanced, identifying the need for “common policies;” “specialized approaches;” 
the particular needs of women, children and the elderly; the diverse approaches of different 
cultures to domestic violence; and, the impact of domestic violence on “attitudes and behaviour, 
                                                
149 U.N., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY, supra notex. It was also at this time that the CEDAW 
committee recommended that states include a discussion of violence against women in their reports to the CEDAW 
committee. See article 2 of General Recommendation 19: Violence against Women, Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992) [hereinafter General Recommendation 
19].  
150 U.N., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY (“Violence against women is a problem worldwide, occurring, 
to a greater or lesser degree, in all regions, countries, societies and cultures, and affecting women irrespective of 
income, class, race or ethnicity.”). 
151 U.N., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE FAMILY, supra note 25. HELEN O’CONNELL, EQUALITY POSTPONED: 
GENDER, RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 11 (1996) [hereinafter O’CONNELL]. 
152 Article 16(3) of the UDHR. See also article 18(1) of the Banjul Charter, describing the family as “the natural unit 
and basis of society.” Article 29(1) states that the “individual shall also have the duty… to preserve the harmonious 
development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family.” Article 17(1) of the ICCPR 
provides that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” Article 23(1) of the ICCPR echoes the 
UDHR, stating that the “family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State.” 
153 For a discussion of this see Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra notex, at 636 (describing how 
“protection of the family also preserves the power structure within the family, which can lead to subjugation and 
dominance by men over women and children.”). 
154 Preamble to General Resolution A/RES/45/114, adopted at the 68th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 
14 December 1990 [hereinafter General Resolution 45/114]. 
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such as increased tolerance to violence in society as a whole.”155 Once again, using suggestive 
language, the resolution “urged” states to adopt and implement multidisciplinary policies to 
prevent domestic violence, protect the victims and provide appropriate treatment for offenders.156  
 
Possibly the most important aspect of the 1990 resolution was its globalizing effect. By 
urging member states to “exchange information, experience and research findings,” the 
resolution shifted domestic violence into the mainstream realm of international justice and public 
affairs.157 
 
In 1992 the CEDAW committee incorporated violence against women into its jurisprudence 
with the adoption of General Recommendation 19. General Recommendation 19 confirmed 
expressly that domestic violence impedes gender equality and that the “full implementation of 
the Convention required states to take positive measures to eliminate all forms of violence 
against women.”158  
 
General Recommendation 19 laid a framework, the value of which cannot be discounted. It 
broadened the definition of violence against women to include physical, sexual and 
psychological harm, including “threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or private life.”159 Moreover, it demonstrated that violence between 
intimates affects women disproportionately, demarcating women as a group in need of proactive 
state protection. To this end, it recommended that states take specific steps to reduce domestic 
violence, namely by improving the legal protection of women, through legislative amendments 
and gender-sensitive training for the judiciary;160 gathering statistics in order to identify the 
nature and extent of the problem;161 and, creating complaint mechanisms and places of refuge for 
women escaping violent circumstances.162 Finally, it incorporated reference to the so-called ‘due 
diligence’ standard to determine what diligent states should do to fulfill the objectives contained 
in General Recommendation 19.163 
 
Then, in 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna witnessed one of the 
strongest global calls for the recognition of violence against women as an international human 
rights violation.164 The incorporation of the human rights of women in the Vienna Declaration 
                                                
155 General Resolution 45/114, supra note 39. However, article 2 emphasizes criminal sanctions for domestic 
violence, which, as discussed in chapter two, is not necessarily the ideal approach towards systemic intimate 
violence. 
156 General Resolution 45/114, supra note 39, at article 1(a)-(d). 
157 General Resolution 45/114, supra note 39, at articles 3 and 4. 
158 See General Recommendation 19, supra note 35. 
159 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, at paragraph 6. 
160 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35 at paragraph 24(b). 
161 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, at paragraph 24(c). 
162 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, at paragraphs 24(i), (k) and r. 
163 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, at paragraph 9: “States may also be responsible for private acts if 
they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for 
providing compensation.” 
164 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, World Conference on Human Rights, 14 – 25 June 
1993, Vienna, Austria, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wchr.htm. See also Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24, at 20 (1993) 
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and Programme of Action led, inter alia, to the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, its causes and consequences, and the emergence of FGC as an 
international human rights violation.165  
 
The internationalization of violence against women gained significant momentum in the 
1994 U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (hereinafter referred to as 
“DEVAW”).166 DEVAW adopted the same principles as the CEDAW committee’s General 
Recommendation 19, identifying the need for: 
 
a clear and comprehensive definition of violence against women, a clear statement of the rights to 
be applied to ensure the elimination of violence against women in all its forms, a commitment by 
States in respect of their responsibilities, and a commitment by the international community at 
large to the elimination of violence against women.167  
 
In the same year, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (hereinafter 
referred to as “OAS”) adopted the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence against Women, which became known as the Convention of Belem 
Do Para.168 
 
In 1995 at the IV World Conference of Women in Beijing, violence against women was 
identified as one of the twelve areas of women’s lives requiring urgent action.169 The consequent 
                                                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter the Vienna Declaration]. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wchr.htm: “…the Conference took 
historic new steps to promote and protect the rights of women…). 
165 [Note: citation to follow] The Mandate of the special rapporteur for violence against women included “seek and 
receive information on violence against women and to recommend measures to eliminate violence. In her reports she 
has covered, inter alia, military sexual slavery in wartime, rape in the community, domestic violence, trafficking and 
forced prostitution of women, women’ s reproductive rights. She has also embarked on missions to Member States 
of the United Nations to investigate and propose strategies to address gender-based violence against women.” See 
the United Nations Work on Violence against Women, available at 
http://www.eurowrc.org/06.contributions/1.contrib_en/30.contrib.en.htm#EuroWRC.  
166 DEVAW, supra note 22. Article 1 defines violence against women as including public and private violence: “For 
the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that 
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of 
such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life;” Article 4(k) 
requires states to “[p]romote research, collect data and compile statistics, especially concerning domestic violence, 
relating to the prevalence of different forms of violence against women and encourage research on the causes, 
nature, seriousness and consequences of violence against women and on the effectiveness of measures implemented 
to prevent and redress violence against women; those statistics and findings of the research will be made public;” 
Article 4(c) requires states to “[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national 
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private 
persons.” See CEDAW Fiftieth Session, supra notex. Specifically, Article 5 of DEVAW, supra note 22, enjoins the 
U.N. bodies and other international organizations to include the protection of women from violence in their 
respective fields of competence. 
167 Preamble to DEVAW, supra note 22. 
168 Convention of Belem Do Para, supra note 22. 
169 See Chapter Three of the Beijing Declaration, supra note 22. 
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Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted the definition of violence against women in 
DEVAW and expanded it to include violence perpetrated against women in war.170 
 
At this point, the focus of violence against women shifted from non-state violence to crimes 
of conflict and the development of the norm against mass rape as a weapon of war, which 
characterized the genocides in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. If the 
practice of FGC was one of the first specific acts of violence against women to receive 
international admonishment, mass rape was the second.171 The jurisprudence of women’s 
international rights was further augmented by the decisions of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which established the precedent and legal 
rationale that led to the criminalization of mass rape as a weapon of war, a crime against 
humanity, and an instrument of genocide under the Rome Statute in 1998.172  
 
In 2000, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. This enabled the CEDAW 
committee to receive communications by or on behalf of individuals who have grievances falling 
within the scope of CEDAW.173 It also gives the CEDAW committee investigative powers, 
significantly augmenting the status of CEDAW.174 
 
In the same year, in March 2000, the U.N. Human Rights Committee adopted General 
Comment No. 28, entrenching equality of rights between men and women.175 This was an 
                                                
170 Beijing Declaration, supra note 22. Paragraph 101 identifies domestic violence as one of the causes of ill health 
of women; paragraph 110(d) urges governments to increase financial support to prevent and deal with domestic 
violence. 
171 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS & POLICIES, supra notex. See also generally Kelly D. 
Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary 
Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 347 (2003) [hereinafter Askin, Prosecuting Wartime 
Rape, supra note 57] (discussing the jurisprudence on rape as a weapon of war/genocide or as a crime against 
humanity). The culmination of these developments was thoroughly addressed by Elizabeth Schneider in her 
examination of the law regarding battered women from the feminist perspective, where the various motivations for 
and implications of domestic violence as an international human rights violation are garnered. See SCHNEIDER, 
supra notex, at 95. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 49. FGC was prohibited specifically in DEVAW, supra note 
22, article 2(a), which includes female genital cutting in the definition of violence against women. Id. Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, supra notex. 
172 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, supra note 2, at 352-53. Although “[n]o international human rights instrument 
specifically prohibits rape[,] . . . . [i]n certain circumstances . . . rape can amount to torture . . . . ”  Id. at 353. See 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 39 I.L.M. 557, 570 (ICTR 1999) (identifying, inter alia, rape and 
torture as crimes against humanity). Article 7 of the Rome Statute, supra note 9, defines crimes against humanity as 
conduct that is widespread, systematic and focused on a segment of a population, including, rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity; . . . [p]ersecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender . . . or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international 
law . . . [o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
to mental or physical health. Id. art. 7 § 1(k). 
173 Article 2 of the CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 22. 
174 For a description of the history of the CEDAW Optional Protocol see the U.N. Division for the Advancement of 
Women, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/.  
175 Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 28, U.N. 
Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000), http://www.bayefsky.com/general/ccpr_gencomm_28.php (last visited 
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important moment in women’s rights jurisprudence. The U.N. Human Rights Committee 
authorized the interpretation of article 3 of the ICCPR as requiring proactive conduct by states to 
“ensure to men and women equally the enjoyment of all rights provided for in the Covenant.”176 
General Comment No. 28 acknowledged what feminists had claimed for over three decades, 
namely, that the harm and inequality, which are unique to women, had not been addressed by 
mainstream international law.177  
 
Today, almost every U.N. body has a policy on violence against women, including “a 
resource manual on strategies for confronting domestic violence,” prepared under the supervision 
of the United Nations Centre for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.178 In addition, the 
United Nations Children Fund has produced a report on “Domestic Violence against Women and 
Girls,” describing the types, causes and consequences of domestic violence.179  
 
The following analysis takes a closer look at the substance of these developments, noting 
their legal status, describing their content and providing an appraisal thereof. 
 
 
Part C: Evaluation of the International Law on Domestic Violence  
 
6. The Current Status of Domestic Violence in International Law: Progress and Deficiencies 
 
6.1 Commission on the Status of Women (1946) 
 
6.1.1 Status of CSW 
 
The CSW was the first international body to deal with women’s rights. Is a functional 
commission of the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. It is a political body made up of 45 
members (who are representatives of member states) elected by the Economic and Social 
Council.180 The object of the CSW is “to promote implementation of the principle that men and 





                                                                                                                                                       
October 22, 2005) [hereinafter Equality of Rights Between Men and Women].  See also CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, 
supra notex, at 10. 
176 Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, supra note 61, at paragraph 3. 
177 Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, supra note 61. 
178 “Other parts of the United Nations system and its related entities, such as the International Labour Organization 
and the World Health Organization, addressed specific forms of violence against women within their specific 
mandates.” Division for the Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23. 
179 United Nations Children’s Fund Innocenti Research Ctr., Innocenti Digest No. 6, 2000, http://www.unicef-
icdc.org/publications/pdf/digest6e.pdf, [hereinafter UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS]. 
UNIFEM also administers the Trust Fund in Support of Action to Eliminate Violence against Women providing 
financial support for projects to eradicate gender-based violence, as well as mounting innovative regional and 
international advocacy campaigns involving grass-roots activists on the issue. 
180 CSW Overview, supra n.. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/caw/. 
181 CSW Overview, supra n.. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/caw/. 
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6.1.2 Work of CSW 
 
Originally, the CSW’s mandate was to prepare recommendations and reports to the 
Economic and Social Council on promoting women’s rights in political, economic, social and 
educational fields.182 Later, this was expanded to promote equality, development and peace. The 
CSW was required to monitor the implementation of measures for the advancement of women 
and the progress thereof at sub-regional, regional, and international levels.183 
 
The work of the CSW is closely linked with the four world conferences on women’s rights 
discussed above. The CSW was part of the organization of these conferences and is responsible 
specifically for the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action. It is also responsible for 
mainstreaming a gender perspective in U.N. activities.184 
 
6.1.3 Appraisal of CSW 
 
The CSW has not been used to its full potential, notwithstanding an impressive legacy of 
work and achievement. For example, the CSW has a communications mechanism which allows 
it to hear communications that reveal “a consistent pattern of reliably attested injustice and 
discriminatory practices against women.”185 It has also been suggested that “it is less powerful 
and effective than other UN commissions.”186 In general, the CSW has been more effective in 
promoting women’s rights than on engaging in specific violations of women’s rights.187 
 
In addition, as the initial U.N. body responsible for the development of women’s rights, the 
CSW was established as part of ECOSOC, which falls under the purview of the ICESCR. 
Unfortunately, however, the ICESCR has been the weaker of the two rights covenants because 
the enforcement of its rights requires state resources and governments are only required to fulfill 
the socio-economic rights if they have the resources to do so. As a result, many governments fail 
to comply with the covenant, citing a lack of resources and priorities as justification. Also, the 
designation of women’s rights under the ICESCR as cultural, social and economic, rather than 
civil or political, confirms the view that the political and civil interests of women are generic, the 
same as men’s, and therefore that no specific steps are necessary to enforce their rights. For the 
                                                
182 CSW Overview, supra n.. 
For a discussion of the CSW see SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 65 (2006). 
183 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL 
JUSTICE 66 (2006). 
184 CSW Overview, supra n.. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/caw/. For a detailed discussion of the type of 
work and process of CSW meetings see SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE 
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 65-68 (2006). 
185 The CSW “used these communications principally as a source of information for its studies rather than as an 
instrument designed to prod governments to address the specific complaints.” INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
NUTSHELL 106. See Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex 
Discriminatory Laws under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and 
Through the Beijing Platform for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 49 (2005) (discussing “a little known and 
hardly used communications procedure for consideration of communications…”). 
186 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL 
JUSTICE 66 (2006). 
187 See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL, 105-106 (describing the limited powers of the CSW). 
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reasons discussed above, this view is incorrect, and prevents the CSW from reaching its full 
potential as a mechanism through which to combat systemic intimate violence. 
 
6.2 CEDAW (1979) 
 
6.2.1 Status of CEDAW  
 
CEDAW is a binding treaty in international law.188 As of March 2, 2006, 182 countries, 
“over ninety percent of the members of the United Nations”, are party to CEDAW.189 For the 
reasons discussed, given the unanimous General Assembly resolution which created CEDAW, 
and the high rate of ratification, it is likely that the provisions of CEDAW constitute CIL.190 
 
6.2.2 Content of CEDAW 
 
The content of CEDAW can be broken down into three parts: (1) substantive provisions; (2) 
recommendations to states; and, (3) provisions relating to the CEDAW Committee. 
 
a. Substantive Provisions 
 
The only provisions in CEDAW which relate to violence against women are the prohibition 
against trafficking and prostitution.191 Apart from these provisions, which relate to public forms 
of violence, there is no broad prohibition against violence against women.192  
 
It is certainly possible to extrapolate violence against women from certain provisions of 
CEDAW. For example, the definition of discrimination against women in CEDAW refers to 
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose 
of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women.”193 Clearly, 
violence against women constitutes a restriction made on the basis of sex, which has the effect of 
impairing or nullifying the enjoyment or exercise of women’s human rights. However, it is a 
                                                
188 The operation of treaties is governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is founded, in part, 
on the notion of pacta sunt servanda, that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.” Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.  THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON AND DAVID STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL, 82. See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 634, 663 (1990). 
189 www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. There are 98 signatures and 182 ratifications, accessions and 
successions. 
190 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (W.Ger. v. Den.) (W.Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4. Jo Lynn Southard, 
Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1996) (describing the difficult views regarding the binding nature of 
CEDAW and the norm of non-discrimination in international law). See also Jo Lynn Slama [note], Opinio Juris in 
CIL, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 610-611 (1990) (noting the theories which suggest that “a rule of custom may 
evolve by the repetitious inclusion of the rule in treaties. It is generally accepted that treaties, both multilateral and 
bilateral, may contribute to a finding of opinio juris and have a role in the formation of CIL. 
191 Article 6. 
192 See Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 952 (2003) (confirming that violence against women was not included in the original 
CEDAW text but that it has been developed with the denunciation of violence against women in DEVAW).  
193 Article 1. 
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profound omission that the eradication of violence against women is not a goal expressly 
stipulated in CEDAW.  
 
b. State Obligations 
 
Article 2 is the central provision that places an international obligation on states to end 
discrimination against women, in all its forms. It requires states to pursue “by all appropriate 
means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women.”194  
 
This includes amending national constitutions and legislation to “embody the principle of 
equality of men and women.”195 States are also required to prohibit by law discrimination against 
women and to impose sanctions where this prohibition is breached.196 Apart from legislative 
reforms, states are required to amend civil, political, social, educational and cultural institutions 
to implement all the provisions of CEDAW.197  
 
CEDAW calls on states to change the way public and private entities and individuals treat 
women. This is important vis-à-vis domestic violence because it brings the state into the private 
realm. It compels the state to equalize private relationships (i.e. the way individuals treat women 
and not only the way the state treats women) and to intervene when discrimination marks both 
public and private affairs.198 
 
c. Provisions relating to the CEDAW Committee  
 
The CEDAW Committee is one of six U.N. treaty bodies responsible for the implementation 
of its constituting treaty.199 The CEDAW Committee was established to monitor the 
                                                
194 Article 2. 
195 Article 2(a). 
196 Article 2(b). 
197 Articles 3, 4 and 5. Reforms include: judicial reform to ensure equality before the law, especially as regards 
marriage (Articles 15 and 16); education reform (Article 10); labor reform (Article 11 and 6, which prohibits the 
exploitation of women by trafficking or prostitution); the meaningful political enfranchisement of women (Articles 
7, 8 and 9. Article 15 requires equality before the law and focuses on equality within the state); improved healthcare 
for women(Article 12); economic reform(Articles 13 and 14); and, the adoption of “all necessary measures at the 
national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights” in CEDAW (Article 24). 
198 Article 5(a) reads as follows: “To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of 
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” See Rebecca J. 
Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 30 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 634, 649-650 (1990) (confirming that CEDAW calls for state intervention in private matters marked by 
discriminatory conduct). 
199 The treaty bodies are: The Human Rights Committee established in terms of article 28 of the ICCPR; the 
Committee against Torture, established in terms of article 17 of the Torture Convention; the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, created in terms of article 17 of CEDAW; the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, established in terms of article 43 of the Children’s Convention;   
committees for the ICCPR and ICESCR respectively; the torture committee, established in terms of article __ of the 
Torture Convention; the CEDAW Committee, established in terms of article ___ of CEDAW; the Refugee 
Committee established in terms of article ___ of the ___; and, the Human Rights Committee established in terms of 
___. [Note: Citation to follow and content to be confirmed]  
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implementation of CEDAW by member states.200 Member states are required to submit regular 
reports to the CEDAW Committee on the “legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures” 
adopted to give effect to the provisions of CEDAW. 201 The majority of the CEDAW 
Committee’s work is examining these reports, interviewing state representatives, and proposing 
ways in which states can enhance gender equality.202  
 
6.2.3 Appraisal of CEDAW 
 
a. Textual Deficiency 
 
While the omission of any reference to violence in the text of CEDAW has been remedied to 
some extent by General Recommendation 19, the original text of CEDAW remains an unrefined 
tool that is disproportionate to address the extent and severity of violence against women.203 This 
thesis proposes that, if one considers that subsequent to the adoption of CEDAW new 
independent instruments regarding mass rape and trafficking were formulated due, in part, to a 
deficiency in CEDAW, a fortiori additional specification is also required for systemic intimate 
violence, which was not addressed in the original CEDAW text. 
 
To the extent that an international treaty exists for the protection of the rights of women, 
there is no escaping the fact that its text omits entirely any specific reference to preventing 
violence against women. The efficacy of DEVAW in enhancing the text of CEDAW to include 




One of the key deficiencies of CEDAW is the number of reservations entered by states 
against its seminal provisions.  
 
A reservation is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State … 
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in 
their application to that State.”204 Most reservations are lawful unless they are specifically 
prohibited by the treaty in question or if the reservation is “incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty.”205  
 
                                                
200 Article 17. The CEDAW Committee is responsible for monitoring “the progress made in the implementation” of 
CEDAW, which it does predominantly by receiving state reports on the status of women and holding dialogues with 
state representatives on the content of such reports. Article 17(1) read together with article 18 of CEDAW. 
201 A member state is required to submit a report within one year after entry into force for the state concerned and 
thereafter, at least every four years or whenever the CEDAW Committee requests. Article 18. 
202 Submissions are made to the Secretary-General of the U.N., for consideration by the CEDAW Committee. 
Article 17. 
203 See Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System,28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 952 (2003) (indicating that violence was not included in the original CEDAW text but 
that it has been developed through other instruments such as DEVAW). 
204 Article 2 of the Vienna Convention. 
205 The international law of treaties provides that, when signing a treaty, a state may enter a so-called reservation to 
such treaty. Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention. 
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There are various legal permutations when a party enters a reservation to a treaty 
provision.206 Generally speaking, a reservation modifies the treaty as between the reserving state 
and the other signatories but does not modify the treaty as between the other non-reserving 
signatories inter se. Under certain circumstances, parties to the treaty may object to reservations 
entered by other state parties, although this does not change the nature of the reservation.207 
 
There are several advantages and disadvantages to reservations.208 On the one hand, because 
of the flexibility to modify the treaty as desired, reservations induce more countries to sign 
treaties. On the other hand, they may dilute the efficacy of the treaty as a whole. This is 
problematic for the purposes of developing CIL since reservations to a particular part of a treaty 
will limit the extent to which a norm of international law can be said to have developed from the 
treaty and become applicable to non-signatories.209 After all, the interpretation of a treaty and the 
existence of its provisions in CIL are determined with reference to the text of the treaty and the 
language of the reservations thereto.210 
 
However, human rights treaties are outliers, different from all other treaties in international 
law because they operate against the state and for the benefit of the individual.211 Therefore, 
allowing the state to enter reservations against its own obligations could, and has, impeded the 
extent to which the treaty benefits the human beings in question.212 CEDAW is an example of 
this. 
 
While CEDAW boasts one of the highest numbers of member states to have signed and 
ratified a treaty, most state signatories have entered significant reservations to some of the more 
seminal provisions of CEDAW.213 In keeping with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, reservations may not be “incompatible with the object and purpose” of CEDAW.214 
                                                
206 Article 21 of the Vienna Convention. 
207 Article 20 of the Vienna Convention. 
208 See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 634, 649-650 (1990) (describing the advantages and disadvantages to allowing 
reservations in international human rights law). 
209 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (W.Ger. v. Den.) (W.Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 42-43. See Rebecca J. Cook, 
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 634, 651 footnote 35 (1990) (discussing the value of multi-party treaties as expanding CIL and citing Barcelona 
Traction case). 
210 See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 634, 653 (1990) (citing the IAC death penalty case). 
211 See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 634, 645-6 (1990). 
212 CEDAW allows for signatory states to enter reservations upon ratification or accession. Article 28(1). See 
William A Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79, 82 & 84-86 (1997) 
(describing the nature of reservations entered against CEDAW). See also Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW) in 1998, 33 INT’L LAW. 
637, 637 (1999) (describing the problematic nature of reservations to CEDAW because “ratification of the treaty had 
not translated into compliance through legislative and policy changes by many state parties.”). This was endorsed by 
the opinion of the International Court of Justice in its discussion of reservations to the Genocide Convention. 
213 See Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1996) (describing the number of states and 
the nature of the reservations they have entered against seminal provisions of CEDAW). 
214 Article 28(2). 
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This, however, has not stopped states from entering reservations against core provisions, such as 
article 2, with the result that many state parties have explicit discriminatory laws on their books 
and in practice.215  
 
The result is a treaty which facially prohibits the discrimination of women but whose 
member states actively and openly discriminate against their female citizens.216 In Nigeria, for 
example, “assault is not an offense if inflicted ‘by a husband for the purpose of correcting his 
wife,’ so long as it ‘does not amount to an infliction of grievous hurt.’”217 Algeria, Yemen and 
Mali are others examples of the concern that “that broad reservations to rights that would require 
any change in domestic law effectively mean ‘[n]o real international rights or obligations have 
thus been accepted.’”218 
 
This is not to say that reservations have rendered CEDAW nugatory; however, its primary 
usefulness has been for non-governmental organizations and not governmental conduct.219 In 
addition, it appears that CEDAW has been more successful in triggering new equality legislation 
rather than in rescinding old discriminatory legislation.220 
                                                
215 See Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform 
for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 19-20 (2005) (describing the sex discriminatory laws in several countries 
which have ratified CEDAW). See also Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women 
and the Human Rights System, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 953 (2003) (discussing the problem of reservations to 
CEDAW). See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 634, 687 (1990) (describing the reservation by Bangladesh with article 2 on the 
basis that it conflicts with Shari’a law. [Note: include ref to CEDAW Committee’s comment on the 25th anniversary 
of the adoption of CEDAW that “in no country in the world has women’s full de jure and de facto equality been 
achieved] 
216 See Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform 
for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 23-25 (2005) (describing the extent of sex discriminatory laws in countries 
such as Yemen, Sudan, Algeria, Mali and Nigeria). 
217 See Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform 
for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 23-25 (2005) (citing the U.N. Comm. On the Elimin. Of Discrim. Against 
Women, Statement to Commemorate the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Adoption of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, @ 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw25anniversary/cedaw25-cedaw.pdf (oct. 13, 2004)). 
218 This concern was raised by the Human Rights Committee, in its general comment on reservations. See Jessica 
Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform for 
Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 30 (2005). 
219 See Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform 
for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 37-38 (2005) (discussing the First CEDAW Impact Study, which concluded 
that “ratification of CEDAW had provided non-governmental organizations with an additional resource helpful to 
their advocacy efforts, but that in many states awareness of the Convention and its use in domestic activism 
remained very limited, even within the women’s rights movement… The study found that while the women’s rights 
framework and the use of CEDAW and CEDAW Committee reports had been ‘extremely useful’ in this respect, it 
could be argued that ‘it is at the grassroots level of organizing that these tools have been more effective.’”). 
220 See Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform 
for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 39 (2005). 
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c. Difficulties Faced by the CEDAW Committee  
 
The CEDAW Committee was designed to meet for a period of two weeks annually, during 
which time it is to review all country reports, hold dialogues with states, prepare comments and 
recommendations on the reports and provide feedback to the Secretary-General. No reference is 
made to remuneration.221  
 
CEDAW traditionally is one of the least empowered U.N. bodies, lacking office space, 
resources, and time.222 Its original meeting time was limited to no more than two weeks annually, 
a limitation which did not exist in respect of any other treaty body.223 In addition, it shares the 
same deficiency as many human rights bodies, namely, a lack of enforcement power.224 
 
d. Positive Impact 
 
While CEDAW is deficient in content and enforcement, the treaty is not a sinking ship. As 
anthropologist Merry states, “CEDAW is law without sanctions. But a close examination of the 
way in which the CEDAW process operates suggests that although it does not have the power to 
punish, it does important cultural work.”225 Firstly, it set a precedent for the development of 
women’s rights law in international law. Secondly, one of CEDAW’s more effective tools lies in 
the reporting procedures whereby states are required to report on the status of women’s rights in 
their country. This has a surprising impact by naming and shaming, a process which should not 
be undervalued if one views international human rights as a “cultural system whose coin is 
admission into the international community of human-rights-compliant states.”226 
 
Upon this basis, both legal and practical changes have taken hold, with varying degrees of 
success, throughout the world. There is no doubt that the international community and individual 
women are both better off for its existence. Yet CEDAW is only the beginning, and not the end, 
of the protection of women against violence. 
 
                                                
221 It has been reported that CEDAW Committee members are paid $3,000.00 a year as remuneration for their work. 
This includes eight weeks’ of meeting time and considerable preparation between meetings. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 238, footnote 6 
(2006). 
222 The CEDAW Committee was established with fewer resources, less financial support and less power than other 
treaty bodies. For a discussion of the difficulties faced by the CEDAW Committee see Margareth Etienne, 
Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International Context, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 139 [page 5] (1995). 
223 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 23 (1996) (describing the limitations of the CEDAW 
Committee due to weak U.N. support). 
224 See Andreea Vesa, International and Regional Standards for Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence, 12 AM. 
U.J. GENDER. SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 312 (2004) (arguing that the major deficiency in international law generally and 
in respect of domestic violence specifically is the lack of enforcement mechanisms.). See also Sally Engle Merry, 
Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System,28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 
942 (2003) (identifying the lack of enforcement mechanisms as CEDAW’s largest weakness). 
225 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL 
JUSTICE 72 (2006). 
226 Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System,28 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 941, 942-943 (2003). 
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6.3 U.N. Resolutions (1990) 
 
6.3.1 Status of the U.N. Resolutions 
 
U.N. resolutions are passed by the General Assembly of the U.N. Such resolutions 
technically are not binding on states, although there are arguments that U.N. resolutions 
constitute CIL and, therefore, are binding and authoritative.227 At the very least, resolutions set a 
standard, albeit advisory, of how states ought to behave. Moreover, because the members of the 
U.N. vote on them in the General Assembly, it is arguable that resolutions constitute proof of 
CIL, articulating the opinio juris of nations. Within the context of CIL, therefore, a U.N. 
resolution is tentative evidence of the existence of an international norm.228  
 
6.3.2 Content of the U.N. Resolutions 
 
a. The 1985 U.N. Resolution 
 
The 1985 U.N. resolution is one of the first references to the public permutations of 
domestic violence.229 It focuses, inter alia, on the negative impact of domestic violence on 
children, the family and the victim.230  
 
The resolution suggests that states are responsible for the prevention of domestic violence 
and the assistance of victims. However, this suggestion is directed only to “Member States 
concerned.” The adjective “concerned” suggests that those states which are not concerned need 
not comply with the recommendations of the U.N. While this is probably a linguistic nuance that 
is unlikely to form the basis of a state’s claim to be exempt from its international obligations to 
protect women, it does contribute to a general atmosphere that the resolution is advisory and 
tentative, rather than authoritative and binding. 
 
The 1985 resolution does not claim to be anything more than a point of departure from 
which the international law of domestic violence should be developed by international 
                                                
227 See Jo Lynn Slama [note], Opinio Juris in CIL, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 647 (1990) (describing the 
opinions of the International Court of Justice in Western Sahara and the Nicaragua cases, which “make clear that 
opinio juris may be manifested in the Resolutions of the United Nations. “[T]he cumulative impact of many 
resolutions when similar in content voted for by overwhelming majorities and frequently repeated over a period of 
time may give rise to a general opinio juris and thus constitute a norm of CIL.”). 
228 See BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 5 (describing the types of instruments and events which qualify as evidence of 
the rules of CIL, including “resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly.”). The 
debate as to what constitutes CIL is extensive. Indeed, as discussed below, the entire notion of CIL is challenged on 
the basis, inter alia, that it is undemocratic and imprecise, subject to inconsistent interpretation. For a discussion in 
this regard, see Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000) (rejecting CIL as a viable source of 
international law). 
229 Article 3, for example, requests “the Secretary General to intensify research on domestic violence from a 
criminological perspective…” 
230 See Preamble, paragraphs 4-8 and 10. Specifically, the resolution notes the “situation of women as victims of 
crime” (Id., article 1) and invites “Member States concerned to take specific action urgently in order to prevent 
domestic violence and to render the appropriate assistance to the victims thereof.” (Id., article 2). 
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organizations and by states.231 It “invites” member states to adopt certain measures, with a view 
to “making the criminal and civil justice system more sensitive in its response to domestic 
violence.”232 Once again, the language is permissive and not mandatory, in keeping with the 
legal nature of the resolution. However, notwithstanding that the resolution merely ‘invites’ 
states to amend their justice systems, it does constitute an expression of the way law ought to be, 
thereby creating a preliminary standard of state behavior as regards domestic violence. As an 
initial statement on the matter, therefore, the 1985 resolution is an important expression of basic 
government action. 
 
Governments are invited under the resolution to make several broad changes to their justice 
systems to deal with the punishment of abusers and the protection of victims.233 First, the 
resolution states that states ought to introduce civil and criminal legislation addressing domestic 
violence, enforce such legislation, protect battered family members and punish the offenders.234 
It is interesting that already in 1985 the U.N. recognized the necessity of “alternative ways of 
treatment for offenders, according to the type of violence.”235 The resolution identifies the 
“special and sometimes delicate position of the victim” and compels states to be respectful of 
victims “in particular in the manner in which the victim is treated.”236 The delicacy of the 
victim’s position includes the recognition that urgent and temporary solutions are required, such 
as “shelters and other facilities and services for the safety of victims.”237 
 
The resolution also identifies the need to prevent domestic violence, and not only punish its 
perpetrators.238 This reveals an awareness of three factors: (1) the normalization of domestic 
violence through social endorsement; (2) the connection between inequality, ignorance and 
gender-based harm; and, (3) the obligation of the state to prevent the violence by addressing each 
link in the chain of violence.239  
 
                                                
231 Article 3, for example, is a request to the Secretary-General “to intensify research on domestic violence from a 
criminological perspective to formulate distinct action-oriented strategies that could serve as a basis for policy 
formulation….” The resolution also invites other bodies within the U.N. to address domestic violence as a 
component of their mandates. Id articles 4-6. 
232 Id., article 7. 
233 Id., article 7. 
234 Id., article 7(a). 
235 Id., article 7(a). 
236 Id., article 7(b). In addition, article 7(e) calls on states to provide “specialized assistance to victims of domestic 
violence…” 
237 Id., article 7(f). Article 7(g) refers to “specialized training and units for those who deal in some capacity with 
victims of domestic violence.” 
238 It calls on states to “initiate preventive measures, such as providing support and counselling to families, in order 
to improve their ability to create a non-violent environment, emphasizing principles of education, equality of rights 
and equality of responsibilities between men and women, their partnership and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.” 
Id., article 7(c). 
239 This is confirmed in article 7(d), which calls on states to create public awareness of the problem of domestic 
violence, specifically as regards “serious acts of violence perpetrated against children.” Article 7(h) also requires 
states to “research and collect data on the background, extent and types of domestic violence.” The resolution also 
refers to the importance of integrating social welfare and health administration with the work of the criminal justice 
system in addressing domestic violence. 
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Finally, the resolution pre-empts the difficulty of reconciling overt state intervention to 
prevent domestic violence with the right to privacy.240 While it does not provide a specific 
solution to the way in which this balance can be achieved, it does compel states to take balanced 
measures and, implicitly at least, the resolution acknowledges that it is possible to have more 
proactive domestic violence laws without compromising the right to privacy. 
          
b. The 1990 U.N. Resolution 
 
The preamble to the 1990 U.N. resolution refers to the “concern of Member States about 
domestic violence as an urgent problem deserving focused attention and concerted action.”241 
This statement indicates that states view domestic violence as an international concern and 
records a type of international consensus against domestic violence that was absent in the 1985 
resolution.  
 
The 1990 U.N. resolution also takes a tentative step in the direction of recognizing domestic 
violence as having an impact on the broader society and not only on the immediate lives of the 
victims.242 This public component is also reflected in the resolution’s proposed solutions to 
combat domestic violence through “multidisciplinary policies, measures and strategies, within 
and outside of the criminal justice system.”243 However, the detail of these steps is left to the 
investigation and imagination of the states.244 While states are urged to cooperate with each other 
and with non-governmental organizations, as regards research findings, there is no stipulation as 
to what states should do with such information.245  
 
6.3.3 Appraisal of the U.N. Resolutions 
 
The 1985 and 1990 resolutions are ambiguous, both in language and content. Certainly the 
1990 resolution is vague and general and provides no specificity as to what steps states should be 
taking to achieve the objective. There is little direct discussion regarding the nature of the right 
in question, the enforceability of the concomitant international obligation and the international 
relevance of the violence.  
 
                                                
240 Article 7(i) invites states to make “legal remedies to domestic violence more accessible and, in view of the 
criminogenic effects of the phenomenon, in particular on young victims, to give due consideration to the interests of 
society by maintaining a balance between intervention and the protection of privacy.” 
241 Paragraph 9 of the Preamble. The Preamble to the 1990 resolution makes several references to the family and the 
destructive force of domestic violence to the family unit. Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 7, and 10 of the Preamble. 
242 See paragraphs 10, 14, 15, and 17 of the Preamble. 
243 Article 1. The resolution also makes reference to “legal, law enforcement, judicial, societal, educational, 
psychological, economic, health-related and correctional aspects…” Id. 
244 The same is true as regards the resolution’s recommendation that states ensure that their criminal justice systems 
are effective and equitable as regards domestic violence. Article 2. Although, it should be noted that article 5 of the 
resolution requests the Secretary-General “to convene a working group of experts, within existing or with 
extrabudgetary resources, to formulate guidelines or a manual for practitioners concerning the problem of domestic 
violence for consideration at the Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders and its regional preparatory meetings, taking into account the conclusions of the report of the Secretary-
General on domestic violence.” 
245 Article 3. 
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In all fairness, however, these are factors that are evident with the hindsight of research (the 
very thing required by these resolutions) and the absence of political exigencies, which may or 
may not have influenced the permissive atmosphere of the documents.  
 
The resolutions prioritize domestic violence in the general areas of crime prevention and 
criminal justice, thus changing the character of domestic violence from a family law infraction to 
a violation of justice.246 Ultimately, the U.N. resolutions contribute to the body of evidence 
proving that domestic violence is an international concern, requiring attention at an international 
level and demonstrating (in theory) a consensus of states that the activities of private individuals, 
in the context of domestic violence, is in fact the responsibility of states.  
 
6.4 General Recommendation 19 (1992) 
 
As will be discussed in chapter five, violence against women became increasingly important 
in the CEDAW Committee meetings around the time of General Recommendation 19.  
 
General Recommendations 12 and 19, passed in 1989 and 1994 respectively, were official 
statements of the CEDAW committee, incorporating violence against women, including 
domestic violence, into the treaty’s framework.247  
 
6.4.1 Status of General Recommendation 19 
 
The CEDAW Committee is empowered to “make suggestions and general recommendations 
based on the examination of reports and information received from the State Parties.”248 General 
Recommendations 12 and 19 are examples of this power. General Recommendation 12 urged 
states to consider the seriousness of violence against women and required statistics on gender-
based violence.249 As the later and more comprehensive recommendation, the discussion 
hereafter focuses on General Recommendation 19. 
 
General recommendations by U.N. treaty bodies are not automatically binding on state 
parties to the treaty in question and are used to explain or interpret provisions within the 
governing treaty.250 However, as with U.N. resolutions passed by the General Assembly, general 
                                                
246 Article 4. 
247 Report on the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: General Recommendation No. 
12, Violence Against Women (8th Sess. 1989), adopted 3 Mar. 1989, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 38, ¶ ¶ 7-9, 
24, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1990), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by the Human Rights Treaty-bodies, at 78, U.N. Doc. HRI./GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994), establishing that violence 
against women was prohibited by CEDAW, supra note 21, and General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, at 5. 
248 Article 21(1) of CEDAW. 
249 Report on the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: General Recommendation No. 
12, Violence Against Women (8th Sess. 1989), adopted 3 Mar. 1989, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 38, ¶ ¶ 7-9, 
24, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1990), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by the Human Rights Treaty-bodies, at 78, U.N. Doc. HRI./GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994). 
250 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL 
JUSTICE 75 (2006) (“CEDAW General Recommendations are not legally binding in the same way as the terms of 
CEDAW, but they are designed to show states their obligations when they are not mentioned or not sufficiently 
explained in the convention itself.”). 
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recommendations made by treaty bodies may constitute evidence of the existence of a rule of 
CIL. The rule of CIL, in turn, theoretically binds all states.251  
 
As will be argued in chapter four, General Recommendation 19 contributes to the plethora of 
evidence indicating the existence of an international norm against domestic violence in CIL. 
Therefore, in a cumulative sense, General Recommendation is an important instrument for 
domestic violence.  
 
6.4.2 Content of General Recommendation 19 
 
a. Violence Equals Discrimination  
 
General Recommendation 19 amends the textual gap in CEDAW and states expressly that 
the “definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence… [which] may breach specific 
provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention 
violence”252 Gender-based violence is “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a 
woman or that affects women disproportionately.”253 
 
Domestic violence, referred to as violence in the family, is described as:  
 
one of the most insidious forms of violence against women. It is prevalent in all societies. Within 
family relationships women of all ages are subjected to violence of all kinds, including battering, 
rape, other forms of sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence, which are perpetuated by 
traditional attitudes. Lack of economic independence forces many women to stay in violent 
relationships. The abrogation of their family responsibilities by men can be a form of violence, 
and coercion. These forms of violence put women's health at risk and impair their ability to 
participate in family life and public life on a basis of equality.254 
 
The recommendation links violence against women to other international human rights 
violations, such as torture and discrimination.255 It creates an express link between discrimination 
and violence. It reiterates states’ obligations to end to all forms of discrimination against women 
and explains that “[t]raditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or 
as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving violence or coercion…”256  
 
Because states have an obligation to prevent discrimination, and because violence against 
women is a manifestation of discrimination, QED states have an obligation to prevent violence 
against women. Therefore, states are required to take positive steps to prevent violence against 
women, whether perpetrated by public or private actors.257  
 
                                                
251 See BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 5. 
252 Article 6.  
253 Article 6. 
254 Paragraph 23. 
255 Article 7(b). It cites violence as “a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits womens’ [sic] ability to enjoy 
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” 
256 Article 11. 
257 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, at paragraph 4: “The full implementation of the Convention 
required States to take positive measures to eliminate all forms of violence against women.” 
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b. Culture Cannot Justify Violence  
 
General Recommendation 19 makes a bold statement as regards cultural and traditional 
“prejudices and practices [which] may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or 
control of women.”258 It rejects this, explaining that the “underlying consequences of these forms 
of gender-based violence help to maintain women in subordinate roles and contribute to the low 
level of political participation and to their lower level of education, skills and work 
opportunities.”259 
 
c. Types of Prohibited Violence  
 
General Recommendation 19 prohibits a wide range of violence. In general, violence against 
women is said to include “acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of 
such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.”260 The following forms of violence against 
women are listed specifically: family violence and abuse; forced marriage; dowry deaths; acid 
attacks; female circumcision;261 prostitution;262 trafficking;263 rape in general;264 sexual assault in 
armed conflict;265 sexual harassment;266 dietary restrictions for pregnant women;267 sexual 
exploitation of rural women;268 and, compulsory sterilization and abortion.269 The effect of the 
violence is “to deprive them [women] the equal enjoyment, exercise and knowledge of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms [sic].”270 
 
“Family violence” is discussed separately and extensively. It is described as “one of the most 
insidious forms of violence against women,” which affects women of all ages.271 The 
Recommendation explains that family violence is universal and “prevalent in all societies.”272 It 
describes the variety of types of harm, such as “battering, rape, other forms of sexual assault, 
mental and other forms of violence…” and the “abrogation of their family responsibilities by 
men” as a form of violence and coercion.273 It reveals that women are unable to leave the abusive 
situations because a “[l]ack of economic independence forces many women to stay in violent 
relationships.”274 It raises the context of discrimination such as traditional attitudes which 
perpetuate the violence.275 It concludes by stating that “[t]hese forms of violence put women's 
                                                
258 Article 11. 
259 Article 11. 
260 Article 1. 
261 Article 11. 
262 Articles 13 and 15. 
263 Articles 14 and 16. 
264 Article 15. 
265 Article 16. 
266 Article 17. 
267 Articles 19 and 20. 
268 Article 21. 
269 Article 22. 
270 Article 11. 
271 Article 23. 
272 Article 23. 
273 Article 23. 
274 Article 23. 
275 Article 23. 
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health at risk and impair their ability to participate in family life and public life on a basis of 
equality.”276 
 
d. State Obligations   
 
As regards the responsibility for violence, General Recommendation 19 states that CEDAW 
applies to violence “perpetrated by public authorities.”277 However, in the following, separate 
article it is “emphasized… that discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by 
or on behalf of Governments.”278 This article refers to the fact that CEDAW requires state parties 
to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise.”279 It then cites “general international law and specific human rights 
covenants” as authority for the fact that states “may also be responsible for private acts if they 
fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of 
violence, and for providing compensation.”280 
 
After listing the forms of gender-based violence, General Recommendation 19 makes several 
recommendations to state parties.281 These recommendations can be grouped into three 
categories: (1) legal; (2) educational and (3) research. State parties are encouraged to comment 
on the implementation of these steps in their reports to the CEDAW Committee.282 
 
There are several aspects of the recommendations which focus on “family violence.” The 
first broad recommendation is of specific importance to systemic intimate violence. It requires 
state parties to “take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-based 
violence, whether by public or private act.”283 Irrespective of whether the violence is conducted 
by private citizens or government entities, the state, it is suggested, remains responsible for the 
violence.  
 
The recommendation is far more specific as regards systemic intimate violence (known as 
family violence):284 it calls for criminal penalties “where necessary and civil remedies in cases of 
domestic violence;”285 it denounces the defense of honor for crimes of assault against or murder 
of female family members and requires its removal by legislation; 286 it recognizes the victims’ 
immediate need for safety, “including refuges, counselling and rehabilitation programmes;”287 it 
                                                
276 Article 23. 
277 Article 8 (“Such acts of violence may breach that State's obligations under general international human rights law 
and under other conventions, in addition to breaching this Convention.”). 
278 Article 9. 
279 Article 9. 
280 Article 9. 
281 Article 24. 
282 Article 24(v) provides that the reports of state parties “should include information on the legal, preventive and 
protective measures that have been taken to overcome violence against women, and on the effectiveness of such 
measures.” In addition, reference is made to the reporting requirement in articles 24(b), (e), (h), (j), (l), (n), (q), (s), 
and (u). 
283 Article 24(a). 
284 Article 24(r)(). 
285 Article 24(r)(i). 
286 Article 24(r)(ii). 
287 Article 24(r)(iii). 
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requires “[r]ehabilitation programs for the perpetrators of domestic violence;”288 and support 
service for families “where incest or sexual abuse has occurred.”289 
 
6.4.3 Appraisal of General Recommendation 19 
 
General Recommendation 19 incorporates a broad definition of violence against women into 
CEDAW. To some degree, this closes the textual loophole of the original CEDAW text. It also 
formed the basis for the U.N. declaration, DEVAW and, therefore, is one of a series of triggers 
which, so to speak, raised violence against women out of the margins of international discourse 
and into the mainframe of international law.290  
 
However, there are three core ways in which General Recommendation 19 is deficient.  
 
First, as its name suggests, General Recommendation 19 is of interpretive value only. It does 
not constitute an amendment to the treaty and, again depending on one’s interpretation of CIL, it 
is not clear whether it is binding on member states.291 After all, this is not a resolution or 
declaration by the community of states represented in the General Assembly. It is an 
interpretation by the committee endowed with the power to administer the treaty. To the extent to 
which this could be viewed as binding CIL is contentious. 
 
The recommendation points out that discrimination “is not restricted” to acts of government 
but it does not authoritatively extend responsibility to private conduct; rather it reminds state 
parties that they “may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to 
prevent violations of rights.” No right against systemic intimate violence is established by this 
paragraph and certainly no clear state obligation manifests. While the first recommendation calls 
on state parties to overcome gender-based violence, “whether by public or private act,” it 
remains a recommendation, which can be applied to systemic intimate violence only by 
extrapolation.292 
 
Second, even though there is sufficient content in General Recommendation 19 to argue that 
states should investigate, prosecute and punish systemic intimate violence, and pay 
compensation if they fail to do so, there is no express statement to this effect. As far as the text of 
General Recommendation 19 is concerned, there is only tentative authority that systemic 
intimate violence is a violation of a woman’s rights for which her state can be held responsible. 
 
Third, the underlying theory of General Recommendation 19 “is that improving women’s 
status with relation to men will reduce their vulnerability to violence.”293 In other words, General 
Recommendation 19 links violence against women to discrimination. At a purely intellectual 
level, this is correct: violence against women is a direct consequence of discrimination. 
                                                
288 Article 24(r)(iv). 
289 Article 24(r)(v). 
290 See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO 
LOCAL JUSTICE 76 (2006). 
291 Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000) (rejecting CIL as a source of international law). 
292 Article 24(a). 
293 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL 
JUSTICE 77 (2006). 
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However, it is not necessarily the best approach in international law. This is because many states 
actively practice gender discrimination or gender differentiation but nonetheless strive to 
eradicate violence against women. In linking violence to discrimination in such absolute terms, it 
becomes even more difficult to obtain the cooperation of stratified states. For example, 
Palestinian women have argued for a reinterpretation of Islam that would grant them greater 
safety, without requiring the equivalent treatment of men and women that would contradict the 
tenets of Islam.294  
 
This is a difficult line to walk. It is counter-intuitive to discuss the reduction of violence 
against women without a commitment to gender equality. However, the heterogeneity of nations 
seems to require us to slice the cord linking violence against women to discrimination. While it 
is far from ideal, it should still be possible to lobby in certain states for the safety of women, 
albeit at the most basic level, within the confines of gender stratification. I emphasize that this is 
not ideal. However, encouraging states to comply with the narrow norm of reducing systemic 
intimate violence may introduce more state parties to the women’s rights discourse.  
 
6.5 Beijing Platform for Action and the Special Rapporteur (1995) 
 
The Beijing Platform for Action was a turning point. Due to an admirable strength of will 
and organization, women’s rights groups succeeded in changing the general view of violence 
against women in two ways. They demonstrated its global pervasiveness and highlighted its 
public nature, thereby ending the demarcation of violence against women as a private and quasi-
legal phenomenon. 
 
In addition, Beijing had a positive effect on the adoption and implementation of CEDAW, 
leading to greater compliance with CEDAW and more national reform.295 States entered 
objections to reservations which had been made and reserving states began to rescind their 
original reservations.296  
 
One of the reasons for the success of Beijing was its pure size. The extent of the conference 
and its global and eclectic attendance made it one of the more visible international events.297 
However, it has been criticized for its lack of enforcement mechanisms and for the fact that its 
follow-up procedure does not allow for state-specific assessment.298  
                                                
294 See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO 
LOCAL JUSTICE 77 (2006). 
295 Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform for 
Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 46 (2005). 
296 Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform for 
Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 43 (2005) (describing the impact of Beijing on the reservations made to key 
CEDAW provisions). 
297 Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform for 
Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 47 (2005). 
298 Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform for 
Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 51 (2005). See also Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of CIL, 92 
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6.6 DEVAW (1994) 
 
6.6.1 Status of DEVAW  
 
DEVAW is the most explicit international instrument regarding domestic violence. It has 
been argued that DEVAW is a representation of CIL, even though it is not a treaty.299 The new 
wave of CIL theory would recognize DEVAW as evidence of a norm against violence against 
women. According to this body of theory, “declaratory resolutions which, if accepted by an 
overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, usually by consensus or by an almost 
unanimous vote, can also constitute ‘generally accepted’ principles of international law.”300 
Theorist Louis Sohn maintains that “[a]ll these documents have by now been generally accepted 
even if at their birth there have been some doubts about their normative character.”301 
 
6.6.2 Content of DEVAW 
 
DEVAW is based largely on the provisions of General Recommendation 19. DEVAW 
summarizes three forms of violence as violations of international law, namely, violence in the 
family, public violence, and violence that is condoned by the state, irrespective of where it 
occurs.302 It also stipulates that states should exercise “due diligence to prevent, investigate and, 
in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those 
acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.”303 Finally, DEVAW instructs states to 
                                                                                                                                                       
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 46 (1998) (arguing that the Vienna Conference on Human Rights and the Beijing 
Declaration “contain relatively modest initiatives to improve the situation of women and reinforce a stereotype of 
women as wives and mothers. In any event, the compliance requirements in the official documents are very weak.”). 
299 Surya P. Subedi, Protection of Women against Domestic Violence: The Response of International Law, 6 
E.H.R.L.R. 587, 598-599 (1997) (arguing that if declarations and resolutions are coupled with state practice and 
opinion jurisdiction, this may “give rise to the emergence of new rules of CIL). See also Patrick Kelly, The Twilight 
of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L., 452, 484-5 (2000) (describing the so-called new CIL which maintains that “unanimous 
and near-unanimous resolutions and declarations of the U.N. General Assembly and other international fora 
constitute a consensus in legal norms providing clear evidence of the opinio juris of nations.”). See also Louis Sohn, 
“Generally Accepted” International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1986). Sohn states quite explicitly that, 
based on statements by the International Court of Justice, “once a principle is generally accepted at an international 
conference, usually through consensus, a rule of CIL can emerge without having to wait for the signature of the 
convention.” Id at 1077. 
Others view this as “declarative” law which is distinct from CIL. For a discussion of this view, see Hiram Chodosh, 
Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 87 (1991). 
300 Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (1986). 
301 Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1986). 
302 Article 2 of DEVAW, supra note 22, includes the following forms of violence in its definition: “(a) Physical, 
sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in 
the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful 
to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (b) Physical, sexual and psychological 
violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation 
at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (c) Physical, sexual 
and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.” 
303 Article 4(c) of DEVAW, supra note 22. 
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develop sanctions to punish perpetrators of violence against women and to make the system of 
justice accessible for injured women.304 
 
6.6.3 Appraisal of DEVAW 
 
DEVAW effectively does what women have been demanding for decades: it requires the 
state to get involved.305 The least contentious position is that it is a guide as to how states, should 
they wish to achieve an end to violence against women, ought to go about it.306  
 
As a statement by an authoritative institution it sets an international precedent that violence 
against women is objectionable. As a declaration, however, its authority is questionable. Whether 
or not it can be demarcated as a principle of international law remains the subject of much 
debate.307 It is possible to conclude that DEVAW “was never intended to be the end of this 
process, but rather a first solid foundation on the basis of which States were supposed to take 
actions at all levels designed to eliminate violence against women.”308  
 
6.7 The Optional Protocol (2000) 
 
6.7.1 Legal Status of the Optional Protocol 
 
The Optional Protocol is an addendum to CEDAW and requires signature and ratification 
like any other treaty.309 It was adopted by the General Assembly on 6 October 1999 and entered 
into force on 22 December 2000.310 As of 1 March 2006, 77 states had ratified the Optional 
Protocol.311 Reservations are not permitted by the Optional Protocol.312 
                                                
304 Article 4(d) of DEVAW, supra note 22: “Develop penal, civil, labour and administrative sanctions in domestic 
legislation to punish and redress the wrongs caused to women who are subjected to violence; women who are 
subjected to violence should be provided with access to the mechanisms of justice and, as provided for by national 
legislation, to just and effective remedies for the harm that they have suffered; States should also inform women of 
their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms.” 
305 Article 4(h) of DEVAW, supra note 22, also encourages States to include in their budgets “adequate resources 
for their activities related to the elimination of violence against women.” Article 4(k), which deals with the 
compilation of statistics and the collection of data, makes specific reference to domestic violence and “the causes, 
nature, seriousness and consequences of violence against women.” 
306 Preamble to DEVAW, supra note 22, (the U.N. General Assembly “urges that every effort be made so that it 
becomes generally known and respected”). There are arguments that U.N. resolutions and declarations are not CIL 
and therefore cannot be applied to a generality of states. Hiram Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The 
Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 87, 89 (1991). 
307 See Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986); Michael Reisman, 
The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CALIF. W. INT’L L.J. 133 (1987); Hiram Chodosh, Neither Treaty 
Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 87 (1991); and, Patrick Kelly, 
The Twilight of CIL, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000). 
308 Surya P. Subedi, Protection of Women against Domestic Violence: The Response of International Law, 6 
E.H.R.L.R. 587, 602 (1997). 
309 See CSW Overview supra n. 
310 See CSW Overview supra n. The General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 6 
October 1999 in its resolution 54/4 (A/RES/54/4), without reference to a Main Committee. The Optional Protocol 
was open for signature on 10 December, 1999, Human Rights Day. On 22 December 2000, following receipt of the 
tenth instrument of ratification, the Optional Protocol entered into force. 
311 See CSW Overview supra n. 
312 Article 17. 
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The Optional Protocol enables the CEDAW committee to receive communications by or on 
behalf of individuals who have grievances falling within the scope of CEDAW.313 It also gives 
the CEDAW committee investigative powers, significantly augmenting the status of CEDAW. 
However, the Optional Protocol has been used only once and only countries which ratify the 
protocol may be brought into the CEDAW committee’s jurisdiction.314 
 
6.7.2 Content of the Optional Protocol 
 
State parties to the Optional Protocol recognize the authority of the CEDAW Committee to 
receive and consider communications by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals.315 
There are substantive and procedural requirements in order for a communication to be 
admissible.316  
 
However, the Optional Protocol operates only on the basis of exhaustion of local remedies. 
Therefore, a complaint will only be considered by the CEDAW Committee if it is clear that “all 
available domestic remedies have been exhausted unless the application of such remedies is 
unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief.”317 In addition, if a communication 
is manifestly ill-founded or not sufficiently substantiated, it will be inadmissible.318 
 
Provision is made for interim urgent relief.319 The CEDAW Committee may request a state 
party urgently “to take such interim measures as may be necessary to avoid possible irreparable 
damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violation.”320 Under ordinary circumstances, 
however, state parties have six months in which to respond to the allegations contained in the 
communication.321 Once the CEDAW Committee has evaluated the communication and made its 
recommendations available to the state and the parties in question, the state party is required to 
consider the recommendations and respond in writing within six months.322 
 
The Optional Protocol also allows for the CEDAW Committee to initiate investigations meru 
moto, if it receives “reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations by a State 
Party of rights set forth in the Convention.”323 Under such circumstances, the state party is 
invited “to cooperate in the examination of the information” and to submit observations.324 The 
                                                
313 Article 2 of the CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 22. 
314 The CEDAW Committee can only entertain communications concerning a state which is a party of both CEDAW 
and the Optional Protocol. Article 3. 
315 Articles 1 and 2. Such individuals must be members of state parties and can claim to be victims of a violation of a 
right protected by CEDAW. 
316 Article 4. 
317 Article 4(1). 
318 Article 4(2)(c). 
319 Article 5. 
320 Article 5(1). 
321 Article 6. 
322 The state party “shall give due consideration to the views of the Committee, together with its recommendations, 
if any, and shall submit to the Committee, within six months, a written response, including information on any 
action taken in the light of the views and recommendations of the Committee.” Article 7(4). 
323 Article 8(1). 
324 Article 8(1). 
 78 
CEDAW Committee is empowered to conduct inquiries and, if warranted, visit the territory of 
the state in question, with the state’s consent.325 Most of the inquiries are conducted 
confidentially.326 Thereafter the procedure mirrors the communications process: the CEDAW 
Committee examines the findings of the inquiry; submits its findings to the state party; and, the 
state party has six months in which to respond.327 While reservations to the Optional Protocol are 
not permitted, a state party is entitled to “declare that it does not recognize the competence of the 
Committee” as described above.328 
 
6.7.3 Analysis of Cases under the Optional Protocol 
 
There have been two applications under the Optional Protocol, which have both been 
declared inadmissible, and one investigation. While it is probably too early to asses the efficacy 
of the complaints procedure in the Optional Protocol, it is necessary and useful to analyze the 
three cases that have been considered by the CEDAW Committee to date. 
 
a. Ms B.-J. v. Germany 
 
The first application, made by a German citizen against Germany, involved a divorced 
woman who had been unable to secure a final maintenance hearing in Germany and was living in 
a state of dire financial uncertainty. The CEDAW Committee declared the application 
inadmissible on the basis that the applicant had not exhausted local remedies and that the 
CEDAW Committee was precluded ratione temporis from considering certain aspects of the 
complaint.329  
 
In a separate opinion, two CEDAW Committee members dissented from the majority 
opinion, maintaining that the domestic proceedings regarding the allocation of maintenance were 
unreasonably prolonged.330 Since the complainant was an older woman who had dedicated three 
decades of her life to supporting her family and husband, the lack of certainty of her financial 
income five years after the divorce “is rightly considered to be unacceptable and a serious 
violation of her human rights in and of itself.”331 
 
There are compelling reasons to support both the majority and the minority positions. The 
majority applied a narrow, black letter analysis to the facts, which demonstrates a positive 
restraint on “judicial activism” and compliance with the letter of the Optional Protocol. This will 
be a comfort to states which are concerned that the CEDAW Committee might become a loose 
                                                
325 Article 8(2). 
326 Articles 6(1) and 8(5). 
327 Article 8(3)-(4). 
328 Article 10(1). 
329 See Excerpt from A/59/38 Annex VIII Decision of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, declaring a communication inadmissible under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Communication No.: 1/2003, Ms. B.-J. v. Germany (Decision 
adopted on 14 July 2004, thirty-first session) Submitted by: Ms. B.-J. Alleged victim: The author State party: 
Germany Date of communication: 20 August 2002 (initial submission), paragraphs 8.4, 8.5, and 8.8(a).  




canon if too much power is vested in it. The minority, on the other hand, focused on the 
complainant’s enduring status quo, which breaches both the letter and the spirit of CEDAW. 
 
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the communication, the complaint against Germany 
proves that the mechanism is functional and respectable.  
 
b. Ms A.T. v. Hungary 
 
The second communication made to the CEDAW Committee under the Optional Protocol 
deals directly with domestic violence.332 The communication, submitted by a Hungarian citizen 
against Hungary, claimed, inter alia, that Hungary had failed to protect her from extreme and 
repetitive forms of domestic violence, thereby violating its obligations in terms of CEDAW.  
 
There are four important aspects to this opinion. The first is that Hungary does not actually 
dispute many of the allegations made against it. Rather, it demonstrates steps it has taken and 
will take to improve its laws and policy regarding domestic violence. Second, the CEDAW 
Committee does not hesitate to include domestic violence within its ambit of consideration. 
Third, the manner in which the claimant describes the pattern of domestic violence, and the 
acknowledgement by both the CEDAW Committee and Hungary of the fact that this violates the 
claimant’s human rights, is weighty evidence of the right in international law to be free from 
systemic intimate violence. Finally, the claimant asks for urgent interim relief, the success of 
which remains unclear. 
 
Hungary raises very few exceptions to the communication.333 It refers to the fact that 
domestic violence is a problem in Hungary and that the laws must be adjusted to address this.334 
In addition, it makes reference to the CEDAW Committee’s instructions in this regard on the 
combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Hungary in 2002.335 On the one hand, this 
acknowledgment of responsibility is frustrating, not least of all because the improved 
mechanisms did not in fact assist the claimant (although this too is acknowledged by the state).336 
On the other hand, as a result of its interaction with the CEDAW Committee, Hungary has made 
                                                
332 See Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
Communication No.: 2/2003, Ms. A.T. v. Hungary (Views adopted on 26 January 2005, thirty-second session) 
Submitted by: Ms. A.T. Alleged victim: The author State party: Hungary Date of communication: 10 October 2003 
(initial submission) The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, established under article 
17 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Meeting on 26 January 
2005. 
333 In fact, it abrogates its right to make procedural exceptions, notwithstanding the possible viability of such 
exceptions. See paragraph 5.6 of the opinion, indicating that the state party “maintains that “although the author did 
not make effective use of the domestic remedies available to her and although some domestic proceedings are still 
pending, the State party does not wish to raise any preliminary objections as to the Advance Unedited Version 
admissibility of the communication. At the same time, the State party admits that these remedies were not capable of 
providing immediate protection to the author from illtreatment by her former partner.” 
334 Paragraph 5.7. 
335 Paragraph 5.7. 
336 Paragraph 7.4 (“Based on the experience of the Office in the present case as well as in general, it is conceded that 
the legal and institutional system in Hungary is not ready yet to ensure the internationally expected, coordinated, 
comprehensive and effective protection and support for the victims of domestic violence.” 
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meaningful amendments to its domestic violence laws, most notably the incorporation of 
protection orders, which, prior to the submission of the communication, did not exist.337 
 
The claimant’s articulation of her claim and the CEDAW Committee’s acceptance thereof, 
demonstrates the revised approach in international law to domestic violence, which incorporates 
the role of the state in allowing the violence to perpetuate. The communication maintains that 
“the irrationally lengthy criminal procedures against L.F. [the abuser], the lack of protection 
orders or restraining orders under current Hungarian law, and the fact that L.F. has not spent any 
time in custody, constitute violations of her rights under the Convention as well as violations of 
General Recommendation 19 of the Committee. She maintains that these criminal procedures 
can hardly be considered effective and/or immediate protection.”338 This is acknowledged by 
Hungary and confirmed by the CEDAW Committee. When Hungary conceded that its legal and 
institutional system was “not ready yet to ensure the internationally expected, coordinated, 
comprehensive and effective protection and support for the victims of domestic violence,”339 it 
accepted that such a standard exists and that it is bound to comply with it. The CEDAW 
Committee confirms that a state can be held responsible for the conduct of non-state actors and 
imposes liability on Hungary for the following: 
 
For four years and continuing to the present day, the author has felt threatened by her former 
common law husband – the father of her two children. The author has been battered by the same 
man, i.e. her former common law husband. She has been unsuccessful, either through civil or 
criminal proceedings, to temporarily or permanently bar L.F. from the apartment where she and 
her children have continued to reside. The author could not have asked for a restraining or 
protection order since neither option currently exists in the State party. She has been unable to 
flee to a shelter because none are equipped to take her in together with her children, one of whom 
is fully disabled. None of these facts have been disputed by the State party and, considered 
together, they indicate that the rights of the author under articles 5 (a) and 16 of the Convention 
have been violated.340 
 
The general discussion of the type of violence perpetrated against the claimant echoes the 
definition of systemic intimate violence described above. The violence is described as 
“severe,”341 a “persistent situation of insecurity,”342 comprising physical, mental and financial 
abuse, and threats of harm.343 Most importantly, the CEDAW Committee details the many ways 
in which the state systemically and systematically failed to assist the complainant: there were no 
protection or restraining orders; there were no shelters which would admit the complainant 
because she has a fully disabled child; the criminal proceedings were too lengthy and the 
tendency was to delay domestic violence cases; and, Hungary had failed to dislodge the attitudes 
of Hungarian citizens and politicians that domestic violence is not sufficiently serious to warrant 
                                                
337 Paragraphs 2.1, 3.2, 5.7, 9.3 and 9.4.  
338 Paragraph 3.2. See also paragraphs 9.3 and 9.4 for the CEDAW Committee’s acceptance of the role of state in 
allowing the violence to be prolonged. 
339 Paragraph 7.4. 
340 Paragraph 9.4. 
341 Paragraph 2.1. 
342 Paragraph 9.3. 
343 Paragraph 2.1. 
 81 
immediate and effective state intervention.344 Therefore, the core elements of systemic intimate 
violence appear in this opinion. 
 
However, to what extent is the process effective for the claimant? The CEDAW Committee 
concludes its opinion with recommendations that Hungary “take immediate and effective 
measures to guarantee the physical and mental integrity” of the claimant and her family, and to 
ensure that the claimant “is given a safe home in which to live with her children, receives 
appropriate child support and legal assistance and that she receives reparation proportionate to 
the physical and mental harm undergone and to the gravity of violations of her rights.”345 It is 
entirely unclear whether the request for urgent interim measures or the final recommendations 
were implemented by Hungary. 
 
c. Investigation of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico 
 
The first and, as of the date of writing, the only investigation launched by the CEDAW 
Committee under the Optional Protocol relates to violence against women in Mexico. Towards 
the end of 2002, the CEDAW Committee received information about the murder, rape and 
disappearance of hundreds of women in the Mexican city of Ciudad Juárez, in the state of 
Chihuahua.346 The CEDAW Committee launched an investigation into the situation in terms of 
article 8 of the Optional Protocol.347 
 
There are a number of factors which make the violence against women in Ciudad Juárez 
remarkable. I discuss these factors in some detail since the substantive nature of the crimes, 
many of which are described as domestic violence, and the structural and systemic nature of the 
state’s response, demonstrate the advances made in international law as regards systemic 
intimate violence. 
 
The first aspect relates to the increasing number of women who have disappeared over the 
last decade. Due to the inconsistency between the various reports it is impossible to determine 
the exact number of missing women, with estimates raging from 350 to a few thousand.348 
However, it is not only the large number of the disappearances which is shocking, but also the 
                                                
344 Paragraphs 9.3 and 9.4. 
345 Paragraph 9.6. The CEDAW Committee also makes several general recommendations regarding domestic 
violence and women in general in Hungary. 
346 See paragraph 3, page 4, Report on Mexico produced by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and reply from the Government of 
Mexico, CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO, 27 January 2005 [hereinafter CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez 
Report]  (“At its thirty-first session in July 2004, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women concluded an inquiry under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women in regard to Mexico that also included a visit to the State party’s territory. 
The Committee included a procedural summary of the inquiry in its annual report (A/59/38, Part II, Chapt. V.B). It 
decided to make public at a later date its findings and recommendations regarding the abduction, rape and murder of 
women in the Ciudad Juárez area of Chihuahua, Mexico, as well as the observations received from the Government 
of Mexico thereon.”). 
347 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 1, page 1. 
348 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 36, page 11, paragraph 73, page 16 and paragraph 135, 
page 24.  
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consistent pattern with which the disappearances take place and fact that the violence has 
persisted and escalated for over a decade. 
 
The second factor is the evidence of torture. Where bodies have been found, there is evidence 
of rape and torture.349 Not only is the violence particularly cruel, but the murders are preceded by 
periods of captivity and mutilated corpses are “then abandoned on waste ground and eventually 
discovered by passers-by, not by the police.”350 
 
Third, the victims apparently fit a profile. They are usually young, attractive women, who are 
very poor, working in the maquiladoras (export processing plant industry) or studying.351 In 
general the victims are vulnerable and, due to their poverty, the victims and their families receive 
very little respect from the community and the authorities.  
 
The fourth factor is the pattern by which the victims are abducted and murdered. At first, the 
victims would disappear “while on their way to or from their homes since they had to cross 
deserted, unlit areas at night or in the early morning.”352 Today, however, the disappearances 
occur in broad daylight, in the city center.353 
 
The fifth alarming aspect of the crimes in Ciudad Juárez, is the role of the state. In addition, 
it appears that “the local authorities, both state and municipal, are assumed to have a years-long 
history of complicity and fabrication of cases against the alleged perpetrators:”354 police officials 
refuse to investigate disappearances when they are reported while simultaneously abandoning 
cases which are too old; families are instructed by the police to look for disappeared women 
themselves; cases are delayed indefinitely with no information regarding their progress; families 
are denied access to court files; evidence is removed from court files; victims’ bodies are found 
accidentally and not by the police; evidence is destroyed or marred; there is evidence that 
internal organs of corpses are missing; families are told to identify bodies as their relatives when 
the remains of the bodies look nothing like the relatives; officials present skeletons which have 
been picked clean; officials  cover certain parts of the bodies and refuse to reveal them to 
families; outspoken families and members of society are intimidated, threatened and followed; 
complaints made against police officials are lost or delayed; evidence indicates that individual 
members of the police have participated in the disappearance and murder of victims; detainees 
are moved from  the prison in Ciudad Juárez to Chihuahua where the press is not allowed access; 
and, detainees are reportedly tortured and coerced into making confessions. The hostile behavior 
                                                
349 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 61, page 15 (indicating that one third of the murdered 
women “have been brutally raped.”). 
350 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 37, page 11.  
351 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 63, page 15.  
352 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 64, page 15.  
353 Id. According to the CEDAW Committee, “the method of these sexual crimes begins with the victims’ abduction 
through deception or by force. They are held captive and subjected to sexual abuse, including rape and, in some 
cases, torture until they are murdered; their bodies are then abandoned in some deserted spot.” CEDAW Committee 
Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 65, page 15. 
354 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 87, page 17. 
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of state officials towards the victims’ families, together with a rate of almost complete impunity, 
has exacerbated the intensity of the crimes and the acceleration of their occurrence.355 
 
The sixth factor is the general status of the women within the local community, combined 
with extreme poverty in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. The violence committed against women is 
“marked by hatred and misogyny.”356 A rigid framework of classism and sexism supports the 
violence, leading to the CEDAW Committee’s conclusion that “the root causes of gender 
violence in its structural dimension and in all its forms — whether domestic and intra-family 
violence or sexual violence and abuse, murders, kidnappings, and disappearances must be 
combated.”357 Due to the peculiarly rapid growth of Ciudad Juárez and the employment of 
women rather than men in the maquilas, “traditional dynamic of relations between the sexes, 
which was characterized by gender inequality” have worsened.358 The increasing employability 
of women set against traditional patriarchal attitudes creates a tension which has perpetuated and 
exacerbated “the stereotyped view of men’s and women’s social roles.”359 While it is the 
author’s opinion that an entire community cannot be labeled as hating women, there appears to 
be a great number of individuals in Ciudad Juárez who are hostile towards women and that such 
hostility is not challenged. 
 
Many of the crimes are committed within the context of personal or intimate relationships. 
According to the Mexican government, the state of Chihuahua “acknowledges that 334 women 
were murdered between 1993 and May 2004. Of those, 66 per cent were the result of intra-
family, domestic or ordinary violence involving husbands, boyfriends or other close family 
members.”360  
 
The final factor is the role of international actors. The CEDAW Committee describes the role 
of NGOs as follows: 
 
The NGOs which have provided information to the Committee are the forces 
which, for the longest time and with the greatest persistence, have taken the 
lead in reporting this clear violation of human rights and demanding justice. 
They are also a source of truthful, heartrending testimony, criteria and 
                                                
355 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 87, page 17 (“Thus far in the cases involving sex crimes, 
the murderers have acted with full impunity.”).  
356 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 26, page 9. See also CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez 
Report, paragraph 24, page 9 (describing how violence against women is regarded as “a ‘normal’ phenomenon 
within the context of systematic and generalized gender-based discrimination.”).  
357 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 34, page 10. See also CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez 
Report, paragraph 23, page 8 (“Furthermore, the delegation was informed by various sources that in Ciudad Juárez 
there is a marked difference between social classes, with the existence of a minority of wealthy, powerful families, 
who own the land on which the marginal maquilas and urban districts are located, making structural change difficult. 
The overall situation has led to a range of criminal behaviours, including organized crime, drug trafficking, 
trafficking in women, undocumented migration, money-laundering, pornography, procuring, and the exploitation of 
prostitution.”). 
358 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 25, page 9.  
359 Id.  
360 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 3.1, page 55. See also CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez 
Report, paragraph 245, page 39 (describing high rates of incest and violence against women in the family).  
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evidence which are essential to the effort to shed light on many of the 
circumstances under which the crimes have taken place.361  
 
Several non-governmental and international organizations have visited the area and raised 
public awareness about the problem.362 International officials have visited Ciudad Juárez, 
including: the Special Rapporteur for women’s rights of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights; the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions; the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women; and, in 2001 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers visited Mexico.363 There are over 300 civil society organizations publicizing and 
campaigning against the denial of justice in Ciudad Juárez and, as a result of national and 
international pressure, the city is now under public purview.364  
 
Therefore, over a period of nine years, approximately 269 disappearances and murders of 
women and girls, usually between the ages of 15 and 25, were reported in Ciudad Juárez.365 A 
substantial number of the killings were linked to domestic and intra-familial violence.366 For the 
most part, the police and judiciary remained inert.367 
 
                                                
361 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 255, page 40.  
362 The recommendation that the CEDAW Committee launch an investigation into the disappearances in Ciudad 
Juárez came from local and international NGOs. See CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 3, page 
4.  
363 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 30-31, page 10.  
364 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 244, page 39. It is recognized that, “as a result of national 
and international pressure during the first half of 2003, various measures … have been taken at all three levels of 
government and that these may help to shed light on the murders and to prevent violence against women.” CEDAW 
Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 247, page 39. 
365 See Center for Reproductive Rights (formerly the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy), Letter to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) entitled, Supplementary Information on 
Mexico Scheduled for Review by CEDAW in August, 2002, June 19, 2002, available at 
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/sl_mexico_eng_2002.pdf [hereinafter CRR, Status of Women in Ciudad Juárez]. See also 
OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369. 
366 See also part three of the OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 
57 (“The killing of women in Ciudad Juárez is strongly linked to and influenced by the prevalence of domestic and 
intrafamilial violence.”) See also paragraphs 43 and 57. Ciudad Juárez is an example of systemic intimate violence 
against women, and the impunity that may accompany it. Both the Mexican Government and non-governmental 
organizations agreed that most of the murders related to manifestations of violence with gender-specific causes and 
consequences. OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 28 
(indicating that “the gender dimensions of this violence have yet to be effectively addressed.”). The homicide rate 
for women between 1993 and 2001 rose at double the rate as that for men. See OAS Report on the Situation of 
Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 42. 
367 The publicity aroused government and international concern that insufficient attention was devoted to the 
underlying causes of the sexual crimes and domestic violence. OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad 
Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 11.  Many citizens of Ciudad Juárez complained about the “insufficient 
response of the police and judiciary to these killings.” OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 
supra note 369, at paragraph 69. 
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When the brutality of and fear associated with the so-called “serial” killings gained public 
attention, the inaction of the authorities of the State of Chihuahua triggered international 
concern.368 Only a decade after the killings commenced, did investigations begin in earnest. 
 
In response to international pressure, the Mexican government at first justified its ineffective 
response by arguing that the victims were immoral women who lived double lives, and were 
responsible for their own victimization.369 This approach fuelled the discussion of impunity, 
revealing disquieting details about Chihuahua’s failure to protect women from public violence 
and systemic intimate violence. The authorities who were responsible for investigating the 
crimes and prosecuting the perpetrators were reportedly negligent, for example, causing delays in 
the initiation of investigations into reports of disappearances; minimizing efforts in the initial 
investigation; failing to collect or record evidence; losing evidence; mistreating the family of the 
victim, and failing to provide information as to the status of the investigation or the workings of 
the legal mechanisms.370 There was a lack of support services for the survivors of those who had 
been killed and a dearth of convictions or prosecutions of perpetrators.371 In this way, the overall 
administration of justice was ineffective and political will to improve the status quo was 
seemingly absent.372  
 
The impunity not only sanctioned past offences, but also led to a rise in criminal conduct.373 
In 1998, due to international pressure, the officials of Chihuahua created a Special Prosecutor’s 
Office to address the killings.374 However, the practice of denigrating the victims and holding 
them responsible for their own victimization continued.375  
                                                
368 Many of the killings were “manifestations of violence based on gender.” OAS Report on the Situation of Women 
in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 11. 
369 CRR, Status of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 648, at 5: “The negligence shown by the authorities, the 
ineffective administration of justice, and the government’s weak resolve to investigate these cases thoroughly 
highlight the Mexican Government’s failure to fulfill its obligation to stop gender-based violence.” 
370 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraphs 34 and 70. OAS Report 
on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 48 (“Because of the lack of basic 
information, family members … have expressed a profound lack of confidence in the willingness or the ability of the 
authorities to clarify what happened or pursue accountability.”) See also OAS Report on the Situation of Women in 
Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraphs 54 and 70. 
371 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 70. 
372 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 34. Many families had 
requested DNA tests to determine and/or confirm the identity of a deceased and either waited without response or 
their requests were denied immediately. See OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 
369, at paragraph 47 (“…even with a missing person’s report, the response was neither rapid nor comprehensive.”). 
It should be noted, however, that the Chihuahua officials have taken steps to improve the facilities and capabilities 
of the Unit for Attention to Victims of the Special Prosecutor’s Office. OAS Report on the Situation of Women in 
Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 55. 
373 As long as the officials remained incapable or unwilling to address the source, actors and motives behind the 
murders, the killings continued, apparently without abatement. OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad 
Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 34 (“The organizations indicated that, because the Mexican State was allowing 
these crimes to remain in impunity, it was encouraging their persistence.”). 
374 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 33.  
375 The officials reportedly blamed the victims for their disappearance, referring to their way of dress or lifestyles 
with the type of derogatory manner that revealed a lack of understanding regarding the exigency of economic 
conditions for many women, and betraying a sexist view regarding the choices women make and the extent to which 
they may or may not conform to the traditional roles expected of them. One of the problems highlight by the OAS 
Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez is the fact that the increased jobs for women was a change in 
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Prejudice against the victims explains the disjuncture between the officials’ claim of action 
and the reality of inaction, a reality which is resonant of historical gender discrimination. Simply, 
the officials’ conduct displayed a perception “that violence against women – most illustratively 
domestic violence – is not a serious crime.”376 
 
The vulnerability of women as a group is stark. The story of Ciudad Juárez is not an isolated 
peculiarity but a theme that is more common of more countries than should be acceptable.]  
It is possible to conclude that the intervention of the CEDAW Committee has been 
effective.377 Yet its efficacy lies in the CEDAW Committee’s most uncertain power, that of 
publication. The media attention has brought the world into Ciudad Juárez and Ciudad Juárez to 
the world. As a result of the many publications of the events in Ciudad Juárez of the last decade, 
Mexico is implementing practical and policy changes, albeit slowly.  
 
6.7.4 Appraisal of the Optional Protocol 
 
The confidentiality requirement of the Optional Protocol is worrying. While the Optional 
Protocol does call on states to “take all appropriate steps to ensure that individuals under its 
jurisdiction and not subjected to ill treatment or intimidation as a consequence of communicating 
with the Committee,”378 it is possible that fear of state recrimination may chill or dissuade 
individuals from communicating with the CEDAW Committee. Without the interface of the 
media and the publication of international events, the intimidation of individuals who have 
communicated with the CEDAW Committee may go undetected. In addition, one of the main 
methods of enforcing international human rights law is through the naming and shaming process, 
which is absent in the case of confidential hearings.379 
 
The entire operation of the Optional Protocol applies to rights contained in CEDAW. If a 
state has entered reservations to CEDAW it is unlikely that the Optional Protocol can be used in 
respect of the provisions to which the state party has reserved its commitment. In addition, while 
the preponderance of probabilities and wealth of CIL indicia establish violence against women as 
a violation of CEDAW, this is not definitive and its absence from the text of CEDAW remains a 
potential loophole.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
cultural patterns that led to further tensions “in a society marked by historical inequalities between men and women 
and few resources to assist in changing those attitudes.” OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 
supra note 369, at paragraph 40. 
376 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 36. 
377 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, paragraph 256, page 40 (Describing the opinion of NGOs that “the 
intervention of international human rights bodies is essential and that the latter’s efforts and, in particular, those of 
the Committee, are responsible for the Mexican authorities’ recognition of the gravity of the situation; they believe 
that, in addition to advocating for an end to these crimes, the Committee has an essential role to play with respect to 
the implementation of measures aimed at preventing and eliminating gender-based violence). 
378 Article 11. 
379 This is not the case with all Optional Protocol proceedings. See article 13 which calls on state parties to facilitate 
access to information about the views and recommendations of the CEDAW. 
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The Optional Protocol has led to greater U.N. support for the CEDAW Committee.380 
However, while it expands CEDAW’s powers of investigation, it does not expand its powers of 
enforcement.381 Its inability to compel state conduct, coupled with the confidentiality 
requirements and the ability of state parties to reject the competence of the CEDAW Committee 
under certain circumstances, means the Optional Protocol actually imports little additional 
power. 
 
The Optional Protocol, however, does bring the CEDAW Committee and the local individual 
into contact. Where the communications and recommendations are made public, a powerful tool 
develops. It is in global announcements that we see the efficacy of international human rights 
bodies and organizations. It is through universal condemnation and public damnation that a 
trickle of change appears in the lives of poor women in Ciudad Juárez. For whatever reason, the 
state officials who were inert in the face of the victims’ families are now alert in the face of the 
camera. If cameras were to be placed in police stations, jails and police vehicles, the freedom 
with which the officials could pursue their own agenda would decrease. The watchdog of the 
world – the fallibility of the human ego and its need to be seen in the best light possible – gives 
the Optional Protocol and the CEDAW Committee a modicum of law enforcement capability. 
 
6.8 U.N. General Comment No. 28 (2000) 
 
6.8.1 Status of General Comment No. 28 
 
General Comment No. 28 was adopted by the Human Rights Committee of the U.N., which 
is the committee responsible for the implementation of the ICCPR.382 General Comment No. 28 
is a revision the Human Rights Committee’s comment on article 3 of the ICCPR, which requires 
state parties “to ensure the equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and 
political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”383 As described above, whether or not General 
Comment No. 28 constitutes CIL depends on the method used to determine the rules of CIL. 
 
6.8.2 Content of General Comment No. 28 
 
The comment’s interpretation is that article 3 “implies that all human beings should enjoy the 
rights provided for in the Covenant, on an equal basis and in their totality.”384 States are obliged 
                                                
380 This is evidenced by the General Assembly’s request that the Secretary-General of the U.N. “provide the staff 
and facilities necessary for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under the Protocol…” 
Paragraph 6 of the General Assembly resolution, to which the Optional Protocol is attached. 
381 See Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and Through the Beijing Platform 
for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RT.S J. 19, 49 (2005) (criticizing the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the Optional 
Protocol). 
382 Adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights Addendum General Comment No. 28 (68) Equality of rights between men and women (article 
3), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, CCPR General Comment 28, 29 March 2000. 
383 Article 3 of the ICCPR, supra n.*. 
384 Paragraph 2. 
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to ensure that men and women enjoy the rights equally.385 Having identified the obligation of 
states, the comment describes the steps states must take to fulfill this obligation.386  
 
In an important statement, the Human Rights Committee confirmed that the fulfillment of 
civil and political rights requires both negative measures (i.e. the abstention from harmful state 
conduct) and positive measures (i.e. the creation of facilities to implement civil and political 
rights).387 State parties, therefore, are required to end discrimination on the ground of sex 
specifically and “to put an end to discriminatory actions, both in the public and the private 
sector…”388 It is important to note that this section posits sex discrimination in the private sector 
as a civil and political issue. 
 
In keeping with the approach of General Recommendation 19 and DEVAW, General 
Comment No. 28 raises the thorny issue of culture.389 It requires state parties to ensure that 
“traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s 
rights to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all Covenant rights.”390 However, it 
provides no information or guidelines as to how states should achieve this. This is particularly 
important since many governments rely on the support of such traditional or cultural 
communities in order to stay in power. It would be preferable if governments are not forced to 
choose between adherence to international law or allegiance to their constituents. 
 
There is an overall obligation on states to provide information regarding the “actual role” of 
women in society.391 The comment’s requests are an improvement on General Recommendation 
19 and DEVAW as it requires states to “take account of the factors which impede the equal 
enjoyment by women” of the rights in the ICCPR and “spells out the type of information that is 
required.”392  
 
                                                
385 It states that because “whenever any person is denied the full and equal enjoyment of any right” the full effect of 
article 3 is impaired. Paragraph 2. 
386 Paragraph 3. The steps include “the removal of obstacles to the equal enjoyment of such rights, the education of 
the population and of State officials in human rights, and the adjustment of domestic legislation so as to give effect 
to the undertakings set forth in the Covenant.”. 
387 Paragraph 3 (“The State party must not only adopt measures of protection, but also positive measures in all areas 
so as to achieve the effective and equal empowerment of women.”). 
388 Paragraph 4. 
389 Paragraph 5. 
390 Paragraph 5. 
391 Paragraph 3. This relates to the affects on women of a state of emergency (paragraph 7); conflict (paragraph 8); 
reproductive rights (paragraphs 10 and 11); violence against women (paragraphs 11 & 12); clothing regulation 
(paragraph 13) (it is interesting to note that this paragraph states that it is a violation of the ICCPR “when women are 
subjected to clothing requirements that are not in keeping with their religion or their right of self-expression” or 
“when the clothing requirements conflict with the culture to which the woman can law a claim”); confinement 
(paragraphs 14, 15, & 16); alien status (paragraph 17); access to justice (paragraph 18 & 19); privacy (paragraph 
20); freedom of thought and expression (paragraphs 21 & 22) (There is also a requirement to restrict dissemination 
of pornographic material which is likely to cause violence against women. This is important because it is mentioned 
in relation to the free speech clause of the ICCPR, with the result that the committee is taking a position contrary to 
the US: namely that free speech does not include the right to distribute harmful pornographic materials.); freedom in 
relation to marriage and children (paragraphs 23-28); equality before the law (paragraph 31) 
392 Paragraph 6. 
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Specifically, the comment requests states to provide information on nationals, legal measures 
and protection for women with regard to domestic violence, rape, safe abortion for pregnancy as 
a result of rape, forced abortion/sterilization and FGC.393 The comment also requires information 
on laws which confine women to the house.394 This request is made in the context of article 9 of 
the ICCPR, which prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, usually associated with state 
incarceration. The comment refers to “any laws or practices which may deprive women of their 
liberty on an arbitrary or unequal basis, such as by confinement within the house,” In light of the 
fact that confinement to the home often is enforced by family members or intimate partners in 
connection with the infliction of systemic intimate violence, General Comment No. 28 brings 
systemic intimate violence within the scope of the ICCPR’s arrest and detention provisions. The 
connection between formal arrest and the isolation of systemic intimate violence is a major step 
forward in recognizing the fact that violence in the home is public. 
 
In referring to access to justice, the comment insists that women should be able to “give 
evidence as witnesses on the same terms as men.”395 This affects the so-called cautionary rule of 
evidence in terms of which women’s testimony traditionally is viewed with caution, as is a 
child’s, due to their ‘tendency’ to provide unreliable information. This is particularly important 
in cases of rape and domestic violence where, with only two witnesses, the woman’s testimony is 
usually balanced against that of a man. General Comment no. 28 requires women to have direct 
and autonomous access to the courts, which includes equal access to legal aid. It emphasizes the 
importance of this in “family matters” thereby acknowledging that this is the realm in which 
women need particular legal assistance. 
 
6.8.3 Appraisal of General Comment No. 28 
 
General Comment No. 28 is a departure from some of the ambiguous egalitarian language of 
other relevant international instruments. Its recommendations are accompanied by examples or 
explanations of why certain positive steps need to be taken to ensure women are able to enjoy the 
ICCPR rights. It also makes an authoritative statement about the long debate regarding positive 
and negative rights, namely, that proactive steps are necessary to entrench civil and political 
rights. 
 
General Comment No. 28 therefore is a significant step in the direction of mainstreaming 
gender discrimination issues and taking women’s specific circumstances into account in all rights 
and not only those which apply exclusively to women. It is one of the many factors that, while 
running the risk independently of not constituting evidence of CIL, reflect the emerging norm, 
the beginning of the process towards the realization of a concrete, definitive and authoritative 






                                                
393 Paragraph 11. 
394 Paragraph 14. 
395 Paragraph 18. 
 90 
 
6.9 Violence against Women in Regional Instruments, Bodies and Laws 
 
6.9.1 The Inter-American System 
 
In 1994, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women, which became known as the Convention of Belem Do Para.396 An even more expansive 
definition of violence against women was incorporated into this regional instrument.397  The 
Convention of Belem Do Para identified violence as one of the historic impediments to women 
achieving equality and a violation of their right to dignity.398  
 
In many respects, the Convention of Belem Do Para is a stronger legal instrument than its 
most recent international equivalent, DEVAW. First, the Convention of Belem Do Para is a 
binding treaty, whereas DEVAW is a declaration, constituting an interpretation of a treaty 
(CEDAW) and at best, reflecting a principle of CIL. Second, while both the Convention of 
Belem Do Para and DEVAW prohibit public and private violence that is condoned or 
administered by the state, the regional instrument contains a more express and detailed 
prohibition of domestic violence per se.399 It refers to physical, sexual and psychological 
violence that “occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal 
relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with the 
woman, including, among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse.”400  
 
Third, the Convention of Belem Do Para establishes an independent right “to be free from 
violence in both the public and private spheres.”401 This is an important distinction since it 
establishes a responsibility on the part of state parties to fulfill that right, an express obligation 
that DEVAW does not emulate.402 Finally, the Convention of Belem Do Para allows individuals 
to lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. By contrast, only 
recently have individual petitions been catered for in the Optional Protocol to CEDAW and, so 
far, the Protocol has been used on only one occasion.403 
 
However, the Convention of Belem Do Para is a regional instrument. It does not constitute a 
principle of international law as a whole, although it certainly adds to the argument that there is a 





                                                
396 Convention of Belem Do Para, supra note 22. For a discussion of the development of a norm against sec-
discrimination in the inter-American system, see WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 644-645. 
397 See Convention of Belem Do Para, supra note 22. 
398 See the Preamble to the Convention of Belem Do Para, supra note 22. 
399 Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of Belem Do Para, supra note 22. 
400 Article 2(a) of the Convention of Belem Do Para, supra note 22. 
401 Article 3 of the Convention of Belem Do Para, supra note 22. 
402 The nature of this responsibility is described in chapter III of the Convention. See articles 7 and 8. 
403 [Note: citation to follow – Mexico City submission]  
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6.9.2 The European System 
 
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter “the European Convention”) prohibits sex discrimination as an impermissible basis 
for differentiation.404 It requires states to respect the individual’s “private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.”405 However, this may be limited when it is:  
 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.406 
 
Therefore, while the right to privacy and family life is entrenched, it is not absolute and 
there is room for state intervention into the family affairs of individuals to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others. Within the articulation of the right to privacy, the protection of individuals is 
recognized.  
 
Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention states that:  
 
Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private law character between 
them, and in their relations with their children, as to marriage, during marriage and in the 
event of its dissolution. This Article shall not prevent States from taking such measures as 
are necessary in the interests of the children.407 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has released some of the more progressive decisions 
vis-à-vis state responsibility for harm committed in private. In the case of A. v the United 
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights considered whether caning a child constituted 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, as prohibited by Article 3 of the European 
Convention.408 The Court concluded that Article 3 of the European Convention, read together 
with Article 1, places an obligation on state parties to take measures to ensure that their citizens 
are not subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, “including such ill-
treatment administered by private individuals.”409 The Court emphasized the state’s 
responsibility to protect children and “other vulnerable individuals … against such serious 
breaches of personal integrity.”410 This laid the foundation for other cases regarding specific 
protection for vulnerable groups, which are discussed in chapter three below. 
 
 
                                                
404 Article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by 
Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, available at, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf 
[hereinafter the European Convention]. 
405 Article 8.  
406 Article 8 of European Convention, supra note 74. 
407 [Note: citation to follow]  
408 Affaire A. c. Royaume-Uni, Case of A. v. The United Kingdom (100/1997/884/1096) Strasbourg, 23 September 
1998 [hereinafter A. v. The United Kingdom]. 
409 A. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 78, at 10, paragraph 22. 
410 A. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 78, paragraph 22 page 10. 
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6.9.3 The African System 
 
By contrast, Africa has experienced little of the successful application and enforcement of 
human rights. The original African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights took positive strides 
in imposing on member states the obligation of actively ensuring that women enjoy a safe home 
environment.411 However, both the formulation of the right (coupled with the rights of the child) 
and the implementation of the right are deficient. The right is a sub-right, forming part of the 
total right to have a family unit based on “traditional values recognized by the community.”412 
The practical outcome of this right does not afford women any real benefit or elevation in status 
especially where such “traditional values” have placed women and children under the authority 
of the male household member, whose control and authority is rarely subject to restraint or 
intervention.413 
 
The new African Union, established on 9 July 2002 seeks, inter alia, “to build a partnership 
between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the 
private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among our peoples.”414 While the 
founding document of the African Union, the Constitutive Act (which incorporates and augments 
the Banjul Charter), undertakes to promote gender equality, the document itself is wanting in 
respect of defining, defending and promoting women’s rights.415 The Constitutive Act also is 
potentially disappointing for human rights lobbyists in its continued commitment to sovereign 
immunity and its dedication to “non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of 
another.”416 However, it should be borne in mind that the nature of the instrument is to detail the 
objectives of the new AU, which include unifying the various African nations and not 
necessarily pursuing a new human rights regime. 
 
In July 2003 the African Union adopted the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa as a 
supplement to the Banjul Charter.417 An unprecedented public commitment to women’s rights 
took place in July 2004, when the AU Heads of State adopted the Solemn Declaration on Gender 
                                                
411 Banjul Charter, supra note 22, (requiring States to “ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women 
and also censure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child”). 
412 Id. at 61. 
413 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Violence Against Women: Challenges to the Liberal State and Relational Feminism, in 
POLITICAL ORDER 454, 457–58, 472–73, 479–80 (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds., 1996). Nedelsky, in writing 
about the patriarchal structure of a liberal State, raises the question as to how fundamental change can be effected 
within a system, the foundation of which is based on tradition, especially when the precepts of that tradition are at 
odds with basic egalitarian values.  Id. at 484–85.  A statement made at the Beijing Conference, supra note 20, 
recognizes that the empowerment of women may well conflict with “regional particularities” and cultural norms but 
insists that these norms must be disregarded if they resist promotion and protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms.  Beijing Declaration, supra note 22, at 11.  See also O’CONNELL, supra note 38, at 9. 
414 Preamble to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, 11 July, 2000, Lomé, Togo, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/home/Welcome.htm [hereinafter AU Constitutive Act].  
415 AU Constitutive Act, supra note 84, at article 4(l). 
416 AU Constitutive Act, supra note 84, at article 4 (g). 
417 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted 
July 11, 2003, at the African Union Summit in Maputo Mozambique. The protocol will enter into force one it has 
been ratified by 15 states [hereinafter Draft African Charter Protocol on the Rights of Women]. The Protocol came 
into force on November 25, 2005. 
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Equality at the AU Summit meeting.418 This undertaking calls for the implementation of gender-
specific economic, social, and legal measures and the protection of women against violence and 
discrimination.419 As regards violence against women, the state parties agree to: 
 
Initiate, launch and engage within two years sustained public campaigns against gender 
based violence as well as the problem of trafficking in women and girls; Reinforce legal 
mechanisms that will protect women at the national level and end impunity of crimes 
committed against women in a manner that will change and positively alter the attitude 
and behaviour of the African society.420  
 
In October 2005 the First African Union Conference of Ministers Responsible for Women 
and Gender was held in Dakar, Senegal by the AU Women, Gender and Development 
Directorate. On a regional and political level, therefore, commitment to ending violence against 
women is evident.  
 
7 Specifications of Women’s Rights in Mainstream International Law  
 
In addition to the international instruments described above which deal with generic 
prohibitions on female targeted violence, there are three specific strands of violence against 
women that have received specific admonishment in international law. These are mass rape as a 
weapon of war, FGC and trafficking of women and girls. I discuss these manifestations of 
violence against women below in order to demonstrate the analogous process of 




Prior to the 1990s, mainstream human rights bodies, “which oversee instruments that have 
stronger protective mechanisms, have used the existence of this separate women’s human rights 
regime as an excuse to marginalize sex discrimination and most other women’s human rights 
violations, which nonetheless fall clearly within their own mandates.”421 In the last twenty years, 
however, specific manifestations of violence against women have been prohibited expressly in 
international law, namely, mass rape, FGC, and trafficking. Based on these developments, this 
thesis proposes that an international prohibition against systemic intimate violence should be the 
next specification of women’s rights in international law. 
 
While there are clear differences between mass rape, FGC, trafficking and systemic intimate 
violence, I discuss these specific instances of violence against women in order to demonstrate a 
trend in international law towards the articulation of various forms of violence against women. In 
                                                
418 [Note: citation to follow]  
419 For a discussion of this meeting see Aide-Memoire for AU Directorate of Women, Gender and Development, 5th 
Consultative Meeting on Gender Mainstreaming in the African Union, 25-26 January 2005, Abuja, Nigeria, 
Organized by: The Women, Gender and development Directorate of the African Union, Femmes Africa Solidarité 
(FAS) and Africa leadership Forum (ALF), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/summit/jan2005/Gender/Aide%20memoire.doc.  
420 Article 4. [Note: citation to follow]  
421 Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Esq, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, HUMAN RIGHTS 
QUARTERLY 15 (1993) 36-62, 47. 
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other words, broad principles in international law have been used to create ‘new’ and specific 
rules with a view to better protecting women against the harm in question. Therefore, I do not 
suggest that the nature and severity of, and the harm resulting from, systemic intimate violence is 
the same as that of mass rape, FGC and trafficking. Rather, I discuss these other forms of 
violence only to establish precedent for the specification in international law of certain forms of 
gender-based violence. 
 
7.2 The Specification of Mass Rape 
 
Prior to 1994, war-time rape was not prosecuted as a breach of humanitarian law or the laws 
of war.422 In an effort to punish mass rape as a war crime, jurists extrapolated established 
international legal principles to this particular form of sexual violence.423 In 1998, in the case of 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, for the first time in legal 
history, tried and convicted an individual for genocide and crimes against humanity due to his 
orchestration and encouragement of mass rape of women.424 This decision was followed by the 
judgment of the ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v. Kunarac, which cemented the Akayesu 
precedent, confirming widespread rape as a war crime and crime against humanity.425  
 
The analysis in these cases of mass rape as a weapon of war is very different from the one 
regarding systemic intimate violence: the violence in question was public; it was part of warfare; 
and, those perpetrating the rapes were clearly demarcated as the enemy of the victims. These are 
all factors that assisted the reconceptualization of wartime rape as a human rights violation rather 
than an unfortunate side-effect of conflicts. Systemic intimate violence, on the other hand, lacks 
the public nature of mass rape; it does not take place within the context of a war and the 
perpetrators of the violence are not only known to the victims, but are ‘their own people,’ often 
belonging to the same ethnic or religious group. In other words, they are spouses, partners and 
relatives. Moreover, there is a quantitative distinction between the conduct of mass rape and 
systemic intimate violence, making the injury of the former more visible than that of the latter. 
 
However, just as it was necessary to establish the public character of mass rape as an 
international human rights violation in an authoritative text, this thesis proposes that systemic 
intimate violence is set on a similar developmental course. As with instances of mass rape before 
the Akayesu and Kunarac decisions, the generic prohibitions under current international law 
against systemic intimate violence are inadequate to constitute an authoritative and mandatory 
obligation on states to help remedy such harm. A specific, express and authoritative prohibition 
against such violence is required. Even though international law has developed a great deal of 
                                                
422 See Jennifer Green, Rhonda Copelon, Patrick Cotter and Beth Stephens, Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution 
of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A 
Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 176 (1994) [hereinafter Green et al]. 
423 Green et al, supra note 107, at 183-4. 
424 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra notex. See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra 
notex, at 1272. See also Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L. 350 (2003) 
[hereinafter Russell-Brown]. 
425 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2. Due to the lack of precedent and patchwork authority regarding mass rape in 
war, the ICTY was able to develop the principles according of this crime. In contrast to the Akayesu decision, the 
Kunarac judgment is considered to be a more reasoned description of mass rape as both a war crime and a crime 
against humanity. See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1284. 
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jurisprudence on systemic intimate violence, it has not yet attained the precision or authority that 
marks mass rape in international law. 
 
7.3 The Specification of FGC  
 
The specific international prohibition against FGC is due in part to the (ongoing) discord 
between cultural autonomy and universalism, which impeded the application of international 
human rights law in countries where FGC is practiced.426 For example, when international 
activists sought to apply the Children’s Convention to oppose FGC, they designated the 
procedure as child abuse. By extension, the mothers of children who underwent the surgery 
became child abusers in terms of the technicalities of the treaty. Given the strong cultural 
commitment to the communal importance of genital cutting, this designation reinforced the gap 
between the community’s perceptions of the cutting as a form of purification, as opposed to the 
westerners’ interpretation of cutting as a form of abuse.427 Real change only began when 
international bodies identified the context of the practice, understanding its causes, rationales and 
sustaining elements.428 
 
A similar shift is required in the development of international law on systemic intimate 
violence. The role of the state as endorsing and, thereby, entrenching intimate violence against 
women, needs to be a focus of international law. The ferocity of the violence between intimates 
does not take place in a vacuum but rather within a context of social, cultural and behavorial 
rules, which, as with FGC, which is a mandatory prerequisite for women prior to marriage, 
impede the ability of the state to prevent the pain in question. As international law develops to 
takes these externalities into account, the regulation of the harm improves. The larger the picture 
of the violence is drawn, the better states and the international community will be equipped to 
react to it. 
 
7.4 The Specification of Trafficking 
 
On November 15, 2000, the General Assembly adopted the U.N. Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime and two optional protocols on trafficking in persons and 
smuggling of migrants.429 Born from the international prohibition against slavery, the 
internationalization of trafficking is pivotal to the effort to end it.430  
                                                
426 See John Tochukwu Okwubanego, Female Circumcision and the Girl Child in Africa and the Middle East: The 
Eyes of the World are Blind to the Conquered, 33 INT’L LAW. 159, 174 (1999) [hereinafter Okwubanego]: “One 
major reason why international organizations in general and the U.N. in particular have appeared to be insensitive to 
female circumcision is culture.” 
427 Kirsten Bowman, Comment: Bridging the Gap in the Hopes of Ending Female Genital Cutting, 3 SANTA CLARA 
J. INT’L. 132 [ page 6] (2005) [hereinafter Bowman] (“Nonwestern women and communities are not very willing to 
embrace the idea that they and their ancestors have been committing child abuse throughout history, and reject the 
notion that they are not free to raise their children as they see fit.”). 
428 Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 8-9] (describing the alienating effect of western endeavors, which rendered 
many nations’ anti-FGC laws nugatory. Greater success was achieved when UN representatives worked slowly, and 
with sensitivity, with the religious and cultural leaders of the communities in which FGC was practiced.) 
429 GA Res. 55/25 (Nov. 15 2000). For a brief discussion of this instrument see Murphy, International Trafficking in 
Persons, supra notex. 
430 See Susan Feanne Toepfer & Bryan Stuart Wells, The Worldwide Market for Sex: A Review of International and 
Regional Legal Prohibitions Regarding Trafficking in Women, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 83, 94-104 (1994) 
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As with FGC and mass rape, the conceptualization of this form of violence against women 
was molded by the “principle that trafficking in women is sex discrimination and a violation of 
human rights.”431 While both genders are victims of trafficking, the fact remains that “the large 
majority of people trafficked throughout the world are women and girl children.”432 However, 
again, the generic prohibitions at international law against female discriminatory violence were 
deemed inadequate. Academic analysis of trafficking has led to the reformulation of the problem 
with a “particular genesis in gender oppression” and the need to formulate laws accordingly and 
specifically. For example, the creation in the United States of a nonimmigrant “T” visa for aliens 
who are victims of severe forms of trafficking.433 By recasting the violence in the light of the 
reality of the coercion, financial exigency and extreme nature of the enslavement, lawyers were 
able to fashion specific and more appropriate legislation to address female trafficking, at both 
national and international levels.434 
 




International law is drawn from many sources, including the academic writing of respected 
authors and scholars.435 For this reason, I describe below the academic analysis of violence 
against women in international law. 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the international community has started to listen to the 
call of theorists to “recharacterize internationally protected human rights to accommodate 
                                                                                                                                                       
(describing the early history of the international law of trafficking in women including: the Convention for the 
Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others in 1949; CEDAW in 1979; 
and, the Convention against Sexual exploitation). Fitzpatrick dates this back as early as 1904. See Joan Fitzpatrick, 
Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and 
Combating Trafficking, 24 MUCH. J. INT’L L. 1143, 1144 (2003). See also Murphy, International Trafficking in 
Persons, supra notex; and, Shelley Case Inglis, Expanding International and National Protections against 
Trafficking for Forced Labor Using a Human Rights Framework, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 55 (2001) (“In 
response to increased recognition of the issue, governments, such as the United States, and international 
organizations, like the United Nations, have begun to focus financially and strategically on combating this immense 
human rights problem.”). See also Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex 
Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MUCH. J. INT’L L. 1143, 
1157-58 (2003) (describing the amendment of asylum laws to acknowledge the “harm threatened directly by non-
state actors, against a backdrop of state indifference or ineffectuality in controlling the violence or protecting 
similarly situated victims.”). 
431 Susan Feanne Toepfer & Bryan Stuart Wells, The Worldwide Market for Sex: A Review of International and 
Regional Legal Prohibitions Regarding Trafficking in Women, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 83, 84 (1994). 
432 Shelley Case Inglis, Expanding International and National Protections against Trafficking for Forced Labor 
Using a Human Rights Framework, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 55, 61 (2001). 
433 Murphy, International Trafficking in Persons, supra notex, at 410 (citing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
of 2000 § 107(e)). 
434 For example, the elements of coercion, deception and abuse of power in relationships between the perpetrator and 
the enslaved led to the realization that if the victim ultimately consents to the exploitation, such consent shall be 
irrelevant. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal 
Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MUCH. J. INT’L L. 1143, 1149-50 (2003). 
435 This is discussed in greater detail in fn ___ below.  
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women’s experience of injustice.”436 In 1991, Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelly 
Wright observed that “[i]nternational law is a thoroughly gendered system.”437 This was a bold 
statement in a time marked by “the immunity of international law to feminist analysis”438 and 
with it came a range feminist commentary on the substance, procedures and politics of 
international law and women.  
 
In 1993, scholars analyzed the reasons for the marginalization of violence against women in 
international law.439 Authors such as Celina Romany identified the negative affect on women 
resulting from the distinction drawn at international law between public and private conduct, 
with the former being addressed by the law and the latter left largely unregulated.440 The battered 
women’s movement highlighted the severity of domestic violence, revealing domestic violence 
as a serious legal issue.441 
 
More than a decade ago, activists in the field began to draw on an analogy to torture to 
describe the experience of domestic violence victims.442 In 1994, Rhonda Copelon framed the 
                                                
436 Rebecca J. Cook, Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward, HUMAN RHTS QUARTERLY 15 
(1993) 230-261, 231 (stating that until 1993 international law did not effectively address the rights of women). This 
is especially true of domestic violence, which occurs universally and universally is condoned. See in general 
Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Esq, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, HUMAN RIGHTS 
QUARTERLY 15 (1993) 36-62, 52 (describing how states universally fail to protect women from domestic violence. 
She cites Brazil as an example, demonstrating how the police and the judicial system fail to assist victims of 
domestic violence). See also Surya P. Subedi, Protection of Women against Domestic Violence: The Response of 
International Law, E.H.R.L.R. 1997, 6, 587-606 @ (describing the universal nature of domestic violence and 
maintaining that is affects women predominantly).  
437 Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra notex, at 614. 
438 Id.. 
439 See e.g., Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 117.  See, e.g., UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 65, at 10. 
440 See Romany, Women as Aliens, supra notex, at 98-99 (1993) (identifying “the diverse layers of coercion 
embedded in legal discourse”). See also John M, Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz, Preface, to FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY iii (John M, Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1978) [hereinafter 
Eekelaar & Katz] (observing that unlike racial conflict, family violence does not take place in public, and the silent 
suffering of its victims has only recently been recognized). See Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 117. Other 
authors have engaged the torture terminology in their discussion of violence against women, comparing battery to 
physical torture and prison life. See ANDREA DWORKIN, LIFE AND DEATH 153–55 (1997) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
LIFE AND DEATH]: “When you look at what happens to women in battery, the only other place where you can see the 
same kind of systematic physical and psychological injuries is in prisons in which people are tortured. . . .   When 
you are battered, over time, you are physically tortured. . . .   Sometimes they use degrees of force so unconscionable 
as to be impossible to believe: for instance, hitting a woman with a big wooden beam; using knives on a woman; 
using a baseball bat on a woman.  Sometimes the woman is tied up and tortured and it is called sex when she is hurt.  
She is often sleep deprived, purposefully, the way she would be if she were in a prison.  He takes her life and he 
messes with it in order to fracture it, to break it into little pieces so that she has no life left.”  Id.  See also Copelon, 
Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 122–139. 
441 See Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra notex, at 41 (describing the process of the battered women’s 
movement and demonstrating how it has been retarded by the powerful denial by jurors, politicians and courts in 
general). Some have criticized this movement’s labeling as being counter-productive. See Martha R. Mahoney, 
Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 
THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 65 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (arguing that, 
ironically, the battered woman syndrome, a psychological condition, is used to explain why women do not leave 
abusive relationships rather than the social exigencies such as a lack of shelters, protection and money.) 
442 See, e.g., Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 117.  See, e.g., UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 65, at 10. 
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comparison between intimate violence and torture as defined by the Convention against 
Torture.443 Other authors have engaged the torture terminology in their discussion of violence 
against women, comparing battery to physical torture and prison life.444 The culmination of these 
developments was thoroughly addressed by Elizabeth Schneider in her examination of the law 
regarding battered women from the feminist perspective, where the various motivations for and 
implications of systemic intimate violence as an international human rights violation are 
garnered.445  
 
The parallel between domestic violence and official torture was part of the initiation of the 
discussion that violence at home could be as egregious as violence in public.446 Amnesty 
International, a leading authority on torture in international law, applied the language and lore of 
the Torture Convention to sexual violence and other types of intimate harm, confirming the view 
that violence against women may constitute torture for which the state is accountable when it is 
of a nature and severity envisaged by the concept of torture in international standards and where 
the state has failed to fulfill its obligation to provide effective protection.447 The struggle for 
international recognition of violence against women also developed through a range of literature 
focusing on FGC, harmful practices against women, and rape as a weapon of war and 
genocide.448 
 
However, criticism continues to be leveled against the inclusion of systemic intimate 
violence in international human rights law.449 Therefore, while authors have highlighted the 
similarities between frequent forms of intimate violence and the acts contemplated by the 
drafters of the Torture Convention and other international instruments, the explicit legal 
consequences of this analogy still need to be explored.450  
 
There are several themes which have developed in the realm of women’s rights 
jurisprudence, which help to advance the argument that systemic intimate violence is an 







                                                
443 See Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 117. 
444 See DWORKIN, LIFE AND DEATH, supra note 92, at 153–55. 
445 See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 57. 
446 See generally Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex. 
447 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF WOMEN 
(2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engact400012001 (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter 
BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS, supra note 98]. See also Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, 
supra notex, at 4, 10 (describing how torture is a “predetermined attack on a person’s psyche, body and dignity”).  
448 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS & POLICIES, supra note 57. See generally Askin, 
Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 57 (discussing the jurisprudence on rape as a weapon of war/genocide or as a 
crime against humanity). 
449 See FELSON, VIOLENCE & GENDER REEXAMINED, supra notex, at 3-5. 
450 See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 48; DWORKIN, LIFE AND DEATH, supra note 92, at 115 (referring to 
Amnesty International in the context of domestic violence). See Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 120–39. 
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8.2 The Distinction between Public and Private 
 
For many years, feminists have noted the failure of legal systems to access and remedy 
harm committed in private.451 This inflexibility of legal systems is compounded by a communal 
tendency to shun victims of intimate violence.452 Cultural conditioning can both trivialize and 
justify violence against women, with the result that victims of violence become “the targets of 
unpunishable and therefore, implicitly endorsed violence.”453 
 
As a result, feminist theorists have extracted the theory of violence against women from the 
realm of family law and placed it within the ambit of public law, discussing the private violence 
against women with reference to the nation-state. A plethora of new and intellectually astute 
formulations of violence against women arose.454 The recasting of violence against women from 
personal to political, with a concomitant change in the language used, clarified the way in which 
legal systems by-pass the specific needs of women. Labels such as “terrorism,” “patriarchal 
terrorism,” “torture,” and “private torture” were employed to describe the public dimension of 
domestic violence and to import the state as a figure responsible for the perpetuation of the 
violence. 455 
 
The suggestion that the state play a greater role in the affairs of the family triggered concern 
that the constitutionally protected right to privacy would be compromised.456 It became 
                                                
451 See MARTHA A. FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY 
OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, xi-xviii, 1994 (describing the development of feminist theory, which identified the need to 
bring the state into the private realm to curb the level of violence, thereby changing the boundaries of the 
public/private distinction. See also Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and 
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 78-81 (Martha A. 
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (showing how much violence against abused women takes place at work, 
underscoring the public nature of the violence and the almost complete absence of free will to exit the relationship). 
The ritual of classifying facts in order to place them into legal categories with standard modes of redress has resulted 
in the “generation of broad generalizations about groups or classes of things and people…” MARTHA A. FINEMAN & 
ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, xviii, 
1994. 
452 See Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”, supra notex, at 12-16 (describing the consistent patterns of 
domestic violence in a range of countries from India, to Pakistan, China to Poland. She demonstrates that 
notwithstanding the extensive and fraught nature of the violence, there is general silence and abstention when action 
is required).  
453 See Id. at 17. 
454 See Id. at 17 and 19-21 (arguing that a new analysis is needed to examine domestic violence and proposing that 
domestic violence is a form of coveture since the woman’s identity is subsumed into that of her husband). 
455 Id. at 25 (adopting the terminology of ‘terrorism’ to replace ‘domestic violence,’ arguing that ultimately, they 
both create psychological and physical harm through a series of “seemingly random but actually calculated attacks 
of violence,” creating “an atmosphere of intimidation in which there is no safe place of escape.”) Id. 31. See also 
Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra notex, at 286 (describing extreme forms of domestic violence as patriarchal 
terrorism); Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 117 (describing domestic violence as torture); and Bonita C. 
Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in International Law (distinguishing between domestic violence 
and private torture). 
456 For a discussion of this issue see Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra notex, at 36. Schneider discusses the 
United States Supreme Court case of Griswold v. Connecticut. The case, which legalized contraception, was both a 
coup and a blow for women’s rights. The case was decided on the basis that the right to privacy prevented the state 
from interfering in the affairs and choices of women but it also entrenched the view that the state was prevented 
from entering the home and family realm, even where the home was the location of the violence. Id. 50. 
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necessary to “develop both a more nuanced theory of where to draw the boundaries between 
public and private, and a theory of privacy that is empowering.”457 To this end, it was argued that 
‘privacy’ is a right that includes “autonomy, equality, liberty, and freedom of bodily integrity, 
that are central to women’s independence and well-being.”458 For victims of domestic violence, 
so the argument develops, these aspects of privacy are absent.  
 
One interpretation of the right to privacy, useful for understanding its nuanced dangers for 
women, is the notion that privacy comprises three dimensions. The first is the “dimension of 
autonomy over the development and expression of one’s intellect, interests, tastes, and 
personality.”459 The second is the “decisional dimension – ‘freedom of choice in the basic 
decisions of one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation [and] contraception.’”460 Finally, 
there is “freedom from intrusion, restraint, and compulsion, and freedom to care for oneself and 
express oneself.”461 This description recognizes that the true value of privacy is the freedom to 
flourish as an individual and not the creation of an impermeable barrier to the intervention – and 
assistance – by the state.  
 
Privacy cannot be understood merely as the right to be left alone; rather, it is linked 
affirmatively to liberty, the right to autonomy and self-determination.462 In this manner, theorists 
developed a notion of privacy which is not in opposition to, but is an affirmation of, women’s 
safety in the home. 
 
8.3 The State-Centric v. Individual Approach 
 
The politicization of violence against women resulted in many states creating criminal 
penalties for domestic violence.463 However, for several reasons, which are discussed in greater 
detail in chapter four below, the incorporation of domestic violence into the criminal justice 
system did not always yield the expected benefits.464 One of the reasons for this was the 
continued perception that domestic violence was a behavioral deviation between private 
individuals who were really pathological exceptions to the norm.465  
 
                                                
457 Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra notex. 
458 Id. 
459 Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra notex, at 51 (citing Justice Douglas’ jurisprudence on privacy as 
gleaned from the United States Supreme Court cases of Griswold and Roe v. Wade, [Note: Citation to follow] , 
where Justice Douglas distilled three components to privacy, namely, autonomy, decision-making capacity and 
freedom from intrusion). 
460 Id. 
461 Id. 
462 Id. At 52. 
463 See Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel in the House”: Digging for the Political Vortex of Male Violence against 
Women in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 285, 287 (Martha A. 
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (arguing that the criminalization of domestic violence is a “significant 
step in the politicization of violence against women.”). 
464 See page ___ below [Note: Citation to follow]. 
465 Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel in the House”: Digging for the Political Vortex of Male Violence against 
Women in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 285, 287-8 (Martha 
A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (maintaining that this perception eroded the politicization of domestic 
violence). 
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Most academics dismiss this. The more typical view today is that many severe forms of 
violence against women occur in private and, because the state has overlooked them, such 
violence has become cemented, entrenched and remains unpunished.466 This state-centric 
approach is analogous to a wide-angle lens, moving away from the narrow focus on the 
individuals to the larger landscape, taking into account the many structural factors that comprise 
state-sanctioned violence.  
 
8.4 Cultural Autonomy v. Human Rights 
 
A major obstacle to the development of an international norm against violence against 
women is the claim of cultural autonomy.467 Emanating in part from colonial oppression, 
cultures and groups are insisting that the ‘West’ refrain from amending their cultures any further. 
International human rights law is so closely connoted with the ‘West’ that a confrontation 
between women’s rights activists and traditionalists has occurred.  
 
The stand-off is fuelled in part by the adoption of a narrow and stagnant definition of 
culture, one which has been abandoned in anthropology.468 Traditionally, academics have 
perceived culture as petrified in a snapshot moment in time. While this may be the view of 
westerners encountering cultures for the first time, it is shortsighted to conclude that the culture 
itself has not evolved in the past, influenced to greater or lesser degrees by externalities. This is 
not to say that because a culture has transmogrified before it is legitimate to subject it to changes 
in the future. Indeed, the type of changes imposed by colonial powers, for example, did not 
‘influence’ or ‘modify’ cultures, but abolished them altogether. What is becoming clear, 
however, is that integrating human rights norms into certain cultures is not necessarily 
antithetical to the perpetuation of, or respect for, the integrity of those cultures.469 
 
The issue of cultural relativity and systemic intimate violence is addressed in greater detail 
in chapter four below. 
 
8.5 The Universal v. The Local 
 
Closely aligned to the debate of cultural relativity is the fact that notwithstanding the 
universality of domestic violence, there are distinct differences between the communities in 
which the violence occurs. In pursuing a universal agenda to address violence against women, 
                                                
466 See Surya P. Subedi, Protection of Women against Domestic Violence: The Response of International Law, 
E.H.R.L.R. 1997, 6, 587-606 @ 591. 
467 See Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 946 (2003) (discussing the obstacle of culture in implementing human rights). See also 
Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra notex, at 636 (describing the CEDAW Committee’s decision 
requesting the U.N. and specialized agencies to review the status of women under Islamic law. The representatives 
of the Islamic nations objected to the decision as a threat to their freedom of religion and the CEDAW Committee’s 
recommendation was rejected). 
468 See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO 
LOCAL JUSTICE 6-10 (2006). 
469 See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO 
LOCAL JUSTICE 6-10 (2006). 
 102 
some academics have started to reign in the call for universal solutions.470 The sameness of the 
problem, such as the “difficulty of naming domestic violence, and the mismatch between the 
severity of the experience of abuse and the weakness of the legal and social tools that exist to 
address that abuse,” does not mean uniform solutions are viable.471  
 
Theorists, therefore, are refining the use of international human rights law as regards 
violence against women. One view is that international human rights law provides a ‘minimum 
standard’ which is independent of a particular culture, tradition, religion or political 
perspective.472 Once this standard is accepted, so the theory goes, universal norms can be molded 
to fit within the contours of different cultures.473 
 
8.6 Discrimination v. Harm 
 
Theorists also examine the intersection between violence against women and discrimination 
against women. Violence was identified as a manifestation of a male-centric view that posits 
women on a lower social echelon with less social value. The cultural and economic abjection of 
women was revealed as the foundation on which violence rests. The academic goal, therefore, 
was to link violence against women “to the broader problems of women … and the need for 
social and economic resources, education, jobs, child care, and housing.”474 
 
This solution has its drawbacks. Historically, the enforcement of the so-called civil and 
political rights (for example, freedom to vote, freedom of speech and the right to privacy) has 
fared better than that of social, cultural and economic rights (such as the right to education, 
housing and health). It seems that forcing the state to abstain from invasive behavior is more 
successful than insisting on proactive social and economic policies. Placing violence against 
                                                
470 See Michele E. Beasley, Introduction to Section III International & Comparative Perspectives on Domestic 
Violence, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 255, 255 (Martha 
A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (pointing out that there is both a universality and a dissimilarity in 
domestic violence around the world).  
471 Michele E. Beasley, Introduction to Section III International & Comparative Perspectives on Domestic Violence, 
in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 255, 255 (Martha A. Fineman 
& Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). See also Rosemary Ofeibea Ofei-Aboagye, Domestic Violence in Ghana: Some 
International Questions, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 260, 
273 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (noting that Ghanaians “have a sense of communal well-
being of their society” that requires mutual assistance and support, yet Ghanaians do not intervene in cases of 
domestic violence. She suggests that this communal structure could be harnessed through education to reduce the 
level of domestic violence). The claim that there are global basic solutions is strong. See ENDING DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE REPORT FROM THE GLOBAL FRONT LINES, PRODUCED BY THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND 5 
(eds., Leni Marin, Helen Zia and Esta Soler, 1998) (“long range challenge for advocates and activists is to forge an 
international consensus on how to prevent domestic violence.”). 
472 Human rights are inalienable, existing by virtue of an individual’s membership to the human species. In theory at 
least, there is no process by which one becomes entitled to these rights and there are no constitutional tests which 
must be passed in order to have them. Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”, supra notex, at 28. 
473 See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO 
LOCAL JUSTICE 20 (2006) (describing the way in which individual and international interaction “provide 
transnational knowledge to local and national activists and contribute local knowledge to transnational settings. 
They provide a critical link in localizing human rights.”). 
474 Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra notex, at 49 (arguing that “[w]ithout access to these resources, 
violence against women will endure.”). 
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women under the rubric of socio-economic issues, therefore, effectively allows states to claim a 
lack of resources or political instability as a reason for continuing violence against women.475 
While it is true that the economic and social abjection of women perpetuates gender-based 
violence, it is necessary to maintain an equal emphasis on the civil and political components of 
domestic violence. 
 
In emphasizing discrimination, CEDAW and the subsequent international instruments aim 
to place women on an equal footing with men.476 This approach is in line with liberal feminism 
or liberal political theory, which is based on the principle that people in similar situations should 
be treated similarly.477 However, critics maintain that the liberal feminism underlying CEDAW 
is “unable to deal with situations where men and women are truly not similarly situated.”478 
Therefore, CEDAW inherently is limited because “it continues the androcentric approach to 
women’s human rights by using a male standard for determining those rights.”479 This approach 
has been used to explain the absence of reference in CEDAW to domestic violence, rape, 
abortion, forced sterilization and FGC.480 Therefore, the problem with CEDAW’s view of 
equality “is the standard used to measure such equality.”481 
 
It is argued that, without taking into account the structural causes of discrimination 
generally, and violence specifically, seeking formal equality will not end violence against 
women. A gender-neutral approach (also known as formal equality, which is similar to the notion 
of color blindness) takes the position that there are no differences between men and women. 
However, this results in gender-neutral state policies ignoring the special needs of women which 
                                                
475 See Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel in the House”: Digging for the Political Vortex of Male Violence against 
Women, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 285, 293 (Martha A. 
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (“The inadequacy of resources becomes the smokescreen for maintaining 
the preeminence of the social over the criminal nature of violence.”). 
476 CEDAW, article 1, describes discrimination against women as the impairment or nullification of the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women on the “basis of equality of men and women, of human rights.” For example, 
article 16 of CEDAW requires states to “ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, … [t]he same rights to 
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children.” 
477 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1996) (describing the criticism of liberal feminism). 
478 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 8 (1996). 
479 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 7 (1996). 
480 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 7 (1996). 
481 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 10 (1996). See also Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or 
Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY 
OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 72 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (criticizing the concept of 
formal equality, which seeks to place on people like expectations notwithstanding their dissimilar circumstances. 
Therefore, while abused women may be seen as weak, this is not because feminism has gone too far in describing 
the violence, but rather because the legal response to such description omits the objective structural difficulties, the 
persistent externalities, that differentiate the violence experienced by an abused women different from other forms 
of violence. Therefore, the assessment of systemic intimate violence needs to be contextual and informed, taking 
into account the range of mitigating and exacerbating factors.) 
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arise as a result of past discrimination.482 Feminist theorists such as MacKinnon, Charlesworth 
and Fineman have argued that the law cannot simply be expanded to apply ‘equally’ to women 
but that it should be recreated to address specifically the needs women have as a result of past 
discrimination.483 
 
Increasingly, academics are seeking to “reconceptualize violence against women in intimate 
relationships as a problem rooted in structural conditions such as political economy, 
globalization, the expansion of capitalism and the growing inequality between rich and poor 
nations as well as the dynamics of interpersonal interactions”.484 To end this structural cycle, 





The language relating to violence against women has also been criticized extensively by 
theorists. The language of “battered women” was first used to emphasize the severity of systemic 
intimate violence. Over time, however, there was concern that overemphasizing the victimization 
of abused women reduces the autonomy, agency and independence of women. Focusing on 
victimization could be misleading because it excludes from the analysis of domestic violence 
other important pieces of the puzzle, such as the “extreme dangers of separation” and the 
“interaction of social structures that oppress women.”486 In addition, this may create the 
                                                
482 See Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 950-1 (2003) (citing Rebecca Cook’s criticism that a gender neutral approach to equality 
is deficient: “As Cook points out violence against women is an issue that reveals acutely the limitations of the 
gender-neutral approach to equality and raises the need for special treatment – such as the creation of shelters – 
rather than formal equality.”) Id. at 951. See also Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, (1996) 
(describing the many deficiencies of CEDAW due to its failure to take the structural exigencies into account). 
483  [Note: add in the citation of Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 1989 Cambridge 
Harvard University Press; Hilary Charlesworth, What are ‘Women’s International Human Rights?” in Human 
Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 58-84 (Rebecca J. Cook, ed. (1994); and Martha 
Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies, 1995 New York: 
Routledge. ] 
484 See Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence against Women and the Human Rights System, 28 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 943-4 (2003). 
485 See Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 67 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (explaining the focus on positive rights with reference to the abortion struggle. The right to 
determine one’s own reproductive rights required the abstention of state intervention. However, notably absent is the 
concomitant claim for the right to have sufficient resources to support and raise and care for one’s child. The 
absence of the struggle for positive rights, according to Mahoney, is part of the reason why abused women remain 
demarcated as individual victims rather than members of a group or class of people who suffer due to unequal social 
structures, prejudice and deficient resources). 
486 See Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 59-61 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (providing a detailed analysis of the effects of labels on the way women and society view 
domestic violence. She also explains the perceived view of agency as requiring very specific conduct (74). When 
this conduct is not met the state may punish the abused, as is evident from Mahoney’s account of two abused women 
who lost custody of their children after leaving their abusive relationship (69-72)). 
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perception that women are weak, whereas in fact enormous strength and courage is required in 
the face of the violence.487 
 
9 An Overall Assessment of the International Law on Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
The Particular norm against sex-discrimination finds expression in many authoritative 
communications, at both international and national levels, and is rapidly being defined in a way to 
condemn all the great historic deprivations imposed upon women as a group. 
 
McDougal, Lasswell and Chen488 
 
The combination of instruments, cases and commentaries in international law make a 
compelling argument that the right to be free from systemic intimate violence is an international 
human right for which states can be held liable.489 This argument is further substantiated in 
chapter four below. 
 
A delicate balance is created by the aforementioned instruments. On the one hand, the array 
of instruments contributes to CIL and the interpretation of international instruments which 
confirm that states have an obligation to prevent and punish systemic intimate violence. On the 
other hand, states may dissent by consistent practice to be bound by the provisions of CIL. 
Moreover, CIL is subject to interpretation and the lack of precision in this area of law feeds the 
lack of precision in the determination of CIL norms. 
 
As stated above, there is evidence of a norm developing in international law. We are in the 
midst of the amorphous process of norm-crystallization through custom. The more precise, 
certain and authoritative international instruments are, the easier it will be to rely on CIL when 
pursuing improved state responses to systemic intimate violence. 
 
There are three steps missing in international law as regards systemic intimate violence. The 
first is specification. The precise right to be free from systemic intimate violence, with all its 
nuances, and the precise concomitant state obligation to help remedy such violence, with all its 
nuances, either is hidden within the network of instruments and their interpretation or is absent 
entirely. A clear, express and binding articulation of this right and duty is required. The accurate 
specification of systemic intimate violence in international law may or may not inhere in a treaty. 
While I do not maintain that the creation of a systemic intimate violence treaty is an ideal 
panacea, its absence is relevant. This is especially important to provide clear enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 
                                                
487 Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 61-62 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (describing the tensions in using battered women terminology: on the one hand, true pain of 
abuse needs to be told to create awareness. On the other hand, emphasizing the violent experience creates an 
impression of weakness and vulnerability). 
488 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 612. 
489 See for example Andreea Vesa, International and Regional Standards for Protecting Victims of Domestic 
Violence, 12 AM. U.J. GENDER. SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 312 (2004) (confirming that there is evidence of a prohibition 
against “domestic violence” in CIL). 
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The second is the general politicization of systemic intimate violence, with concomitant 
economic empowerment. This requires a movement away from a male-centric approach to 
international law, which currently obscures the political nature of systemic intimate violence.490 
Systemic intimate violence is not a socio-economic issue alone. It is a political one, relating 
directly to civil rights, political rights and individual well-being. Although this is changing, the 
energy demanding this change should not subside.491 
 
The third missing element is a precise theory and instructions as to what states should be 
doing to achieve compliance with their international obligation, within the unique contours of 




For women, international human rights presents the biggest gap between principle and 
practice in the known legal world.492  
 
Since 1945, the regional and international commitment to violence against women has been 
staunch and many of the deficiencies highlighted by theorists in the 1980s and 1990s have been 
addressed.493  
 
There is evidence of the development of a norm against systemic intimate violence in 
international law. The process is underway, emanating in part from the rubric of violence against 
women in international law, which has prohibited mass rape, FGC and trafficking. I propose that 
systemic intimate violence is the next category of violence against women, which ought, and is 
destined, to receive independent expostulation by authoritative international institutions.  
 
However, while this internationalizing process has translated into changes for many women, 
systemic intimate violence exists and persists. Notwithstanding the development described 
above, international law remains deficient. It has not yet targeted systemic intimate violence with 
the precision and authority needed to remedy this violence. The institutions and bodies 
                                                
490 See Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel in the House”: Digging for the Political Vortex of Male Violence against 
Women, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 285, 295-7 (Martha 
A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (arguing that the jurisprudence of the social contract is male-centric. 
The family is posited as a necessary foundation of social order, but one from which the state is removed. The 
violence women experience takes place in this realm and is compounded by the state’s non-political perception 
thereof. Compounded by the social and psychological processes which normalize the violence, the political nature of 
violence and the way it impedes women’s full citizenship is obscured and rendered invisible). 
491 See for example, Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra notex, at 47 (arguing that developing a legal process 
for women is vacuous without also providing them with the resources to use it, such as trained free legal counsel. 
She concludes that “although in theory we might prefer a more formal legal process for battered women, in practice, 
under present conditions of scarce legal resources, it may not be realistic.”). [Note: augment this point. It is changing 
if one considers that Turkey and Romania are having to amend their treatment of women in order to join the EU]. 
492 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS THE OXFORD AMNESTY 
LECTURES, 83, 97 (Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley eds., 1993) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of 
Peace]. 
493 For a precise review of the deficiencies of international law vis-à-vis women see Feminist Approaches to 
International Law, supra notex.  
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responsible for addressing systemic intimate violence need to improve their understanding of 
such violence, and take more direct action towards remedying such violence. 
 
This thesis proposes that continued activity is necessary at both international and national 
levels. I argue that one of the tools necessary for improving national laws and systems is a 
specific, express and binding prohibition against systemic intimate violence in international law. 
I now turn to discuss the content of this right to be safe from systemic intimate violence and the 








Freedom from Systemic Intimate Violence: 




[I]mplicit prejudices call for explicit scrutiny.  
 
We have to be clear on the nature of the ‘theory’ underlying the practice of extreme 









1. Description of this Chapter 
 
In this chapter I describe the proposed right to be free from systemic intimate violence and 
the elements that constitute that right. I then discuss the steps that the international community 
and states should adopt to mitigate systemic intimate violence. 
 
This chapter: (1) begins with a discussion of why a new label is necessary to describe the 
phenomenon of domestic violence in international law; (2) analyzes each element of systemic 
intimate violence; and, (3) identifies the substance of the obligation on the international 
community and states to mitigate systemic intimate violence. 
 
2. The Label: Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
2.1 The Many Labels of Domestic Violence  
 
There are many meanings and almost as many labels for domestic violence. The labels used 
to describe domestic violence demonstrate a pattern by which academics and practitioners have 
attempted to reveal the extreme nature of the violence and its political causes. 
 
                                                
494 Amartya Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, in WOMEN, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT A STUDY OF 
HUMAN CAPABILITIES 259, 270 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter Sen, Gender 
Inequality and Theories of Justice]. 
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One of the first changes to the domestic violence lingo was launched by the battered 
women’s movement. The terminology employed by this movement was intended to shake the 
consciousness of courts and demonstrate the exigency of the harm. The theory of battered 
woman syndrome referenced the psychological conditioning of victims to explain their behavior 
in the face of extreme domestic violence. For some women, however, the label was alienating. 
Many victims did not see themselves as battered women, notwithstanding the physical and 
psychological violence they endured.495 The difficulty of self-identifying as a battered woman, 
coupled with the social stigma of battered women being weak and helpless, led to the articulation 
of different labels, such as ‘domestic abuse’, ‘intimate abuse’, ‘domestic violence’, ‘spousal 
abuse’, ‘family abuse’, ‘gender-based violence’, and ‘violence in the family’. Other labels use 
phrases such as ‘torture’ and ‘terror’ to import the extremity of violence and the role of the state 
in allowing its perpetuation. 
 
I veer away from the existing labels and choose one which I believe captures both the nature 
of the violence in question and its structural component. I do this because, while some labels, 
such as “intimate terror” or “private torture” may achieve this broader meaning, there is a sense 
of borrowing words from established areas of law, which potentially offends the “true” victims 
of such harm. While survivors of domestic violence indicate that the terms “torture” and “terror” 
are in fact apt, using these phrases may cause friction with the proprietary hold some maintain 
over these labels.  
 
Therefore, for the purposes of creating a legal category in international law for such violence, 
I use the term ‘systemic intimate violence’. However, this is not to suggest that the myriad of 
labels used in the literature is defunct. A strict use of labels and words is the burden of 
lawmakers, but for the victims, the more words, phrases and notions available to describe their 
experiences, the better. 
 
2.2 The Type of Violence Covered by the Label: Systemic Intimate Violence  
  
This entire thesis is limited to a specific type of harm, namely, systemic intimate violence. It 
is this particular manifestation of domestic violence which I propose constitutes an international 
human rights violation.  
 
The term ‘domestic violence’ is one that applies to a miscellany of harm. Currently, falling 
within the one composite term of ‘domestic violence’ are acts as diverse as a single event of 
shoving or pushing on the one hand, and ongoing incidents of battering, breaking bones, burning, 
raping, and torturing on the other. While all of these forms of harm constitute domestic violence, 
this thesis does not propose that all such forms of violence can be addressed at international law. 
Rather, only a subset of domestic violence – ‘systemic intimate violence’ – has the elements 
                                                
495 See Nancy Fraser, Martha Minow and Schneider as auth for the development of labels such as “battered women” 
and their drawbacks. (see 48 of Schneider). See also Rosemary Ofeibea Ofei-Aboagye, Domestic Violence in 
Ghana: Some International Questions, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF 
DOMESTIC ABUSE, 260, 266-7 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (describing the importance of 
terminology. She notes that questions incorporating words such as “beating” and “battery” will not extract 
information from abused women whereas asking women whether they are subjected to methods of “discipline” to 
keep the order, will yield more information about domestic violence.) 
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necessary to elevate such conduct from the exclusive purview of domestic laws to justifying 
intervention at international law.496 
 
Why is it necessary to segregate harm into these categories? By using a single, 
undifferentiated notion of domestic violence, current legislation fails to grasp the mélange and 
nature of harm produced by intimate aggression. This results in laws that are improperly 
fashioned and therefore ineffective. Because of the different types of harm involved, 
international and domestic laws should distinguish between systemic intimate violence on the 
one hand, and other forms of domestic violence on the other. This may make it easier to identify 
effective, appropriate and direct tools to reduce the frequency and harmful effects of both 
categories of violence.497 
 
Distinguishing between types of violence may seem objectionable; yet, this is the task of 
lawyers in respect of all human behavior, including violence. For example, lawyers must 
distinguish between: grievous bodily harm and attempted murder; rape and sexual assault; 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity; torture and legitimate interrogation; mass 
killing and genocide. In the same manner, not all conflict or violence that takes place within a 
family or intimate context is necessarily a human rights violation. It would be unreasonable, and 
I believe inaccurate, to suggest that intimate discord of all types warrants the same legal 
approach.  
 
In addition, the purpose of this distinction is not to reduce the status or seriousness of a 
category of harm or to rank harm according to some qualitative hierarchy. Rather, the objective 
is to create laws that best address specific types of conduct, to demarcate human conduct which 
should receive international attention from human conduct that is not suited for global redress.  
 
I therefore distinguish between, on the one hand, forms of violence that can be (and are) 
addressed by domestic legal systems in their current form and, on the other hand, systemic 
intimate violence, which I propose requires a review of national legal systems through the lens of 
                                                
496 The forms of violence which would fall into the category of systemic intimate violence are not limited to the 
location of the home but are defined with reference to the perpetrator and victim of the harm.  The words domestic 
or home are used to import the characteristic of intimacy or privacy. 
497 An example of successful conceptual reformulation is the conceptualization of sexual harassment as an 
actionable offense.  See Ann Scales, Law and Feminism: Together in Struggle, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 291, 294 (2003).  
Prior to this relatively new concept, women in the workplace were forced to endure sexually-invasive conduct 
without redress.  See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT].  Their options were to tolerate the 
abuse or leave the workplace.  See id.  The reformulation of this conduct as the actionable offense of sexual 
harassment gave women the recourse needed to address this form of gender discrimination.  See, e.g., Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing that conduct may be prohibited as “sexual harassment” even 
when it is not “directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo”).  However, it is noted that the 
reformulation of domestic violence is but one part of a much larger multi-disciplinary approach to this phenomenon. 
See also Diana E.H. Russell, Introduction: The Politics of Femicide, in Femicide in Global Perspective, 3, 7 (Diana 
E.H. Russell and Roberta A. Harmes eds., 2001) (describing the definition of ‘femicide’ and indicating how the 
definition of “newly defined forms of women’s oppression can play a critical role in mobilizing feminists to try to 
combat and prevent the problem… Until feminists realize that there is a term that applies to the killing of females 
because they are females, they will likely not recognize the link between different kinds of femicide nor engage in a 
concerted campaign to protest and try to prevent femicides”) 
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international law. On the basis that categorizing forms of violence is uncomfortable but 
necessary, I now turn to the other elements of systemic intimate violence. 
 
Part B: The Right  
 
3 Definition of the Right to be Free from Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
Systemic intimate violence has a significant and ever-present negative effect on our society 
which distinguishes it from other forms of violence.498  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I define “systemic intimate violence” as meaning any form of 
violence which contains the following elements: (i) severe emotional or physical harm, or the 
threat thereof; (ii) a continuum of violence rather than a one-off incident; (iii) it is committed 
predominantly by men against women within an intimate relationship; (iv) the victim is unable to 
procure traditional legal assistance due to her isolation, incapacitation or general vulnerability; 
and (v) the violence is ‘systemic’ in the sense that it occurs in a society in which the state in 
question has failed to supply the minimum facilities necessary to help remedy such violence. 
 
The combination of these factors eludes the legislative and enforcement efforts of many 
states, which, in turn, re-enforces the systemic nature of such violence. I deal with each of these 
elements in more detail below. 
 
4 Elements of Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
4.1 Severe and Frequent Acts of Emotional or Physical Harm 
 
4.1.1 Physical and Emotional Violence 
 
Typically, acts of systemic intimate violence include various forms of physical violence, 
including punching; slapping; shouting; battery; biting; burning; hacking; electrocuting; 
starvation; mutilation; sleep deprivation; forced sexual encounters; non-consensual sexual 
touching; rape; forced sexual activities with third parties; poisoning; exposure; property 
destruction; murder; the withholding of medical care; threats of harm; threats of harm to third 
parties; threats of removing children; threatening to use a lethal weapon; persistent shouting; 
accusations of infidelity; controlling day to day activities; isolation; and threats of suicide.499 
                                                
498 See Justice Sachs’s statement in the South African constitutional case of the State v. Godfrey Baloyi, Case CCT 
29/99, paragraph 11 (1999) [hereinafter State v. Baloyi]  (“All crime has harsh effect on society. What distinguishes 
domestic violence is its hidden, repetitive character and its immeasurable ripple effect on our society and, in 
particular, on family life.”) Id. The Swedish government has stated that domestic violence is “an extremely difficult 
area with particular characteristics that could not be compared with those of other acts of violence.” See Cedaw 
Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra notex, at paragraph 503. 
499 Physical violence comprises “assault and battery in the form of blows, kicks, boxes on the ears, shoving, 
strangleholds and the use of various objects and weapons. Sexual violence includes sexual touching and degrading 
sexual acts and games that a man inflicts upon a woman or forces her to take part in, rape and violence to the breasts 
and genitals. Psychological violence consists, i.a., of threats of physical and/or sexual violence, death threats, 
constant insults and abusive language, controlling behaviour, threats against other persons who are important to the 
woman (for example, her children or parents), imposed and degrading acts and behaviour, restraining the woman 
from comforting her crying children or preventing her from seeking help and treatment. Injuries caused by physical 
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However, systemic intimate violence is not only physical and also includes emotional 
violence and threats of violence. Emotional violence comprises a combination of intense and 
persistent verbal abuse, insults, derision, threats of harm, intimidation, stalking, financial 




The threat of violence can be as destructive as the execution thereof. Often, one serious 
physical or sexual attack has the effect of so hurting or degrading the victim, that the mere threat 
of its recurrence is an act of violence whereby the abuser controls the victim.501 The threat of 
violence is particularly powerful if there has been past or intermittent physical injury.502 
                                                                                                                                                       
assault are most often localised to the head, followed by the arms, the neck and the abdomen.” Amnesty 
International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 6. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 66 (“[I]t is now 
widely recognized that within intimate relationships there is a significant overlap between physical abuse and sexual 
abuse.”). See also Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 24 (identifying the types of violence to which women 
are exposed for the purposes of eliciting statistics on domestic violence. The questionnaire asked “whether the man 
has ever thrown anything at the woman which could have injured her, whether he has pushed her, held her or 
dragged her, struck her with a hard object or kicked her, throttled her or tried to suffocate her, banged her head 
against something or threatened to use, or used, a firearm or other weapon”). See Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 
1595 (identifying “extreme jealousy and control as constant features of the abusive relationship.”).  
500 The recognition of emotional abuse is a significant achievement in remedying violence against women and most 
progressive laws refer to the act of violence as both physical and non-physical. The South African Domestic 
Violence Act defines domestic violence as physical, sexual, emotional, verbal and psychological abuse, which 
“harms, or may cause imminent harm to, the safety, health or wellbeing of the complainant.” See Domestic Violence 
Act no. 116 of 1998, 1998 SA CRIMINAL LAW 116 (BSRSA, LEXIS through June 2003 update) [hereinafter the 
South African Domestic Violence Act]. § 1.  Section 1 of the Act defines physical abuse as “any act or threatened 
act of physical violence towards a complainant;” sexual abuse as “any conduct that abuses, humiliates, degrades or 
otherwise violates the sexual integrity of the complainant;” and economic abuse as including “the unreasonable 
deprivation of economic or financial resources to which a complainant is entitled under law or which the 
complainant requires out of necessity . . . .”  Id. See WORLDLawDirect.com, What is the legal definition of 
domestic violence?, at 
http://www.worldlawdirect.com/article/446/What_is_the_legal_definition_of_domestic_violence.html (last modified 
Feb. 14, 2003). In many States this is not an offence. See for example Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 30 
(describing controlling behavior, which does not fall within the purview of a criminal code. Examples of such 
behavior included “jealousy, the man preventing the woman from seeing relatives and friends, calling her 
disparaging names or forbidding her to make her own decisions about money.”). See also Candies in Hell, supra 
note 122, at 1602 (indicating “extreme jealousy and control as constant features of the abusive relationship. Nearly 
one-third of women referred to their husband’s jealousy as the main cause of violence.”) See SCHNEIDER, supra note 
57, at 65. 
501 The Captured Queen Report includes the notion of threats. The concept of sexual violence includes ‘any physical, 
visual, verbal or sexual act that is experienced by the woman or girl, at time or later, as a threat, invasion or assault, 
that has the effect of hurting her or degrading her and/or takes away her ability to control intimate contact… For a 
woman who has been beaten, the threat of further assault is a reality which may be as frightening as the violence 
itself. Threats to kill the woman may likewise be uttered at the same time as threats of abuse made earlier are being 
put into effect, so that threats of violence and actual violence become very hard to separate.” Captured Queen 
Report, supra note 123, at 17. Section 1 of the South African Domestic Violence Act recognizes the threat of 
violence and prohibits “any act or threatened act of physical violence towards a complainant.” South African 
Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. 
502 Because controlling behavior and threats form a continuum of violence, there is no such thing as “mere threats.” 
Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 79: “…there is a link between controlling behavior by the male and his 
subjecting the female to violence, including threats. There is also a clear link between threats on the one hand and 
 113 
Therefore, for the purposes of the definition, threats of violence which are debilitating also 




The definition of systemic intimate violence envisages severe forms of violence only.503 It 
encompasses violence which is invasive of the victim’s mental and physical autonomy in a way 
that is particularly destructive of the individual’s dignity.504 The standard of severity is such that 
it shocks human conscience. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
the exercise of physical and sexual violence on the other.” The incremental dynamic of domestic violence in Sweden 
was confirmed in the Captured Queen Report, which references five forms of harm, namely, physical violence, 
sexual violence, threats of violence, sexual harassment and controlling behavior. Captured Queen Report, supra note 
123, at 20. The notion of a continuum of violence, which includes the threat of violence, is discussed in analyses of 
domestic violence in Nicaragua. See Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1596. Captured Queen Report, supra note 
123, at 17. SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 65 (“‘What he did wasn’t exactly battering but it was the threat. I 
remember one night I spent the whole night in a state of terror, nothing less than terror all night. . . .   And that was 
worse to me than getting whacked.’”). See also Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 16 (describing the 
importance of threats within the definition of domestic violence: “And where is the line to be drawn between threats 
and actual violence? For a woman who has been beaten, the threat of further assault is a reality which may be as 
frightening as the violence itself. Threats to kill the woman may likewise be uttered at the same time as threats of 
abuse made earlier are being put into effect, so that threats of violence and actual violence become very hard to 
separate.” Moreover, the Captured Queen Report also reveals that women “who have been subjected to threats 
report suffering both more intensely and from more physical and psychological disorders than do women subjected 
to other types of violence.” Id at 58. 
503 Typically, acts of systemic intimate violence include: punching; slapping; shouting; battery; biting; burning; 
hacking; electrocuting; starvation; mutilation; sleep deprivation; forced sexual encounters; non-consensual sexual 
touching; rape; forced sexual activities with third parties; poisoning; exposure; property destruction; murder; the 
withholding of medical care; threats of harm; threats of harm to third parties; threats of removing children; 
threatening to use a lethal weapon; persistent shouting; accusations of infidelity; controlling day to day activities; 
isolation; and threats of suicide. 
504 Many academic and research sources describe various acts of reported abuse.  The author gathered the instances 
of abuse cited above from legal consultations with domestic violence clients at the South African NGO, People 
Opposing Woman Abuse (POWA) over a period of one year. Many women experience some form of sexual 
aggression.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 66 (“[I]t is now widely recognized that within intimate relationships 
there is a significant overlap between physical abuse and sexual abuse.”). See Captured Queen Report, supra note 
123, at 24 (identifying the types of violence to which women are exposed for the purposes of eliciting statistics on 
domestic violence. The questionnaire asked “whether the man has ever thrown anything at the woman which could 
have injured her, whether he has pushed her, held her or dragged her, struck her with a hard object or kicked her, 
throttled her or tried to suffocate her, banged her head against something or threatened to use, or used, a firearm or 
other weapon”). See Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1595 (identifying “extreme jealousy and control as constant 
features of the abusive relationship.”) Specifically, Amnesty International describes the violence against women in 
abusive relationships as recurring physical, sexual and psychological violence that causes injury. Physical violence 
comprises “assault and battery in the form of blows, kicks, boxes on the ears, shoving, strangleholds and the use of 
various objects and weapons. Sexual violence includes sexual touching and degrading sexual acts and games that a 
man inflicts upon a woman or forces her to take part in, rape and violence to the breasts and genitals. Psychological 
violence consists, i.e., of threats of physical and/or sexual violence, death threats, constant insults and abusive 
language, controlling behaviour, threats against other persons who are important to the woman (for example, her 
children or parents), imposed and degrading acts and behaviour, restraining the woman from comforting her crying 
children or preventing her from seeking help and treatment. Injuries caused by physical assault are most often 
localised to the head, followed by the arms, the neck and the abdomen.” Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in 
Sweden, supra note 98, at 6. 
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Dividing violence according to degrees of severity is intuitively problematic.505 How does 
one begin to grade levels of harm? However, other social disciplines have engaged in such a 
categorization process; for example, by using scales of aggression to assess the extent of physical 
violence, “ranging from throwing objects to the use of a weapon”506 and analysts have relied on 
tables of abuse which distinguish between “moderate” and “severe” violence.507 
 
The distinction between types of domestic violence is addressed by sociology theorist, 
Michael Johnson.508 Johnson employs a distinction between “patriarchal terrorism” on the one 
hand and “common couple violence” on the other.509 Johnson uses the term “patriarchal 
terrorism” to refer to “a product of patriarchal traditions of men’s right to control ‘their’ women” 
that results in “a form of terroristic control of wives by their husbands that involves the 
systematic use of not only violence, but economic subordination, threats, isolation, and other 
control tactics.”510 The second category of common couple violence “is less a product of 
patriarchy, and more a product of the less-gendered causal process… in which conflict 
occasionally ‘gets out of hand,’ leading usually to ‘minor’ forms of violence…”511 Therefore, 
only harm that is severe qualifies as systemic intimate violence.  
 
On this basis, this thesis proposes that acts of violence do in fact fall along a spectrum of 
severity. Such categorization is uncomfortable, but necessary for the purposes of establishing an 
international legal right. Therefore, in addition to the elements discussed in this chapter, the 
violence must meet a certain threshold of severity in order to trigger the provisions of 
international law. 
 
A one-off incident of violence by a male partner, which leaves no lasting physical or 
emotional damage and does not create a climate of fear, for example, will not require state 
intervention. A state cannot reasonably be blamed for the act of violence because, as will be 
discussed in chapter three, such act is neither the act of the state nor can it be attributable to the 
state. By contrast, where a victim suffers long-term, systematic violence, and the state fails to 
provide effective police intervention and basic shelters to help mitigate the consequences thereof, 
the state reasonably can, and should, be held accountable for its failings. On this basis, only 
severe harm qualifies as systemic intimate violence. 
 
                                                
505 However, this is the very nature of the work conducted by the United Nations Committee against Torture, 
established to monitor and enforce the provisions of the Convention against Torture.  See generally U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Fact Sheet No. 17, U.N. CHR, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs17.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (observing that the Committee monitors 
compliance with the United Nations standards of what constitutes torture and other inhuman behavior). 
506 Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1597. The existence and extent of physical violence sometimes is determined 
with reference to the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS). This scale of aggression lists eight acts of physical harm in order 
of severity. There is much contention regarding the use of this scale. See for example, Johnson, Patriarchal 
Terrorism, supra note 122, at 285-6. 
507 The most frequent violence includes pushing, punching and kicks, followed by slaps and thrown objects. Candies 
in Hell, supra note 122, at 1600. 
508 Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra note 122, at 283.  
509 Id. at 284. 
510 Id. Johnson explains that the “term patriarchal terrorism has the advantage of keeping the focus on the 
perpetrator and of keeping our attention on the systematic, intentional nature of this form of violence.” 
511 Id. 
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4.1.4 Determining Severity 
 
In determining the severity of the harm, it is necessary to weigh the severity of the conduct 
together with the frequency of the acts of violence. As discussed above, it is unlikely that a one-
off incident of relatively minor violence, which leaves no lasting physical or emotional damage, 
would be sufficiently severe to qualify as systemic, unless that one-off incident induces an 
ongoing environment of fear and control from which the victim is unable to escape. However, 
one-off incidents of severe forms of violence, or prolonged, serious and tolerated violence, will 
fall within the definition of systemic intimate violence provided they occur within a context of 
systemic state failure. 
 
Physical injury is rarely external or identifiable, especially in respect of sexual violence.512 
Because the violence is incremental in nature, injuries are normalized, causing victims to ‘down 
play’ the violence or its consequences as insufficiently ‘serious’ to warrant hospitalization or 
police intervention.513 This is distinct from violence which occurs infrequently and which is not 
sufficiently intense to cause either long-term physical damage or to induce an environment of 
fear and apprehension regarding the recurrence of the violence.514  
 
Therefore, the distinction is a fluid one; the severity of the violence involved should be 
weighed on a case by case basis, together with the past frequency and severity of that (or any 
other) form of violence, to determine whether the cycle of violence as a whole is such that it 
satisfies the threshold for international intervention. 
 
4.2 Continuum of Harm 
 
Systemic intimate violence is a continuum of harm; it is a hybrid of physical, emotional and 
sexual harm, the effects of which are often invisible. Not only can various incidences of violence 
against women be extreme, but it is also clear that different acts, perpetrated by one’s intimate 
partner, while individually not alarming, may accumulate to make a cycle of harm that is 
impenetrable and debilitating.515  
 
The notion of a continuum of harm is necessary because it is difficult to determine the extent 
of the violence based on one incident alone.516 Often a bout of violence may appear erratic or 
                                                
512 “Most frequent injuries are not [] serious enough to require treatment in hospital… In approximately 50 per cent 
of all rape cases the woman incurs no physical injury at all.” Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, 
supra note 98, at 6. “Injuries caused by rape vary considerably, from no injuries at all, to internal injuries, injuries to 
the head or the anus, unwanted pregnancies and HIV infection.” 
513 See Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 65, describing the tendency of abused women in Sweden to 
describe their state of health in positive terms, whereas “it turns out that physical and psychological orders are fairly 
widespread.” See also Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 6 (The most frequent 
injuries are not, however, serious enough to require treatment in hospital.”) 
514 Indeed, this is the notion underpinning crimes against humanity.  Crimes against humanity are crimes that take 
place on a scale that transcends individuals and isolated incidents and relate to violence that is systematic, repeated, 
and/or of such large proportions that its commission exceeds the ambit of domestic laws in their current forms. 
515 See Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 17 (discussing the notion of a continuum of violence, which “is 
not to be used as a method of creating hierarchies of more or less serious abuse”). 
516 Johnson describes the same different between patriarchal terrorism and common couple violence, the former 
evidencing an escalation in frequency and intensity over time. See Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra notex, at 
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sublime in a vacuum, but if it is brought into the context of a continuum, it takes on a far more 
pernicious character.517 Emotional and physical harm may operate separately, but generally are 
combined to spin a web of abuse in which the exigency of violence escalates.518 Threats, 
violence and sexual abuse are “impossible to isolate from one another; characteristically the 
boundaries between them are fluid and actions merge into one another.”519 
 
This is referred to as a cycle of abuse. Theorists first identified the so-called cycle of abuse as 
containing instances of violence, followed by apologies, gifts, and expressions of remorse.520 
Slowly, the tension intensifies and rebuilds itself; first in the form of verbal denigration and 
ultimately resulting in another episode of anger and physical violence.521 As the cycle repeats 
itself, the severity of the violence intensifies and there are fewer and shorter periods of 
                                                                                                                                                       
286. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 65–66.  See also Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 116–33.  Copelon 
deftly parallels the physical and mental harm caused by domestic violence to the combination of physical and mental 
harm used in official torture.  Id. at 121. In Nicaragua, analysts identify a “series of characteristics which define the 
experience of battering for women, and conceptualize violent relationships as an ongoing process of entrapment and 
diminished coping capacity.” Candies in Hell, supra notex, at 1596. 
517 The Captured Queen Report and Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden describe 
domestic violence as forming a continuum of harm, involving many stages and not a single episode. See Amnesty 
International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 6 (“The demarcation lines between the different forms 
of violence are vague, and gender-based violence is often described as a continuum where men expose women to a 
continuous sequence of psychological, physical and sexual violations, such as controlling behaviour, threats, 
restriction of the freedom of movement, sexual harassment, battering, sexual violations and rape. Psychological 
assault often includes threats of physical and sexual violence. Sexual violations and rape often involve both physical 
and psychological violence. Physical abuse is often combined with threats and sexual violations or rape.”) See also 
Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 17 (indicating that the continuum approach to gender-related violence 
“views threats, violence and sexual abuse as actions impossible to isolate from one another; characteristically the 
boundaries between them are fluid and actions merge into one another.”) 
518 In Nicaragua, 94% of physically abused women reported that verbal abuse and insults usually accompanied the 
physical violence. Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1600-1. The report indicated a significant overlap between 
physical and emotional violence and 21% of ever-abused women reported all three kinds of abuse (i.e. physical, 
emotional and sexual). 36% of abused women reported that they were forced to have sex while being beaten. See 
Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1601. This is evidenced by the description of the continuum of violence in the 
Candies in Hell report on domestic violence in Nicaragua. Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1602 (“physical abuse 
is so often intertwined with acts of psychological and sexual degradation as to be virtually indistinguishable.”).  
Ninety four per cent of the abused women in Nicaragua reported that physical violence had been accompanied by 
verbal humiliation and control of daily activities. OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra notex, at 12. See 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 65–66. See also Captured Queen Report, supra notex, at 17 (describing the continuum 
of violence that “enables us to see the linkages between its various forms, putting serious violence on the same scale 
as acts which are less serious, perhaps  not criminalized, or even considered acceptable. The concept thus links 
together commonly used expressions of sexism and acts of criminal violence”). 
519 Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 17. 
520 The cycle is described as having three components, namely, tension-building, followed by an incident of 
violence, and then seduction, which ultimately leads to a renewed period of tension.  See LENORE E. WALKER, 
TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 42-47 (1989) [hereinafter 
WALKER] (providing a detailed analysis of the “cycle of violence”). See also Captured Queen Report, supra note 
123, at 17 (describing how “actions which the law defines as minor may signify an explicit or implicit threat to an 
abused woman, i.e. that they are anything but minor to her”). 
521 WALKER, supra note 127, at 42–45. 
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remorse.522 The emotional stress caused by this cycle results in dependency, depression, 
sleeplessness and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.523 
 
The continual nature of systemic intimate violence has been recognized to varying degrees in 
the ‘domestic violence’ legislation of foreign jurisdictions. Mexico and Nicaragua have defined 
domestic violence with reference to acts that are recurring, intentional and cyclical.524 The South 
African Constitutional Court has stated that what distinguishes domestic violence from other 
crime “is its hidden, repetitive character and its immeasurable ripple effects on our society and, 
in particular, on family life.”525 In Sweden also, new domestic violence legislation recognizes 
that “(g)ross physical violence is a part of a pattern, a notch on a sliding scale, a continuum, 
rather than an isolated and inexplicable incident”526 The legislation targets not only physical 
violence but the full fabric of harm which results in the “gross violation of a woman’s 
integrity.”527 
 
The continuum of violence inherent in systemic intimate violence demonstrates the 
seriousness of the harm in question and reveals the infrastructural component. If a victim is 
unable to procure help from state sources, there is a clear deficiency on the part of the state’s 
service provision. This may be due to an inability to provide resources, but often also is the result 
of the state mis-conceptualizing the fluid and cyclical pattern of systemic intimate violence.  
 
 
                                                
522 Id. at 46. 
523 The violence “often produces anxiety, depression, and sleeplessness. It can produce extreme states of 
dependency, debility, and dread as well as the same intense symptoms that comprise the post-traumatic stress 
disorders experienced by victims of official violence as well as by victims of rape.” Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra 
notex, at 125.  Often women find the psychological terror the most unbearable and will “precipitate battering as 
opposed to enduring the fear.”  Id. at 124. 
524 Article 1 of the Law of Assistance and Prevention of Domestic Violence, Decree of the Assembly of 
Representatives of the federal District, promulgated April 26, 1996 and published on July 9, 1996 in the Daily 
Gazette [hereinafter Law of Assistance and Prevention of Domestic Violence, Mexico], cited in Women’s 
Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra notex, at 23. In Mexico, the Law of Assistance and 
Prevention of Domestic Violence defines the violence as “an act of power or omission that is recurring, intentional 
and cyclical, and is aimed at dominating, subordinating, controlling or harming any member of the family through 
physical, verbal, psycho-emotional, or sexual violence.” Article 1 of the Law of Assistance and Prevention of 
Domestic Violence, Mexico, supra note 131. Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1596. 
525 State v. Baloyi, supra note 119, at paragraph 11. 
526 Two years later, Amnesty International conducted an investigation of domestic violence in Sweden. This report 
also highlighted the nature of domestic violence as a continuum, indicating that the violence against women in 
abusive relationships “is often recurrent and has almost always been preceded by a pattern of increasing dominance 
and control over the woman by the man. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 6. 
527 In an attempt to target domestic violence more precisely, Sweden appointed a committee to “scrutinize all sex 
crime legislation [for the] protection for women and children exposed to violence.” The committee proposed the 
introduction of a new crime entitled “Protection of Women’s Integrity.” Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 
13. The objective of the legislation is to mitigate the “effects of the normalization process and the impact of repeated 
violations on women subjected to them.” The legislation takes account of “the changes which a woman gradually 
experiences while being subjected to violence.” Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 13. It also takes the 
position that “violations which may seem fairly minor when viewed separately have a grave negative effect on a 
woman when they are part of a process, thus meriting severe punishment.” This is reinforced in the punitive 
component of the legislation, which penalizes acts which, “viewed separately, are relatively minor but when 
repeated may lead to substantial violation of the victim’s integrity.” Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 13. 
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4.3 Between Intimates 
 
Systemic intimate violence is characterized by the dichotomy between love and pain. 
Generally, it is an incomprehensible thought that within the boundaries of an ostensibly loving 
relationship exists one of the most acute manifestations of violence. Yet the reality is that the 
highest rate of violence against women occurs in private relationships.528 It is this element that 
distinguishes domestic violence from other forms of violence in society. 
 
The intimacy complicates the victim’s understanding of the violence, her ability to escape it 
and the approach of society to her experience.529 The pattern of systemic intimate violence may 
be discernable by experts but rarely by laypeople, not least of all by the victim herself. Beginning 
with an imperceptible degradation, the abuser, at times unknowingly, primes his partner for the 
first onslaught of violence. The shock is debilitating, almost as crushing as the aftermath of 
sorrow and shame. The abuser’s subsequent remorse may be genuine but is temporary; its 
presence deteriorates, transforming once more into the subtle, slightly more perceptible disdain 
that precedes the attack. As the cycle evolves, the chapters of harm intensify until the abused is 
imprisoned in a combination of physical disability and mental despair.530 Encapsulated within 
the relationship, the recurrent violence becomes normalized, preventing the abused from 
reporting the violence and the authorities from recognizing it.531 
 
A further complication is the principle of privacy and the constitutional injunction against 
state interference with one’s personal affairs. It is difficult to draw a line between an improper 
state presence in one’s personal affairs, on the one hand, and necessary state protection, on the 
other. This sensitivity also arises in other contexts, such as regulations concerning child 
pornography or dangerous political dissidents. It is crucial that proper procedural guidelines are 
employed when asking for state intervention, albeit for protective purposes. But state 
intervention remains necessary, especially in light of the fact that the predominant harm for 
women emanates from her private, and not public, world.532 
 
                                                
528 See Annexure 1 hereto. 
529 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 12 (describing that domestic violence is 
different from other forms of violent crime because “the woman has an emotional relationship with the perpetrator 
and … because the violence is generally planned, controlled and carried out in the home, out of sight of other 
people”). 
530 Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 77: “The violence is committed in the woman’s home, in indoor and 
outdoor public places and at women’s places of work. The results seem to show that there are no free zones for 
women.” Systemic intimate violence “compels many women to change their ways of life and to limit their freedom 
of movement in order to avoid or reduce the risk of being subjected to abuse.” Amnesty International, Intimate 
Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 23. 
531 She may have become accustomed to the abuse and through the process of ‘normalization’ she no longer is able 
to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. For a lengthier discussion of the process of 
normalization and its impact on reporting domestic violence, see Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in 
Sweden, supra note 98, at 8 (describing the dynamic process by which the violence becomes a normal way of life 
for both the abused and the abuser: “For the woman, the process of normalization means … that her own limits 
gradually disappear and that the man’s violence becomes a normal part of everyday life… her sense of reality is 
blurred and she starts seeing herself through the eyes of the man, blaming herself as the cause of the .”) Id 8. 
532 “Despite the high value set on the privacy of the home and the centrality attributed to intimate relations, all too 
often the privacy and intimacy end up providing both the opportunity for violence and the justification for non-
interference.” State v. Baloyi, supra note 119, at 20, paragraph 16. 
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Therefore, not only is the cycle of abuse pernicious because of the almost subliminal 
increment of harm but also the context of the relationship masks the harm; distorts the victim’s 
and society’s view of the violence; and, divorces the abused in her private world from the 
remedies that exist in the public one.533  
 
4.4 Group Vulnerability of Women 
 
The fourth element is the vulnerability of women, as a group, to systemic intimate violence. 
The vulnerability is the result of a combination of the following factors: (1) traditional views 
about male and female roles often result in distance between the abused and the public world; (2) 
violence tends to escalate upon separation; (3) the nature of systemic intimate violence tends to 
remove the abused, and signs of the abuse, from the purview of society; (4) economic difficulties 
restrain women’s freedom; and (5) communities ignore or acquiesce to the violence. 
 
4.4.1 The Private Lives of Women 
 
For the reasons described below, victims of systemic intimate violence often are isolated 
from society.534 This is compounded for women who operate more within a private, and by 
extension, socially disconnected environment. A significant cause of the vulnerability, therefore, 
is the normalcy attached to women’s submergence into private, domestic and non-public 
activities.  
 
Traditional social demarcation between the genders has lead to different roles and needs for 
men and women. However, this difference is not always taken into account when formulating 
legal protection. The result is that women often are unable to procure legal assistance which 
targets the specific difficulties women face.535  
 
This deficiency has been remedied in some spheres of life. For example, thirty years ago 
women employees endured acts of intimidation in the workplace, which limited their earning 
potential, professional development and general wellbeing. It was only when the conduct was 
examined through the lens of systemic difference between men and women that the harm was 
identified as sexual harassment. Today almost every major corporation has a sexual harassment 
policy, based in part on the better legal analysis of this phenomenon. Therefore, identifying the 
vulnerabilities that are peculiar to women is a necessary precondition to formulating applicable 
legal remedies, not least of all in respect of systemic intimate violence. 
                                                
533 Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 633 (2001) 
[hereinafter Resnik] (“A locked room denotes a safe space, a home”). 
534 The reasons for this are discussed below. 
535 Okin maintains that the gender has been excluded from development studies and theories of justice (in the same 
way that, until recently, is has been excluded from discussions of war) because: (i) due to the dichotomy between 
public and private, only the public sphere has been examined for the purposes of development analysis; and, (ii) the 
family is assumed to have a natural hierarchy and even where that hierarchy may be unjust or damaging, it is 
legitimized by its assumed position as an inextricable component of private family lives. Okin, supra note 593, at 
279 and 281-3. [Note: Citation to follow] [Note: add in the citation of Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State, 1989 Cambridge Harvard University Press; Hilary Charlesworth, What are ‘Women’s 
International Human Rights?” in Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 58-84 (Rebecca 
J. Cook, ed. (1994); and Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies, 1995 New York: Routledge. ] 
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Systemic intimate violence against women is not a case by case peculiarity but in many ways 
is a manifestation of social views, perceptions, priorities, and custom.536 The intimate context of 
the violence produces an almost visceral reaction that what happens within the boundaries of a 
home is venerable, impervious to the strictures of law and law enforcement. The opposite, 
however, is true. Women particularly are vulnerable to systemic intimate violence, which, as the 
main cause of women’s ill-health worldwide, is neither harmless nor gender-neutral.537  
 
4.4.2 Why Doesn’t She Just Leave?  
 
While it appears that abused women have the freedom to leave, this is a myth. Flight is a 
fallacy. At times, victims of systemic intimate violence quite literally are imprisoned and held 
against their will.538 However, abusers also implement a more subtle procession of isolating 
factors: the abuser may control the daily activities of the abused and prevent her from visiting 
family, friends or neighbors; receiving visitors; working outside the home; studying; or using 
contraceptives.539 Therefore, factors other than direct force prevent escape.540  
 
                                                
536 Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 120: It is “systemic and structural . . . built on . . . economic, social, 
and political predominance of men and dependency of women.” 
537 See Annexure 1 hereto. 
538 The violence targeted by the Mexican legislation includes acts of power or omission that dominate, subordinate, 
control or harm individuals “through physical, verbal, psycho-emotional, or sexual violence.” Article 1 of the Law 
of Assistance and Prevention of Domestic Violence, Mexico, supra note 131. 
539 According to the report, 71% of abused women had endured controlling acts of emotional aggression including 
“insults, humiliations and threats of physical violence.” Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1597-1600. This form of 
control leads to “periods of denial, self-blame and endurance.” Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1605. Other 
common forms of domestic violence in Mexico include verbal aggression, confinement to the home, prohibitions on 
seeing family members or working, and forced sexual relations.” Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A 
Shadow Report, supra note 131, at 24. Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1603, (relating how an interviewee’s 
husband was so jealous that his “demands and accusations made it impossible for her to work. Eventually she was 
forced to give up her job, thereby losing her social contacts and economic freedom.” One interviewee describes the 
manifestation of her husband’s jealousy as follows: “…He didn’t always beat me, but he was constantly saying 
‘what man have you been with now’ and ‘where are you coming from’ and he would touch me to see if I was wet, or 
he would check my underpants…’”) 
540 It is an important aspect of systemic intimate violence that the abuser usually is in control of his actions, 
evidenced by the fact that the violence takes place in private, out of the public eye. See Amnesty International 
Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra notex, at 29. See Candies in Hell, 1601 (indicating that much 
domestic violence in Nicaragua takes place on the weekends or in the evenings. The report included an investigation 
into the time and place in which the abuse occurred. Nearly all 188 women reported being beaten in the house. This 
is important information substantiating the isolating component of domestic violence). Jane Maslow Cohen, 
Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT.  L. REV. 757 
(1996) (distinguishing between abusers who employ “a far more controlled and generally infrequent for of violence 
that is calibrated to do only as much physical and emotional damage as necessary to instill fear, obedience or any 
other reaction that is desired in the subject…” and those whose “goal, control, is of crucial value; violence and the 
infliction of pain are not, Because of this conjunction, the efficient tyrant is able to rule with, as it were, a light hand. 
What matters is the maintenance of fear, or even terror, as a steady-state phenomenon. It may be possible to achieve 
this state through only the most occasional demonstration of force, perhaps early in the relationship. Afterwards, 
threats alone may do the necessary work, provided that they suitably manipulate the subject’s mental state.”)  
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Escape may also precipitates escalated violence against the woman or her children. It is at the 
point of leaving when many women die at the hands of their abusive partners.541 Faced with the 
                                                
541 Many women experience the most intense violence at the point when they leave their partners or seek outside 
help. Women who have left the relationship report higher instances of violence than women who are in 
relationships. This may be due to a higher level of violence or the tendency to create a more favorable description 
“of current relationships compared with relationships that the women have terminated.” See Captured Queen Report, 
supra note 123, at 81. Mahoney refers to this as “separation assault. Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or 
Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY 
OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 78-81 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). The Mexican legal 
provisions seem deficient in this regard. The procedures established for cases of domestic violence include 
conciliation, friendly settlement, and arbitration. The failure to respect the orders generated by this process is 
penalized with a fine of 30 to 180 days’ of the minimum salary in the Federal District, or its equivalent, and the 
incommutable administrative arrest of the offender for a period of no more than 36 hours. The Candies in Hell report 
confirms that the “strong association found between marital control and physical abuse is consistent with 
international research suggesting that acts of physical violence do not represent isolated events but rather a 
relationship based on dominations.” Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1604. SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 77 
(“Leaving provides battered women no assurance of separation or safety; the stories of battered women who have 
been hunted down across state lines and harassed or killed are legion.”).  See also BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED 
MINDS, supra note 98, at 1 (“When she was 20, she ran away with her two children, but her parents and husband 
found her, and her mother held her down while her husband beat her with a stick.  He took the children, whom she 
has not seen since.”). See also Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 27 (concluding that women in Sweden 
who were not living with a man at the time of the survey reported “a higher level of experiences of violence on the 
part of former husbands/cohabitant partners than do women who are currently living with a man.” The Captured 
Queen Report also indicates how violence may escalate when a woman leaves the abusive situation: “it does happen 
that women who are murdered by men have left or been about to leave the man in question. In other cases, the man 
continues to molest and harm the woman by pursuing her and threatening her, with or without physical attacks.” Id 
at 35). See Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1602 (describing how the “involvement of children in the violence is 
a particular source of anguish for women, possibly more distressing than her own abuse…” The report also 
demonstrates how abused women’s day to day activities were constrained and controlled by abusive husbands or 
partners. Controlled activities include visiting friends and the use of birth control. The intensity of the controlling 
nature of jealousy was described by an interview as follows: “He was so jealous, my grandmother used to say, ‘if 
you stay with him he’s going to put blinders on you like the horses that pull carriages.’ I couldn’t look at anyone on 
the street, nor have either men or women friends, nor greet anyone. And if a man looked at me, he would smack me 
right there on the street.”) See Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and 
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 73-74 (Martha A. 
Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (describing the factors that inhibit escape: “resistance becomes the 
project of staying alive, which will only involve flight when it seems either possible or safer than staying.”). See also 
Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE 
OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 60 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk 
eds., 1994): describing the danger of leaving an abusive relationship: “Staying is a socially suspect choice – often 
perceived as acceptance of violence – though ‘leaving’ is often unsafe.” Mahoney argues that the issue of domestic 
violence is part of a system, a sequence of factors that all lead into the prolongation of domestic violence. This is 
enhanced by denial of such violence and social stigma attached to the victims. Id at 62. There are instances where 
women do leave abusive situations. Reasons for finally leaving may vary and include the fear of actually getting 
killed; going mad; fear that a child will be killed; and the revelation of an opportunity to escape. Most often, 
however, the dynamics of the violence and infrastructural deficiencies restrict, at times to the point of eliminating, 
the victim’s ability to leave. See, for example, Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, 
at 10; WALLACE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra notex, at 180 (indicating that “men have far greater opportunities to 
leave the abusive situation than women.”). 
Even in the most sophisticated legal and institutional systems, officials may fail to protect the abused from the 
violence of her abusive partner who is subject to a restraining order. For example, in Sweden in 2002, only one 
fourth (approximately 24 per cent) of the cases of assault against women, which were reported to the police, resulted 
in prosecution. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 24. It is also interesting to 
note that in 75 per cent of all reported cases of gang rape in Sweden in 2000, the charges were dropped either by the 
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reality of a loss of control and seeking to re-establish dominance, the aggressor tends to use 
force, either against the abused or her children.542 The abuser may also threaten to take away her 
children or harm her family members, companion animals or work colleagues. The victim’s 
‘choice’ dissipates and, in reality, she is left with only once course of action, that is, to stay. The 
threats of violence form a barrier to liberation that can be as equally restrictive as prison walls.543 
 
In cases of immigrant women, the fear of deportation may restrain them from seeking 
assistance from any official government body.544 In this way, the abuser removes the possibility 
of seeking outside assistance by linking her call for help with the certainty of harm to her or a 
third person. This is confirmed if the authorities have been contacted before and either have not 
demonstrated sufficient commitment to assisting her or have been unable to prevent further 
incidences of harm. In such a situation, the abused may decide either to live with the violence to 
avoid bringing harm to third parties or, in certain cases, to take independent action, such as 
hurting the abuser or herself. Women who are sex workers, alcoholics, drug abusers and lesbians 
may feel disempowered to engage the law at all.545  
 
Psychologically, abused women are threatened, shamed and manipulated into believing that 
they deserve violent treatment and are unable to leave.546 Perpetual violence exhausts the abused, 
leaving her too tired and depressed to take action. If she has been denied hospital treatment her 
injuries may become debilitating. It is increasingly difficult, if not indeed impossible, to reason 
                                                                                                                                                       
police or the prosecutor. Only 10 cases per year led to legal proceedings. Most often a woman is afraid to leave her 
partner because she has not received institutional help when she has sought it. She may be told by police or hospital 
officials that there is nothing they can (or will) do. This will decrease the options she has to leave. Amnesty 
International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 10 (“In extreme cases, women who have survived 
violence become refugees in their own countries…”). It is also interesting to note that most women in Sweden who 
are able to turn to a shelter for assistance have not in fact reported the perpetrator to the police or been in contact 
with the authorities. See Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 28. 
542 See Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 10 (stating that the “single most 
frequent motive behind fatal violence against women by men close to them is ‘the problems in conjunction with 
separation,’ where the man’s perception that he risks losing control over the woman is seen as the triggering  
factor”). 
543 Telephones are disconnected and windows are often sealed.  One POWA client could only communicate to her 
sister through the letter opening in the front door.  See also DWORKIN, LIFE AND DEATH, supra note 92, at 115–16 
(“When you look at what happened to these women, you want to say, ‘Amnesty International, where are you?’—
because the prisons for women are our homes.  We live under martial law.  We live in a rape culture.  Men have to 
be sent to prison to live in a culture that is as rapist as the normal home in North America.”).  
544 For example, the abuser may threaten that a “court is not going to award custody to a lunatic like you” or “Call 
the police, see if I care - do you think a policeman doesn’t beat his wife?.” Fedler, supra notex, at 235. 
545 Id. 
546 Id. See also Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 18 (explaining that many women do not report incidence 
of violence due to their experience of “fear, guilt and shame”). 
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in the face of violence.547 The power of self-blame and shame contributes to the entrapment 
process.548  
 
The onset of depression is one of the side effects of repeated acts of assault. This clinical 
condition reduces an individual’s ability to perform ordinary daily functions and long term 
planning becomes a task that is beyond the victim’s ability. Merely making a phone call can take 
significant energy. Accepting one’s situation and not involving the authorities may be the easiest 
way of surviving.549  
 
By cutting a woman off from her personal support system the abuser reduces the victim’s 
sphere of public interaction. The isolation deflates hope of intervention, confirming the 
seemingly omnipotent control of the abuser.550 Women may “survive their situation by avoiding 
adversarial encounters and by actively shunning legal assistance.”551 Shut off from the outside 





Women may be compelled to remain in violent relationships for economic reasons. A victim 
simply may not be able to survive without the income of her abuser, especially if she is 
responsible for children. The fact that most women worldwide earn less than men, decreases 
women’s earning potential and, therefore, their ability to sustain themselves and dependents.552 
Leaving a relationship, abusive or otherwise, is a costly effort, entailing moving and travel 
expenses, which may be high if the abused needs to move states to escape her abuser.  
 
In addition, women are most often the primary care-giver, and their ability to enter or re-
enter the workforce is undermined by the opportunity cost and lack of experience incurred by 
                                                
547 KATHLEEN B. JONES, LIVING BETWEEN DANGER AND LOVE THE LIMITS OF CHOICE, (Rutgers University Press 
New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London) 2-3, 2000 (“Being unable to reason, you are unable to believe, once and 
for all, that one purpose for living is much better than another. All of a sudden the arguments you can muster for 
going in one direction or another start to pull and tug at you equally and turn you inside out with indecision until you 
feel, quite literally, as if the edges of your world have disappeared. And you want nothing more than to be freed 
from having to choose at all.”) 
548 Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1605 (describing the universal nature of research “which suggests that shame 
and self-blame are powerful mechanisms keeping many women entrapped in violent relationships.”) 
549 See Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 9 (describing the effort it takes to 
keep the violence a secret in order to ensure appearances of “working order. Her own needs are restrained, she tries 
to avoid annoying the man, controls her facial expressions and body language. Enormous amts of activity, planning 
and strength are required, simply to cope with everyday life”). See also Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in 
Sweden, supra note 98, at 31 (describing the results of a study of a psychiatric facility in Sweden showing that “as 
many as 70 per cent of the women interviewed (1,382) stated that they had at some point been subjected to physical, 
sexual or psychological abuse. Among those who indicated that they had experiences of violence, some 70 per cent 
believed that their mental illness was linked to the violence”). 
550 Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1605. 
551 Fedler, supra note 179, at 235. 
552 See Sen, Nussbaum, MacDougal, Lasswell and Chen, Okin, U.N. reports note citation to follow. 
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their non-remunerated work in the private sphere. In many instances a victim may be unable to 
return to her place of employment for fear of being traced by her abuser.553 
 
4.4.4 Social Factors Leading to Isolation 
 
The existence of social support plays an important role in the escape, recovery and 
readjustment of an abused woman.554 Where there is a lack of social assistance, abused women 
often do not seek help for their situation due to shame, fear of reprisals or because the abuse 
itself seems disproportionate in their minds to calling the police i.e. it was not sufficiently 
serious.555 In this way, part of the harm exists in society’s stigma against an abused woman. 
 
In some instances an abused woman may fear social recrimination for the failure of her 
marriage to meet an ideal standard. The response of the community may condition the way in 
which she determines her own self-worth and culpability.556 This is particularly acute in 
communities where authority of the family vests in men.557 In Nicaragua, for example, the 
notions of Machismo (male strength and dominance) and Marianismo (female maternity and 
chastity) are cultural imperatives that often guide women’s behavior in an abusive situation. The 
allocated role of a demure, submissive and devout wife will require subservient behavior, with a 
concomitant “duty to put up with the abuse and keep your family together.”558 On the other hand, 
the equivalent role for men is that of power, strength and authority, legitimizing the expression 
of these qualities, even when they manifest in violence.559  
 
In other situations, ironically, the emphasis on the empowerment of women may make 
women reluctant to reveal their own victim status for fear of failing to comply with the 
perception of equality.560 The perceived equality of women in Sweden may deter women from 
reporting the violence since it “conflicts with strong normative conceptions of what a modern 
Swedish heterosexual partner relationship is supposed to be like…”561  
                                                
553 Abused women often lack the “resources, legal and community support and alternative means to survive” Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58, at 13.  
554 Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1604 (“When friends or family are unavailable or indifferent, this may be 
more distressing that the initial vicitmising experience, because it reinforces the victim’s perception of deviance and 
self-blame.”) 
555 Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at, 1604, describing how 80% of women did not report the abuse if there were 
no social services (“26% of women who had suffered severe violence felt that they did not need help”). 
556 Nicaraguan women appear to have limited knowledge about their rights and their enforcement and domestic 
violence is so commonplace that many Nicaraguan women refer to it as “the cross one must carry.” OMCT CEDAW 
Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 11-12. There is the common and socially condoned position that violence is 
a normal part of a woman’s life. OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 14. Sweden has a similar 
view. See footnote ___ above. Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1604 (describing the series of isolating factors 
endured by an interviewee who was very young, had two small children and no education or income. Her shock at 
the onset of violence was augmented by an unsympathetic mother-in-law.) 
557 Social data confirms that abused women in Nicaragua have less interaction with friends, neighbors and relatives. 
Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1604. 
558 Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1606. 
559 For a detailed discussion of this cultural dichotomy see Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1606. 
560 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 10 (describing how some women may be 
embarrassed at how their violent relationship contradicts the perception of Sweden as an equal and ideal society). 
561 “The normative character of the Swedish equality ideology may mean as far as women are concerned that they 
shrink from interpretations of their partners that deviate from the ideal of an equal relationship.” In a culture whose 
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Cultural imperatives often discourage discussion about one’s private affairs. Sexual abuse, 
while a common component of systemic intimate violence, is reported the least.562 The 
stereotypical image of rape is by an unknown stranger, upon a woman who has abandoned the 
so-called ‘precautions’ of staying at home or wearing demure clothing. Because of this erroneous 
perception, a victim or her society may not recognize the crime of rape when her sexual partner 
of many years demands sex without her consent.563 
 
In such environments, abused women encounter oppressive externalities, which contribute to 
their retraction away from the public into the private.564 
 
4.5 State Failure 
 
The failure of states to intervene in cases of systemic intimate violence is the fifth element 
and a key ingredient in the perpetuation of violence against women.565 State omission, the theory 
of which I discuss in chapter three, usually manifests in deficient police services, inaccessible or 
inefficient court processes, poor health services and a lack of economic assistance, either in the 
form of welfare systems or protective labor laws. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
official message is that equality shall prevail between the sexes, it may be presumed that both men and women will 
develop a propensity to interpret their lives in conformity with this norm. In other words, the Swedish self-image, 
and Sweden’s very strong tradition as ‘the most equal country in the world’, may set their impress on how women 
view and interpret their experiences of life. Gender equality can here be seen as a discursive truth, a discourse that 
functions as a standard for the interpretation of social life.  Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 84. 
562 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 10. This makes sense since sex is not a 
subject that is easily discussed. Few contexts allow for an open and frank discussion about one’s sexual activities. 
And then there is the component of humiliation. The literature on and understanding of the crime of rape reveals that 
the victim internalizes a sense of shame and humiliation that rightly belongs to the abuser. It is stated that 
conceptions about sex and violence “are thus intimately linked and all societies have their own ways of excusing or 
legitimizing gender-based violence.” Id. at 7. 
563 For example, some women report waking up while their partners are having sexual intercourse with them. When 
asked to stop, the man persists. 
564 “If a woman leaves her husband, she risks not only economic hardship, but also dealing with the social stigma of 
having failed as a wife and mother. On the other hand, if she doesn’t leave, it may be assumed that she is somehow 
to blame for provoking her partner’s violent behaviour…” Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1606. The policy of 
the Swedish Government in addressing systemic intimate violence is to take into account all aspects of the equal 
opportunities policy in order to bring about changed patterns of behaviour in all fields. Cedaw Concluding 
Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 503. 
565 [Note: citation to follow]  special rapporteur report; inocenti report. See also Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel 
in the House”: Digging for the Political Vortex of Male Violence against Women, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF 
PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 285, 293 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 
1994) (describing the deficiency of Puerto Rico’s domestic violence legislation: “The experience with protective 
orders is a showcase of the resistance displayed by enforcement agents. Women engage in forum shopping for 
sympathetic judges, since they are frequently confronted with judges’ reluctance to deal with the serious 
implications of violence with its lethal nature. At times judges make derogatory comments about Law 54, revoke 
orders granted by other courts, while granting the batterer temporary custody of the children. They attempt to 
reconcile the couple, advising women to give their husbands or partners another opportunity; grant the order for a 
relatively short period of time; grant ‘mutual orders of protection’ ordering both parties ‘to refrain from harming 
each other.’ In short, battered women are not given adequate protection.”).  
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In many countries the courtroom is no friend to women, let alone women who are survivors 
of systemic intimate violence. Women experience explicit and implicit discrimination in the 
legal system: they are humiliated, re-victimized, misunderstood, and patronized.566  
 
The systemic failure of the state to protect victims of systemic intimate violence and punish 
the perpetrators, constitutes an endorsement of the harm, implicit or otherwise. The conduct of 
the state, therefore, by virtue of its omission to act, perpetuates the violence, creating an 
atmosphere of impunity. 
 
Systemic failure is the key element of the definition which distinguishes systemic intimate 
violence from domestic violence generally. It is the element which most significantly justifies 
international intervention.  
 
5 Summation of the Right  
 
Systemic intimate violence is a phenomenon replete with the strangeness of human nature, 
where love meets violence at a juncture of incomprehensible pain. Understanding the intricacies 
of this violence reveals how an abused woman has little, if any, access to traditional legal 
mechanisms. Simply escaping the physical control of an abuser is a challenge. The fact that 
something so nebulous occurs in private serves to increase the difficulty in harnessing systemic 
intimate violence within the current legal structure.567 Therefore, procuring help from public 
structures such as police, courts or hospitals is not the automatic remedy we would like it to be. It 
is the exception.568   
                                                
566 See Vicki Jackson, What Judges Can Learn from Gender Bias Task Force Studies, 81 JUDICATURE 15 (July-
August 1997) (describing sexist conduct such as addressing female witnesses and attorneys by their first names or as 
‘pretty’, ‘young’, or ‘girls.’ Jackson maintains that the “perception of gender bias in a judge is more harmful to the 
legal system than its appearance in other participants.”). Id at 16. See also Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel in the 
House”: Digging for the Political Vortex of Male Violence against Women, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE 
VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 285, 289 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) 
(explaining that what drives judicial officers in their discrimination against women in cases of domestic violence is 
the need to preserve, at all costs, the family unit, the most revered of all social institutions). 
567 Amnesty International defines men’s violence against women in intimate relationships as “psychological, 
physical and sexual violence committed by a man with whom the woman has, or has had an intimate relationship. It 
may be her current or former husband, cohabitant/partner or boyfriend.” Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in 
Sweden, supra note 98, at 6. The Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden combines the 
definition of cyclical harm with the intimate and gendered component of the violence, largely absent from many 
other definitions. This is probably preferable from the point of view of legislation since many men and boys suffer 
from domestic violence and, while they may have better access to legal and social facilities, they may be prevented 
from utilizing them due to the stigma that inheres in such abuse. 
568 In 1995, statistics indicated that every second woman in Nicaragua had been physically mistreated at some point 
by her husband or companion, and one in four women had been the recipient of physical violence within the 
preceding year. UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, supra notex. See specifically the country report on Nicaragua 1, 
available at http://www.undp.org/rblac/gender/nicaragua.htm [hereinafter UN 1998 Nicaragua Report], citing 
(“Confites en el infierno” or “Candies in Hell”). In 1997, “70% of all women had experienced physical violence 
some time in their lives, while 3% had been subjected to violence in the past year.” UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, 
supra note 197. 94% of mistreated women indicated that the physical violence was accompanied by insults and 
humiliation and that 20% had suffered all three forms of abuse (physical, psychological and sexual). 31% of abused 
women had been hit while pregnant, almost half of them suffering blows to the abdomen. One in three of the abused 
women had been forced to have sexual relations. In 80% of the cases, violence began within the first four years of 
marriage. 70% of the acts of violence were classified as “severe (blows with the fist, threat or use of arms”). Half of 
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In the darkness and detachment of such isolation, acts of violence are carried out, 
implemented, and executed in silence.  This silence effectively removes the existence of the 
harm from the realm of reality. As far as the state is concerned, the abuse disappears. 
 
Part C: The International Law Prohibition 
 




As described in chapter one above, there already is evidence of international legal 
prohibitions against systemic intimate violence. However, taking into account the slow 
development in international law, these prohibitions do not yet ensure protection against the 
precise nature of the right described above. 
 
To achieve the effective delineation of systemic intimate violence as an international human 
rights violation I propose three steps to be taken in international law.  
 
First, a specific, express and authoritative prohibition against systemic intimate violence 
must be adopted and developed in international law. Second, the ramifications of systemic 
intimate violence must be incorporated into the political, economic and health-related 
components of international dialogues.569 Mainstream international bodies, such as the torture 
and refugee committees, need to consider systemic intimate violence as a human rights violation 
for which such committees are responsible. Finally, the right to be free from systemic intimate 
violence, and the corresponding duty of states to uphold this right, require greater theoretical 
substantiation and practical direction in international law. 
 
After the adoption of these measures at international law, it will be up to states to take 
positive steps to satisfy their duties to help remedy systemic intimate violence. The proposed 
development of international law should be considered within the context of the transnational 
legal process, which I discuss in chapter five. I do not maintain that change will come about at 
the hand of an international policing authority. This is historically inaccurate and conceptually 
improbable. Rather, this thesis proposes that the enunciation of a specific legal right to be free 
from systemic intimate violence would advance the infiltration of women’s rights norms into 
national legal systems. This, in turn, would help improve state-sponsored infrastructural support 
and help generate the necessary social reform to prevent systemic intimate violence and protect 
its victims. 
 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the need for a specific and authoritative prohibition 
against systemic intimate violence at international law, and the need for main-stream 
                                                                                                                                                       
the abused women stated that the violence against them was generally witnessed by their children. UN 1998 
Nicaragua Report, supra note 197, at 1, citing the “Candies in Hell” report. 
569 See Violence against Women: The Health Sector Responds, supra notex. at 7 (“…intervention by health 
providers can potentially mitigate both the short –and long-term health effects of gender-based violence on women 
and their families.”). 
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international bodies to take into account women’s violence in the context of broader social and 
political problems. This chapter then discusses in detail the numerous practical steps which states 
should take to meet their international legal duties. That is, the steps necessary to help remedy 
systemic intimate violence. 
 
The rest of this thesis then provides the legal, theoretical substantiation for: (1) why the right 
to be free from systemic intimate violence is an international legal right, thereby providing the 
jurisprudential justification for the development of specific and authoritative prohibition against 
such violence at international law; (2) why states have a duty under the doctrine of state 
responsibility to take positive steps to help remedy such violence; and, (3) the process by which 
an articulated international legal right to be free from such violence can filter down into, and 
reform, domestic legal and political systems. These issues are addressed in chapters 3, 4, and 5 
respectively. 
 
6.2 The Enunciation of a Specific Legal Right  
 
Current statements in international law provide overarching principles regarding violence 
against women generally. Where statements mention domestic violence specifically, the 
uncertainties of CIL discussed in chapter one undermine the efficacy of these statements. 
Therefore, there needs to be an express legal statement which describes the precise contours of 
the right of women to be free from systemic intimate violence and the conjoint obligation of 
states to ensure safety in intimate, as well as public, settings. 
 
The most certain and authoritative method through which new rights can be recognized is via 
the creation and endorsement of treaties, which would be a coup for the women’s rights 
movement. However, I do not claim that the creation of a treaty in international law to prevent 
systemic intimate violence would yield decisive benefits, nor do I believe it is a realistic 
objective. A preferable short term goal would be the enunciation by the U.N. Security Council 
that systemic intimate violence is a function of government conduct, by virtue of states’ 
omissions, and that states have a concomitant right to assuage it, through the adoption of 
specified steps. 
 
The enunciation of systemic intimate violence in international law would translate into better 
formulated and implemented legislation in national legal systems. This can be affected through 
the process of norm infiltration; the potential for national reform through impact litigation; and, 
the granting of asylum to victims of systemic intimate violence, factors which I discuss in 
chapter four.570 
 
The enunciation of this right would pave the way for the second method of improving 
international law, namely, the mainstreaming of systemic intimate violence.  
 
 
                                                
570 [Note: add in Neuwirth’s suggestion of a Special Rapporteur on Laws that Discriminate against Women @ 21; 
also see her discussion on pg 47, fn 177 where she cites Heyns and Viljoen as saying that treaty bodies must be 
visible. Look at these authors’ recommendations that treaty bodies should travel more and meetings should be held 
outside of Geneva and New York]. 
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6.3 Bringing the Consequences of Systemic Intimate Violence into Mainstream Issues 
 
In terms of political agendas, domestic violence takes a back seat to more mainstream 
political issues, such as economic, health and foreign policy concerns. Therefore, it is necessary 
to connect systemic intimate violence to mainstream concerns, with a view to raising the public’s 
political awareness of these issues, and therefore, placing political pressure on governments to 
create change. This can be achieved by highlighting the economic and health consequences of 
systemic intimate violence. However, this is not to say that systemic intimate violence should fall 
within the category of negative socio-economic rights in international law. The economic and 
health consequences are part of a larger story of political marginalization of abused women as a 
group suffering from systemic intimate violence. 
 
The economic expense of systemic intimate violence is substantial and involves both implicit 
and explicit costs. Implicit costs include missed work days, poor work performance and the loss 
of potential labor. Explicit costs include the expenses of hospitalization, police and criminal 
institutions, homelessness and child welfare. As the primary cause of harm to women, systemic 
intimate violence also is a significant health hazard. It is a cause of child mortality, high rates of 
HIV AIDS and mental diseases. 
 
As the primary cause of harm to women, systemic intimate violence is a health hazard. It is a 
cause of child mortality, high rates of HIV AIDS and mental diseases.  
 
Linking systemic intimate violence to these so-called ‘mainstream’ phenomena would help 
bring this violence into political discourse and demonstrate the seriousness of what traditionally 
has been perceived only as a nucleus concern.  
 
The politicization of systemic intimate violence is necessary to propel continued 
incorporation of this gender-specific harm into the decision-making process of ‘mainstream’ 
international bodies, such as the refugee committee, the torture committee, and the EU. The 
importance of incorporating these themes into the work of mainstream bodies is evident from the 
case of A. v. The United Kingdom.571 The court held that child abuse had reached the level of 
severity prohibited by article 3, which deals with torture.572 The extrapolation of the definition of 
torture to circumstances of unrestrained child abuse allowed the European Court of Human 
Rights to place positive obligations on the state to take positive steps into protect children in 
accordance with states’ international obligations to prevent torture. 
 
Until recently, ‘mainstream’ human rights bodies had not addressed women’s rights per se. 
Notwithstanding the framing of systemic intimate violence as a form of torture and terror, the 
torture committee has not addressed such violence as a form of torture and there are very few 
successful asylum claims based on systemic intimate violence.573 However, this is changing and 
increasingly international bodies which are not gender-specific are taking violence against 
                                                
571 A. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 78. 
572 A. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 78, at paragraph 21. 
573 See Laura S. Adams, Beyond Gender: State Failure to Protect Domestic Violence Victims as a Basis for Granting 
Refugee Status, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 240 (2002). 
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women into account in their activities.574 This thesis proposes that this process needs to be 
developed further. The augmentation of this process could yield fruitful developments both 
nationally and internationally. Specifically, the framing of violence against women as torture, 
terrorism and a basis for asylum, is a feature of claims which activists are pursuing, and 
international bodies should be challenged to incorporate into their activities. 
 
I now turn to discuss the steps states ought to take to mitigate systemic intimate violence. 
 




Whether a state has violated its international legal obligations towards its (predominantly) 
female citizens depends on the precise contours of the obligation, the extent to which the state 
has attempted to fulfill its obligation and the facts of systemic intimate violence in the country in 
question.575 
 
There are three core minimum steps states should take to prevent and remedy the incidence 
of systemic intimate violence. These steps are: (1) the enactment of legislation addressing such 
violence; (2) the implementation of such legislation; and, (3) the restructuring of the distribution 
of resources and the allocation of institutional tasks to help remedy such violence. 576 I deal with 
each of these three steps in detail below.577 
 
States are obliged to take the aforementioned steps, subject to economic constraints and 
political stability. Where a state’s resources are so few that it struggles to meet primary needs, or 
if the state is fractured by internal or external conflict, it may well be excused from allocating 
                                                
574 See Amnesty International, Broken bodies, shattered minds: Torture and ill-treatment of women (2001), available 
at  http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engact400012001 (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Broken bodies, 
shattered minds] (documenting the worldwide torture of women, observing that “states all around the world have 
allowed beatings, rape and other acts of torture to continue unchecked”). 
575 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 124 
[hereinafter CRAWFORD] (“… in the final analysis, whether and when there has been a breach of an obligation 
depends on the precise terms of the obligation, its interpretation and application, taking into account its object and 
purpose and the facts of the case.”). 
576 These steps are logical requirements for states to ensure the protection of the international human rights of their 
citizens and can be extrapolated from a number of international instruments. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 29 (1988) [hereinafter JANIS] (confirming the possibility of interpreting treaties as a basis for 
determining state liability). I base these steps in part on the discussions which arose during the CEDAW committee 
meetings in respect of domestic violence. The CEDAW committee has encouraged governments to “consider the 
possibility of implementing an integrated, long-term plan for combating domestic violence. Such a plan could 
include taking legal action, training judicial, law enforcement and health personnel, informing women about their 
rights and about the Convention and strengthening victims’ services.” 1998 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 
paragraph 412, page 35. The CEDAW committee has suggested that “strong action be taken against persons who 
commit violence against women, and that it should be made easier for women to bring court actions against 
offenders.” 1998 CEDAW report, supra note 204, at 35. 
577 The ideological underpinning of these steps is nugatory without a conjoint analysis of their efficacy. Do these 
steps work as a standard against which to measure a state’s compliance with its international obligations? In 
performing this pragmatic investigation I include descriptions of the steps take in differing jurisdictions. 
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sufficient budget to prevent systemic intimate violence.578 However, these factors would be a 
defense to the failure to comply with an international obligation on a case by case basis, and are 
not reasons why the obligation should not exist. Therefore, as with any international obligation, 
the relevant circumstances will determine the extent of the state’s accountability. 
 
The underlying barometer, taking into account the relevant factors described above, would 
be whether “a more active and more efficient course of procedure might have been pursued” 
where in fact there was a lack of “diligence and intelligent investigation as constitutes an 
international delinquency.”579 
 
7.2 Legislative Steps 
 
7.2.1 Legislative Amendment as a Requirement of International Law 
 
The first basic step is the enactment of legislation prohibiting systemic intimate violence.580 
In most instances, the amendment of legislation is the first step required in complying with any 
international obligations. This is evident in numerous international instruments including the 
ICCPR, the ICESCR and the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearances.581 The 
CEDAW committee has required state parties to enact federal and state laws to criminalize and 
                                                
578 Circumstances that would preclude responsibility may range in type and intensity. While a full discussion of 
these factors exceeds the ambit of this analysis, it is of seminal importance to the proposal of international 
responsibility for systemic intimate violence. 
579 ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 380 (Longmans, 
Green and Co. 1938) [hereinafter FREEMAN] (citing Neer (72-74 (U.S. v. Mexico Opinions) case). The commission 
in this case laid down two grounds on which international responsibility could be founded for an omission to 
provide justice: “(1) that the authorities administering the [ ] law acted in an outrageous way, in bad faith, in willful 
neglect of their duties, or in a pronounced degree of improper action, or (2) that Mexican law rendered it impossible 
for them properly to fulfil their task.” 
580 The international obligation to enact enabling legislation exists in several international instruments. Article 2 of 
DEVAW, supra note 22, provides that all appropriate measures be taken to abolish existing laws “…which are 
discriminatory against women, and to establish adequate legal protection for equal rights of men and women.” 
Article 4(1) of the Torture Convention, supra note 5, requires State parties to “ensure that all acts of torture are 
offences under its criminal law.” Article 4(1) of the Torture Convention, supra note 5,, which goes on to provide 
that the “same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity 
or participation in torture.” [Note: cite authority which argues that Convention against Torture applies to acts of 
private individuals too] Cf. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 27, footnote 97 
and 31 (Oxford University Press, 1999) [hereinafter SHELTON] (discussing the notion of an ineffective internal 
remedial system. Shelton suggests that states have an obligation to change their laws where they are deficient). 
581 See ICSCER, supra note 13, article 2(1), in terms of which state parties undertake to “to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” See also ICCPR, 
supra note 4, article 2(2): “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes 
and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Article 1(d) of the Inter-American Convention on 
Enforced Disappearances [hereinafter, Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearances] requires states to 
“take legislative, administrative, judicial, and any other measures necessary to comply with the commitments 
undertaken in this Convention.” 
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punish systemic intimate violence and the perpetrators thereof, and to “take steps to ensure that 
women victims of such violence can obtain reparation and immediate protection…”582  
 
The creation of model legislation regarding violence against women was a priority for the 
former Special Rapporteur for Violence against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy.583 The model 
legislation includes draft definitions, complaint mechanisms, civil and criminal provisions, a 
description of judicial responsibilities and sentencing guidelines.  
 
On several occasions the European Court of Human Rights has compelled states to adopt 
protective legislation in the context of sexual violence. The international legal imperative to 
enact corrective legislation was discussed in the case of MC v. Bulgaria, where the European 
Court of Human Rights required the amendment of Bulgaria’s penal system to criminalize rape 
in instances where the victim displays no act of physical resistance due to silent shock. In the 
case of X and Y v. the Netherlands, the ECHR held that the Government of the Netherlands had 
failed to provide “practical and effective protection” for mentally handicapped women (over the 
age of sixteen) who had been sexually abused.584 The court held that “in such cases, this system 
meets a procedural obstacle which the Netherlands legislature had apparently not foreseen.” 
Finally, in A v. The United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights recalled the 
international law of torture to compel states to amend laws, which currently fail “to provide 
adequate protection to children” who had been severely abused under the guise of corporal 
punishment.585 
 
Therefore, the need for states to adopt or amend legislation to comply with their 
international legal obligations is well settled. The next section discusses the types of legislation 





                                                
582 The CEDAW committee referred particularly to “establishing 24-hour telephone hotlines, increasing the number 
of shelters and conducting zero-tolerance campaigns on violence against women, in order that it may be recognized 
as an unacceptable social and moral problem. The Committee also considers it especially important that steps be 
taken to train health-care workers, police officers and staff of special prosecutors’ offices in human rights and 
dealing with violence against women.” 2002 CEDAW report, supra notex, at page 209, paragraph 432. 
583 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, supra notex. Coomaraswamy submitted  a 
framework for model legislation on domestic violence, Distr. GENERAL E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2, 2 February 1996, 
Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-second session, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission; 
Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective 
Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, available at 
http://193.194.138.190/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/0a7aa1c3f8de6f9a802566d700530914?Opendocument. 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58. 
584 X and Y v. The Netherlands - 8978/80 [1985] ECHR 4, para 30, (26 March 1985) [hereinafter X and Y v. The 
Netherlands] 
585 A. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 78, at paragraph 24 [Note: check citation]. “In the Court’s view, the law 
did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3. Indeed, 
the Government have accepted that this law currently fails to provide adequate protection to children and should be 
amended. In the circumstances of the present case, the failure to provide adequate protection constitutes a violation 
of Article 3 of the Convention.” 
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It is not possible to require states to adopt uniform legislation. Because there is a multitude 
of legal systems with varying degrees of resources and enforcement capabilities, certain 
legislative steps in one system may be nugatory or even counter-productive in another. 
Legislation instead should facilitate the creation of state infrastructures, which, based on the 
specificities of the country in question, can provide victims with nuanced help. 
 
Whatever the structure of the legislation, it should take into account the specific elements of 
systemic intimate violence described above. In addition, to the extent that a state’s legal system 
is based on the principle of a fair trial, it is seminal that the rights of the abuser are not diluted.  
 
b. Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
 
Depending on the status of a country’s human rights legislation, a state may be required to 
adopt preliminary anti-discrimination legislation or incorporate the equality principle into its 
legal system by abolishing discriminatory laws and adopting appropriate ones that prevent and 
punish unfair discrimination against women.586 South Africa, for example, has injected the 
notion of equality between men and women in its Constitution, which, as supreme law, requires 
the incorporation of equality into other national and provincial legislation.587 
 
c. Criminal Versus Civil Sanctions 
 
Initially, domestic violence advocates called for criminal sanctions for domestic violence.588 
General Recommendation 19, for example, refers to both criminal and civil laws. It requires 
governments to make laws that ensure punitive, preventive and rehabilitative provisions, 
including refuges, specially trained health workers, rehabilitation and counseling.589 However, 
this is changing and one of the dominant debates regarding intimate violence legislation is 
whether domestic violence should be a criminal or civil violation.  
                                                
586 Article 2(a), (b), (c), (f), (d), 3, 6, 11(3), 15(1) and (4), 16(1)(f) and (2) and 18 of CEDAW, supra note 21. Cf. 
SHELTON, supra note 209, at 27 footnotes 97 and 31 (discussing the notion of an ineffective internal remedial 
system. Shelton suggests that states have an obligation to change their laws where they are deficient).  
587 See article 5 of the South African Constitution. [Note: Cite supremacy clause of the Constitution.] This was 
followed by additional legislation that reveals the egalitarian policy adopted by government. See, for example, the 
following South African legislation: the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act, no. 49 of 2003, which 
seeks to dismantle gender stereotypes; the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, no.4 
of 2000 and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Amendment Act 52 of 2002, which 
provide for the inculcation of gender and sex equality within governmental and other institutions, including the 
establishment of the Commission for Gender Equality. 
588 In most jurisdictions, intimate violence is not a criminal offence in and of itself. Spousal violence may be 
construed as assault and battery, but for the reasons described below, this generic legal categorization is 
inappropriate. 
589 Articles 24(k) and 24(t)(iii). For example, governments should take specific preventive and punitive measures for 
trafficking and sexual exploitation §(g) and (h); sexual harassment §(j); female circumcision §(l); reproductive rights 
§(m); rural women §(o) and (q); and domestic workers §(p). 
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There are two main advantages to criminalizing systemic intimate violence. Firstly, creating 
a specific crime (independent of assault and battery) may confer a higher status on the conduct, 
removing it from its designation as a ‘family’ matter and placing it within the objectionable 
realm of criminal conduct. Secondly, if the crime of systemic intimate violence is proved, a 
prison term may ensue, ensuring that the victim is no longer threatened by the abuser.  
 
In 1993, the CEDAW committee endorsed the notion of criminalizing intimate violence on 
the basis that if such cases “were treated as other criminal offences were, with the police being 
obliged to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators regardless of whether the women wished to 
prosecute or not, and with therapy provided for the perpetrator, the positive outcome would be a 
changed social attitude towards domestic violence.”590  
 
The European Court of Human Rights supported the criminalization of sexual violence on 
the basis that “the need for protection existed erga omnes, whilst an injunction could only be 
directed to a limited circle of persons.”591 The holding of the ECHR that “civil law lacked the 
deterrent effect that was inherent in the criminal law” is appealing.592 As with sexual abuse, 
systemic intimate violence “is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private 
life are at stake. Effective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by 
criminal law provisions; indeed, it is by such provisions that the matter is normally regulated.”593  
 
However, the criminalization of intimate violence is not necessarily appropriate for all 
jurisdictions and there are disadvantages in employing the criminal system. Given the 
complexity of intimate violence, the victim’s emotional commitment to her abuser may deter her 
from taking such drastic steps as having him arrested. She may want the violence to stop but may 
not necessarily desire the imprisonment of her partner. This is exacerbated if the abuser is the 
primary or only earner in the home. The abused, therefore, may be reluctant to report the abuse 
for fear of losing the financial support her partner provides, particularly if the support includes 
financial care for her children. 
 
In addition, in most common law and civil law jurisdictions, the standard of proof in 
criminal matters is much higher than in civil cases. The chances of ensuring a successful claim, 
therefore, would be lower. Moreover, criminal matters are often time consuming and 
inappropriate for the urgent attention required in cases of systemic intimate violence. 
 
Finally, if a prosecutor is responsible for running the case against the abuser, all power is 
taken out of the hands of the abused. This has advantages because, as has been discussed, the 
psychological damage caused by the violence may reduce the ability of the individual to engage 
                                                
590 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 502. 
591 These were the statements of the Commission, which were adopted by the ECHR. X and Y v. The Netherlands, 
supra note 213, at para 26-27. 
592 X and Y v. The Netherlands, supra note 213, at 26-27. 
593 X and Y v. The Netherlands, supra note 213, at para 27. It is important to note that the ECHR did not base its 
decision on a violation of article 13 of the Convention, which enjoins States to provide effective remedies for a 
violation of a right in the Convention. Rather, it found that because there was a clear violation of the victim’s right 
to family integrity for which no remedy was available, it did not have to pursue a similar analysis in terms of article 
13.  
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in legal action. Therefore, placing the decision to prosecute in the hands of the prosecutor (or 
having a system of mandatory prosecution or arrest) may better facilitate the safety of the 
abused. On the other hand, if a victim knows that by calling the police she triggers an 
unstoppable series of legal events, which could culminate in the long-term imprisonment of her 
intimate partner, she may be daunted by the prospect and refrain from contacting the police at all.  
 
A balance needs to be struck and it makes more sense to have an interactive process 
between the abused and the official legal services. For example, in Norway, violence against 
women is a criminal offence but the abuser may be prosecuted only at the instigation of the 
injured party. Norway also facilitates the appointment of an intermediary to advise the abused of 
her options, which enhances the sense of choice the abused may experience.594  
 
In 1998, as part of the country’s progress towards gender equality, South Africa enacted the 
Domestic Violence Act which provided for urgent temporary retraining orders, which can be 
given in the absence of the defendant, and greater scope to the type of maintenance orders judges 
could make.595  
                                                
594 See 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at pages 37-45, paragraph 277-338.  
595 South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. This replaced the 1993 Prevention of Family Violence 
Act 133 of 1993 (‘Prevention of Family Violence Act’). The South African Domestic Violence Act is a considerable 
improvement on its predecessor, the 1993 Prevention of Family Violence Act. The 1993 Act was criticized as an 
“electioneering strategy undertaken in haste.” Elsje Bonthuys, The Solution? Project 100 - Domestic Violence, 114 
S. AFR. L.J 371, 372 (1997) [hereinafter Bonthuys]. One of the most problematic aspects of the original Prevention 
of Family Violence Act was the lack of an interim protection order. The rules of procedure and evidence 
surrounding the issuing of a protection order were necessarily more restrictive. I would submit that many of the 
problems which existed in the 1993 Act to some extent have alleviated by the 1998 Act. The obtaining of a 
protection order is divided into a two stage process in the South African Domestic Violence Act. The first leg of the 
process involves the application for an interim protection order (Section 5 of the South African Domestic Violence 
Act. The second leg envisages the granting of a final protection order (section 6 of the South African Domestic 
Violence Act). A civil protection order has been described as a “legally binding court order that prohibits an 
individual who has committed an act of domestic violence from further abusing the victim.” Cf. Harvard Law 
Review, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra notex, at 1501 (citing PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, CIVIL 
PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT v (1990)). In light of the 
exigency of systemic intimate violence the interim protection order exists to provide immediate relief. An 
application for an interim protection order must be heard as soon as is reasonably possible, even in the absence of 
the respondent. Section 5(1) of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. Subsection 2 indicates 
that an interim protection order can be granted notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may not have been given 
notice of the proceedings. This is a decidedly uneasy element since the abandonment of the audi alteram partem 
principle compromises the core of equitable justice. However, the South African Domestic Violence Act balances 
the need for an urgent remedy with the basic principles of legal proceedings. By allowing a return date where the 
respondent’s presence is required, the Act provides the immediate and necessary relief without infringing too greatly 
into the procedural rights of the respondent. The South African Domestic Violence Act, however, is an improvement 
on the old Act in which the court was required to make a final protection order against the respondent potentially 
without having heard him. Therefore, although an application for a protection order can be made ex parte, only an 
interim protection order will be granted and the respondent has an opportunity to contest the provisional order on a 
return date. South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141, section 5(6). See Brigitte Clerk and Lirieka 
Meintjies-Van Der Walt, The New Domestic Violence Bill: Rhetoric or Reality?, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 760 (1998). This 
aspect of the protection order also helps to quell an additional concern: what if the applicant is lying. The division of 
the protection order into two parts can inject a type of equity into a situation where a respondent may have a 
legitimate defense but was not aware of the proceedings against him. The onus of proof is another characteristic of 
the South African Domestic Violence Act worthy of mention. The complainant must satisfy the court that there is 
prima facie evidence of domestic violence perpetrated by the respondent and that “undue hardship may be suffered 
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Sweden also has adopted some of the most advanced legislation in respect of systemic 
intimate violence, namely, the Law on Gross Violation of Integrity and Gross Violation of a 
Woman’s Integrity. This legislation includes a myriad of criminal and civil provisions that take 
into account many of the elements of systemic intimate violence.596 The law applies where an 
abuser commits “repeated acts of harassment or abuse against a woman with whom he is, or has 
been, in an intimate relationship.”597 The provision applies to offences such as assault, 
molestation, violation of the privacy of the home and sexual coercion, all with the aim of filling a 
vacuum where assault may not apply.598  
 
The original objective of this law was to take into account repeated violations of a woman’s 
integrity jointly. This gave a context to seemingly ‘minor’ incidents of harm, revealing the 
continuum of danger. This results in a more stringent sentence than would be the case if the acts 
were considered separately.599 The legislation also recognizes that intimate violence  
 
is often systematic and it may be difficult for the victim to keep track of the events and dates 
when the crimes were committed. The law on violation of a woman’s integrity takes into 
consideration all aspects of the abused woman’s life, characterised by threats, assault and mental 
stress, and has been drawn up so as to facilitate prosecution of perpetrators who repeatedly have 
violated the integrity of a woman with whom they are in an intimate relationship.600  
                                                                                                                                                       
by the complainant as a result of such domestic violence if a protection order is not issued immediately.” Section 
5(2)(a) - (b). This onus of proof may have acted harshly against an innocent respondent had it applied in a hearing 
for a final protection order; however, the opportunity of a final hearing negates this concern. This neatly 
demonstrates the purpose of the interim protection order, namely, to allow for fast and efficient relief which can 
later be tested in a hearing for a final protection order. At the final hearing, if certain requirements have been met, 
then “the court must issue a protection order against the respondent, in the prescribed manner.” The mandate is 
found in section 5(2). The interim protection order must then be served on the respondent (Section (5)(6)) and a 
return date of no less then than ten days must be specified in the order (violence). The court’s power in respect of a 
protection order is outlined in section 7 of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. Once again 
there is a compulsory duty on the court, if it finds on a balance of probabilities that the respondent is committing or 
has committed an act of domestic violence, to issue a protection order in terms of section 6(4). The protection order 
can consist of an order regarding no further abuse [Subsec (1)(a), (b), (g) and (h)], no further contact or restraining 
orders  [Subsec (1)(c ), (d), (e) and (f)], seizure of weapons [Subsec 2(a)], police assistance [Subsec 2(b)], 
confidentiality [Subsec 5(a) and (b)], monetary orders [Subsecs 3 and 4] and eviction orders [Subsec 1(c )]. A very 
interesting aspect of the final hearing provides that if the respondent is not represented by a legal representative, then 
such respondent “is not entitled to cross-examine directly a person who is in a domestic relationship with the 
respondent and shall put any question to such witness by stating the question to the court, and the court is to repeat 
the question accurately to the respondent.” Section 6(3) of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 
141. This section recognizes the unusual fear involved in an intimate crime. The accused abuser may not have direct 
interaction with the applicant since to allow otherwise would place the victim back in her largely impotent and 
defenseless position.  
596 Chapter 4, section 4a of the Swedish Penal Code, cited in Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, 
supra note 98, at 19. See also Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 35, footnote 45 
(“Gross violation of a woman’s integrity accounted for 1,840 cases of suspected crime”). 
597 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 19. 
598 Id. 
599 Id. at 20. 
600 Id. at 20. An extract from the Swedish Penal Code: Law on Gross Violation of Integrity and Gross Violation of a 
Woman’s Integrity, Chapter 4, Section 4a is cited by Amnesty International and reads as follows: “A person who 
commits criminal acts as defined in Chapters 3, 4 or 6 against another person having, or have had, an intimate 
relationship to the perpetrator shall, if the acts form a part of a repeated violation of that person’s integrity and suited 
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d. Restraining Orders 
 
Many states have enacted some form of protection or restraining order facility, falling 
within the realm of civil law.601 Ideally, this facility allows an individual to seek an urgent 
restraining order, which does not require the presence of the abuser or the rigorous evidentiary 
requirements of criminal law. The urgent restraining order should be temporary, allowing for a 
return date when the abuser may be present and a higher standard of proof may be required. This 
allows for an individual to seek immediate redress, without having to incur the cost or emotional 
strain of proving the abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the temporary nature of 
the restraining order with a return date ensures that proper evidentiary requirements are met, 
thereby ensuring the restraints of fairness inherent in the rules of evidence.  
 
Although a final protection order may be issued imposing the most rigid constraints on the 
abuser, there is the very real possibility that the abuser will simply ignore the order. While the 
law does have remedies for such an event, namely arrest for violating a court order, it is not 
unusual for the enforcement process to be lengthy and, often, too late. Furthermore, the issuing 
of an order may not serve to intimidate the abuser. Instead, by disempowering him, it may enrage 
him to an extent that initiates a new cycle of violence.602  
 
If this is the case in a particular instance, then the only real remedy available to the victim is 
to escape the abuser completely by seeking refuge in a safe house such as a shelter where her 
abuser cannot find her.603 
 
e. Labor Laws 
 
Intimate violence may affect the employment of an abused woman. Usually, employers do 
not allow days off to go to court to obtain or enforce a protection order. As it is, women’s role in 
the business world is unstable at best and the discriminatory impact of systemic intimate violence 
only adds to the unsteadiness of a woman’s economic position.604  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
to severely damage that person’s self-confidence, be sentenced for gross violation of integrity to imprisonment for at 
least six months and at most six years. If the acts described in the first paragraph were committed by a man against a 
woman to whom he is, or has been, married or with whom he is, or has been cohabiting under circumstances 
comparable to marriage, he shall be sentenced for gross violation of a woman’s integrity to the same punishment.” 
Originally, the legislative provision stated that the separate acts had to “form part of a repeated violation.” In 1999, 
this was construed by the Supreme Court of Sweden as meaning “that the man had to be convicted of similar 
offences against the woman after the law had entered into force.” The number of reported cases of violation of a 
woman’s integrity halved, until the legislation was amended so that no previous conviction would be necessary in 
order for a court to convict an individual for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and the current charges would 
suffice. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 36. 
601 [Note: citation to follow] no. of state which have enacted domestic violence legislation. One of the most 
progressive definitions is in the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. 
602 Fedler, supra note 179, at 246. 
603 Admittedly, this too is not full proof since the shelter remains ineffective for a woman with children or a woman 
who holds down a daily job where her partner can easily find her. 
604 Mason, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic Violence, supra notex, at 642. 
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Furthermore, studies show that one third of women who are killed by their husbands have 
already left their partners and that the dangers of homicide actually increase after a woman has 
ended the abusive relationship.605 Consequently, many women cannot remain in one place for 
any length of time and continually have to move around to avoid detection by their intimate 
abusers. This prevents them from continuing with their employment, and from accepting long-
term positions. 
 
In such circumstances, the victim is prevented from gaining experience; her résumé may 
become disjointed; and a reference from a previous employer or any contact with a past life is 
simply not a viable option.606 The impact that this would have on a person’s career is evident and 
the integration of labor and welfare laws in respect of systemic intimate violence could help 
mitigate the economic complications of systemic intimate violence.   
 
Labor laws could also be amended to allow women to cite systemic intimate violence as a 
reason for long-term absence from work. Ideally, the employer ought to assist in protecting the 
abused from her the abuser. This can be done, for example, by preventing the abuser from 
entering the premises and refusing to give any information regarding the abused. However, the 
size of employer’s organization should be taken into account when imposing such an obligation. 
Small firms with few resources may not be able to protect the abused or fellow employees, under 
which circumstances dismissal may be unavoidable. 
 
f. Summation  
 
Enacting appropriate legislation is the first basic step states should take to comply with their 
international obligation to help remedy systemic intimate violence. A balance must be struck 
between sufficient state protection and excessive state intervention.607 An attempt to subvert the 
latter cannot justify the abrogation of the former. At the very least, victims of violent conduct 
should be able to trigger the effective legal provisions of their state, through a combination of 





The second core step for states is that of implementation. It is not enough that states 
introduce appropriate legislation. Such legislation must be implemented effectively. 
 
7.3.1 Implementation through the Police Force 
 
The first and perhaps the most obvious tool of implementation is the police force. 
According to the doctrine of denial of justice, international law will impose responsibility on a 
state where there is “a failure to provide adequate police protection before a crime has been 
                                                
605 Catherine Humphreys, Judicial Alienation Syndrome - Failures to Respond to Post-Separation Violence, 29 
FAMILY LAW, 313 (1999).  
606 Mason, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic Violence, supra notex, at 642. 
607 X and Y v. The Netherlands, supra note 213, at para 25. 
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committed, as well as by proven deficiencies in connection with apprehending and punishing the 
culprits.”608  
 
Due to ignorance and prejudice, police apathy may lead to the breakdown of the protection 
order and other aspects of a protective system.609 Ignorant and uneducated officers who 
perfunctorily intervene and give ineffectual and inappropriate advice could perpetuate the result 
that the abuser feels “reinforced about the normalcy of his conduct. Conversely the victim might 
believe that society offers no recourse and tacitly condones the conduct.”610  
 
At what point can one say that a state has failed to provide proper measures of police 
protection? Certainly not every unanswered call for help or deficient police conduct would 
trigger international responsibility. The absence of police protection must be sustained and 
systematic, and its repetition must follow a particular pattern; a pattern that remains unaddressed 
by state authorities. Where, in specific circumstances, police consistently fail to address harm 
perpetrated against specific members of a society, a failure by the state to compel police 
protection constitutes an omission, the nature of which is sufficiently serious to constitute a 
breach of its international obligation to protect its citizens. 
 
In certain parts of Sweden, for example, the police have established specialized ‘domestic 
violence’ units.611 These units have specially trained officials and enhanced methods of 
cooperation with the prosecutor and other relevant authorities.612 Investigators in these units 
attend two week special training sessions on male violence against women.613 
 
In South Africa the role of the police is pivotal to the success of restraining orders.614 The 
South African police have been described as “the weakest link in the interdict structure.”615 
                                                
608 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 368. 
609 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA—STATE RESPONSE TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE 44 (1995) in SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPER ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 72-3 (1999) [hereinafter SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPER ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE] 
610 EVE BUZAWA AND CARL BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 52 (1990) 
[hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE] (“If the police don’t offer unconditional 
protection to women, they are in fact condoning the violence.”). See also David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, III, 
Female Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 73, 81 (1992) [hereinafter The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment]: (describing how “responding 
officers, who were usually male, typically sided with the offenders. This taking of sides reinforced a cultural norm 
which stressed male superiority.”). 
611 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 40. 
612 Id.  
613 Id. According to Amnesty International, where prosecutor districts introduce family violence units, the highest 
prosecution rates are registered. 
614 Practice indicates that most police departments are reluctant to adopt arrest policies. The Charlotte, North 
Carolina Experiment, supra note 246, at 85. This has been remedied to a certain extent by section 8(4)(b) of the 
South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141, which constitutes an arrest provision and provides that ‘(i)f it 
appears to the member (of the police force) concerned that, subject to subsection 5, there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the complainant may suffer imminent harm as a result of the alleged breach of the protection order by 
the respondent, the member must forthwith arrest the respondent for allegedly committing the offence referred to in 
section 17(a).’ While, section 18(4)(a) of the Domestic Violence Act does penalize failure on the part of a police 
officer to comply with obligations in terms of the Act, the perception that intervention in domestic violence does not 
‘constitute real police work’ adds to the general debilitation of the efficacy of the Act. The creation of awareness 
and the education of the police is not provided for in the Act. South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141 
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There is a common sentiment among police officers that “domestic violence and other ‘private 
misconduct’ should not be subject to public intervention”616 To remedy this, the South Africa 
Domestic Violence Act imposes extensive obligations on police officers. The Act states that: 
 
(w)henever a warrant of arrest is handed to a member of the South African Police Service… the 
member must inform the complainant of his or her right to simultaneously lay a criminal charge 
against the respondent, if applicable, and explain to the complainant how to lay such a charge.617 
 
However, the officer also may arrest the abuser for allegedly committing an offence if 
“there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the complainant may suffer imminent harm as a 
result of the alleged breach of the protection order by the respondent….”618  
 
The aspiration to achieve a co-operative relationship between the judiciary, welfare 
department, health care and the police is evident in section 2 of the South African Domestic 
Violence Act. Section 2 imposes a duty on the police to inform the victim of her rights in terms 
of the Act and to help her to access a place of safety where reasonably possible to do so. 
Furthermore, section 2(a) requires the police to make “arrangements for the complainant to find 
a suitable shelter and to obtain medical treatment.” The Act goes even further and stipulates that 
failure to comply with the terms of the Act “constitutes misconduct as contemplated in the South 
African Police Service Act, 1995.”619 This provision in relation to police culpability takes 
cognizance of the reality that these crimes are disliked by the police and a greater imperative is 
needed to ensure that the police provide the legally required protection.  
 
This thesis proposes that similar measures should be taken by all states to ensure the 
effective implementation of police intervention. 
 
7.3.2 Implementation through the Judiciary and State Agents 
 
Law enforcement officers and public officials are responsible for implementing laws and 
policies aimed at reducing, preventing or remedying systemic intimate violence. Failure to fulfill 
this function should result in some form of accountability and/or penalty.620 For example, 
ongoing preventative government involvement, particularly in the form of monitoring and 
enforcing compliance with protection orders, could be one of the missing links in implementing 
effective legislation.621 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
615 Fedler, supra note 179, at 246. 
616 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE, supra note 246, at 31 
617 Section 8(6) of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. 
618 Section 8(4)(b) of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. 
619 Section 18(4)(a) of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. 
620 See article 4(i) of DEVAW, supra note 22. See also the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in M.C. 
v. Bulg., App. No. 39272/98 (Dec. 4, 2003, final judgment Mar. 4, 2004), 152, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm [hereinafter M.C. v. Bulgaria] (“Further, the Court has not excluded the 
possibility that the State's positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard the individual's physical integrity may 
extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation.”). 
621 Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 218, at 1512 
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There is precedent for the fact that a failure by a state to give effect to a civil judgment (as 
opposed to enforcing criminal laws) would also constitute a denial of justice.622 This is important 
in the context of systemic intimate violence since in many (if not most) state jurisdictions, 
intimate violence itself is not a crime; rather, the criminal justice system is triggered when a 
protection order is violated (a form of contempt of court that carries criminal penalties for the 
failure to comply with a civil judgment). This responsibility arises irrespective of whether the 
state was responsible for the initial violation or not.623  
 
This is underscored by the CEDAW committee, which invoked Recommendation No. 19 to 
compel states to “take the steps required to ensure that the law provides appropriate penalties for 
all forms of violence against women and that appropriate procedures exist for investigating and 
prosecuting such offences.”624  
 
In South Africa enforcement “is the principal weakness” of laws.625 If a judge is not 
sympathetic but hostile, or even merely insensitive, to the dynamics of intimate violence, the 
attempt that the Domestic Violence Act makes to reduce the inequality and fear characteristic of 
an abusive relationship may be rendered nugatory. The attitude of a judge may influence a 
victim’s decision to use or reject the law in future cases of abuse. Hostility in the court room 
could dissuade the victim employing the law in future violent situations. Therefore, it is 
important that the atmosphere in the court room aspires towards neutralizing gender inequality in 
accordance with the Domestic Violence Act. A further potential obstacle which may undermine 
the efficacy of these orders is reticence on the part of a judge to impose legal restrictions on the 
family nucleus.626  
 
7.3.3 Equality  
 
It is impossible to use the law and legal apparatus to confront gender-based hegemony 
without concurrent social change, spearheaded by a visible government force.627 Social and 
cultural structures are 
                                                
622 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 392-399. 
623 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 395. 
624 2002 CEDAW report, supra note 210, at 209, paragraph 432. 
625 Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 218, at 1511. 
626 Bonthuys, supra note 218, at 385: Bonthuys also adds that alteration of the law is inadequate ‘as long as women 
cannot in practice afford to leave abusive situations’. 
627 E. DOBASH AND R. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 147 (1992). The realization that 
progressive domestic violence legislation is crippled without the concurrent progression of the adjudicators' views 
has been confirmed as late as 1993 in America where legislators began to recognize the inefficacy of their laws 
without the conjoint exorcising of stereotypes within the minds of the court officials. Legal Responses to Domestic 
Violence, supra note 218, at 1503. In the 1997 Draft Discussion Paper for Public Consultation on Gender Policy 
Considerations, an undertaking was made, in recognition of the fact “that women have largely been rendered 
invisible in the legal system.” See Gender Policy Considerations June 1997 Draft Discussion Paper for Public 
Consultation 3, Developed by the South African Gender Unit, in consultation with the Department of Justice. 
Published by Dr M E Tshabalala-Msimang, the then Deputy Minister of Justice of South Africa, available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/discuss/gender.html?rebookmark=1. This entails a firm and public initiative 
by the State and a persistent commitment to helping those who are harmed. Such an unveiling meets with the 
approval of Romany who points out that male suppression of women must be exposed, dealt with and not ignored. 
Bonthuys also refers to this approach which was adopted by the Australian Law Reform Commission which “draws 
attention to the connection between the social and legal inequality of women.” Bonthuys, supra note 218, at 379. 
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the framework within which the violations are made possible and carried out, and subsequently 
interpreted and reacted to by the outside world… It affects the criminal evidence and the legal 
proceedings, including the interpretation of the legal prerequisites, the evaluation of evidence and 
the possibility of treating victims of sex-related crimes with greater respect.628  
 
Many states’ judicial officers, police, health services and other relevant agents are immersed 
in the misconceptions surrounding systemic intimate violence. Educating service providers is not 
a new recommendation but it cannot be stressed strongly enough.629  
 
International instruments are replete with provisions that require policy amendments to 
ensure that governments endorse the principle of equality and equivalency between men and 
women, which includes the reduction of violence perpetrated by one gender against the other.630 
For example, CEDAW binds states to implement policy changes that take effect not only in the 
political sphere but also in the more intimate compartments of private life.631 DEVAW also 
provides that all appropriate measures, including education, should be taken by states to abolish 
existing prejudicial customs and practices that mitigate the implementation of safety for 
women.632 General Recommendation 19 requires sates to undertake research to “identify the 
nature and extent of attitudes, customs and practices that perpetuate violence against women and 
the kinds of violence that results.”633 This includes the “compilation of statistics and research on 
the extent, causes and effects of violence, and on the effectiveness of measures to prevent and 
deal with violence.”634 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
One therefore cannot continue to use the mechanisms of a male-dominated system. But before this can happen the 
patriarchy of our country and legal system must be labeled since it has been recognized that violence against women 
should be viewed as a “subproblem in the wider context of gender inequality.” Id. 
628 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 38. 
629 Romany points out that part of a woman’s struggle for equality, dignity and justice is to capture the attention of 
legislatures and adjudicators and to reveal the global structure of gender subordination. Celina Romany, State 
Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights 
Law, HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 85, 90 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 
1994) [hereinafter Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private]. Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel in the House”: 
Digging for the Political Vortex of Male Violence against Women, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 
THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 285, 298 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (arguing for 
rehab for qualifying batterers and education in schools). 
630 For example: article 7 of CEDAW, supra note 21, and article 4 of DEVAW, supra note 22, address political 
equality; article 8 of CEDAW, supra note 21, deals with the role of women in international organizations; article 10 
of CEDAW, supra note 21, and article 9 of DEVAW, supra note 22, deal with equality in education; article 11 of 
CEDAW, supra note 21, and article 10 of DEVAW, supra note 22, prescribe equality in the workplace; article 13 of 
CEDAW, supra note 21, protects economic, family and recreational equality; article 14 of CEDAW, supra note 21, 
focuses on the peculiar difficulties faced by rural women; and article 16 of CEDAW, supra note 21, and article 6 of 
DEVAW, supra note 22, deal with equality within marriage. 
631 This is clear from article 5 which enjoins states to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based 
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 
Article 5(a) of CEDAW, supra note 21. 
632 Article 2-3 DEVAW, supra note 22. 
633 Article 24(e). 
634 Article 24(c). 
 143 
These instruments target not only government but also cultural practices. While the debate 
regarding cultural autonomy rages intensely within the context of women’s rights, I maintain that 
the complexities of this debate are not triggered by the proposal that governments are responsible 
under international law to protect women from gender-specific violence.635 If the notion of 
cultural autonomy is raised as an excuse not to protect women against systemic intimate 
violence, international law would face an alarming contradiction: to hate a black man is a 
prejudice; but to hate a woman is a culture.  
 
7.4 Allocation of Financial and Institutional Resources 
 
The third core step, the allocation of financial and institutional resources, helps to assess the 
government’s commitment to complying with its international obligation to prevent and mitigate 




Ideally, governments should be required to allocate a percentage of their annual budget to 
aid victims of systemic intimate violence. General Recommendation No. 19 requires states to 
establish or support bodies that provide protection or safe haven for women who have been 
abused (including assistance to refugees).636 Often, the victim’s first port of call is a shelter.637 
An examination of the role of the shelter in conjunction the protection order is necessary as the 
victim or the abuser may have to be removed from particularly volatile environments. Unlike any 
other violent crime, the victim of systemic intimate violence has no place of refuge. Her home is 
the locus of the crime.  
 
As a basic principle, state facilities should help the victim break the cycle of violence. This 
is necessary both to secure her physical safety and to allow her sufficient distance from the 
violence to adjust to the fact that what has happened to her is not ‘normal’ or acceptable.638 The 
South African Domestic Violence Act, for example, empowers the court, when making a 
protection order, “to prohibit the respondent from … entering a residence shared by the 
complainant and the respondent: Provided that the court may impose this prohibition only if it 
appears to be in the best interests of the complainant.”639 This therefore prevents an abuser 
following his victim into a safety shelter. 
 
                                                
635 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the Empowerment of 
Women, 34 GWILR 483, 494 (2002) [hereinafter Coomaraswamy, Identity Within]. 
636 [Note: citation to follow]  Amnesty International proposes that municipalities create specific action programs as a 
guide to social services when handling cases of domestic violence. This includes being able to identify and 
communicate with the appropriate local authorities and non-governmental services. Amnesty International, Intimate 
Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 43. 
637 Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 218, at 1506: The shelter has been identified as “the battered 
woman’s first encounter with the legal system after she flees her assailant.” 
638 The Captured Queen Report has referred to this as the “denormalization process” which requires an end to the 
isolation of the victim and removing the control that her abuser may exercise over her. Captured Queen Report, 
supra note 123, at 18. The survival and recovery process of abused women largely depends on the emotional support 
provided by family, friends and social services. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, 
at 43. 
639 Section 7(1)(c ) of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. 
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Non-profit women’s shelters “are still the most important actors in providing help, support 
and protection to women who survive violence – even though the municipal authorities and the 
social services bear the ultimate responsibility.”640 In Sweden, one third of women who have 
suffered systemic intimate violence have turned to agencies other than the police for assistance, 
including hospitals, psychiatric clinics, non-governmental women’s shelters, crime-victim 
centers and emergency social services.641 Therefore, where shelters are run by private 
organizations or non-governmental institutions, the governments should provide financial 
support. 
 
Ideally, shelters should be accessible within a limited radius to enable victims of abuse to 
seek confidential and temporary safety. However, in rural areas, comprised of small 
communities, shelters may not provide the required remedy and specific remedies need to be 
created for alternative environments. It is also important that shelters are open to women with 
children, that they have medical and psychological facilities and that they are functioning as well 
as any government hospital.642 
 
I recommend support of shelters with one caveat. It remains problematic that when a 
woman is abused it is she who must leave the home and not the abuser. However, forcing the 
abuser to leave, and stay away from, the home requires the implementation of criminal resources, 
which trigger a host of difficulties for the abused. Moreover, shelters are necessary because their 
locations can be secret and in theory the abused can choose when to expose herself to her abuser 
once again.  
 
This takes resources. In countries where the necessary money and/or interest are scarce, 
lobbyists could challenge international organizations and the private sector to contribute towards 
developing a network of shelters. This is a practical measure but its theoretical efficacy should 
not be discounted. Bringing women together in shelters allows for formal and informal 
education, and facilitates a link between the abused and the public world, which is especially 
important given the isolating nature of systemic intimate violence. Moreover, she should be 
allowed to return to, and escape from, her abuser as many times as is necessary until she decides 
to leave for good, if that in fact is her decision. The human characteristic of relationships and 
love cannot be ignored in this context.  
 
7.4.2 Other: Health, Tax, Education 
 
Another avenue of enforcement is through health services. This includes the training of 
health care staff and the provision of rehabilitation and counseling services.643 The education of 
                                                
640 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 43. 
641 Id.  
642 The shelter offers legal, physical, financial and emotional help which the victim may not necessarily receive 
staying at home. An ultimate goal would be to develop a support system in which the shelter would act as a point of 
access to “other tangible physical services, such as child care, housing access, job referral, food and clothing, 
transportation and case monitoring”. While an overriding problem is obviously lack of funds, it is interesting to note 
that a solution has been found by some American States which use marriage license fees and fines for violations of 
protection orders to fund such structures. Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 218, at 1507 
643 See Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 14. See Irma MacKay, Educating the 
Professional to Aid Abuse Victims in Achieving Human Rights, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
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health care professionals is “decisive for the early detection of acts of aggression and for 
handling these women with competence and referring them on for further help and care.”644 
Many health professionals will come into contact with abused women regularly, either in respect 
of a manifestation of the violence or for other health-related issues, such as gynecological, 
dental, pre- or post-natal or psychological needs.645 It is of great value if such professionals are 
able to identify, understand and provide advice in respect of the abuse. For example, women in 
Sweden who require assistance receive more satisfactory assistance when they approach 
hospitals, lawyers, women’s shelters or crime-victim centers than when they attempt to utilize 
governmental services.646 
 
Sweden has proposed the inclusion of compulsory training programs regarding violence 
against women in the education of professionals who are likely to come into contact with abused 
women, including lawyers, physicians, midwives, nurses, psychologists, psychotherapists, 
dentists, social workers and others employed in the social services, teachers and educational 
staff.647 It is also necessary to have enhanced cooperation and communication between the 
different authorities within the state, from the police, prosecutors, health and social services.  
 
However, it makes little sense to have an array of legal, health and social services if women 
are unaware of their existence. States are responsible for making women aware of two things. 
First, she should know what her rights are: she should know that physical, psychological or 
sexual violence, albeit in the context of an intimate relationship, is against the law and an 
actionable violation of her being. Second, she should also know what her remedies are. This 
could be achieved through any number of mechanisms, ranging in efficacy and cost. A state may, 
for example: require all hospitals to have information regarding systemic intimate violence; 
require all health officials, especially emergency, dental and gynecological professionals, to 
screen every patient for abuse and be required by law to advise the patient on her rights and 
options; and compel the police, court clerks and judges to advise women of their rights regarding 
systemic intimate violence whenever they have such cases before them. 
 
The government should be responsible for inculcating a norm of equality within its society. 
This includes educating legal, police and other officials to “ensure that the re-victimization of 
women does not occur because of laws insensitive to gender considerations, enforcement 
practices or other interventions.”648 This applies equally to judges who should be educated in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
PERSPECTIVES 203 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992) [hereinafter MacKay, Educating the Professional] (“Her inner pain 
only deepened as she left the emergency department that night, but in many ways she was relieved that her family 
life had remained private. She deserved it, didn’t she? And the hope of any change seemed so remote. The 
professionals with whom she had an encounter that day did not ask the question. Was it because they did not want to 
know, or, maybe, they did not know what to say when she would reply ‘yes’ to the question?”). 
644 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 43. 
645 Id. 
646 Id. 
647 Amnesty International endorses the notion of a degree ordinance. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in 
Sweden, supra note 98, at 49 and 56. 
648 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 14. See also article 4(j) of DEVAW, 
supra note 22 (enjoining governments to adopt measures, “especially in the field of education, to modify the social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women and to eliminate prejudices, customary practices and all other 
practices based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes and on the stereotyped roles for 
men and women.” This briefing list is somewhat disconcerting, not least of all because it is unlikely to occur. Many 
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basic understanding of “gender theory, gender discrimination and society’s gender power 
structure.”649 Indeed, it has been recognized that knowledge “is the most important instrument in 
changing outdated attitudes and combating prejudices among law enforcement authorities.”650 
 
Statistics on the prevalence, causes and effects of gender-based violence are valuable for 
determining what steps are required and what differences may apply in different states, provinces 
or regions. States should devote resources towards generating, compiling and using statistics and 
social surveys aimed at combating systemic intimate violence in the context of that state’s unique 
social settings and infrastructures. Sweden also has posited the notion of a ‘domestic violence’ 
tax, imposed on men who have committed acts of violence against women.651 This would help 
internalize on abusers the external costs borne by society in trying to remedy the effects of 
systemic intimate violence. 
 
7.5 Theoretical Justifications 
 
7.5.1 Using the Theory of Denial of Justice 
 
There are several ways in which a state could ensure the effective implementation of 
protective legislation. The requirement that states properly implement laws is not new in 
international law. The effective implementation of legislation was a principle of the theory of 
denial of justice and the treatment by states of aliens within their territories.  
 
The theory of denial of justice focuses on inadequate measures to apprehend, prosecute and 
punish persons guilty of crimes against aliens. The requirement is not that the state agents are 
flawless in their execution of the law; this would be impossible.652 Rather, the discussion focuses 
on reasonable and basic remedies, the absence of which is unsustainable in light of the social, 
political and economic circumstances of the state in question. This thesis proposes that the 
justification for, and the principles embedded in, the notion of denial of justice may be 
extrapolated equally to instances where citizens, and not aliens, are unable to access legal 
assistance in the event of egregious physical violation. 
 
The standard demanded of states is high but it does not include ad hoc or incidental 
incidences of maladministration of justice. Professor Freeman, an authority on the theory of 
                                                                                                                                                       
countries may refuse to recognize the provisions of DEVAW simply because they refuse to abandon all cultural 
practices that rely on role allocation based on gender. While this may be an ideal, it should be recognized as such. 
Moreover, the articulation of role allocation as automatically dysfunctional is problematic since this may offend the 
cultural imperatives of certain communities. 
649 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 40. 
650 Id. at 41. General Recommendation 19 includes educational recommendations which are based on the notion that 
states should take “effective measures” to mitigate attitudes and practices that discriminate against women. Article 
24(f). These should be tempered through public programs and education, and the dissemination of information 
through the media to promote respect for women. Reference is made to the use of educational programs “to change 
attitudes concerning the roles and status of men and women.” Article 24(t)(ii). See also article 24(d). 
651 See Sweden Debates Hitting Men with Domestic Violence Tax, October 6 2004, in the Sydney Morning Herald, 
available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/10/05/1096949511735.html hereinafter Sweden Debates Hitting 
Men with Domestic Violence Tax]. The newspaper article describes a proposal in Swedish courts to impose a tax on 
men to cover the cost of domestic violence against women in Sweden. 
652 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 367. 
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denial of justice, acknowledges this berth of reasonableness, pointing out that, assuming “proper 
measures of police protection have been taken, there is clearly no duty incumbent upon members 
of the family of nations to answer for the injuries which resident aliens may suffer at the hands of 
individuals unconnected with the State or acting in a purely private capacity.”653 His initial 
assumption, however, is crucial and it is only if proper measures of police protection have been 
taken that a state can discharge its duty in international law. If not, even if the suffering is 
induced by an individual in a purely private capacity, the state would fail to fulfill its duty and it 
would be responsible for a breach of its international obligation. 
 
Of course, effective police protection is nugatory without concomitant judicial enforcement. 
As Freeman points out, the state has an “irrefutable duty to take adequate steps aiming at the 
apprehension and punishment of the guilty parties. It may have been unable to prevent 
commission of the crime complained of… Its duty subsists none the less.”654 Moreover, not only 
should unlawful activity trigger the judicial mechanism, but the penalty imposed by the judiciary 
must be reasonable (in that it is proportionate to the misconduct)655 and it must be implemented 
in full (in that the sentence is served).656  
 
The state’s obligation to protect survivors of systemic intimate violence does not stop with 
the passing of legislation, nor is it fulfilled by the issuance of a protection order. Continued 
government assessment is necessary to determine that the legislation is implemented in a 
meaningful way and that the circumstances that are peculiar to the state are taken into account 
when combating systemic intimate violence. 
 
The requirement of legislative implementation is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the victim will see some sort of state intervention and begin to believe that there is an external 
concurring belief that what her abuser is doing to her is wrong. Secondly, government action 
could begin to influence societal perceptions and lead to the view that non-stranger abuse is 
unacceptable. This in turn will help to dilute the abuser’s confidence that his exertion of physical 
and mental control over his victim is justifiable. The action of a government, as is evident in the 
South African constitutional age, has a deep impact on the behavior of the society it governs. 
Whereas South Africa was previously steeped in discriminatory legislation and custom, today 
many South Africans seem to be emulating their government in an attempt to develop new 
equitable norms. Finally, on a practical level, continued preventative involvement is  
                                                
653 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 368. 
654 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 369. Once again in the realm of denial of justice, Freeman acknowledges that the 
State is not, in principle, under an obligation to prevent harm occurring to aliens, but it is under a duty to punish 
harm where it occurs. It is interesting to note that this obligation pertains irrespective of the political makeup of the 
State in question. In the case of a federal system such as the United States, the federal government will remain 
answerable in international law for the actions of the member States. FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 370. 
655 Freeman points out that there is also a requirement that adequate penalties be imposed. FREEMAN, supra note 
207, at 383-4. This pertains even where the judicial process transpires efficiently and adequately since the ultimate 
imposition of a penalty must be proportionate to the violation. 
656 See in general FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 374-5. In the two cases referred to by Freeman, the courts found the 
accused parties guilty. The guilty parties, however, escaped with the result that both governments paid damages to 
the State of the injured alien (the cases are Frank W Lenz and Charles W. Renton). Freeman confirms that 
punishment must be executed and a failure to give effect to the penalty “will produce the same international 
consequences as though the State’s machinery of criminal justice had not been put into operation at all.” FREEMAN, 
supra note 207, at 385. 
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… advisable because of the general tenacity of batterers, their resistance to control, and 
the historical failings of protection orders as applied to persistent batterers. Systematic 
and strict punishments for order violations are desirable to incapacitate the recalcitrant 
batterer … and in a broader sense, to convey a stern message of disapproval of the 
batterers’ conduct to the individual and society.”657  
 
This is particularly relevant in respect of civil remedies. The protection order without 
continued state intervention is not only potentially ineffective, but possibly extremely 
dangerous.658  
 
7.5.2 Philosophical Justification 
 
At some point we are moved to ask: “but why?” Why concern ourselves with the private 
lives of individuals? In public life, and especially in poor or politically unstable countries, so 
many issues compete for attention, including famine, war, environmental decay, politics, 
commerce, and globalization. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that tensions between 
intimates simply do not warrant comparable consideration.  
 
An alternative view, however, is that stable, non-violent private lives are essential for 
international development. If citizens’ private lives are infected by violence, states will be far 
less likely to achieve the development that internationalization offers. If we accept the enormity 
of systemic intimate violence, both in its occurrence and in its composition, it becomes clear that 
the response of many states is grossly inadequate, and disproportionate to what is required. 
 
It is necessary to draw a distinction between developed and developing societies. In the 
former, many states have domestic violence legislation; in the latter, many do not. Self-evidently, 
different actions are necessary by these different types of societies. Developing countries that 
allocate few rights to women need to improve their protection of women at the most basic level, 
such as by enacting anti-discrimination legislation. In developed states, the requirement is less 
raw and may instead involve the refinement of pre-existing legislation and the allocation of 
resources towards, for example, additional shelters.659 
                                                
657 Fedler recognizes that the efficacy of a protection order often depends on the character of the abusive partner. 
Fedler, supra note 179, at 233: ’It may be useful for practitioners to assess the suitability of the interdict on the basis 
of the particular personality-type of the abusive partner.’ If the batterer has no respect for the law, abuses when he is 
inebriated or high, has an exaggerated sense of self power (‘suffers from a God - complex’) and is generally 
determined to continue to manifest his control in a violent way, then a protection order may serve only to anger the 
abuser to the point where the abuse becomes more severe. Fedler, supra note 179, at 250. Furthermore, where the 
abuser views the protection order or general legal intervention as a threat to his control, he could begin to look for 
other modes of asserting his domination, namely, murder. 
658 This is confirmed by the statement that ‘the order will not adequately protect the victim from renewed attack 
absent provisions for immediate police response’. Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 218, at 1514 
659 For example, in South Africa, as of 2004, the South African government had enacted domestic violence 
legislation, implemented education and awareness-raising programs to combat domestic violence and dedicated a 16 
days in September of 2004  to combating domestic violence. However, only 25 shelters exist in South Africa where 
approximately one woman is killed every 6 hours as a result of intimate violence and one out of four women, is 
beaten every week by her boyfriend or spouse. For statistics see http://www.tricky.org/POWA/stats.htm. See also the 
United States government, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, February 28, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41627.htm. 
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The allocation of resources to alleviate gender-based violence and discrimination in general 
is a call that has been made many times before. Political philosopher, Amartya Sen, argues that 
both biological and social differences between men and women should be taken into account if a 
fair distribution of resources is to be achieved.660 However, Sen also recognizes the social 
imperatives that impede the wellbeing of women. He identifies “[s]ocial conventions and 
implicit acceptance of ‘natural’ roles [which] have a major influence on what people can or 
cannot do with their lives. … The sources of pervasive social discouragement are often hard to 
trace and harder to separate out.”661 On this basis, Sen calls for gender to be taken into account in 
the distribution of resources.  
 
I propose a similar consideration in respect of systemic intimate violence. Because systemic 
intimate violence is so prevalent and severe, health and safety resources need to be better 
equipped (i.e. extra resources given to shelters and hospitals) to address a need that is peculiar to 
women for both biological and social reasons. Sen points out how the “behavioral constraints 
related to perceptions of legitimacy and correctness can strongly affect the relationship between 
primary goods and the freedoms that can be generated with their use. If women are restrained 
from using the primary goods within their command for generating appropriate capabilities, this 
disadvantage would not be observed within the space of primary goods.”662  
 
In other words, the security and protection required for women is different to that required 
by men. There are social rules, norms and inequities that generate different lives for the two 
genders. While these differences are unfortunate, they are a reality that will continue to pervade 
national laws unless international law requires alternative action.  
 
In Rawls’ depiction of the social contract, he omits (either deliberately or not) gender as a 
criterion for consideration. This is not irremediable but it is necessary to examine the 
consequences of such an omission.663 If one fails to take into account an individual’s particular 
experience based, for example, on gender, the implications of certain legal rules for such an 
individual are not considered when deliberating behind the veil of ignorance.664 Laws that 
                                                
660 Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, supra note 118, at 264. For example, Sen proposes that a 
pregnant woman may need a greater range of nutrition than a man. Therefore, if gender is not taken into account, “a 
pregnant woman may be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis a man of the same age in having the freedom to achieve 
adequate nutritional well-being. The differential demands imposed by neo-natal care of children also have 
considerable bearing on what a woman at a particular stage of life can or cannot achieve with the same command 
over primary goods as a man might have at the corresponding stage of his life.” 
661 Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, supra note 118, at 265. 
662 Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, supra note 118, at 265. 
663 Rawls himself acknowledges this. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 20 (Revised Edition, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Pres Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE] 
(“…we have a choice. We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing 
judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision. By going back an 
forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and 
conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and 
adjusted.”). 
664 See, for example, JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES, 
120 (1999) [hereinafter PTACEK]: “…there are a variety of feelings that women experience at the point when they 
claim their legal rights or take other actions to stop the violence…. indifferent responses by the courts and police 
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traditionally have failed to help women therefore risk perpetuation. Gender, no less than race or 
economic status, contributes to an individual’s ability (or lack thereof) to engage the law and 
benefit from the structures of social communities.665 The hypothetical philosopher, however, 
potentially does not know that or how gender permeates a person’s interaction with society.666 
Women, as a marginalized sector of society (even a democratic or liberal one as Rawls requires) 
may not benefit from the analysis of the hypothetical philosopher and the Theory of Justice, at 
least superficially, proves to be deficient in this regard.667 
 
Take, by way of example, the following hypothetical scenario. The individual in the original 
position (we can refer to her/him as the draftsperson) must create rules to govern the 
administration of public hospitals. S/he must create a rule that will not prejudice one individual 
unduly, unless it will improve the situation of the least privileged in society. The draftsperson 
creates a rule stipulating that patients seeking urgent medical care, whose condition is not 
terminal, are required to register their personal information upon arriving at the hospital. The 
motivation for such a rule is, for arguments sake, to create a data bank of information about the 
citizens in the area, their medical needs, financial capabilities and criminal records.  
 
After the implementation of this rule, there is a radical decline in the number of reported 
cases of domestic violence at public hospitals. It transpires that women who seek hospitalization 
for domestic violence are afraid to register their personal details for fear of recrimination from 
their abusive partners or for fear of being identified by an abusive partner from whom they are 
fleeing. Moreover, even if the draftsperson was sufficiently sensitive to include a caveat that 
exempted the personal registration under certain circumstances, many women still may be 
                                                                                                                                                       
heighten feelings of isolation and desperation, narrowing women’s ability to escape.” McKinnon provides the 
following example of a misguided legal solution to the crime of rape: “Rape cases finding insufficient evidence of 
force reveal that acceptable sex, in the legal perspective, can entail a lot of force. This is both a result of the way 
specific facts are perceived and interpreted within the legal system and the way the injury is defined by law. The 
level of acceptable force is adjudicated starting just above the level set by what is seen as normal male sexual 
behavior, including the normal level of force, rather than at the victim’s, or women’s, point of violation.” 
CATHERINE A. MCKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 173 (Harvard University Press, 1989) 
[hereinafter MCKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE]. 
665 [Note: citation to follow]  
666 Nor does it make sense to suggest that it is implicit, since Rawls so thoroughly designates other individual 
characteristics for consideration. McKinnon describes the danger in a male-centric jurisprudence as being inattentive 
to gender inequality in society and continuing to require a government to be negative in its regulation of society 
rather than fulfill positive obligations to ensure rights are fulfilled and not only refrain from violating them. See 
MCKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 275, at 163-164. Some argue that non-human 
animals should also be taken into account in the formulation of rules in the original position. See Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Beyond “Compassion and Humanity” Justice for Non-Human Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS CURRENT 
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 299 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter Nussbaum, 
Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”]. 
667 See MCKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 275, at 159. A similar criticism is 
raised by McKinnon in discussing feminism and the liberal State: “Feminism has not confronted on its own terms, 
the relation between the state and society within a theory of social determination specific to sex. As a result, it lacks 
a jurisprudence, that is, a theory of the substance of law, its relation to society, and the relationship between the two. 
Such a theory would comprehend how law works as a form of state power in a social context in which power is 
gendered. It would answer the questions: What is state power? Where, socially, does it come from? How do women 
encounter it? What is the law for women? How does law work to legitimate the state, male power, itself? Can law do 
anything for women? Can it do anything about women’s status? Does how the law is used matter?”  
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dissuaded from attending a hospital if they do not know about the exemption or are fearful that 
they will not be entitled to it.  
 
Of course, there are innumerable problems of this type within any given scenario using the 
original position. Any draftsperson creating a rule on any social issue is liable to make such an 
error. However, the likelihood of enacting deficient regulations decreases the more the 
draftsperson takes account of the types of problems that affect certain groups more than others. 
For this reason, gender, family dynamics and police attitude are a few characteristics of systemic 
intimate violence that simply cannot be excluded from consideration. Rawls does not explicitly 
rebut this and, therefore, his Theory of Justice is not inaccurate; it is merely incomplete as 
regards the type of factors that should pertain in the original position.  
 
A remedy to this deficiency is proffered by theorists Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen 
who developed the notion of human capabilities.668 In general, the capability approach asks, to 
what extent an individual is free to lead different types of life and the answer, according to Sen, 
“is reflected in the person’s capability set.”669 Sen recognizes that a person’s capability is 
influenced by both personal characteristics and social arrangements.670 This acknowledgement 
immediately brings us closer to taking account of the various permutations that affect women 
who suffer systemic intimate violence.  
 
For example, we could understand the prolonged victimization of a woman who is slight of 
body and illiterate. She might be too physically weak to defend herself against her abuser and, 
because she cannot read, she is unable to follow street signs or even find a police station. We 
might have less tolerance, though, for a woman who is both physically strong and educated. If 
she is being abused on a long-term basis, we might be tempted to judge her lack of courage to 
leave, since her personal characteristics seem to empower her to do so. However, if we also 
consider relevant social arrangements, as Sen proposes, we would see that many women are 
raised in a culture of submission to men, as a child may be raised in culture of submission to 
her/his parents. When the woman is beaten, therefore, she has a strong social imperative that 
prevents her from protecting herself (assuming she is physically capable of doing so) or of 
seeking help. Another important social component may be the fact that filing a police claim will 
bring shame to her and her children or trigger further violence on the part of her abuser. 
Therefore, through Sen’s invocation of capabilities, a more informed picture of domestic 
violence emerges.671  
                                                
668 See Amartya K. Sen, Equality of What, in EQUAL FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURE ON HUMAN VALUES 
307 (Stephen Darwell ed., 1995) (arguing that utilitarian equality, total utility equality and Rawlsian equality are 
deficient and do not provide a sufficient basis for ensuring moral equality. In response, Sen proffers the thesis of 
basic capability equality). Sen extends this thesis in Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF 
LIFE 30 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen eds., 1993) [hereinafter Sen, Capability and Well-Being] 
(describing the capability approach as an evaluation of a person’s advantage “in terms of his or her actual ability to 
achieve various valuable functionings as a part of living.” The capability approach was refined in Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT A STUDY OF HUMAN 
CAPABILITIES 61 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).  
669 Sen, Capability and Well-Being, supra note 279, at 33. 
670 Sen, Capability and Well-Being, supra note 279, at 33. 
671 For Sen, however, Rawls’ Theory of Justice does not remedy gender inequality because of the difference between 
freedoms and the means to freedoms. Sen describes the difficulty arising from the fact that “primary goods are the 
means to the freedom to achieve, and cannot be taken as indicators of freedom themselves. The gap between 
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8 Conclusion  
 
For these reasons, systemic intimate violence can and should be defined as a form of harm 
against women with specific components. It comprises severe acts of harm between intimates, 
which operate on a continuum and to which women are especially vulnerable. Due to inert and/or 
inappropriate state response, the violence becomes systemic, normalized and condoned. While 
there is little the law can do to change individual human behavior, it can require the state to 
create better facilities to respond to pain when it is caused. 
 
As an international human rights violation, systemic intimate violence must be prohibited by 
states. In this chapter I have attempted to reveal the various elements and effects of systemic 
intimate violence in society by describing its integral components. I argued that these elements 
should be articulated in international law together with the corresponding obligation on states to 
take core steps to mitigate systemic intimate violence. 
 
The failure of states to take these practical steps constitutes an internationally wrongful act. 
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to substantiating the legal arguments that systemic 
intimate violence is such that it can legally be addressed in international law, and that, given that 
international obligation, states can and should be required to take positive steps to address such 
violence. The theory underpinning this notion of state responsibility, the test determining the 
application of international law to systemic intimate violence and the benefits of 
internationalizing systemic intimate violence are discussed in chapters three, four and five 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                       
freedoms and means to freedoms would not have been of great practical significance if the transformation possibility 
of means into actual freedoms were identical for all human beings.” From this point, Sen goes on to discuss the 
biological and social factors that lead to gender inequality, concluding that the Rawlsian theory of justice is deficient 







Can the Theory of International Human Rights Law  
Apply to Systemic Intimate Violence? 
 
 
I was lying on the floor, two guards held my legs while another kicked me in the testicles.  I 
would lose consciousness and come to, I lost consciousness four times. They hit me around 
the head, there was blood.  They would beat me unconscious and wait until I came round:  
“He’s woken up,” and they would come in and beat me [again]. 
Chechnyan survivor of torture by the Russian Army672 
 
From the moment Rodi Adalí Alvorada Peña married a Guatemalan army officer at the age of 
16, she was subjected to intensive abuse, and all her efforts to get help were unsuccessful.  
Her husband raped her repeatedly, attempted to abort their second child by kicking her in the 
spine, dislocated her jaw, tried to cut off her hands with a machete, kicked her in the vagina 
and used her head to break windows. 
Guatemalan Woman673 
 
[F]irst they would beat you and then you would have to lie down on the floor and crawl to 
them. You would have to say, “Request permission to crawl.” Me personally, they beat me on 
the knees, with clubs, and on the kidneys. 
Chechnyan survivor of torture by the Russian Army674 
 
He was sittin’ on the bed.  Had his .357 Magnum.  He said, “June, you get down on this floor 
right now.  You crawl to me.”  And when I got to his feet he took that pistol and hit me right 
alongside of the head.  I thought I was gonna die.  I still got the knot from it.  He said, “if you 
even act like you’re gonna run I’ll blow your brains all over this wall.” 
American Woman675 
 




1. Description of this Chapter 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to propose the theoretical basis for why freedom from systemic 
intimate violence is a human right under international law. To this end, I apply a test consisting 
of four elements: (i) the first element is fundamentality, showing that systemic intimate violence 
is of the same substance as other human rights violations; (ii) the second considers the 
                                                
672 Human Rights Watch, “Welcome to Hell”: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and Extortion in Chechnya, 35 (2000) 
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch, “Welcome to Hell”].  
673 BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS, supra note 98, at 23. 
674 Human Rights Watch, “Welcome to Hell”, supra note 529, at 39. 
675 NEIL WEBSDALE, RURAL WOMAN BATTERING AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN ETHNOGRAPHY 10 (1998). 
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universality, showing that the rights violated by systemic intimate violence are universal; (iii) the 
third element is vulnerability, showing that the victims of systemic intimate violence belong to a 
vulnerable group; and, (iv) the final element is a consideration of the state accountability, 
comprising a systemic failure on the part of states to protect victims of systemic intimate 
violence. 
 
This chapter comprises two parts. The first part distils the elements of international human 
rights in general. The second part, in turn, applies these elements specifically to systemic 
intimate violence. The chapter therefore: (1) begins with a summary of the claim I make in the 
chapter as a whole; (2) describes the academic theory used to identify human rights; (3) by 
extracting core themes from this theory, creates a test to identify human rights; (4) applies each 
element of this test to systemic intimate violence; (5) addresses miscellaneous issues and (6) 




International human rights law does not protect all our interests. Only core, fundamental 
interests are protected as ‘human rights’. My claim in this chapter is that the right to be free from 
systemic intimate violence qualifies as such a right, thereby triggering the rules of international 
law. In particular, I propose that the status of systemic intimate violence as an international 
human right violation requires states to act proactively. States are obliged to take positive steps 
to help remedy such violence and curb its consequences, pursuant to the doctrine of state 
responsibility, which I discuss in chapter four. 
 
Even though domestic violence has received some international recognition, as described in 
chapter one, current statements against systemic intimate violence are deficient. In an attempt to 
reduce some of the confusion and skepticism in this area of law, this chapter proposes a clear, 
theoretical explanation of why systemic intimate violence constitutes a human rights violation. 
 




Human rights are rights; they are not merely aspirations, or assertions of the good… by 




3.1.1 The Problem  
 
Intuitively we understand that our interests in becoming a rock star, climbing a mountain, or 
having loyal friends are not human rights. They may be needs, interests and desires but they are 
not ‘rights’ we can demand from our governments.677 On the other hand, our interest in being 
free to have a relationship with a person of a different race, in practicing our religion, in 
                                                
676 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 2 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990) [hereinafter HENKIN]. 
677 This statement is not intended to ignore claims of the capabilities theory, discussed below.  
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education, or in being treated with dignity by the police, are rights which are enforceable against 
the state. 
 
Apart from intuition, how do we determine what is a right and what simply is an interest? In 
this part, I discuss the various ways in which human interests are recognized as human rights 
under international law, and provide the theoretical analysis to justify the application of 
international human rights law to systemic intimate violence. Throughout this chapter I 
distinguish between ‘interests’ or ‘claims,’ on the one hand, and ‘rights,’ ‘human rights’ or 
‘international rights’ on the other. Interests or claims are aspirant rights; that is, issues which 
benefit human beings but have not gained international recognition or do not warrant the 
application of international law. Rights, human rights and international rights, by contrast, are 
recognized and protected by international law.  
 
3.1.2 Why Have a Rights-Theory? 
 
Henkin explains that casting an interest as a human rights violation is: 
 
an assertion of fact about human psychology and emotion, that human beings cannot close their 
minds and hearts to mistreatment or suffering of other human beings; a moral statement that 
mistreatment or suffering of other human beings violates a common morality (perhaps also 
natural law or divine law) and that all human beings are morally obligated to do something about 
such mistreatment or suffering, both individually and through their political and social 
institutions; … that governments will attend to such mistreatment or suffering in other countries 
through international institutions and will take account of them also in their relations with other 
states.678 
 
Declaring an interest to be an international human right, therefore, should not be done 
lightly.679 There are several reasons why every individual’s interest is not necessarily a protected 
human right. Firstly, there are insufficient resources to realize every person’s interests and 
secondly, the absence of standards by which interests become rights would dilute “the integrity 
of the entire process of recognizing human rights.”680 The ideal is to achieve:  
 
an appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the need to maintain the integrity and 
credibility of the human rights tradition, and on the other hand, the need to adopt a dynamic 
approach that fully reflects changing needs and perspectives and responds to the emergence of 
new threats to human dignity and well-being.681  
 
                                                
678 HENKIN, supra note 426, at 16. 
679 Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control, 78 A.J.I.L. 607, 607 (1984) 
[hereinafter Alston] (Arguing that the proliferation of rights has diluted the importance and effect of human rights 
law). 
680 Alston proposes that the proclamation of new rights which are not recognized in either the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights or the two International Human Rights Covenants, the recognition of rights by bodies other than 
the General Assembly, and the ease with and “haphazard and anarchic manner” in which these rights have been 
recognized have threatened the respected status of human rights. Alston, supra note 477, at 607. 
681 Alston, supra note 477, at 607. 
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Therefore, I attempt to find some framework of a rights-theory to determine whether 
systemic intimate violence is an international human rights violation without compromising the 
“integrity and credibility of the human rights tradition.”682 
 
3.1.3 Evaluating Different Theories to Extract Core Themes 
 
Philosophers and lawyers, amongst others, have given a great deal of consideration to the 
theory underlying this intuitive distinction. Decades of thought have spawned a multitude of 
theories attempting to identify the elements of human rights.683 However, no one definitive test 
exists in international human rights law to determine what constitutes a right.684 
 
Since there is no one standard definition of human rights, I examine below a cross section of 
philosophical and jurisprudential theories on human rights.685 Many of these theories, while 
differing in the particular, have general themes in common. By identifying these common themes 
I am able to: (1) extract elements of human rights; and (2) using these elements, create a 
framework in which to determine whether systemic intimate violence qualifies as an 
international human rights violation.686 In other words: a range of theorists identify factors A, B 
and C as prerequisite elements of human rights; I extract factors A, B and C; and, determine 
whether A, B and C are features of systemic intimate violence. I conclude that elements A, B and 
C inhere in systemic intimate violence; QED systemic intimate violence is an international 
human rights violation. 
 
 
                                                
682 Alston, supra note 477, at 607. 
683 See for example, Shestack, supra notex, at 70 (describing the abundance of theories on the meaning of human 
rights). 
684 McDougal, Lasswell and Chen state that “[i]t is in the substantive definition of human rights that the greatest 
confusion and inadequacy prevail.” WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 64. See also Oscar Schachter, United 
Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1994) (“The processes of lawmaking have not been simple, nor free from 
serious controversy. Scholarly writings have revealed the gradations and subtleties in the conceptions of 
authoritative law, the wavering lines between peremptory "hard" law and the varieties of "soft" law. Rules have 
emerged from practice and interpretations of officials, as well as from pronouncements of organs composed of 
member states.”). Henkin claims that human rights are a product of politicians and not philosophers. Philosophers, 
according to Henkin, are trying to build philosophical justifications for human rights but the “international 
expression of rights themselves claims no philosophical foundation, nor do they reflect any clear philosophical 
assumptions.” HENKIN, supra note 426, at 5. See also Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the 
United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25, 32 (Theodor Meron ed., 
Clarendon Press Oxford 1984) [hereinafter Henkin, Human Rights in International Law] (stating that “international 
human rights reflect no single, comprehensive theory of the relation of the individual to society.”). See also MOSES 
MOSKOWITZ, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 98-99 (1968), cited by Jerome J. Shestack, The 
Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 69, 69 
(Theodor Meron ed., Clarendon Press Oxford 1984) [hereinafter Shestack]. As Shestack points out, the relevant 
question is what the source of these rights is, i.e. is the fundamentality of rights found in religion, natural law, 
positivism or the authority of the state? Shestack, supra notex, at 75-85. 
685 Nickels reminds us that in defining human rights, “one should not focus exclusively on legal rights.” JAMES W. 
NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 13, (University of California Press, 1987) [hereinafter NICKEL]. 
686 Buchanan has engaged this process of showing “a widely shared conception of human rights that is already partly 
implemented in international law…” ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 74 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) [hereinafter BUCHANAN]. 
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The primary theories on human rights have been classified, more or less, as: the theological 
approach; the natural law approach; the historical approach; the positivist approach; the Marxist 
(or communist) approach; the social science approach; utilitarianism; the approach of justice; 
libertarianism or laissez-faire theory; the policy oriented approach; liberal equality; 
communitarianism; the capabilities theory; and, feminism.687 I attempt, as far as possible, to 
represent each of these theories in formulating common themes. 
 
It is important to note that the purpose of this analysis is not to compare, study, or examine 
the philosophy of rights.688 I do not propose that all theories are represented or that the theories I 
cite are described conclusively. Rather, I simply note some of the leading rights-theorists and 
extract themes which, on the whole, are common to them all for the purpose of determining the 
international status of systemic intimate violence.  
 
Based on this analysis, I identify four common themes: (1) fundamentality; (2) universality; 
(3) group vulnerability; and (4) state accountability. I discuss each element below, providing first 











The first element that appears in an array of human rights-theories is fundamentality. This is 
the idea every right relates to something basic, foundational or elemental. Some theorists frame 
fundamentality with reference to humanity, some to the natural order of the world and others to 
religion. Many labels are used to describe fundamentality, including, ‘morality,’ ‘generality,’ 
‘legal,’ or ‘intrinsic.’  
 
                                                
687 See WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 68-82; Shestack, supra notex, at 75-101; WILL KYMLICKA, 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AN INTRODUCTION (Claredon Press Oxford, 1990) [hereinafter 
KYMLICKA]; and BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 80-88. 
688 Such a task would exceed greatly the ambit of this thesis. As McDougal, Lasswell and Chen note, the confusion 
and breadth of rights-theories is vast, ranging from “natural law absolutes … buttressed by transempirical 
justifications, both theological and metaphysical” to “demands which particular peoples make at particular times in 
their particular , unique communities” to “rights which a particular system of law in a particular state in fact 
protects.” WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 65. 
689 JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND TRANSLATION 
BY ROBERT HORWITZ, JENNY STRAUSS CLAY AND, DISKIN CLAY 95 (Cornell University Press, 1990) [hereinafter 
LOCKE]. 
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The concept, however phrased, refers to the fact that rights relate to the essence of us and the 
way we live our lives. It is the center, around which all other facts of life revolve; it is 
uncompromisable; it is basic; it is, shall we say, fundamental.  
 
The legal investigation into the fundamental nature of laws developed in part when states 
sought to protect their own nationals living in other countries and insisted that the basic rights of 
their citizens be protected when living abroad.690 The initial objective was to ensure a standard of 
treatment of foreign citizens, which “was often higher than that – if any – applied by these 
countries to their own citizens at home.”691 As a result, the standard of what is ‘fundamental’ or 
‘basic’ was created in the absence of philosophical foundations or agreed principles of universal 
fairness. 
 
In the discussion below, I harness a variety of theoretical sources on fundamentality and 
divide them into two groups: (1) theories which make specific statements about the 
fundamentality of rights; and, (2) theories which investigate fundamental rights in pursuit of a 
theory of distributive or social justice. I propose that each of these theories embraces the concept 
that certain interests are so fundamental that they take on the status of rights requiring 
enforcement by states. In Part B, I demonstrate that, based on these theories, the rights to 
equality; physical integrity; and, dignity, which are each violated in the context of systemic 
intimate violence, are fundamental human rights. 
 
4.2.2 Theoretical Source 
 
Specific Statements about Fundamentality  
 
In the 1600s, John Locke stated that human beings are said to possess certain inalienable 
natural rights.692 Locke’s notion of the inalienability and naturalness of rights is evident in the 
theories of the 19th century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes concluded that “any man in 
the state of nature (which… is a condition of mutual hostility) has a right of nature to do 
whatever is necessary for his preservation.”693 The ‘state of nature’ according to Hobbes is “the 
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own 
Nature; that is to say, of his own Life.”694 While Locke invokes generic themes of 
fundamentality in rights that are inalienable or natural, Hobbes specifies fundamentality in the 
right to defend oneself according to the human being’s state of nature. Both philosophers echo 
the theme of fundamentality. 
 
The notion of fundamentality in rights pertains no less in modern philosophies, particularly in 
relation to people’s rights to equality, physical integrity and dignity. American philosopher, 
Richard Rorty alludes to fundamentality in his argument that social concern for the impotent’s 
                                                
690 See HENKIN, supra note 426, at 14. 
691 HENKIN, supra note 426, at 14. 
692 LOCKE, supra notex, at 1, citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT, (Peter Laslett, ed., New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
693 W. VON LEYDEN, HOBBES AND LOCKE THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM AND OBLIGATION 9 (St. Martin’s Press New 
York (1982) [hereinafter HOBBES AND LOCKE]. 
694 HOBBES AND LOCKE, supra notex, at 10] 
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basic rights has brought us “to a moment in human history in which it is plausible … that the 
human rights phenomenon is a ‘fact of the world.’”695 
 
Shestack, for example, identifies fundamentality as a trend in so-called modern human rights-
theories, which posit some manifestation of fundamental principles as their point of departure, be 
it the “equal right of all people to be free” (as expounded by the positivist Hart) or the “morality 
of personhood” and the “autonomy of the individual in choosing his or her ends” (as expounded 
by John Rawls and Alan Gewirth respectively). According to Shestack, these concepts consist of 
a “natural necessity, i.e., necessity in the sense of prescribing a minimum definition of what it 
means to be human in society.”696 
 
Professor Louis Henkin is clear and sober in his application of fundamentality. He argues 
that when a society recognizes that a person has a right, it affirms, legitimates, and justifies that 
entitlement, and incorporates and establishes it in the society’s system of values, giving it 
important weight in competition with other societal values.697 Tom Campbell alludes to the same 
sense of fundamentality in his description that “[t]he rhetoric of human rights draws on the moral 
resources of our belief in the significance of an underlying common humanity, and points us in 
the direction of a type of society which ensures that the basic human needs and reasonable 
aspirations of all its members are effectively realized in, and protected by, law.”698 
 
One of the more comprehensive definitions of human rights is given by Philip Alston who 
states that a human right should “[r]eflect a fundamentally important social value.699 Ramcharan 
too confirms that human rights possess “certain qualitative characteristics.”700 Included in these 
                                                
695 Rorty, supra note 464, at 134. 
696 Shestack, supra notex, at 87. 
697 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, 2 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990) [hereinafter HENKIN]. 
698 Tom Campbell, Introduction: Realizing Human Rights, in Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality 1,1 (Tom 
Campbell, David Goldberg, Sheila McClean and Tom Mullen eds., Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
699 Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control, 78, A.J.I.L. 607, 614 (1984) 
[hereinafter Alston].  Alston states that a proposed human right should: “Reflect a fundamentally important social 
value; Be relevant, inevitably to varying degrees, throughout a world of diverse value systems; Be eligible for 
recognition on the grounds that it is an interpretation of UN Charter obligations, a reflection of customary law rules 
or a formulation that is declaratory of general principles of law; Be consistent with, but not merely repetitive of, the 
existing body of international human rights law; Be capable of achieving a very high degree of international 
consensus; Be compatible or at least not clearly incompatible with the general practice of states; and Be sufficiently 
precise as to give rise to identifiable rights and obligations.  Id. While Alston’s concern is primarily with the process 
by which rights become international human rights, I will address his concerns regarding the substance of rights and 
what criteria should be applied in elevating some claims to rights rather than others. Alston, supra note 477, at 616. 
Alston maintains that the right must be precise. I address this issue below. Alston proposes that the proclamation of 
new rights which are not recognized in either the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the two International 
Human Rights Covenants, the recognition of rights by bodies other than the General Assembly and the ease with and 
“haphazard and anarchic manner” in which these rights have been recognized have threatened “the integrity of the 
entire process of recognizing human rights”. 
700 Alston, supra note 477, at 621. [Note: get original citation for Ramcharan] Ramcharan’s synopsis is that “human 
rights are legal rights which possess one or more of certain qualitative characteristics, such as: appurtenance to the 
human person or group; universality; essentiality to human life, security, survival, dignity, liberty, equality, 
essentiality for international order; essentiality in the conscience of mankind; essentiality for the protection of 
vulnerable groups.” Id. 
 160 
characteristics is the element of “essentiality to human life, security, survival, dignity, liberty, 
equality, essentiality for international order; essentiality in the conscience of mankind.”701 
 
Nickel also lists generic elements, of which he maintains all rights are constituted.702 
Nickel’s second element is that “rights are to some freedom or benefit.”703 This entails the scope 
of the right; that is, what is included in its content and the conditions of its operability.704 
Nickel’s reference to fundamentality is implicit, evident in the notion that only interests with a 
particular content will qualify as human ‘rights,’ such content being that which is basic or 
fundamental to human beings. 
 
The theory of McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, in what has become known as the New Haven 
School, is a value-oriented approach based on the protection of human dignity.705 McDougal, 
Lasswell and Chen search for the fundamentality of human rights by offering “an itemization in 
terms of the principal features of a number of representative value processes, believed to be 
indigenous in varying forms of equivalency in most contemporary cultures.”706 Framed as the 
values upon which human rights depend, the itemized values are demands relating to respect, 
power, enlightenment, well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and, rectitude.707 Ultimately, the 
foundation or distillation of these is the basic value of dignity.708 
 
Fundamentality in Theories of Justice 
 
Many rights-theorists use a principle of fundamentality from which to develop a theory of 
governance or distributive justice. In determining how to engineer the structures and order of 
society, philosophers determine which rights are “absolute, which are universal, which should be 
given priority, which can be overruled by other interests, which call for international pressures, 
which can demand programs for implementation, and which will be fought for.”709 In this 
process, fundamentality appears in that which is absolute, “important, moral, and universal.”710  
 
Jeremy Bentham, the exponent of classic utilitarianism, centered his philosophy of 
governance on the human being’s calculation of pleasure and pain. In developing the theory of 
maximization, Bentham operates on the basis of a core minimum human condition. He breaks 
down the complexity of the human being to arrive at its fundamental needs. While the utilitarian 
approach is criticized as hedonic, seeking “to define notions of right solely in terms of tendencies 
                                                
701 Alston, supra note 477, at 621. [Note: get original citation for Ramcharan]. 
702 NICKEL, supra notex, at 13. These are: (1) conditions of possession; (2) scope; (3) addressees; and, (4) weight. Id 
at 13-14. 
703 NICKEL, supra notex, at 13. 
704 NICKEL, supra notex, at 13-14. 
705 See in general MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, AND LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press, 1980) [hereinafter WORLD PUBLIC ORDER]. For a brief description of this theory, see 
Shestack, supra notex, at 96. 
706 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 7. 
707 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 7-13. 
708 Shestack, supra notex, at 96. 
709 Shestack, supra notex, at 70. 
710 Shestack, supra notex, at 74. 
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to promote certain specified ends, e.g., [the] common good,” it nonetheless operates on the basis 
of the fundamentality of the human being’s need to limit pain and expand pleasure.711 
 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the linchpin of modern discourse on political philosophy and in 
part, is a methodology of how to deduce the fundamentality of human rights or needs.712 Rawls 
adopts an altered form of the contract theory of Locke, Rousseau and Kant and asks what “free 
and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of 
equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.”713 To ensure that people in the 
original position are neutral and do not promote their own particular interests, Rawls designs the 
famous “veil of ignorance,” creating a “hypothetical situation” where “no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution 
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like… The principles of justice 
are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”714  
 
Thus, by ensuring fairness in the original position, one ensures justice in society. The terms 
of this justice are determined by ignorant equals acting rationally.715 For Rawls, therefore, the 
fundamentality of rights is the goal to which the aforementioned mechanisms aspire. 
 
Cahn’s formulation of justice “is the active process of remedying or preventing what arouses 
the sense of injustice. An examination of the instances that will be considered injustice thereby 
allows a positive formulation of justice.”716 Cahn therefore seeks a type of fundamentality, which 
would be evident from the “‘emotional force and practical urgency’ to press for the satisfaction 
or repair of some need, deprivation, threat, or insecurity.”717 
 
In pursuing a theory of justice based on equality for men and women, feminist theorist 
Catherine MacKinnon also demonstrates how fundamentality currently is absent from our notion 
                                                
711 Shestack, supra notex, at 88. Although, as Shestack points out, “[i]n an era characterized by man’s inhumanity to 
man, the dark side of utilitarianism made it too suspect to be accepted as a prevailing philosophy.”) Id at 89. Sen, for 
example, criticizes utilitarianism as “an efficiency-oriented approach, concentrating on promoting the maximum 
sum total of utilities, no matter how unequally that sum total may be distributed. If equity is central to justice, 
utilitarianism starts off somewhere at the periphery of it.” Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, supra 
note 118, at 262. 
712 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE supra note 274, at 7 (“The justice of a social scheme depends essentially on how 
fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and social conditions in the various 
sectors of society.”). 
713 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE supra note 274, at 10. In attempting to define elusive basic rights, Rawls “effects 
a reconciliation of the tensions between egalitarianism and noninterference, between demands for freedom by the 
advantaged and demands for equality by the less advantaged. His structure of social justice maximizes liberty and 
the worth of liberty to both groups.” Shestack, supra notex, at 92-93. 
714 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE supra note 274, at 11, 17. 
715 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE supra note 274, at 17. Rawls articulates two principles which he suggests would 
emanate from the original position. The first is the principle of equal basic liberties. The second principle is that 
socio-economic inequalities should be arranged in a way that both advantages everyone and to which everyone has 
access. Id, 53. In discussing these principles, Rawls takes us to the point where he asserts that “[i]njustice, then, is 
simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.” Id, 54. 
716 Shestack, supra notex, at 93 citing E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949). 
717 Shestack, supra notex, at 93 (explaining how this formulation could be used to explain the injustice of 
disappearances in Argentina). 
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of human rights, since those rights are framed only in terms of male needs and experiences.718 
Her point of departure is her quest to identify the fundamental, the basic, which is representative 
of the experiences of women and men, leading to “a new jurisprudence, a new relation between 
life and law.”719 
 
Fundamentality is evident in Walzer’s notion of moral minimalism.720 For Walzer, this 
minimal morality is “‘truth’ and ‘justice,’ minimally understood. The minimal demands that we 
make on one another are, when denied, repeated with passionate insistence.”721 Walzer suggests 
that to understand what the fundamental demands of human beings are, we should make a list of 
occasions we all have experienced, cataloguing our responses thereto and try “to figure out what 
the occasion and the responses have in common. Perhaps the end product of this effort will be a 
set of standards to which all societies can be held – negative injunctions, most likely, rules 
against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny.”722 
 
Professor Robert Nozick seeks fundamentality in what he identifies as core individual rights: 
“the rights not to be killed, robbed, assaulted or defrauded; the right to acquire, retain and 
transfer property; the right to the performance of contracts; and, most importantly, the right to do 
as one chooses, so long as one does not violate the same right of others… moral wrongdoing has 
one form – violation of these rights.”723 While these rights are minimal (constituting what has 
been called a “barren morality”), Nozick nonetheless seeks and develops a notion of 
fundamentality in the theory of rights.724 
 
Professor Ronald Dworkin, in proposing a theoretical reconciliation between liberty and 
equality, encapsulates fundamentality in those liberties which require “special protection against 
government interference.”725 While Dworkin justifies this selection on a procedural rather than a 
value judgment, his theorizing nonetheless involves the process of identifying the basic, 
fundamental or core components of citizen rights.726 
 
The notion of fundamentality is captured in Buchanan’s discussion of the “generality” of 
human rights.727 According to Buchanan’s Moral Equality Argument, human rights “are the most 
                                                
718 MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, supra note 114, at 84-85: “Human rights principles are based on 
experience, but not that of women. It is not that women’s human rights have not been violated. When women are 
violated like men who are otherwise like them – when women’s arms and legs bleed when severed, when women 
are shot in pits and gassed in vans, when women’s bodies are hidden at the bottom of abandoned mines… this is not 
recorded as the history of human rights atrocities to women… When no war has been declared and still women are 
beaten by men with whom they are close, when wives disappear from supermarket parking lots, when prostitutes 
float up in rivers or turn up under piles of rags in abandoned buildings, this is overlooked entirely in the record of 
human suffering because the victims are women and it smells of sex.” 
719 MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, supra notex, at 249. 
720 WALZER, supra notex, at  6. 
721 WALZER, supra notex, at  6. 
722 WALZER, supra notex, at  10. 
723 Shestack, supra notex, at 94. 
724 Shestack, supra notex, at 95. 
725 Shestack, supra notex, at 97. 
726 Shestack, supra notex, at 97. 
727 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 76. 
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general moral rights that can be ascribed to us”728 and they “represent the most fundamental 
institutional constraints by which equal consideration for persons is to be achieved.”729 He 
further expands his notion of fundamentality and maintains that “there are some interests 
common to all persons that are of such great moral concern that the very character of our most 
important institutions should be such as to afford them special protection. These interests are 
shared by all persons because they are constitutive of a decent life; they are necessary conditions 
for human flourishing.”730  
 
This aspiration of “human flourishing” emanates from the capabilities theory, originated and 
developed by philosophers Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum raises the standard of 
fundamentality, arguing that “[t]he questions that should be asked when assessing quality of life 
in a country are … ‘How well have the people of the country been able to perform the central 
human functions?’ and ‘Have they been put in a position of mere human subsistence with respect 
to the functions, or have they been enabled to live well?’”731 Therefore, Nussbaum utilizes 
fundamentality in identifying core capabilities, which include “[b]eing able to avoid unnecessary 
and non-beneficial pain, so far as possible, and to have pleasurable experiences.”732 
 
This broader notion of fundamentality appears also in Sen’s notion of a web of rights: 
 
a remarkable empirical connection that links freedoms of different kinds with one another. 
Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to promote economic 
security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health facilities) facilitate 
economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation in 
trade and production) can help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for 
social facilities. Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one another.733  
                                                
728 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 76. 
729 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 83. 
730 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 79. The most basic rights, for Buchanan, are: the right to life; the right to security of 
the person, which includes the right to bodily integrity, the right against torture, and the right not to be subject to 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or imprisonment; the right against enslavement and involuntary servitude; the right to 
resources for subsistence; the most fundamental rights of due process and equality before the law; the right to 
freedom from religious persecution and against at least the more damaging and systemic forms of religious 
discrimination; the right to freedom of expression; the right to association; and, the right against persecution and 
against the “the more damaging and systemic forms of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, race, gender, or 
sexual preference.” BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 81. 
731 Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, supra notex, at 87. 
732 Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, supra notex, at 83. Nussbaum also identifies the following capabilities which are 
relevant to the right to be free from systemic intimate violence: “Being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life. This includes, today, being able to seek 
employment outside the home and to participate in political life…Being able to live for and to others, to recognize 
and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the 
situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. 
Protecting this capability means, once again, protecting institutions that constitute such forms of affiliation, and also 
protecting the freedoms of assembly and political speech…Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities…Being able to live one’s own life and nobody else’s…” Id. According to Nussbaum, these are the 
qualities of human beings that should be nurtured: “My claim is that a life that lacks any one of these capabilities, no 
matter what else it has, will fall short of being a good human life. So it will be reasonable to take these things as a 
focus for concern in assessing the quality of life in a country and asking about the role of public policy in meeting 
human needs.” Id at 85. 
733 SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 470, at 10. 
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In this interactive description, Sen both justifies and describes the fundamentality of human 
rights. 
 
The notion of fundamentality is summarized succinctly by the Rev. Canon Sydney Hall 
Evans: 
Sometimes attempts to give expression to the content of this fundamental intuition have 
been made academically in the study by moralists, jurists or theologians. Sometimes they 
have been hammered out in the heat of political upheaval. But always they express this 
basic human hope, this basic human vision in which men reach beyond themselves 
towards a better life for man in society: a reaching out which expresses a concern both for 
the better ordering of society and for the good life of individual persons within society.734 
 
Therefore, the concept of fundamentality appears in diverging jurisprudential and 
philosophical rights-theories. For this reason, I include an examination of fundamentality in 
determining whether systemic intimate violence is a human rights violation. In Part B of this 
chapter, I apply this theory of fundamentality to systemic intimate violence, concluding that 










If human rights are ‘fundamental’ to human beings, they must apply to every human being, 
everywhere; that is, in order for an ‘interest’ to be a ‘right,’ it must also be universal. This does 
not require that every state recognizes and adopts that right. Rather, the element of universality 
requires that the ‘right’ must be “relevant, to varying degrees, throughout the world of diverse 
value systems.”736  
 
As described in chapter one, however, not everyone agrees that all human rights are 
universal. Some argue that rights are not universally relevant, but vary from culture to culture. 
Others counter argue, saying that it is the very fundamentality of rights that underpins difference 
and pervades all cultures, irrespective of their structural differences. Culture, according to this 
argument, does not preclude universality. 
 
                                                
734 The Rev. Canon Sydney Hall Evans, Christianity and Human Rights, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7 (Sir Francis Vallat ed., Europa Publications: London, 1970) [hereinafter Evans]. 
735 LOCKE, supra notex, at 217.  
736 Alston, supra note 477, at 614. See also HENKIN, supra note 426, at 20. International human rights law 
specifically attempts to articulate certain norms which, even if they contradict a belief system or require the 
amendment of a culture’s way of life, will be considered universal because of their so-called fundamentality. The 
question of what constitute a fundamental norm is the subject of an entirely independent yet important discussion. 
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Nevertheless, in the analysis that follows, universality appears as a consistent theme. Some 
theorists qualify universality on the basis that rights manifest differently in different societies. In 
other words that even if an interest is ‘fundamental,’ a society or culture can choose whether or 
not to accept that interest as being of relevance in that society or culture. Most, however, 
maintain that if a right relates to the essence of human beings, every being that is human has this 
right. QED: human rights are of universal relevance. 
 
The theories relating to universality can be divided into three groups: (1) theories which 
address the universality of rights specifically; (2) theories which approach the principle of 
universal rights by examining what is common or universal in diversity; and, (3) theories which 
attempt to reconcile the universal with the specific. 
 
4.3.2 Theoretical Source 
 
Theories which Address Universality Specifically 
 
Locke maintains that the law of nature is both perpetual, “that is, that there is not time in 
which a man would be permitted to violate the precepts of this law,” and universal. 737 For 
Locke, universality refers to those precepts of the law of nature which are absolute… [and] 
equally binding on all men wherever men exist, kings as well as subjects, senators together with 
the commoners, parents and children together, barbarians no less than Greeks.”738 
 
Rawls describes human rights as “a special class of rights of universal application and hardly 
controversial in their general intention.”739 For Buchanan also, universality is implicit in human 
rights, which “as the name implies, are ascribed to all human beings simply by virtue of their 
humanity or personhood, regardless of whatever other characteristics differentiate them from one 
another, and regardless of where they live.”740 
 
Ramcharan identifies universality as an element of human rights, stating that “[t]he history of 
the human rights movement, the experience of the League of Nations, and the philosophy of the 
United Nations, reach out towards the concept of the universality of rights.”741 His synopsis of 
human rights includes “…universality; essentiality to human life…essentiality for international 
order; essentiality in the conscience of mankind.”742 Nickel’s elements of human rights also 
                                                
737 LOCKE, supra notex, at 217-225. 
738 LOCKE, supra notex, at 225. 
739 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES, 41, 70 (Stephen 
Shute and Susan Hurley eds., 1993) [hereinafter Rawls, The Law of Peoples]. 
740 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 76. 
741 Ramcharan, Universality of Human Rights, supra notex at 24 (“If we take universality to mean things shared by 
all human beings together, is the concept of universality valid as an idea? Do we not all breathe the same air, need 
food and water for survival and want to live our lives in peace and in happiness? Do we not have physical attributes 
which are common to all of us as human beings? And if yes, then is not the idea of universality a valid one in the 
sense that all human beings share some things in common?” Id at 25. 
742 Alston, supra note 477, at 621. [Note: get original citation for Ramcharan]. Ramcharan, however, also recognizes 
the contribution diversity makes to universality. See B. Ramcharan, in UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
PLURALISTIC WORLD 138, 138-139 (Proceedings of the Colloquy organised by the Council of Europe in co-
operation with the International Institute of Human Rights, Council of Europe, N.P. Engel, Publisher, 1989) 
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include the principle of universality evident in his argument that a right can apply narrowly to 
one person or to the human race as a whole.743 
 
Finally, Alston is explicit that human rights must be “relevant, inevitably to varying degrees, 
throughout a world of diverse value systems.”744 
 
Theories which Express Universality in Seeking the Common in the Diverse 
 
The element of universality is problematic since different people will have different views of 
what is fundamental to them. Rights therefore depend on certain informational input. The result 
is that for some, the right to private property is fundamental whereas to others unrestrained 
property rights are considered dangerous.745 Does this mean that the right to property is not 
fundamental or does it mean that rights in general, demonstrated by the differing approaches to 
property, are not in fact universal?746 In response to this question, theorists have attempted to 
investigate a commonality that would justify the conclusion that a right for one is a right for all. 
 
An honest answer to this quandary is provided in the very vivid inculcation of universality 
provided by Walzer. In his discussion of moral minimalism, Walzer grapples with his sense of 
universality in a description of:  
 
a picture of people marching in the streets of Prague; they carry signs, some of which say, simply, 
‘Truth’ and other ‘Justice.’ When I saw the pictures, I knew immediately what the signs meant – 
and so did everyone else who the saw the same picture. Not only that: I also recognized and 
acknowledged the values that the marchers were defending – and so did (almost) everyone else. Is 
there any recent account… that can explain this understanding and acknowledgement? How could 
I penetrate so quickly and join so unreservedly in the language game or the power play of a 
distant demonstration? The marchers shared a culture with which I was largely unfamiliar; they 
                                                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter Ramcharan, Universality of Human Rights]  (stating that “the substance of the universal principles is 
constantly evolving and is enriched by the experience of individuals throughout the world.”). 
743 NICKEL, supra notex, at 13. The addressee can be “the entire world” or “specific parties.” Id at 14. 
744 Alston, supra note 477, at 614. 
745 SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 470, at 56-61 (“One can indeed entertain different views on the 
intrinsic attractions or repulsive features of private property. The consequentialist approach [focus on the 
consequential outcomes social arrangements rather than their constitutive features] suggests that we must not be 
swayed only by these features, and must examine the consequences of having – or not having – property rights. 
Indeed, the more influential defenses of private property tend to come from pointers to its positive consequences. It 
is pointed out that private property has proved to be, in terms of results, quite a powerful engine of economic 
expansion and general prosperity. In the consequentialist perspective that fact must occupy a central position in 
assessing the merits of private property. On the other side, once again in terms of results, there is also much 
evidence to suggest that unconstrained use of private property – without restrictions and taxes – can contribute to 
entrenched poverty and make it difficult to have social support for those who fall behind for reasons beyond their 
control (including disability, age, illness and economic and social misfortune). It can also be defective in ensuing 
environmental preservation and in the development of social infrastructure.”).  
746 Elaine Pagels poses the following question: “Advocates of human rights policy claim not only that there are 
human rights but also that these rights have universal applicability. What – if anything – justifies this claim?” 
(Elaine Pagels, The Roots and Origins of Human Rights, in HUMAN DIGNITY THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1 (Alice Henkin ed., Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1979) [hereinafter Pagels]). 
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were responding to an experience I had never had. And yet, I could have walked comfortably in 
their midst. I could carry the same signs.”747  
 
Rorty identifies universality in “‘a progress of sentiments,’ which consists in an increasing 
ability to see the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike us as outweighing the 
differences.”748 On the other hand, Sen states that “[w]hile there is some danger in ignoring 
uniqueness of cultures, there is also the possibility of being deceived by the presumption of 
ubiquitous insularity.”749 
 
Many authors argue specifically that gender equality is of a universal nature. Cultural 
relativity and the justification of gender-differentiation in societies are addressed by McDougal, 
Lasswell and Chen. They maintain that the:  
 
justifications offered for sex-based discrimination, subordinating women, are traditionally that it 
is ‘natural or necessary or divinely ordained.’ Sometimes it is argued that discrimination is 
inherent ‘in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things.’ At other times it is asserted 
that simply out of the social necessity of functional division of activities, there exists ‘a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.’ The ‘domestic sphere,’ it is 
said, ‘properly belongs to the domain and function of womanhood.’ The boldest of discriminators 
may on occasion argue that women are inherently inferior to men.’”750  
 
For the authors, therefore, “[i]n a global community aspiring toward human dignity, a basic 
policy should, accordingly, be to make the social roles of the two sexes, with the notable 
exception of childbearing, as nearly interchangeable or equivalent as possible.”751 
 
McKinnon’s feminist theory, contrary to the implication of the label, is not exclusive to 
women. It is an analysis of the legal, social and political coexistence of women together with 
men. The element of universality is evident from MacKinnon’s assertion that women around the 
globe are denied equivalency and equality in the way states currently are structured. In 
formulating her challenge to the construction of states, she argues that  
 
guarantees women specifically need, due to sex inequality in society, in order to live to a 
standard defined as human – like freedom from being bought and sold as sexual chattel, 
autonomous economic means, reproductive control, personal security from intimate invasion, 
a credible voice in public life, a nonderivative place in the world – were not considered at 
all.752 
 
For Nussbaum, the convergence of cultures “gives us some reason for optimism, that if we 
proceed in this way, using our imaginations, we will have in the end a theory that is not the mere 
                                                
747 MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD 1 (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1994) [hereinafter WALZER]. 
748 Rorty, supra note 464, at 129. Relying on the arguments of Annette Baier, Rorty concludes that we should view 
“the spread of the human rights culture not as a matter of our becoming more aware of the requirements of the moral 
law, but rather as what Baier calls ‘a progress of sentiments.’” Id. 
749 SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 470, at 242.  
750 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 624. 
751 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 624-625. 
752 MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, supra note 114, at 96. 
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projection of local preferences, but is fully international and a basis for cross-cultural 
attunement.”753 
 
Theories which Reconcile the Universal and the Specific 
 
Walzer explains that there are broad overarching principles which are universal (what he 
refers to as “common, garden variety justice.”).754 When it comes to the details justice, such as 
“designing a health care system or an educational system” the marchers in Prague “will not be 
universalists: they will aim at what is best for themselves, what fits their history and culture, and 
won’t insist that all the rest of us endorse or reiterate  their decisions.”755 Walzer sees this as 
moral dualism, which we should embrace. We can imagine universal principles and we can 
imagine applying them to the specificity of our lives. Walzer describes this as “reiteratively 
particularist and locally significant, intimately bound up with the maximal moralities created 
here and here and here, in specific times and places.”756 
 
Walzer’s argument turns on the coexistence of that which is fundamental, and therefore 
universal, with that which is particular to a specific society, and therefore relative.757 For Walzer, 
this dualism is definitive of human society, which is “universal because it is human, particular 
because it is a society.”758 
 
While McDougal, Lasswell and Chen point out that different people “will assert these 
fundamental demands in many different modalities and nuances of institutional practice,” the 
authors nonetheless locate fundamentality in  
 
an overriding insistence, transcending all cultures and climes, upon the greater production 
and wider distribution of all basic values, accompanied by increasing recognition that a world 
public order of human dignity can tolerate wide differences in the specific practices by which 
values are shaped and shared, so long as all demands and practices are effectively appraised 
and accommodated in terms of common interest.759 
 
Buchanan identifies the importance of universality in discussing the way human rights 
develop. He argues that because an increasing number of countries and non-governmental 
organizations are participants in international law, the “processes that specify the content of 
human rights has been greatly broadened.”760 Buchanan “welcome[s] these developments” 
because, inter alia, “broader participation can be expected to reduce the risk of parochial biases 
in moral reasoning about which rights are truly human rights and how their content is to be 
                                                
753 Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, supra notex, at 74. 
754 WALZER, supra notex, at 2. 
755 WALZER, supra notex, at  4. 
756 WALZER, supra notex, at  7. 
757 WALZER, supra notex, at  8. 
758 WALZER, supra notex, at  8. 
759 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 6. 
760 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 75. 
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understood.”761 Therefore, in praising the diversity and legitimacy of this “broad participation” 
Buchanan endorses the notion of universality of rights consistent with the details of local lives.762 
 
Nussbaum engages the more fraught question of whether women’s rights are universal. She 
focuses on women’s commonalities, rather than their differences (although she acknowledges 
that differences exist).763 She concludes optimistically that universality enhances the notion of 
rights, answering the question that the formation of fundamental rights should take into account 
differences which will “allow explicitly for the possibility that we will learn from our encounters 
with other human societies to recognize things about ourselves that we had not seen before, or 
even to change in certain ways, according more importance to something we had thought more 
peripheral.”764 
 
Universality, therefore, is an element of human rights, which, as described by Henkin, are: 
 
a moral statement that mistreatment or suffering of other human beings violates a 
common morality (perhaps also natural law or divine law) and that all human beings are 
morally obligated to do something about such mistreatment or suffering, both 
individually and through their political and social institutions; … that governments will 
attend to such mistreatment or suffering in other countries through international 




[N]o legal order, international or other, is true to its essential function if it fails to protect 
effectively the ultimate unit of all law – the individual human being. 
H. Lauterpacht766  
 





In most rights formulations there is a notion of rights recipients or right-holders.768 However, 
not all such right-holders may look to international law for the enforcement of their rights. For a 
right to be one which invokes an international response, I propose that the right-holder must be 
‘vulnerable’ in the sense that, as a result of physical, cultural, socio-economic or other factors, 
that right-holder is more at risk of losing her or his right than a “reasonably empowered” person 
                                                
761 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 75. 
762 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 75. It should be noted, however, that Buchanan does not conclude that all western 
values are automatically universal. Id. 
763 Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, supra notex, at 63, 72-74. 
764 Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, supra notex, at 74. 
765 HENKIN, supra note 426, at 16. 
766 LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra notex, at 78-79. 
767 Abraham Kaplan, Human Relations and Human Rights in Judaism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 53, 54 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., Greenwood Press, 1980). 
768 See for example, BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 77 (identifying the right-holder as “whoever is said to have the 
right.”). 
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falling within less vulnerable groups. For example, if an individual, in the suburbs of 
Connecticut, is robbed, his right to property has been violated. This violation, however, does is 
not an international human rights violation, even if the Connecticut police are unable to reclaim 
his car. Contrast this to the ‘land grabs’ in Zimbabwe, where war veterans have taken control of 
large tracts of lands in the possession of the white farmers. In the latter instance, the farmers’ 
property rights take on an international dimension because they are suffering as a group (white 
farmers) which is particularly vulnerable. Therefore, the state’s failure to remedy the violation of 
the property rights in Zimbabwe is an international human rights violation. In the former 
example, the Connecticut citizen is more reasonably empowered in her/his state than the white 
farmer in Zimbabwe. 
 
I divide the theories evidencing this element of vulnerability into two groups: (1) theories 
which refer to right-holders; and (2) theories which expand or explain the notion of vulnerability. 
 
4.4.2 Theoretical Source 
 
Theories Referencing Right-Holders 
 
Hobbes’ theory of rights focuses more on the individual self, rather than the plight of others. 
According to Hobbes, the fundamentality of rights exists in the essential nature of humankind as 
being belligerent, constantly on the defense against attack. The entire basis of Hobbes’s theory is 
that the individual is always prepared for aggression in order to protect itself. Hobbes, therefore, 
develops a system of governance based on the perceived or actual vulnerability of human 
beings.769 
 
At first blush a theorist such as Nozick may seem to preclude the vulnerable from his 
minimalist morality, which requires as little state involvement in private affairs as possible. 
However, his narrow carving out of core rights does not discount vulnerability; rather, it limits 
the occasions when the state is responsible for the vulnerability of individuals. In the appropriate 
circumstances, vulnerability is a key ingredient of his rights-theory, triggering the responsibility 
of the state to protect individuals because “each person is separate and ‘his is the only life he 
has.’”770 
 
Nickel’s list of elements begins with the requirement of a right-holder. Every right “identifies 
some party as its possessor or holder,” be it one or many individuals.771 Buchanan also 
emphasizes that human beings are “subjects of primary moral importance, as the ground or 
source of especially weighty obligations. The focus on the right-holder captures the common 
belief, expressed in most human rights declarations and conventions, that to recognize human 
rights is to acknowledge the inherent dignity of persons.”772  
 
                                                
769 HOBBES AND LOCKE, supra notex, at 10. 
770 Shestack, supra notex, at 95, citing NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
771 NICKEL, supra notex, at 13. 
772 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 77. 
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Ramcharan too identifies elements of human rights, which include “appurtenance to the 
human person or group… and essentiality for the protection of vulnerable groups.”773 Finally, 
Henkin recognizes that “political society must also act to protect the individual's rights against 
private invasion… For Buchanan, too, the “idea that the obligation is owed to the right-holder is 
also essential to human rights.”774 
 
Theories Expanding or Explaining Vulnerability  
 
At the core of the jurisprudence of feminism is the notion of vulnerability. Its formulation is 
intended to deconstruct the dominance of man at the expense of women. This relevance of the 
element of vulnerability in developing feminism is evident in MacKinnon’s statement that: 
 
Those who most need equal treatment will be the least similar, socially, to those whose situation 
sets the standard as against which one’s entitlement to be equally treated is measured. Doctrinally 
speaking, the deepest problems of sex inequality will not find women ‘similarly situated’ to 
men.775 
 
Rorty, however, asks the more difficult question of human rights: “Why should I care about a 
stranger, a person who is no kin to me, a person whose habits I find disgusting?”776 Rorty finds 
the answer in the notion of the: 
 
sentimental story which begins ‘Because this is what it is like to be in her situation – to be far 
from home, among strangers,’ or ‘Because her mother would grieve for her.’ Such stories, 
repeated and varied over the centuries, have induced us… to tolerate, and even to cherish, 
powerless people. 
 
The answer he proffers is in being able to identify with the vulnerable, to imagine a person’s 
suffering or pain, and wanting to prevent it. According to Rorty, an evolution of sentiment has 
taken place, allowing us to identify with the humanity and needs of others.777 Rorty, therefore, 
identifies the same phenomenon as MacKinnon, namely that perpetrators of human rights 
violations often commit such acts because they see their victims as something less than human. 
That is, they do not consider their victims to be holders of human rights. 
 
For MacKinnon, the distinguishing factor is gender: men see women as falling outside the 
scope of human rights law. For Rorty, Serbs were able to violate Muslims in the way they did 
(through internment in concentration camps, mutilation, rape and murder) because they 
“discriminate between the true humans and the pseudohumans.”778 However, in both cases, the 
victims involved are vulnerable, and suffer a deprivation of their human rights. 
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Professor Lukes suggests a scheme of human rights which echoes Rorty’s sentimentality. For 
Lukes, human rights involve “seeing persons behind their identifying (even their self-identifying) 
labels and securing them a protected space within which to live their lives from the inside, 
whether in conformity with or deviation from the life their community requires of or seeks to 
impose on them.”779 Therefore, similarly to Rawls, Lukes urges us to look to human needs 
behind the labels which ordinarily influence the allocation of resources and creation of laws. It is 
this approach of looking at needs behind labels, which evidences the element of fundamentality, 
and the corresponding need to recognize vulnerability and universality in the upholding and 
enforcement of human rights. 
 
Ramcharan also recognizes this element of vulnerability. He attributes much of the 
development of the human rights movement to “the existence of a cause for complaint, the 
voicing of claims based thereon and the resultant recognition of rights.”780 As a result, 
Ramcharan notes that the “universal movement has a duty of solidarity with those whose rights 
are not respected or are violated.”781 
 
One of the rigorous advocates of the vulnerable is Sen. Arguing against utilitarianism as a 
basis of political philosophy, Sen notes that the: 
 
utility calculus can be deeply unfair to those who are persistently deprived… the usual 
underdogs in stratified societies, perennially oppressed minorities in intolerant communities, 
traditionally precarious sharecroppers living in a world of uncertainty, routinely overworked 
sweatshop employee in exploitative economic arrangements, hopelessly subdued housewives 
in severely sexist cultures… The mental metric of pleasure or desire is just too malleable to 
be a firm guide to deprivation and disadvantage.782  
 
For Sen, the purpose of a political philosophy is the protection of the marginalized, 
victimized or vulnerable. To this end, he advocates a combination of theories, “which 
acknowledges the possibility of real conflict of interests… coexisting with a socially conditioned 
perception of harmony… that give stability to extreme inequalities in traditional societies.”783 
 
For Nussbaum, the capabilities theory is linked to the eradication of vulnerability. This is 
evident from her articulated need to determine, when assessing quality of life in a country, the 
extent to which its population has been placed in a position of mere human subsistence as 
opposed to being given the rights and freedoms necessary to reach an acceptable standard of 
living.784 
 
Sociologist, Professor Lukes, echoes the entitlement notion and maintains: 
 
that human rights presuppose a set of permanent existential facts about the human condition: that 
human beings will always face the malevolence and cruelty of others, that there will always be 
                                                
779 Lukes, supra note 474, at 29-30. 
780 Ramcharan, Universality of Human Rights, supra notex at 139. 
781 Ramcharan, Universality of Human Rights, supra notex at 139. 
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scarcity of resources, that human beings will always give priority to the interests of themselves 
and those close to them, that there will always be imperfect rationality in the pursuit of individual 
and collective aims, and that there will never be an unforced convergence in ways of life and 
conceptions of what makes it valuable. In the face of these facts, if all individuals are to be 
equally respected, they will need public protection from injury and degradation; and from 
unfairness and arbitrariness in the allocation of basic resources and in the operation of the laws 
and rules of social life.785 
 
4.5 State Accountability  
 
The purpose of the State is to safeguard the interests of the individual human being and to render 






It is a basic premise of many legal and social systems that individuals have rights and 
duties.787 Not every duty is owed by the state.788 However, where human rights are concerned, 
the duty is either owed by individuals and enforceable by the state; or owed directly by the state. 
For example, respect for human dignity is a duty with which all human beings are required to 
comply. If an individual fails to comply with this duty, the state steps in to enforce it.  
 
Rights-theories usually view the articulation, development and protection of rights from the 
point of view of a political system. Therefore, the obligation of the state vis-à-vis the individual 
is one of the more common elements of rights-theories.789 However, the role of the state is 
understood very differently by the varying theorists, who tend to approach the obligations of the 
state from one of two directions: either to limit its intervention with private life or to promote its 
involvement in improving private life. 
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Setting aside such differences in approach, a common theme of theorists is that rights are 
linked, either negatively or positively, to the state. This means simply that a human right relates 
to something which is the business of the state. Either the state is enjoined to do something for 
the individual or to refrain from doing something which will harm the individual. The fact that 
there are two sides of the coin – two opposing components of the same element – does not negate 
it as a prerequisite element of human rights. 
 
I divide the theories into three categories: (1) neutral statements about state accountability; 
(2) theories that advocate for a conservative role of the state in facilitating individual rights; and, 
(2) theories arguing for greater involvement of the state in the pursuit of human rights. Based on 
these theories, I propose that when a vulnerable individual or group is harmed, the state has a 
positive duty to take steps to help remedy that harm. As discussed later in this chapter, this 
principle is applicable directly in the case of systemic intimate violence. 
 
4.5.2 Theoretical Source 
 
The Principle  
 
Henkin identifies the state as the regulator of rights and duties.790 According to Henkin, the 
“state may arrange to satisfy my claims by maintaining domestic laws and institutions that give 
me… rights and remedies… Those legal rights and remedies within society give effect to my 
human rights claims upon society.”791 
 
Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, leading theorists of political philosophy, have taken us to 
the point of concluding that states have obligations to their citizens and each theorist, spawning a 
range of subsequent ideas, has developed theories for identifying the most pressing needs and the 
way states should operate to ensure the fulfillment of such needs.792 In determining the extent of 
a state’s responsibility to its citizens, Rawls looks to justice and famously suggests that what is 
just is that which is fair.793 For Rawls, social justice (or justice as fairness) is achieved by “the 
way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties…”794  
 
Buchanan notes that human rights have two essential elements: “a permission or liberty and a 
correlative obligation.”795 The obligation, according to Buchanan, is “especially weighty.”796 For 
Buchanan “it is misleading to think of our understanding of human rights and the attempt to 
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implement them in a legal system as entirely independent. Even if the existence and basic 
determination of human rights can be determined by moral reasoning without reference to the 
particular features of any legal system, institutionalized efforts to monitor and improve 
compliance with these rights are needed to specify their content, if they are to provide practical 
guidance and these must be context specific.”797 
 
Ramcharan is explicit in this regard and states that “[e]ach State should, on the basis of 
international human rights charters, set up an effective and appropriate national monitoring 
system comprising constitutional, legislative, judicial, administrative, teaching and information 
branches.”798 For Rawls, human rights “specify limits on the domestic institutions required of all 
peoples by that law. In this sense they specify the outer boundary of admissible domestic law of 
societies in good standing in a just society of peoples.”799 
 
Alston’s definition of human rights requires that human rights be “capable of achieving a 
very high degree of international consensus” and “compatible or at least not clearly incompatible 
with the general practice of states.”800 Furthermore, his requirement that rights be precise is 
aimed at the development of obligations, which include the obligations of the state, “not only the 
absence of restraint but ‘also the positive organization of the social and economic conditions 
within which men can participate to a maximum as active members of the community at the 
highest level permitted by the material development of the society.’”801  
 
Nickel’s list of human rights elements requires the identification of “a party or parties who 
must act to make available the freedom or benefit identified by the right’s scope.”802 Nickel 
invokes the state as one of the addressees of rights. These addressees, which include “local, state, 
national and international legal systems,” are responsible for protecting “important freedoms, 
powers, immunities, protections, opportunities and benefits.”803 
 
The Abstaining State 
 
Locke’s philosophy of law entwines the state, the individual and the deity throughout. In 
analyzing whether law is binding on men, Locke states that as far as the government is 
concerned, it is bound not to act capriciously towards its citizens. However, while all [divine] 
law must be obeyed, it is not necessary to obey “a king out of fear, because he is more powerful 
and can compel us. For this would be to establish the power of tyrants, thieves, and pirates.”804 
Locke, therefore, imports the state into his discussion of rights and the limitations on state power. 
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Nozick, whose theory is characterized by the least possible state intervention, identifies the 
role of the state as minimal, mostly abstaining, and intervening only “to protect citizens against 
force, fraud, theft, and breach of contracts, to settle disputes, and to punish violations.”805  Even 
at this minimalist level, Nozick recognizes that the state has a duty to intervene to protect its 
citizens against force. I propose that this is directly applicable when such force is exercised 
against a particularly vulnerable subset of society, and therefore requires states to take positive 
action to help remedy systemic intimate violence. 
 
The Proactive State  
 
Nussbaum, by contrast, argues expressly for positive state intervention. She proposes that 
“human capabilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed.”806 She posits the state as 
a facilitating structure, one that develops institutions to draw on the capacity of each individual 
to reach her/his potential.807 Nussbaum states the belief that: 
 
certain basic and central human endowments have a claim to be assisted in developing, and 
exert that claim on others, and especially, as Aristotle saw, on government… in thinking of 
political planning we begin from this notion, thinking of the basic capabilities of human 
beings as needs for functioning, which give rise to correlated political duties.808 
 
According to Nussbaum, therefore, “capability, not actual functioning, should be the goal of 
public policy.”809 
 
Henkin also proposes that the “rights deemed to be fundamental include not only freedoms 
which government must not invade, but also rights to what is essential for human well-being, 
which government must actively provide or promote.”810 Even in respect of the less enforceable 
socio-economic rights, Henkin reminds us that the ICESCR “uses the language of right, not 
merely of hope; of undertaking and commitment by governments, not merely of aspiration and 
goal… the language of rights is increasingly used and the sense of entitlement to such benefits is 
becoming pervasive.”811 
 
In the same vein as Nussbaum, Sen raises the standard of the state’s obligations to its citizens 
to ensure social opportunities. Social opportunities, according to Sen: 
 
refer to the arrangements that society makes for education, health care and so on, which 
influence the individual’s substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not 
only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a health life and avoiding preventable 
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morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and 
political activities.812  
 
Therefore, Sen argues for positive state action in the form of “social support, public 
regulation, or statecraft” to “enrich – rather than impoverish – human lives.”813 
 
For these reasons, I adopt the approach that states have a duty not just to refrain from directly 
violating the ‘fundamental’ and ‘universal’ rights of ‘vulnerable’ members of its society (as these 
terms are defined in this chapter), but also to take positive steps to prevent and help remedy such 
violations when faced with the knowledge thereof. When a state fails to protect this right, the 
omission triggers international law. For the purposes of this chapter, this principle is referred to 
as the notion of ‘state accountability.’  
 
5 Formulation of the Test for Determining ‘Human Rights’  
 
Against this theoretical background, I now consider whether freedom from systemic intimate 
violence is an interest that is capable of being cast as an international human right. Based on 
philosophical and legal discussions above, I propose that the test to determine whether an 
interest is a right is as follows: (1) is the interest fundamental; (2) is it universal; (3) does it 
protect the vulnerable; and, (4) is the state accountable for its violation? If the answer is 
affirmative and each of these elements is fulfilled, the interest is a human right protected in 
international law.814 However, I do not propose this as a test for determining whether an 
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objective, normally the elimination of harm or suffering. While I address each criterion within the framework of 
these three themes, I do not maintain that this is the sole manner in which one determines the international nature of 
a right. Alston himself acknowledges that this is neither a closed list of criteria nor an accurate one. The patriarchy 
of Alston’s international law regime is evident in the following extracts quoted by Alston. Alston refers to a 
UNESCO Committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights which defined a “right” as a “condition of living, 
without which in any given historical stage of a society, men cannot give the best of themselves as active members 
of the community because they are deprived of the means to fulfill themselves as human beings”. Furthermore, 
“‘Liberty’ was defined to mean not only the absence of restraint but ‘also the positive organization of the social and 
economic conditions within which men can participate to a maximum as active members of the community at the 
highest level permitted by the material development of the society’”. Much more is contained in these statements 
than mere terminology. The reference to “men” in both conceptualizations is not simply a universal term employed 
for the sake of linguistic convenience; it is a reflection of a status quo which recognized (and recognizes) men “as 
active members of the community” and the sole beneficiaries of the system of “positive organization of … social 
and economic conditions…”. This is not to say that women are helpless victims of a regime run by and for men. 
Different women in different countries enjoy varying degrees of empowerment and occupy different levels socio-
economic fulfillment. However, this project is not seeking either to reify a perception of subjugation and 
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international human right should remain a right. I offer this test merely as an instrument for 
determining whether a new claim should be acknowledged as a human right under international 
law. 
 
The four parts of the test are linked and the answer to all questions must be in the affirmative 
in order for the interest to qualify as an international human right.815 I now proceed to apply the 
test to systemic intimate violence. 
                                                                                                                                                       
victimization or to laude any particular fabricated quality of women which resists such subjugation; it merely seeks 
to consider whether the factual instances of harm inflicted upon a significant portion of the world’s population by 
virtue of its gender has been adequately described, properly understood and correctly categorized. The remaining 
factors within these descriptions can be used to interpret these themes. For example, the fundamental nature of a 
claim can be proved by showing that it is eligible for recognition in international law and that it is consistent with, 
but does not repeat, current international human rights. The global relevance of the claim can be proved by the fact it 
is capable of achieving a high degree of international consensus and that it is compatible, or not clearly 
incompatible, with the practice of States. Finally, the precision of the claim will emanate from the proof used to 
describe its fundamental and global relevance. His list is a guide of what a list of criteria “might look” like and not 
what such a list ought to look like. Alston, supra note 477, at 614. Alston’s list assumes the paradigm in which the 
Universal Declaration was born. This paradigm developed (and hence the Universal Declaration developed) because 
of the worst possible incidences of cruelty effected under and condoned on the basis of ethnic divisions. Most of our 
modern human rights discourse developed as a result of the ethnic cleansing, genocide, torture, inhumanness and 
indescribable cruelty of the Holocaust. Little in our history at all has matched the meticulous and reviled evil of 
Hitler’s regime. It is natural and correct that from this cesspool of violation should develop the iridescence of a 
human rights order. It is therefore necessary to understand the broad backdrop to and the global influences of 
international law. 
815 I do not propose this as a test for determining whether an international human right should remain a right. I offer 
this test merely as an instrument for determining whether a new claim should be acknowledged as an international 
human right.  
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Part B: Applying the Test to Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
As described in chapter two, the elements of systemic intimate violence are: (i) severe 
emotional or physical harm, or the threat thereof; (ii) a continuum of violence as opposed to a 
one-off incident; (iii) committed predominantly by men against women within an intimate 
relationship; (iv) where the victim is unable to procure traditional legal assistance due to her 
isolation, incapacitation or general vulnerability; and (v) the violence is ‘systemic’ in the sense 
that it occurs in a society in which the state in question has failed to supply the minimum 
facilities necessary to address such violence appropriately. 
 
Given these elements, I propose that systemic intimate violence satisfies the requirements of 
fundamentality, universality, vulnerability and state accountability necessary to trigger 






Systemic intimate violence is a violation of the following fundamental human rights: 
equality; physical integrity; and, dignity. While a slew of other rights is violated by systemic 
intimate violence, I make my claim on the basis of these three rights because there is little 
contention as to their fundamentality, or to the universal application thereof. 
 
I therefore propose that the nature of systemic intimate violence is such that freedom from 
such violence is an international human right requiring positive state enforcement. In the 
following discussion I demonstrate how: (1) each of the fundamental human rights to equality, 
physical integrity and dignity has been interpreted and applied in international law;816 and, (2) 
how each such right is violated by systemic intimate violence. 
 
6.2 The Right to Equality 
 
6.2.1 Meaning and Application in International Law  
 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world 
 
                                                
816 Systemic intimate violence has many of the same components as official torture, mass rape, FGC, and 
disappearances. I do not suggest that all these violations are the same; however, they share core elements which are 
constituent components of systemic intimate violence. Article 1 of the Convention against Torture defines torture as: 
“Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 
Torture Convention, supra note 5. 
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Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in … the 
equal rights of men and women 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights817 
 
Equality is a “principal theme” of international human rights and appears in several binding 
international instruments.818 The UN Charter, augmented by the UDHR, commits states to 
protect human rights on the basis of equality.819 This is confirmed expressly in the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR820 and most international instruments include a non-discrimination clause regarding 
the application and implementation of treaty provisions.821 
                                                
817 Paragraph 1 of the preamble to the UDHR, supra notex. 
818 Henkin, Human Rights in International Law, supra notex, at 42 (“The major U.N. covenants are permeated with 
the commitment to equality. Discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, and other such 
characteristics is prohibited again and again, even in times of public emergency.”). 
819 The UN Charter refers to the rights set forth in the UDHR. See U.N. Charter, supra note 508. For a discussion of 
the binding status of the UDHR, see Hannum, supra note 492, at 287. Chapter nine of the UN Charter commits the 
UN to promoting, inter alia, “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to … sex.” Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter, supra note 508. Article 2 of the UDHR, supra 
note 4: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.” Article 7 provides that “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.” This is an important provision in that it calls on 
States to act positively to protect individuals against acts of discrimination. See also article 3 of the UDHR, supra 
note 4: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” Article 4 prohibits slavery: “No one shall be 
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” Finally, article 5 
prohibits torture: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
For a discussion of the political and intellectual background to the UDHR, see the address by Oscar Schachter at the 
Pace International Law Review in 1999, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 51 (1999). 
820 ICCPR, supra notex, see: the preamble, paragraph 1: “Considering that, in accordance with the principles 
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world;” article 3: 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant;” article 14(1): “All persons shall be equal before the 
courts and tribunals;” article 14(3): “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality;” article 23(4): “States Parties to the present Covenant 
shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution;” article 25(b): protecting “universal and equal suffrage;” article 25(c): “To have 
access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country;” and, article 26: “All persons are equal before 
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.” As regards the ICESCR, supra note 13, see: the preamble, paragraph 1: “Considering that, in 
accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world;” article 3: “The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men 
and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant;” article 
7(a)(i): “Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular 
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;” 
article 7(c): “Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, 
subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence;” and, article 13(2)(c): “Higher education 
shall be made equally accessible to all.” 
821 Torture Convention, supra note 5. 
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In particular, this right to equality in international law includes the right not to be 
discriminated against on the grounds of sex. The primary examples of binding regional and 
international instruments incorporating gender equality are the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, 
CEDAW, DEVAW, the Belem Do Para and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.822 
 
Moreover, there is further evidence of gender equality as a norm of international law. The 
‘fundamental’ importance of combating gender discrimination (and gender-based violence 
specifically) was confirmed at Beijing +10 in March 2005, when the Beijing Platform for Action 
was unequivocally reaffirmed.823 The UN has endorsed the worldwide Sixteen Days of Activism 
against Gender Violence Campaign,824 emphasizing “the connections between women’s human 
rights, violence against women and women’s health, and the detrimental consequences violence 
against women has on the well-being of the world as a whole.”825 
 
A large collection of nations’ representatives demonstrated a commitment to the 
fundamentality of gender equality in the articulation of the third goal of the Millennium 
Development Goals to “promote gender equality and empower women.”826 The UN Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs has confirmed this link, indicating that gender equality is a 
prerequisite to achieving the other Millennium Development Goals.827 This lead was taken up by 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan who confirmed the connection between 
combating violence against girls and women to the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
 
6.2.2 The Violation of Equality by Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
Systemic intimate violence is colored by gender delineations. This is not to say that such 
violence does not include victims and perpetrators of both genders against both genders; 
                                                
822 Article 8 of the European Convention, supra note 74. The fundamentality of the right to gender equality is 
evident in international instruments, but less clear from the practice of nations. Both mainstream human rights 
instruments and women’s rights instruments attest to the development of a rights-based system which includes the 
right to enjoy civil and political rights, and socio-economic rights, without regard to gender. It is argued that in order 
end discrimination against women, gender in fact should be taken into account on the basis that inequalities can only 
be remedied when one acknowledges the difference in the first place. See, for example, the discussion by Jennifer L. 
Ulrich, Confronting Gender-Based Violence with International Instruments: Is a Solution to the Pandemic within 
Reach? 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 629 (arguing that various instruments in international law, when read 
together, incorporate a norm against violence against women and that positive steps need to be taken in societies to 
extricate the roots of violence against women). 
823 See The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2005 Theme Announcement for the 
Sixteen Days of Activism against Gender Violence Campaign, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/events/16_days/theme.htm [hereinafter Sixteen Days of Activism].  
824 This is an international campaign originating from the first Women’s Global Leadership Institute in 1991. Since 
1991 approximately 1700 organizations in 130 countries have participate in the campaign. See Sixteen Days of 
Activism, supra note 514.  
825 See Sixteen Days of Activism, supra note 514.  
826 The U.N. Development Goals, available at, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/#. 
827 See U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division Progress Towards the Millennium 
Development Goals 1990-2005, available at, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/goals_2005/goal_3.pdf.  
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however, both the statistics and the limited extent to which women enjoy their fundamental 
rights and freedoms evidences an indisputable intersection between violence and their gender. 
 
It is within this context that I claim that individuals have a justiciable right to be treated 
equally, and a right, enforceable against the state, to safety, not only in public, but also in 
private.828 In particular, since women suffer the most (although certainly not exclusively) from 
systemic intimate violence, and systemic intimate violence is the primary cause of injury to 
women, women constitute a group that is particularly vulnerable. 
 
While many perceive gender differentiation as normal or harmless, the perpetuation of 
separateness – as was the case with the racial system of ‘separate but equal’ – manifests in 
explicit and implicit social subjugation, limited political power and the submergence of women’s 
individual autonomy. 
 
Richard Rorty describes some of the discriminating institutions which use:  
 
simpler ways of excluding them from humanity: for example, using ‘man’ as a synonym of 
‘human being.’ As feminists have pointed out, such usages reinforce the average male’s 
thankfulness that he was not born a woman, as well as his fear of the ultimate degradation: 
feminization... [Rieff] confirms Catherine McKinnon’s claim that, for most men, being a woman 
does not count as a way of being human. Being a nonmale is the third main way of being 
nonhuman.829 
 
McDougal, Lasswell and Chen confirm that “the existence and perpetuation of distinct sex 
roles, as dictated mostly by men, have characteristically resulted in male-dominated societies in 
which women are regarded as ‘the subordinate sex,’ ‘the second sex,’ ‘the weaker sex,’ or ‘the 
Other.’”830 This perception justifies the expression of dominance by male family members over 
female family members through violence. Therefore, when women are subjected to systemic 
intimate violence, both their communities and the state perceive their experience as ranking 
lower than public violence. 
 
The result of this perception is that difference becomes discrimination and the class of 
women becomes “that of a caste.”831 This leads to a lack of “support for fundamental functions 
of a human life.”832 Women are  
 
less well nourished than men, less healthy than men, more vulnerable to physical violence 
and sexual abuse. They are much less likely than men to be literate, and still less likely have 
preprofessional or technical education. Should they attempt to enter the workplace, they face 
                                                
828 For a discussion regarding the absence of household gender inequality in law and policy making, see Okin, supra 
note 593, at 279-289. 
829 Rorty, supra note 464, at 114. 
830 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 614, citing, inter alia, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX, xvi (H. 
Parshley trans. &ed. Bantam ed. 1961). 
831 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 615-616. 
832 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 79, citing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
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greater obstacles, including intimidation from family or spouse, sex-discrimination in hiring, 
and sexual harassment in the workplace…833 
 
As McDougal, Lasswell and Chen indicate, “[s]ex, like race, offers no rational criterion for 
‘classification’ in ‘determining the legal rights of women, or of men.’834 Therefore, according to 
McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, “the most rational general community policy requires the 
complete emancipation of women, without countenancing the subordination of men.”835 
 
The separateness of men and women, therefore, has not led to equality between the two 
genders but to inequality and, in part, to a situation where one in three women worldwide is a 
victim of systemic intimate violence. Such violence is an extension of gender discrimination and 
inequality, and for that reason constitutes a breach of the fundamental right of women to be 
treated equal. On this basis, I propose that the ‘fundamentality’ element of international human 
rights is satisfied. However, there is further evidence of fundamentality in the right to physical 
integrity, which I now turn to discuss.  
 
6.3 The Right to Physical Integrity 
 
6.3.1 Meaning and Application in International Law  
 
Physical integrity is a fundamental human right. All states are required to protect the 
security of the person.836 The underlying premise is that each person has an interest in the 
maintenance of her or his physical autonomy and an essential right to be free from fear.837 This is 
reflected in international treaties, declarations, other international instruments and many nations’ 
constitutional and legal systems.838 The legitimate violation of this right takes place under very 
rare circumstances.839 For the rest, physical harm is prohibited and its perpetrators punished.840   
                                                
833 BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 79, citing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
834 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 623-624. 
835 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 625. 
836 Article 3 of the UDHR, supra note 4: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” Article 4 
prohibits slavery: “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all 
their forms.” Finally, article 5 prohibits torture: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 22 enjoins States to dedicate resources to ensuring the flourishing of 
individuals’ dignity and personality. 
837 The principles of safety and equality that are violated by domestic violence are rooted in articles 2 and 3 of the 
UDHR, supra note 4. See also Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Four Freedoms Speech,” Annual Message to Congress 
January 6, 1941, available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html (“The fourth is freedom from fear, which, 
translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough 
fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor --anywhere 
in the world… To that new order we oppose the greater conception --the moral order. A good society is able to face 
schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear. Since the beginning of our American 
history we have been engaged in change, in a perpetual, peaceful revolution, a revolution which goes on steadily, 
quietly, adjusting itself to changing conditions without the concentration camp or the quicklime in the ditch. The 
world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized society.”) 
Eleanor Roosevelt, a historic figure in constructing the UDHR, emphasized the so-called four freedoms, as 
articulated by former President Franklin D. Roosevelt. This included the freedom from fear. The freedoms became a 
fundamental value around which many of the principles of international human rights law have developed. 
838 See for example, the Torture Convention, supra note 5, and its regional equivalents; CEDAW, DEVAW and their 
regional equivalents; the ICCPR and its regional equivalents; the Banjul Charter, and more. The rights to physical 
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In order to trigger international law, physical harm must attain “a minimum level of 
severity.”841 The assessment of this minimum is both relative and objective. According to the 
European Court of Human Rights, the severity of the harm depends on all the circumstances of 
the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental 
effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.842  
 
One of the more recent specifications of the right to physical integrity is the harm caused by 
mass rape. Mass rape is characterized by the seriousness of harm, in that “it must constitute a 
breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for 
the victim.”843 The ICTY, in its consideration of acts of mass rape, adopted an objective test to 
determine whether such acts violated the international principle protecting physical autonomy. It 
held that violence should be deliberate and cause “serious mental or physical suffering or injury 
or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.”844 The ICTY concluded that “the humiliation 
to the victim must be so intense that the reasonable person would be outraged.”845 
                                                                                                                                                       
autonomy and dignity are also reflected in many nations’ constitutions, which may also constitute a form of 
evidence of customary international law. See Hannum, supra note 492, at 322. Physical integrity is an element of 
crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra notex (including in the definition 
of crimes against humanity: article 7(e) “Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; article 7(f) Torture; article 7(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; and, article 
7(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health. 
839 As far as the protection of an individual’s physical integrity is concerned, there are instances where physical or 
emotional invasive conduct is permissible. For example, punitive incarceration and violence in self defense are 
considered to be justifiable and proportionate forms of invasive conduct. There are also practices, which, while less 
mainstream, in certain regions are still viewed as acceptable inroads to an individual’s physical autonomy, for 
example, female genital cutting, widow burning and the death penalty. The death penalty is the subject of much 
debate and continues to be implemented by several countries, including China and the United States. For an analysis 
of the international trends of and attitudes towards capital punishment, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE 
STATE KILLS… THE DEATH PENALTY V. HUMAN RIGHTS (1989). The explanations used to justify these practices are 
largely rejected by international law. Therefore, it is at least possible to conclude that the violation of an individual’s 
physical integrity is permissible in international law under rare circumstances, and that systemic intimate violence is 
not such a circumstance.  
840 This is true of both common law and civil law countries. 
841 A. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 78. 
842 A. v. The United Kingdom, supra note 78. 
843 “Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 109, at paragraph 597. In determining whether the rapes in the Former 
Yugoslavia constituted a violation of international humanitarian law, the ICTY held that “rape, torture and outrages 
upon personal dignity, no doubt constituting serious violations of common Article 3, entail criminal responsibility 
under customary international law.” The tribunal held that the charges of “rape, torture and outrages upon personal 
dignity… are serious offences.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraphs 407(iii) and 408. 
844 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 502, citing Prosecutor v Delalic and Others, Case No 96-21-T, 
Judgement, 16 Nov 1998, par 543.  
845 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 504, citing Prosecutor v Aleksovski, Case No IT-95-14/1-T, 
Judgement, 25 June 1999, par 54 [hereinafter Prosecutor v Aleksovski] (“The Trial Chamber in the Aleksovski case 
also considered the question of how the existence of humiliation or degradation could be measured and concluded 
that a purely subjective assessment would be unfair to the accused because the accused’s culpability would be made 
to depend not on the gravity of the act but on the sensitivity of the victim. Therefore it was concluded that “[...] an 
objective component to the actus reus is apposite…”). 
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On this basis, I propose that the mental and physical suffering of women victims of systemic 
intimate violence is sufficiently severe that it satisfies the objective test set forth by the ICTY. 
By examining below the acts of harm inherent in systemic intimate violence, I propose that, 
objectively and relatively, systemic intimate violence reaches a ‘minimum level of severity’ and, 
therefore, is a violation of the international right to physical integrity.  
 
6.3.2 The Violation of Physical Integrity by Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
The harm caused by systemic intimate violence can be grouped into three categories: (1) 
physical or mental harm; (2) threats of harm; and, (3) the continuum of harm. Each of these three 
categories of harm have been prohibited in international law in respect of other human rights 
violations, and on this basis I propose that such harm should be prohibited in the context of 
systemic intimate violence . Where a victim experiences any of these forms of harm, a violation 
of the international right to physical integrity occurs. 
 
Acts Causing Physical or Mental Harm 
 
I discuss in detail the extreme forms of physical and psychological harm suffered as a result 
of systemic intimate violence in chapter two, and do not repeat that discussion here. However, I 
believe it suffices to say that such violence, and the intent with which it is executed, often 
mirrors accounts of other violations of victims’ right to physical integrity, such as mass rape, 
FGC, enforced disappearances and official torture.846 
                                                
846 Acts of systemic intimate violence cause “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,” and which are 
“intentionally inflicted.” There are instances where abusers are intoxicated or high when carrying out acts of abuse; 
however, in most instances the abuse is not limited to these periods of insobriety.  Moreover, the abuser is aware of 
his propensity for belligerence and aggression when inebriated and such foresight could constitute the intent element 
envisaged by the Convention against Torture. Torture Convention, supra note 5. The abuser has full emotional, 
psychological, and physical control over his victim. Isolating one’s intimate partner from family, friends, society 
and, most importantly, State authorities, is one of the key characteristics of domestic torture.  See Joyce McCarl 
Nielson ET AL., Social Isolation and Wife Abuse: A Research Report, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 49 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992) (providing a detailed discussion and analysis of isolation and 
domestic violence). The purpose of the infliction of pain differs widely and includes theories of social inferiority, 
psychology and sexism. See WHITE, supra note 135, at 20–21.  White explains that African-American men are so 
demoralized in the public world that violence against their intimate partners is sought as an outlet for suppressed 
anger and humiliation. Id. See, e.g., Fedler, supra note 179, at 250–251 & n.77.  The first two categories of 
abusers—type “A” and “B”—generally possess some fear of the law or have a social profile which they wish to 
protect.  The third, or type “C”, abuser is one who has no fear of the police or the law and as such will have no 
respect for any court order which may be made.  In such a case the victim’s only alternative is suicide or murder of 
the abuser.  Id.  See also Renata Vaselle-Augenstein & Annette Ehrlich, Male Batterers: Evidence for 
Psychopathology, in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 139 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992) 
(developing a psychological profile that is believed to be common to many batterer’s based upon the responses of 
batterer’s in psychological testing). See WALKER, supra note 127, at 71.  See also Noel A. Cazenave & Margaret A. 
Zahn, Women, Murder, and Male Domination: Police Reports of Domestic Violence in Chicago and Philadelphia, 
in INTIMATE VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 83, 85 (Emilio C. Viano ed., 1992) (arguing that the 
ultimate cause of battering is sexual inequality). Most importantly, the perpetuation of systemic intimate violence 
involves either the omission or acquiescence of public officials or persons acting in an official capacity. Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58, at 12 (“Torture, as defined in international human 
rights law, generally involves four critical elements: (a) it causes severe physical and/or mental pain, it is (b) 
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Applying the ICTY’s severity standard, it is possible to conclude that prohibited acts are 
those which constitute inhumane treatment, leading to grave consequences and include serious 
suffering or humiliation.847 The required intensity of the harm, according to the ICTY, is not a 
question of inconvenience or discomfort but rather consists of “physical and psychological abuse 
and outrages that any human being would have experienced as such.”848 
 
Moreover, this test of severity has been applied successfully in other contexts of gender-
based violence, namely, FGC. FGC qualifies as a violation of physical integrity. Notwithstanding 
the private nature of the violence, the severity triggered the attention and approbation of 
international law.849 While the process of FGC ranges in severity, in general, the removal of 
healthy bodily tissue impedes a woman’s ability to attain the highest standard of mental and 
physical health.850 
                                                                                                                                                       
intentionally inflicted, (c) for specified purposes and (d) with some form of official involvement, whether active or 
passive.”).  
847 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 503. The ICTY applied the actus reus requirement of 
inhumane treatment in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at 
paragraph 502. 
848 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 505, citing, Prosecutor v Aleksovski, supra note 527. For a 
discussion of the mens rea component relevant criminal liability, see Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at 
paragraphs 508-514. While mass rape differs from systemic intimate violence in its organized and systematic 
execution, the relevant characteristic it shares with systemic intimate violence is the extent and severity of the harm 
in question. Rape in the conflict of Bosnia-Herzegovina was “deliberate, massive and egregious.” It was used as an 
instrument of ethnic cleansing, intended to degrade and humiliate members of the victim’s ethnic group and, through 
enforced impregnation, literally dilute the ethnic gene pool of the victim’s ethnicity. See Theodor Meron, Rape as a 
Crime under International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L  L. 424, 425 (1993) [hereinafter Meron]. 
849 FGC involves severe and often irreparable harm and is a major cause of ill health for millions of women. It and 
“can result in death through severe bleeding leading to hemorrhagic shock, neurogenic shock as a result of pain and 
trauma, and severe, overwhelming infection and septicemia.” UNICEF Fact Sheet, available at, 
http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_genitalmutilation.html [hereinafter UNICEF Fact Sheet]. (“Other harmful 
effects include: failure to heal; abscess formation; cysts; excessive growth of scar tissue; urinary tract infection; 
painful sexual intercourse; increased susceptibility to HIV AIDS, hepatitis and other blood-borne diseases; 
reproductive tract infection; pelvic inflammatory diseases; infertility; painful menstruation; chronic urinary tract 
obstruction/bladder stones; urinary incontinence; obstructed labour; increased risk of bleeding and infection during 
childbirth.”) FGC and other harmful practices against women are prolific. They occur in some form in almost every 
region. FGC involves entails the cutting away of various parts of the sexual organs with the purpose of reducing the 
sexual drive of the victim. The cutting is performed by a woman, trained in the procedure but not a medical 
practitioner, and the procedure has remedial purpose or health benefits. No anesthesia is provided during the 
procedure and after care is minimal. The invasion, therefore, yields no physical benefit to the woman upon whom it 
is performed. See Catherine L. Annas, Irreversible Error: The Power and Prejudice of Female Genital Mutilation, 
12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 325, 327-332 (1996) [hereinafter Annas] (describing the various aspects of a 
woman’s dignity which are violated by the procedure.) 
850 The most minimal damage is the cutting away of the hood of the clitoris. At the other end of the spectrum is 
infibulation, which involves the complete removal of the labia minora, labia majora and the clitoris and the sowing 
together of the seams of the vagina allowing a small hole for the escape of fluids. Female genital cutting refers to the 
practice of “cutting away part or all of a girl’s external genitalia.” UNICEF Fact Sheet, supra note 537. For a 
detailed description of the various forms of FC/FGM and the health implications see FEMALE GENITAL 
MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS & POLICIES, supra note 57. Early marriage is another form of harmful practices 
against women that correlates with the substance of systemic intimate violence. “I was married when I reached the 
age of ten. At thirteen, my son was born.” Mulugoja Ashebir is 21 years old. “I was married at the age of seven. My 
husband was much older than me. He waited until I was nine years old before intercourse.” Weinishet Makonnen, 16 
years old. See http://www.unicef.org.uk/news/Presscentre/emfeature.htm. The early marriage of girls will almost 
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Also, in the case of enforced disappearances, the deflation of the victim’s humanness and 
dignity has been considered by the international community to be part of its internationalizing 
nature. The injury caused to a disappeared individual includes: her/his abduction, incarceration 
and denial of freedom without due process; severe physical harm; psychological aggression; and, 
often, death.851 On this basis, such disappearances are considered to involve a level of harm 
sufficient to satisfy the necessary threshold to constitute a breach of the victims’ international 
human right to physical integrity 
 
For these reasons, it is clear that the ‘minimum severity’ standard set forth by the ICTY has 
been applied more broadly to other types of violence. Therefore, I propose that such a test also is 
applicable in the context of systemic intimate violence.  
 
I do not raise the examples of mass rape, FGC and enforced disappearances to argue that 
these crimes are directly analogous to incidents of systemic intimate violence. However, strong 
in respect of the violation of acts of physical and psychological harm, similarities do exist. In the 
case of systemic intimate violence, individual acts of violence include battery, burning, 
electrocuting, starvation, mutilation, sleep deprivation, forced sexual encounters, poisoning, 
exposure, murder, and associated threats. In particular, as required by the test laid down by the 
ICTY, and the approaches taken in FGC and enforced disappearances, incidents of systemic 
intimate violence cause serious suffering or humiliation; physiological and physical abuse that 
would outrage any human being who experiences it; physically invasive acts which impede the 
                                                                                                                                                       
certainly mean premature pregnancy and childbearing, and is likely to lead to a lifetime of domestic and sexual 
subservience over which they have no control. Early marriage is a practice of giving away or transferring girls for 
marriage between the ages of seven to twelve years, at which time they must engage in sexual intercourse and are 
expected to start producing children. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTER, EARLY 
MARRIAGE CHILD SPOUSES, 8 (2001) available at http://www.unicef.org.uk/news/pdf%20files/digestfinal.pdf 
[hereinafter UNICEF, EARLY MARRIAGE] (“The Inter-African Committee (IAC) on Traditional Practices Affecting 
the Health of Women and Children states that early marriage is: ‘Any marriage carried out below the age of 18 
years, before the girl is physically, physiologically and psychologically ready to shoulder the responsibilities of 
marriage and childbearing.’ The Forum of Marriage echoes this position.”). This practice is prevalent amongst 
certain population groups in Asia and Africa. Early marriage is widely practiced in many parts of Ethiopia: 82% in 
Amhara, 79% in Tigray, 64% in Benishangul/Gumuz, 64% in Gambella and 46% in Afar. See 
http://www.unicef.org.uk/news/Presscentre/emfeature.htm. Early marriage compromises the health of the child 
brides. Health risks include the likelihood of operative delivery, low weight and malnutrition resulting from frequent 
pregnancies and lactation in a period of life when the young mothers are themselves still growing. Some women 
suffer permanent paralysis of parts of their body. In many instances, either the girl or the fetus will not survive the 
birth. See http://www.unicef.org.uk/news/Presscentre/emfeature.htm. In addition, pregnancy at such an early age is 
dramatically more dangerous than when a woman has completed her own development into maturity. The health 
risks are exacerbated where girls have undergone some form of FGC. Given the young age of child brides, FGC 
often takes place soon before the marriage and this is especially serious in the case of infibulation, which is designed 
to make penetration more difficult. Childbirth is particularly compromised by FC/FGM. Millions of women are 
required to resume sexual relations within two or three days after childbirth, even if there has been vaginal cutting 
during the delivery and regardless of the pain it causes. UNICEF, EARLY MARRIAGE, supra note 538, at 10. Article 
10(2) of the ICSCER, supra note 13 (“Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period 
before and after childbirth.”). 
851 Juan E. Mendez and Jose Miguel, Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation 
Experience, 13 HAMLR 507, 511 (1990) [hereinafter Mendez & Miguel, supra note 539] (“The authorities take their 
victims to secret detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and to without fear of judicial or other 
controls.”) 
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women’s ability to attain the highest standard of mental and physical health; the deflation of the 




The right to physical integrity is violated by threats of harm. The disabling effect of threats of 
violence was recognized by the ICTR, which held that sexual violence is not “limited to physical 
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even 
physical contact.”852 Moreover, it was recognized that coercion need not manifest in physical 
force but includes threats, intimidation, extortion and “other forms of duress which prey on fear 
or desperation.”853 
 
For these reasons, I propose that systemic intimate violence will breach the victims’ 
international human right to physical integrity even where the violence comprises in part an 
atmosphere of fear and threats, especially where such threats are in fact carried out. Therefore, 
severe emotional violence comprising of a combination of intense and persistent verbal abuse, 





Finally, the continuation of physical or psychological harm over a period of time has also 
been considered in international law to constitute a violation of the victims’ right to physical 
integrity. This is evident, for example, in the case of enforced disappearances.854 The period of 
                                                
852 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 109, at paragraph 688. 
853 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 109, at paragraph 688. 
854 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. res. 47/133, 47 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992). Adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/133 of 18 December 
1992 [hereinafter U.N. Declaration on Enforced Disappearances] refers to disappearances as occurring in a 
persistent manner “in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise 
deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private 
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, 
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the 
deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law.” Preamble to the U.N. 
Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 542. For a discussion of the historical development of the legal 
prohibition of enforced disappearances, see Mendez & Miguel, supra note 539, at 556-7. The Rome Statute includes 
“enforced disappearances” as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population in its definition 
of crimes against humanity. Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1)(i). It further defines enforced disappearances as 
“the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a 
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on 
the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a 
prolonged period of time.” Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(i). These definitions are mirrored in the Inter-
American Convention on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 209, which defines enforced disappearances as “the 
act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated by agents of the state or by 
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by an 
absence of information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the 
whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural 
guarantees.” 
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time involved in the detention of the disappeared is a seminal component of the crime. 855 
Trafficking is another example of a continuum of harm, involving the abduction, abuse and the 
forced transfer from one place to another. In this way, the harm manifests in a continuum and not 
only in a single act of abduction. 
 
FGC also provides a relevant example of a continuum of violence which a violation of 
physical integrity in terms of international law. The long-term impact of FGC precludes sexual 
enjoyment and normal urinary and menstrual activity for the rest of the victim’s life.856 During 
childbirth and during sexual intercourse, the closure is opened and, after the event, the procedure 
is repeated. Over a period of time, the one act of cutting can lead to a range of infections, tetanus, 
extreme blood loss, depression, loss of sexuality, infection of the internal organs and death due to 
hemorrhaging and other forms of severe infections.857 The original act of harm, therefore, is part 
of a continuum of pain.  It is this continuum which violates the right to physical integrity. 
 
The notion of a continuum is also evident in the context of mass rape.858  The ICTY 
confirmed that it was “sufficient to show that the act took place in the context of an accumulation 
                                                
855 Mendez & Miguel, supra note 539, at 552-553 (discussing disappearances as a crime “that involves multiple and 
continuous violations of rights … the effects of which are prolonged over time.”). See the European Convention, 
supra note 74. See Kurt v. Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 24276/94, Judgment of 
25 May 1998, where the European Court of Human Rights found that while the mother of the deceased, who had 
brought the application, was victim of the authorities’ complacency and her anguish and distress endured over a 
prolonged period of time, constituting ill-treatment within the scope of Article 3 of the European Convention, supra 
note 74. See also Hector Perez Salazar v. Peru, Case 10.562, Report Nº 43/97, Inter-Am. C. H. R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 771 (1997). Report Nº 43/97 Case 10.562 Hector Perez Salazar Perú February 19, 
1998, paragraph 19 [hereinafter Hector Perez Salazar v. Peru] (the disappeared individual had been disappeared for 
eight years). See also the discussion by Javier Leon Diaz Human, available at http://www.javier-leon-
diaz.com/docs/enf_disappearances.htm (“Different perspectives need to be taken into account in order to make a 
clear distinction with other similar situations as for instance an unacknowledged detention. The time element is of 
paramount importance; whereas a secret detention, lasting for a couple of hours cannot be regarded as 
'disappearance,' the unacknowledged detention of a person during a couple of weeks is clearly something else. It is 
very hard to draw the border; the time factor remains elusive.”). Finally, see UNHCHR Fact Sheet No. 6 (Rev.2), 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs6.htm#introduction [hereinafter UNHCHR Fact Sheet No. 
6] (describing the functions of the working group, which includes attending to the needs of the left-behind families, 
who may lose a breadwinner, and therefore a source of income, during the absence of the disappeared). One of the 
most important cases regarding enforced disappearances is that of Velásquez Rodríguez case, supra note 408. In this 
case the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the government of Honduras responsible for the 
disappearance of Velásquez Rodríguez, a Honduran student activist. 
856 FGC entails both physical and emotional harm, which continue over time. See Okwubanego, supra note 111, at 
169-171 (describing the consequences of FGC as death; physical trauma due to infection, inability to urinate, painful 
sexual encounters; and psychological scarring such as a sense of betrayal, anxiety, depression, social insecurity and 
fear.) Infibulation is performed on 80% of the women in Somalia. These are the numbers proffered by Waris Dirie, a 
survivor of FC/FGM who was appointed as the United Nations Population Development Fund’s special ambassador 
http://www.fgmnetwork.org/articles/Waris.htm. For a detailed description of the various forms of FC/FGM and the 
health implications see FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS & POLICIES, supra note 57. See also 
Okwubanego, supra note 111, at 162-166. 
857 See Annas, supra note 537, at 327-332. 
858 The ICTY referred to one of its previous decisions, indicating that a crime against humanity is not “one particular 
act but, instead, a course of conduct.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 415. The Tribunal cited 
Prosecutor v Tadic, Case IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Form of the Indictment, 14 Nov 1995, par 11. Therefore, an 
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of acts of violence which, individually, may vary greatly in nature and gravity.”859 Therefore, not 
every rape committed during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda had to fulfill a 
standard of extremity.860 It was the unbridled commission of rape, over an extended period of 
time and the creation of an environment of terror that distinguished mass rape from random 
instances of rape (which at the time did not constitute a violation of international law).861  
 
While these mass rape decisions focused on the continuum of violence over time of crimes 
across the whole country, rather than in the context of an individual victim suffering repeated 
acts of violence, I propose that a similar approach can be applied equally on an individual victim 
basis. That is, for the purpose of satisfying the ‘minimum severity,’ it is (to use the phraseology 
of the ICTY) sufficient to show that the act took place in the context of an accumulation of acts 
of violence which, while individually may vary greatly in nature and gravity, in aggregate are 
sufficiently severe to constitute a human rights violation.862 
 
It is clear, therefore, that international law has embraced the principles that a continuum of 
violence can constitute, in aggregate, conduct which is sufficiently severe to constitute a 
                                                                                                                                                       
attack “can be described as a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence.” Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 415. 
859 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 419. 
860 Mass rape, in order to constitute a crime against humanity, had to be widespread or systematic. I do not maintain 
that private violence is a crime against humanity; notwithstanding, however, private violence certainly is 
widespread. The fact that it does not take place during war time precludes it from designation as a war crime, but it 
places it within the same context as mass rape, since both are widespread and, in the case of private violence, there 
is a uniformity that applies worldwide. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 417. The acts affect a wide 
range of victims and the perpetrators of systemic intimate violence are not acting under color of war. But I am not 
aiming to prove that systemic intimate violence is a war crime, or even a crime against humanity. I am showing 
merely that it has the substantive components to be a violation of a human right. According to the ICTY, the 
adjective ‘widespread’ “connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of its victims.” Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 428, citing The Commentary of the International Law Commission in its Draft 
Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind. The adjective ‘systematic’ “signifies the organised nature of 
the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at 
paragraph 429. Once again, while there is a distinction between the contexts of war time rape and systemic intimate 
violence, the relevant overlapping characteristic is the perpetual nature of the harm that reveals something systemic, 
and therefore public and political, about the violence. 
861 The ICTY went further and stated that the attack must be “either ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic,’ thereby excluding 
isolated and random acts.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 427. 
862 Mass rape, in order to constitute a crime against humanity, had to be widespread or systematic. I do not maintain 
that private violence is a crime against humanity; notwithstanding, however, private violence certainly is 
widespread. The fact that it does not take place during war time precludes it from designation as a war crime, but it 
places it within the same context as mass rape, since both are widespread and, in the case of private violence, there 
is a uniformity that applies worldwide. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 417. The acts affect a wide 
range of victims and the perpetrators of systemic intimate violence are not acting under color of war. But I am not 
aiming to prove that systemic intimate violence is a war crime, or even a crime against humanity. I am showing 
merely that it has the substantive components to be a violation of a human right. According to the ICTY, the 
adjective ‘widespread’ “connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of its victims.” Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 428, citing The Commentary of the International Law Commission in its Draft 
Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind. The adjective ‘systematic’ “signifies the organised nature of 
the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at 
paragraph 429. Once again, while there is a distinction between the contexts of war time rape and systemic intimate 
violence, the relevant overlapping characteristic is the perpetual nature of the harm that reveals something systemic, 
and therefore public and political, about the violence. 
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violation of human rights. On this basis, I propose that a similar approach should apply to 
incidents of systemic intimate violence. Even where individual incidents of systemic intimate 
violence are not sufficiently severe in themselves to satisfy the ‘sufficiently severe’ standard set 
forth by the ICTY, such incidents will constitute a violation of the victim’s right to physical 
integrity where they accumulate and satisfy the severity threshold in the aggregate. 
  
6.4 The Right to Dignity 
 
6.4.1 Meaning and Application in International Law  
 
The right to dignity is the fundamental premise upon which the UDHR was created and acts 
as the root of almost all human rights norms.863 Dignity is associated with the “worth of the 
human person.”864 The right to work is framed by the right to an “existence worthy of human 
dignity;”865 the rights of an accused are founded on the principle that “[a]ll persons deprived of 
their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person;”866 and torture violates the individual’s right to dignity as much as racial discrimination 
or religious intolerance. 
 
Because human beings are “born free and equal in dignity and rights” and because they are 
“endowed with reason and conscience” our dignity requires that we “should act towards one 
                                                
863 See the Preamble to the U.N. Charter, supra note 508, which compels states “to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small.” The UDHR opens be recognizing “the inherent dignity and [ ] the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family” as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” UDHR, supra 
note 4. Article 1 of the UDHR states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Id. 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the ICCPR “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” and that “these rights 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.” Article 6 of the Banjul Charter, supra note 22, provides that 
[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition 
of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.” The preambles to the ICSCER, supra note 13 
and ICCPR recognize that all rights emanate from the inherent dignity of human beings. See Oscar Schachter, 
Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 848-849 (1983) [hereinafter Schachter, Human 
Dignity] (indicating that the principle of human dignity is found in international treaties, resolutions, and 
declarations, and in national constitutions. The value of human dignity is the foundation of international law, which 
is constructed to “uphold the inherent dignity of the individual.”). Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 
499, citing Prosecutor v Aleksovski, supra note 527, at 21-22. This is also a component of mass rape and it is similar 
to the statement about the gross violation of a woman’s integrity in the Swedish legislation. The ICTY enunciated 
the requirement that the harm “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” 
This forms part of the actus reus in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibiting inhumane treatment. 
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 498. “The Prosecutor charged outrages upon personal dignity 
under Article 3 of the Statute on the basis of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It is clearly 
established in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence that Article 3 of the Statute permits the prosecution of offences falling 
under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The specific offence of outrages upon personal dignity 
is found in common Article 3(1)(c) which prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment”. This specific offence of outrages upon personal dignity has been recognised at both Appeals 
Chamber and Trial Chamber level to constitute an offence which may be prosecuted pursuant to Article 3 of the 
Statute.” 
864 Paragraph 5 of the preamble to the UDHR, supra note 4. 
865 Article 23(2) of the UDHR, supra note 4. 
866 Article 10(1) of the ICCPR, supra notex. 
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another in a spirit of brotherhood.”867 The right to personal dignity describes something essential 
in the being, the personality and the wholeness of the individual.868 
 
Human dignity “has acquired a resonance that leads it to be invoked widely as a legal and 
moral ground for protest against degrading and abusive treatment. No other ideal seems so 
clearly accepted as a universal social good.”869 Conduct that violates this principle is “animated 
by contempt for the human dignity of another person.”870 McDougal, Lasswell and Chen note 
that “the peoples of the world, whatever their differences in cultural traditions and styles of 
justification, are today increasingly demanding the enhanced protection of all those basic rights, 
commonly characterized in empirical reference as those of human dignity…”871 
 
6.4.2 The Violation of Dignity by Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
One day Jim came home and caught Molly in the backyard talking to a neighbor woman. He 
began hitting Molly with his fists, throwing her against cabinets and appliances, knocking her 
to the floor, pulling her up, and hitting her again. He threw everything in the kitchen that was 
moveable, saying over and over, “I can’t trust you.” Then Jim dragged Molly into the living 
room and demanded that she take off all her clothes. He burned them together with her 
clothes from the closet, saying she wouldn’t be needing them if she was going to be a whore. 
He yelled and yelled at her about being outside, screaming, biting, pinching, pulling hair, 
kicking her in the legs and back. Molly held her breath and prayed it would be over soon. 
This time she thought she might die. After about an hour, Jim seemed to wear out. Molly 
pulled herself to the bathroom and tried to stop shaking. But Jim burst in and accused her of 
trying to hide something, saying this proved she had been unfaithful. He pushed her forward 
over the sink and raped her anally, pounding her head against the mirror as he did so. Molly 
started throwing up, but he continued. Then he grabbed the scissors and began shearing off 
Molly’s long dark beautiful hair, scraping her scalp with the blades, ripping out handfuls, 
shaking her violently, saying, “How do you like how you look now? No one will look at you 
now, will they? No one will ever want you now!”872 
 
Each person has a right to human dignity. This is no less true in the context of systemic 
intimate violence. I do not repeat the nature of such violence here, but propose that the nature of 
the harm, as articulated above, is such that it is disturbed deeply by the infractions of gender 
                                                
867 Article 1 of the UDHR, supra note 4. 
868 Article 22 of the UDHR requires states to secure “social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the 
free development of his personality.” UDHR, supra note 4. 
869 See Schachter, Human Dignity, supra note 556, at 848-849. 
870 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 500, citing Prosecutor v Aleksovski, supra note 527, at 56. The 
actus reus of this crime entails “an act which is animated by contempt for the human dignity of another person. The 
corollary is that the act must cause serious humiliation or degradation to the victim. It is not necessary for the act to 
directly harm the physical or mental well-being of the victim. It is enough that the act causes real and lasting 
suffering to the individual arising from the humiliation or ridicule.” However, the Tribunal in the Kunarac decision 
parts way with the Aleksovski decision, stating that it is not necessary that the humiliation be lasting. See Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 501. Acts of mass rape are outrageous violations of a person’s dignity. 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 498. This factor was one of the driving forces in the 
internationalization of mass rape and FGC. FGC and mass rape reached international proportions, in part because of 
the severity of the harm committed to individuals. 
871 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 6. 
872 Copelon, Intimate Terror, supra notex, at 119. 
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inequality and violations of physical integrity. These breaches also constitute violations of those 
victims’ overarching right to be free from human indignity. The rights to equality and personal 
integrity are founded on, and are extensions of, the right to human dignity. Therefore, violations 
of those rights must also constitute a violation of the victims’ right to human dignity. 
 
6.5 Application of Fundamentality to Systemic Intimate Violence   
 
On this basis, I propose that incidents of systemic intimate violence violate each of the 
fundamental human rights to equality, physical integrity and human dignity, thereby satisfying 
the ‘fundamentality’ element of the test for determining whether systemic intimate violence 
involves a violation of a human right enforceable in international law. The next section discusses 






In order for an ‘interest’ to be a ‘right,’ apart from being fundamental, the right in question 
must also be universal. That is, it must be “relevant, to varying degrees, throughout the world of 
diverse value systems.”873  
 
While the rights to dignity, equality and physical integrity may be described as 
fundamental, it is not clear that the prevention of systemic intimate violence and the protection of 
its victims are universal objectives in a diverse world. As described in chapter one, the behavior 
of many states suggests that the protection of women against systemic intimate violence is not a 
universal norm.  
 
Therefore, the question is: given the diverse approaches by states to violence against 
women, is the eradication of systemic intimate violence, a relevant objective in international 




7.2 The Tension 
 
The theory of universality, as described above, reveals the tension in applying ‘universal 
norms’ to a heterogeneous world. The bulk of the theory also indicates that this is the challenge 
of international human rights law: its purpose, for better or for worse, is to prescribe and 
implement a set of uniform norms for the protection of human beings.  
 
However, the waters are muddied by two historical questions: who gets to make the rules, 
and why? Given the fact that the UDHR was born out of the Holocaust and drafted by the victors 
                                                
873 Alston, supra note 477, at 614. See also HENKIN, supra note 426, at 20.International human rights law 
specifically attempts to articulate certain norms which, even if they contradict a belief system or require the 
amendment of a culture’s way of life, will be considered universal because of their so-called fundamentality. The 
question of what constitute a fundamental norm is the subject of an entirely independent yet important discussion. 
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of World War II, the document, and its values, tend to represent so-called western values. As the 
number and diversity of states within the international community grow, the universality of 
human rights increasingly is questioned.874 The tension between the current framework of human 
rights and those who resist its original formulation is known as cultural relativism. 
 
7.3 Cultural Relativism 
 
Universalists “believe that human rights do not vary in their application, regardless of the 
country or culture in which they are applied.”875 Relativists, on the other hand, “believe that the 
contents of human rights should be understood through the cultural setting in question.”876  
 
This stand off is fuelled by the fact that international human rights law protects the rights of 
both individuals and groups.877 In some regions, the status of women is framed by cultural, 
religious, political or social imperatives which may preclude the protection of women’s 
individual rights. Such societies generally are structured on the basis that women are designated 
a role for the benefit of family order, discipline or other communal imperatives. In some 
instances, even where a practice is harmful, there are those who insist on its role as an essential 
part of a communal practice, the abolition of which “will destroy the tribal system.”878 Where 
collective and individual interests do not coalesce, the debate develops into one of the thornier 
issues in international law.879       
                                                
874 Koskenniemi explains the condescension inherent in the notion of universality: “Universality still seems an 
essential part of progressive thought – but it also implies an imperial logic of identity: I will accept you, but only on 
the condition that I may think of you as I think of myself.” MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF 
NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, 515 (Cambridge U. Press, 2001) [hereinafter 
KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS]. 
875 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). 
876 Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women’s Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). 
877 Article 27 of the ICCPR provides that in states “in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” ICCPR, supra note 
4. 
878 See Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 3], citing the late president of Kenya and his view of FGC/M. See, for 
example, the discussion of role allocation based on gender in the Philippines in the 1984 CEDAW report, supra 
notex, at 10-17, paragraphs 69-124. The report shows a clear disjuncture between the terms of CEDAW as 
interpreted by the CEDAW committee member and the notion of women’s rights as interpreted by the Philippine 
government. When the Philippine representative was asked to clarify certain aspects of the country’s initial report, 
including the severe rape laws, the representative replied that “there were cultural and traditional aspects in every 
country which could not be legislated. His culture regarded both sexes not as equal but as complementary to each 
other.” In respect of the severe punishment for the rape of children and adolescents his reply was that “honour and 
family were the highest concepts of life in his culture and the honour of a husband, father or brother was affected if 
such a thing happened to a woman in the family” Id. at page 14, paragraph 100. The representative of the Philippines 
argued that the reason why no women’s liberation movement had developed in the Philippines was because “it was 
preferred that its [Philippine] women retain their femininity and gentleness because, in such a way, they had 
obtained many advantages and progress.” Id. at paragraph 105. 
879 Some maintain that cultural relativism, which balances the interests of the individual against the communal 
interests of the group, has slowed the impetus of asserting certain values as universal. The issue of cultural 
relativism came before the CEDAW committee in 1984 during Egypt’s country report. 1984 CEDAW report, supra 
notex, at page 28, paragraph 209 (“There was no reference in the report to the incidence of prostitution and rape, and 
questions were asked as to rehabilitation of victims and sanctions for those offences.”) One of the opening 
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One cannot ignore the claim of cultural preservation.880 Taking an unfiltered, pejorative view 
of cultural autonomy is dangerous, not only because the value of tradition deserves respect, but 
also because disregarding the cultural context of practices feeds a rift between non-western 
communities and the UN system, potentially alienating victims from international assistance.881  
 
The rift between traditional communities and international law should not be underestimated. 
Some communities view international law with suspicion, especially former colonies, where 
                                                                                                                                                       
comments made by the representative for Egypt related to the intersection between Shari’a law and women’s rights.  
“Islam, she stated, attached great importance to the protection of women and guaranteed their rights and 
responsibilities as daughters, sisters, mothers and wives.” 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 25, paragraph 183. 
The representative explained that “the Shari’a preceded the Convention, and it embodied many precepts which 
protected women and guaranteed their equality with men.” 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 28, paragraph 211. 
In a later extract of the report the representative explained that “Islamic law had given a prominent position to all 
women and liberated them from any form of discrimination.” 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 29, paragraph 
215. However, the representative did point out that there were a number of differences between Islamic law and the 
Convention as regards marriage (this being the only manifestation of difference between the two bodies of law). 
1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 29, paragraph 216. A similar issue arose in respect of Bangladesh. CEDAW 
committee Forty-Second Session, supra notex, at paragraphs 503-572, pages 69-76. It is interesting to note a stark 
comment made by the CEDAW Committee members regarding Islam and women: “It was suggested that the part of 
the report on Islamic law could have been more clearly presented and that there was not sufficient emphasis on the 
effect of Islam on the situation and rights of women in Bangladesh. It was considered that Islam had often been 
misinterpreted by men in their own interests and that that could be dangerous in a country with a high level of 
illiteracy such as Bangladesh; new developments in the world should force a new interpretation of Islam to be 
made.” CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 71, paragraph 517. Even where a specific 
culture does not oppose the substance of a ‘western’ right, there are “overtones of moral arrogance” which hinder 
the communication of human rights. See Pagels, supra notex, at 1, citing Abraham Sirkin. 
880 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 480, at 43 (“Just as a citizen in a liberal society must respect other 
persons’ comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines provided they are pursued in accordance with 
a reasonable political conception of justice, so a liberal society must respect other societies organized by 
comprehensive doctrines, provided their political and social institutions meet certain conditions that lead the society 
to adhere to a reasonable law of peoples.”) However, what happens when a society does not act in accordance with 
our understanding of reasonableness? This does not allow us to dismiss such society nor should it. The repercussions 
would be highly problematic if we were to simply dismiss any country that abided by different values and political 
themes. Rather, a human rights framework should apply universally, notwithstanding political differences. What can 
be extracted from Rawls’ statement is that there has to be a core minimum standard according to which governments 
treat people. If it has institutions that embody different political ideologies but retains the basic level of treatment, 
ought not that to be acceptable? Rawls does address this to some extent and suggests that certain nonliberal societies 
will respect human rights as much as liberal ones, provided it is a well-ordered society, defined by Rawls as “being 
peaceful and not expansionist; its legal system satisfies certain requisite conditions of legitimacy in the eyes of its 
own people; and, as a consequence of this, it honors basic human rights.” I am not sure that his notion of a 
nonliberal society is satisfactorily broad. However, he at least acknowledges the need to include other types of 
societies in his notion of a well-ordered state, even if we disagree on the type. 
881 See Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 4-5] (summarizing the two sides of the cultural relativism debate, and 
indicating how victims find it difficult to embrace so-called ‘universal norms’ without being disloyal to their homes, 
families and communities). The analysis from an international law perspective is whether the consequences of a way 
of life are harmful to individuals but only those individuals can assess that. See Bowman, supra note 112 (describing 
the debate regarding cultural autonomy: “Why do western women believe that they have any sort of right to speak 
with even a hint of authority on the subject of Female Genital Cutting?”). For a discussion of the tension between an 
individual’s rights and cultural autonomy see Coomaraswamy, Identity Within, supra note 269, at 494. 
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foreign intervention connotes oppression and disrespect.882 In an effort to maintain cultural 
longevity, such societies may reject international law in toto.  
 
On the other hand, opponents of culturally endorsed gender-based violence reject the claim 
of cultural preservation, arguing that there is no justification for harming an individual.883 
Renowned feminist theorist, Professor McKinnon, points out how human rights experiences are 
molded according to the male perspective, with the result that violence against women “is either 
too particular to be universal or too universal to be particular, meaning either too human to be 
female or too female to be human.”884 
 
Therefore, the universality of human rights, the notion that “how human beings are treated 
anywhere, concerns everyone, everywhere”885 needs to be balanced against the fact that for 
some, their practices, community and way of life, are linked inextricably to their own 
humanness. Finding the balance between respecting culture and ousting cruelty is at the heart of 
universality and, not surprisingly, arises in the context of systemic intimate violence. 
 
7.4 The Impact of Cultural Relativism on Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
Uniform principles regarding women’s rights need not comply with every culture in order 
to be relevant to that culture. Countries as diverse as the United States, Hungary, the Philippines, 
and Canada participate in the process (such as it is currently developing in international law) 
against systemic intimate violence and they all have widely different cultures and perceptions of 
women. The existence of alternative practices, therefore, is not incompatible with the protection 
of women from systemic intimate violence in international law.886 Diversity does not bar the 
formulation of principles that could be universally adopted within the contours of a country’s 
                                                
882 Especially in light of the fact that most international human rights as understood today emanate from western-
based thought, even though their substance inheres in the most ancient of philosophies from across the globe. Cite 
Sen. [Note: citation to follow]. The imposition of western values is strongly connotative (if not denotative) of 
colonialism, elitism, and imperialism. The fact that these values are framed in a rights discourse (rather than one of 
‘civilization’) does not disconnect them, either in perception or, at times, in substance, from the west’s dark history 
of abuse of power. It is not surprising, therefore, that ‘global’ human rights as an institution, is viewed with 
suspicion from many quarters. 
883 For a discussion of this debate see Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT. 
L. 1, 9 (2000) [hereinafter Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance]. See also John D. McCarthy, The 
Globalization of Social Movement Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: 
SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE, 243, 245 (Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter McCarthy, The Globalization of Social Movement Theory] (“Movements attempting to construct frames 
that resonate in diverse cultural settings and to promote frame bridging… confront great obstacles.”) 
884 MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, supra note 114, at 84-85: “Human rights principles are based on 
experience, but not that of women. It is not that women’s human rights have not been violated. When women are 
violated like men who are otherwise like them – when women’s arms and legs bleed when severed, when women 
are shot in pits and gassed in vans, when women’s bodies are hidden at the bottom of abandoned mines… this is not 
recorded as the history of human rights atrocities to women… When no war has been declared and still women are 
beaten by men with whom they are close, when wives disappear from supermarket parking lots, when prostitutes 
float up in rivers or turn up under piles of rags in abandoned buildings, this is overlooked entirely in the record of 
human suffering because the victims are women and it smells of sex.”  
885 HENKIN, supra note 426, at 16. 
886 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction, in WOMEN, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT A STUDY OF HUMAN 
CAPABILITIES 1, 13 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover eds., 1995). 
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specific cultural and traditional imperatives.887 Rather, even very diverse nations should view the 
interest of remedying systemic intimate violence as conforming to the ethos of the international 
legal system, the function of which is to “convert misfortune to be endured into injustice to be 
remedied.”888 
 
However, even if we accept that many states do not endorse the claim for prevention of 
systemic intimate violence directly, it is possible to show that those states oppose certain of the 
effects of systemic intimate violence, and, therefore, indirectly agree to its prevention. Systemic 
intimate violence causes damage not only to the individual but also to broader communities. The 
violence impedes economic growth, reduces human longevity, increases child mortality and, as 
the highest cause of injury to women, constitutes a significant global health problem: 
 
The immediate costs of violence are those physical and mental costs borne first by the women 
themselves.889 It has been recorded that in the UK alone, monetary costs are estimated at a 
billion pounds per year. This includes “consultation with health practitioners, prescription 
costs, costs incurred by the police and the criminal justice system, and the cost of social 
services support, re-housing, security protection, the loss in economic productivity and 
reduced income to the family. [The authors’] accounts explicitly point to the lack of co-
ordination on part of those agencies working to assist victims of violence, meaning any 
assistance or support to victims of violence is significantly compromised. It also shows that 
women are suffering routinely from the effects of violence, but that this is not dealt with in a 
systematised way, service providers duplicate efforts wasting resources and obviously 
compromising their own efficiency.”890 
 
For these reasons, I propose that, once states appreciate the real consequences and costs that 
systemic intimate violence imposes on each state, many states will be more willing to consent to, 
and take positive actions to assist, the curtailment of such violence.  
 
Moreover, in terms of assessing whether the prevention of systemic intimate violence 
satisfies the universality principle of being “relevant” to states of diverse value systems, it is 
important to realize that such universality does not require universal adoption of this principle; it 
requires only universal relevance. Even if a number of states continue to reject claims to stop 
gender discrimination and to take positive steps to help remedy systemic intimate violence, the 
                                                
887 See for example, BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 76 (“It may be difficult, and in some cases arbitrary, to say 
precisely when a change in our conception of human rights, as opposed to our views about which sorts of 
institutional arrangements would best respect them, has occurred.”).  
888 State v. Baloyi, supra note 119, at 15, paragraph 12 (basing its decision on, inter alia, DEVAW, CEDAW and 
the Banjul Charter). See, for example, Hilary Charlseworth, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International 
Law, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 44, 47 (1998): Describing Webber’s argument that “a member of one community 
might have multiple allegiances and memberships in other communities, each with its own normative discourse.” 
This acknowledges that there are instances where a person can belong to two communities – the one being the 
cultural and the other being the international. 
889 The Cost of Violence Against Women and Girls, WOMANKIND Worldwide 6 (July 2002), available at: 
http://www.fourliteracies.org/Research.htm [hereinafter The Cost of Violence against Women] (At its most severe, 
violence against women results in death – one every six days in South Africa.  Amna Hassan’s  paper (pg. 52) 
documents how harmful traditional practices can result in exceptionally severe and persistent damage to women’s 
health. Other papers testify to the litany of personal injuries resulting from violence including bruises, cuts, broken 
bones, burns, miscarriages, mobility problems and increased risk to HIV/AIDS).  
890 The Cost of Violence against Women, supra notex, at 7 and 11-19. 
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existence of such violence nevertheless will be of relevance to those states. Such violence results 
in various, broader social, economic and cultural repercussions. On this basis, I propose that the 
right to be free from systemic intimate violence satisfies the universality element of the test for 
determining whether systemic intimate violence involves a violation of a human right 
enforceable in international law.  
 
In respect of each cultural practice that conflicts with international law, be it gender 
discrimination, racism, environmental protection or forms of punishment, the value of the one 
will outweigh that of the other. In other words, a choice will have to be made. Calling for the 
liberation of women from violence, from oppression and from marginalization, is not necessarily 
the plea of the righteous to the regressive; nor is it the plea of the regressive to the righteous. 
Each call, regarding each value, each practice within each context is unique. Understanding this 
is difficult but the degree of the challenge is by no means a reason to withdraw from the analysis. 
The truth may be hard to determine and the balancing of values is precarious, but it is possible to 
do, and it is necessary.  
 
The intention behind those calling for human rights and those rejecting them should never 
be assumed; each camp has objectives that are praiseworthy and others that are pernicious. 
However, if the cultural autonomy debate continues to oscillate around the hub of gender 
equality, we need to ask why it is that to hate a black man is a prejudice, but to hate a woman is a 
custom.  
 
7.5 Application of Universality to Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
It is possible to conclude that, the universality of a right is not absolute but rather a question 
of degree.891 Notwithstanding diversity, there is sufficient evidence in the practice and theory of 
international law to support that the existence of systemic intimate violence results in broader 
social, economic and cultural repercussions thereby ensuring that the remedying of such violence 
is of universal relevance even to states that currently refuse to curb gender discrimination.892  
 
The claim to remedy such violence does not have to accord with all cultures, beliefs and 
systems. It need only be relevant to those cultures. I now turn to the requirement that the right to 
be free from systemic intimate violence involves the claims of a vulnerable subset of right-
holders. 
 




As described in chapter one, the vulnerability of women as a group is a definitional element 
of systemic intimate violence. This vulnerability is caused by a combination of: (1) traditional 
                                                
891 Id. Alston acknowledges that some belief, cultural or political systems may reject certain basic international law 
values. 
892 For a detailed analysis of the cultural relativism debate and its impact on women’s rights throughout the world 
see WOMEN, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 274, 279-289 (Martha C. Nussbaum 
and Jonathan Glover eds., 1995). 
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views about male and female roles, which justify the victims’ limited presence in the public 
world; (2) the escalation of extreme violence upon separation; (3) the nature of systemic intimate 
violence, which tends to remove the abused, and signs of the abuse, from the purview of society; 
(4) economic difficulties restraining women’s freedom; and (5) the acquiescence of communities 
to the violence.  
 
I propose that these factors result in women being ‘vulnerable’ in the sense that, due to 
gender discrimination and inequality, and the particular nature of the violence suffered, they are 
at risk of violence to a greater degree than the reasonably protected or empowered person in 
society. On this basis, the ‘vulnerability’ element of the test for determining the existence of a 
‘human right’ enforceable in international law is satisfied. 
 
8.2 Vulnerability in International Human Rights Law 
 
International human rights law generally applies to people in circumstances which render 
them vulnerable. For example, the Convention against Torture protects detainees who are subject 
to the control of the state. The Convention against Racial Discrimination protects racial 
minorities and, in the same way, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion protects religious groups from persecution.893 The same 
concept applies to children who are subject to the control of their parents and to civilians 
detained as prisoners. People who are uneducated, hungry or homeless benefit from the 
assistance of international bodies in part because their power to remedy their situation is limited. 
In all these examples, there is a particular vulnerability on the part of the right holder.  
 
A common feature of these victims of human rights violations is the difficulty such 
individuals have in negotiating the enforcement of their rights. External norms, therefore, are 
required to ensure that the rights in question are protected. By placing an obligation on the state 
or controlling entity to ensure such protection, international law attempts to reduce the 
impotency of the victims of the violation in question. This applies equally in the case of private 
relations, as is evidenced by the Child Convention.  
 
I propose that an analogous, and equally deserving, vulnerability arises in the context of 
gender discrimination. Vulnerability due to gender discrimination has been identified as a factor 
in the internationalization of certain human rights. For example, the social abjection of women is 
very much a component of mass rape. The rapes in Rwanda, Darfur and the Former Yugoslavia 
were (and are) intended to ‘spoil’ the purity of women, to offend the honor of men and to 
impregnate the victims, resulting in the birth of children of enemy ethnicity.894  
 
                                                
893 See the Convention against Racial Discrimination, supra note 3, at 47 and the Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981). See also the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. res. 47/135, annex, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 
210, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1993). 
894 All of these factors are strong incentives to remain silent about the harm, if that is at all possible. See Short, supra 
note 573. See also Russell-Brown, supra note 109. 
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Sexual discrimination is evident also in the case of FGC, which is mandated for religious or 
cultural reasons, with a view to delineating a norm of sexual appropriateness for women.895 
Generally, the objective is to control women’s sexuality as a way of ensuring both their sexual 
subservience and the family honor. The cutting is linked to a girl’s gendered identity within her 
social group and is quite independent of her personal or individual characteristics. Mostly, FGC 
is practiced on women in order to prepare them for marriage. Without the procedure, a woman 
may be deemed impure or unsuitable for marriage. Since marriage provides a livelihood for 
many women, remaining unmarried is neither economically nor socially viable. The fact that the 
procedure is a necessary precondition to marriage, confirms the role of society in enforcing the 
harm and reveals the vulnerability of girls to this harm.896 
 
These vulnerability factors can be grouped into one of two categories: (1) vulnerability due 




8.3 Vulnerability due to Sex Discrimination 
 
8.3.1 Women Are Vulnerable to Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
Women are particularly vulnerable to systemic intimate violence, thereby satisfying the 
‘vulnerability’ element of the test for determining the existence of a human ‘right’ enforceable 
under international law.  
 
                                                
895 Some maintain that the Qu’ran prescribes FGC although this is a hotly contested position. Often, women may not 
marry unless they have undergone this procedure. In addition, the closing of the vaginal opening makes a woman 
“tighter” thereby increasing the sexual enjoyment for men. 
896 The same is true of honor crimes. Other harmful practices against women are generally understood as practices 
that form part of a ritual ceremony or rite of passage. While the type of harmful practices against women may differ, 
in general they constitute the physical (and more often the sexual) control by men of women. Such practices involve 
bodily harm that has no medical or therapeutic benefit but receives social, legal and political approbation. Harmful 
practices against women are often enforced at a community level and even though a State’s government does not 
impose these practices, they are no less mandatory. The economic and political subordination of women, together 
with the government inertia in preventing such conduct, inhibits the structural and attitudinal changes necessary to 
eliminate these types of practices. So-called ‘crimes of honor’ receive lower penalties than murder committed 
without such motivation. This reinforces the perception that women, their bodies and their sexuality, belong to their 
husbands, brothers and fathers in that the dignity of a man is linked to the virginal conduct of a woman. This not 
only controls the activity of a woman, but the punishment for her failing to comply with her allotted role are 
decidedly disproportionate to the perceived anti-social behavior. OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 
123, at 15 (If a man kills a woman while surprising her in illicit intimate relations, he may be sentenced to 2-5 years 
of imprisonment, “while the standard punishment for homicide is 6-14 years.”) Both private violence and harmful 
practices against women violate an individual’s physical and psychological wellbeing. See UNICEF, EARLY 
MARRIAGE, supra note 538. Early marriage deprives a girl of her childhood. This not only affects her emotional and 
mental development, but causes serious physical setbacks. Most child brides are simply not sufficiently developed 
either physically or emotionally, to endure sexual intercourse and even less so childbirth. Early marriage inflicts 
great emotional stress as the young girl is removed from her parents’ home and transferred to the home of her 
husband and in-laws. The husband of a child bride is invariably many years her senior and generally will have little 
in common with a young girl. It is this strange and older man with whom she is required to develop an intimate 
emotional and physical relationship. 
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One of the causes of the high levels of systemic intimate violence against women is the effect 
of sex discrimination. While the reiteration of the vulnerability of women risks the reification 
thereof, it is necessary to consider how the history of segregation has endorsed gender-based 
violence today. I do so below. 
 
8.3.2 History of Gender Segregation and Vulnerability  
 
The physical and social differences between men and women, on the whole, have resulted in 
a very different quality of life for the two genders.897 It is important to acknowledge that the 
social abasement of women has been diluted. As the feminist movement, particularly in the west, 
developed and grew, women obtained greater civil liberties and individual freedoms. These 
movements were responsible for the progression from disenfranchisement and the legal 
incompetence of women, to access for women to political processes, economic fora, and public 
life in general.898 However, the residue of inequality lingers in the shadows of the home and 
work. Feminists have made strides but society has lagged behind, continuing to demarcate the 
role of women within domesticity and as a satellite to men.899  
 
The social inferiority of women has manifested itself in various communal structures. In the 
workplace, women face sexual harassment, prejudice, lower pay, harder work, and little concern 
for the duality of roles many women experience as both workers and mothers.900 Politically, 
women are striving ahead as first ladies, ministers, and cabinet members but few countries boast 
female leaders.901 Socially, women continue to be the predominant gender responsible for child 
rearing and concomitant household responsibilities, irrespective of whether such women hold 
other jobs or pursue other careers.902  
                                                
897 This is endorsed by Amartya Sen who is careful to merge both biological/physical attributes with social 
considerations when analyzing gender inequality. He states that “To assume that difference away [biological 
difference] would immediately induce some systematic errors in understanding the correspondence between the 
space of primary goods and that of freedoms to achieve.” Therefore, while certain aspects of development are 
relevant generically to men and women, others are not. Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, supra note 
118, at 264. 
898 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2127-30 
(1996) [hereinafter Siegel] (discussing the role of the women’s movement in the repudiation of the right of 
chastisement). SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 4–5. 
899 Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 11, 12 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (“The exclusion of any 
group—whether on the basis of gender, class, sexual orientation, religion, or race—involves cultural definitions of 
the members of that group as less than fully human.” Id. at 12.). 
900 Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1883 (2000) (“[U]nless we pay attention to the 
institutional contexts through which housework is valued and individual choice realized, stubborn patterns of gender 
inequality will continue to reassert themselves—including the gender-based distribution of work that is at the root of 
women’s disadvantage.” Id. at 1883.). 
901 Notable exceptions to the male domination of leadership include Margaret Thatcher of England, Mary Robinson 
of Ireland, Golda Meir of Israel, Acting Head of State, Sühbaataryn Yanjmaa of Mongolia, Acting Head of State, 
Song Qingling of China, President Maria Estella Martínez Cartas de Perón of Argentina, President Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga of Sri Lanka, and Lydia Gueiler Tejada of Bolivia.  Worldwide Guide to Women in 
Leadership, available at http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Presidents.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003). 
902 See Gwendolyn Mikell, Introduction, AFRICAN FEMINISM: THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
1 (Gwendolyn Mikell ed., 1997) [hereinafter Mikell].  The link between gender and family has minimized the 
importance of female education, particularly in developing regions.  “African women’s struggle against gender 
asymmetry and inequality is often described in terms of the relationship between public and private spheres, or what 
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The correlation between violence and sex-discrimination is widely acknowledged and is 
“predicated upon economic dependency, acculturation to sex roles, and legal and political 
inequality.”903 Therefore, the inheritance of gender discrimination is a key reason for the 
vulnerability of women and explains why women suffer systemic intimate violence 
disproportionately to men.904  Sex-discrimination, at some point and in some way, has infiltrated, 
affected and, at times, corrupted many national laws vis-à-vis women.905 The discrimination that 
segregates men and women also distinguishes between their respective needs, with the result that 
certain forms of violence are more readily addressed by laws than others.  
 
8.3.3 General Effects of Gender Segregation and Vulnerability  
 
According to Sen it is “in the continued inequality in the division of food – and (perhaps 
even more) that of health care – that gender inequality manifests itself most blatantly and 
persistently in poor societies with strong anti-female bias.”906 This view is echoed by other 
theorists. McDougal, Lasswell and Chen refer to many manifestations of discrimination against 
women, including disproportionate wealth, noting that “[s]ex bias takes a greater economic toll 
                                                                                                                                                       
we may call the “domestic versus public” distinctions in gender roles in Africa. Female subordination, often 
implemented through this domestic-public dichotomy, tends to be linked with sex roles and relationships in most 
parts of the world . . . [and] were exaggerated by colonial, Western, and hegemonic contacts.” Id. at 3.  For an 
examination of the intersection between the inferior treatment of women in society and the greater degree of 
exposure to violence for such women, see also Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private Distinction in International 
Human Rights Law, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 126, 133-4 (Julie 
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) [hereinafter Sullivan]. 
903 Resnik, supra note 159, at 658.  See also UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra 
note 65, at 7–8. In reality, women remain second class citizens in many communities.  This disparity is manifested 
into extreme and often sanctioned physical violence.  See generally Peters & Wolper, supra note 620.  See STANLEY 
G. FRENCH, WANDA TEAYS & LAURA M. PURDY, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 1–2 
(1998) (“Women are the victims of widespread personal and systemic violence . . . .   The sweep of violence—overt 
or subtle—is striking: common in North America and elsewhere are sexual assault and rape, wife battering, sexual 
harassment, prostitution, sadistic pornography, and sexual exploitation by medical personnel.  Cultures beyond these 
shores add their own forms of violence such as dowry death and female genital mutilation . . . .   [Violence against 
women] knows neither racial nor ethnic limitations—only cultural variations, such as female genital mutilation or 
dowry burnings.” Id.).  See also Resnik, supra note 159, at 641 (recognizing that legal change is required to “achieve 
a categorical shift of women from dependent householders to physically secure equal citizens”).  See generally 
CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61. Over 95% of reported spousal abuse cases involve men attacking women. 
Mason, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic Violence, supra notex, at 640 footnote 117. See also Jo Dixon, The 
Nexus of Sex, Spousal Violence, and the State, 29 LAW & SOC. REV. 359, 367 (1995) [hereinafter Dixon]. This is 
especially true of post-conflict or transitional regions with high levels of crime and desensitization to violence in 
general. In such societies, women “are disproportionately likely to be victims of that violence.” See SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW COMMISSION RESEARCH PAPER ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 245, at para. 1.2. See also UNICEF, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 65, at 8. 
904 In order for systemic intimate violence to fulfill this component, it is necessary to accept that it is a manifestation 
of gender discrimination. If this assumption is incorrect and there is no particular group which is affected by this 
harm, it is less likely that systemic intimate violence will constitute an international human rights violation. This is 
so because it is necessary to create a narrow recognition rule for human rights. If the next is cast too widely, the test 
becomes nugatory because almost all claims could be admissible into the human rights framework. 
905 See, e.g., Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper, Introduction, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) [hereinafter Peters & Wolper] (“While men 
may care about reproductive freedom, their lives are not actually threatened by its absence . . . . ” Id. at 2.). 
906 SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 470, at 194.  
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than racial bias.”907 Okin also describes the economic costs of systemic intimate violence, 
demonstrating that the “power differential extends beyond the abuse and overwork of women to 
deprivation in terms of feeding, healthcare, and education of female children.”908 
 
This view is expressed by several theorists. Nussbaum explains that if “women are held to be 
bearers of a different ‘nature’ from unmarked ‘human nature,’ or whether they are simply said to 
be degenerate and substandard exemplars of the same ‘nature,’ the result is usually the same: a 
judgment of female inferiority, which can then be used to justify and stabilize oppression.”909 
Sen also describes how “inequality between men and women afflicts – and sometimes 
prematurely ends – the lives of millions of women, and, in different ways, severely restricts the 
substantive freedoms that women enjoy.”910  
 
Okin maintains that the “devaluation of women’s work, as well as their lesser physical 
strength and economic dependence upon men, in turn allows them to be subject to physical, 
sexual and/or psychological abuse by their husbands or other male partners”911 McDougal, 
Lasswell and Chen point out that the most distinguishing feature of sex-discrimination is “the 
prevalence of double standards. What is permissible for men is often made impermissible for 
women… The cumulative impact of the various deprivations… further handicap women’s 
capabilities to participate effectively and responsibly in the social process and fosters what is 
called the ‘syndrome of social marginality,’ such as ‘withdrawal, submission, inferiority, 
passivity.”912 
 
Therefore, while the social, political and economic equality and equivalency of women has 
been achieved to varying degrees throughout the world, true choice regarding personal priorities 
and life ambition, unfettered equality, and de-gendered expectations remain an objective and not 
an achievement, thus perpetuating the social and legal abjection, and vulnerability, of women.913 
 
8.4 Vulnerability Due To Intimacy 
 
8.4.1 Application of Vulnerability to Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
The above sections explain why, given gender discrimination and gender inequality in 
society generally, women constitute a vulnerable subset of society. The following section 
discusses why victims of systemic intimate violence in particular face even greater disadvantages 
                                                
907 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 619, citing PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE 18 (1970). 
908 Okin, supra note 593, at 284. 
909 Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, in WOMEN, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT A STUDY OF HUMAN 
CAPABILITIES 62, 62 (Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Human 
Capabilities]. 
910 SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 470, at 15.  
911 Okin, supra note 593, at 284. 
912 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 623. 
913 CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61, at 279.  “Moreover, women victims of violence in general, and of 
domestic violence in particular, are still reported to face hostility when dealing with the police as well as 
discriminatory and sexist assumptions when dealing with the judicial system.”  Id.  See generally SUSAN FALUDI, 
BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN ix-xxiii (1991). 
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because the privacy of their home, and the nature of the violence itself, often prevent them from 
accessing outside assistance even where such assistance is available. 
 
In the case of systemic intimate violence, even if the violence is visibly severe (either 
initially or after a series of more subtle incidents of harm), the abused victim may still not 
recognize the abnormality of the abusive behavior. The abuser may convince her that the 
violence is somehow acceptable or not serious. She also may believe her abuser’s accusations 
that she is responsible for the violence and that it is perhaps proportionate to whatever conduct 
allegedly triggered the act of aggression. Perhaps most obviously, no-one readily believes that an 
intimate relationship, which connotes warmth, support and love, could be the context in which 
such violence takes place. 
 
The nature of systemic intimate violence also often involves the enforced physical isolation 
and effective imprisonment of victims. Given the degree of violence and the isolating effect of 
the action conducted within the realm of intimacy, the vulnerability of the victims of systemic 
intimate violence is acute.914 The literal removal of the abused from her community and her 
isolating imprisonment are disquietingly synonymous with the structure of torture and 
disappearances, which use isolation both to mask the ferine effects of their execution and as a 
psychological force against the victims. Even where an abuser allows his victim to leave their 
home, the victim often is sufficiently scared of subsequent violence, whether as a result of direct 
or implied threats of violence against that victim, her children, companion animals, personal 
property or otherwise, that she feels unable to access outside help.  
 
For these reasons, victims of systemic intimate violence constitute a particularly vulnerable 
subset of society. Victims of other social crimes such as isolated and random incidents of 
common assault are better able comparatively to access state laws, infrastructures and resources 
to help remedy the effects of such crimes. For these reasons, international law excuses itself and 
leaves the prevention of such crimes to domestic criminal legislation. By stark contrast, however, 
victims of systemic intimate violence (1) due to social gender discrimination and inequality are 
at greater risk of violence and (2) in the face of such violence, are unable relatively to obtain 
such outside assistance.  
 
Therefore, I propose that the ‘vulnerability’ element of the test to determine the existence of 
an international ‘human right’ is satisfied. International law can, and should, intervene to protect 
victims of systemic intimate violence. Moreover, as discussed below, such intervention in private 
contexts is not unprecedented. International law already intervenes to prevent a number of forms 
of private, intimate violence. 
 
8.4.2 Examples of International Law Regulating Private Relationships  
 
While international law originally governed state conduct exclusively, it has extended to 
individuals (the theory of which I discuss in chapter four below). Therefore, there are a number 
                                                
914 The victim of systemic intimate violence, as in cases of official torture, mass rape, FGC, and disappearances, is 
subject to the complete control of the abuser and is either physically unable to escape or is imprisoned by the threat 
of harm to her or third parties. In this way, “marital control, physical abuse and the lack of social support interact to 
maintain women in abusive relationships.” Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1605. 
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of private contexts which form the subject-matter of international law. The most obvious 
example of a private relationship regulated by international law is that between the child and 
her/his parents or caregivers. This relationship was triggered by the procedure of FGC.915 In most 
incidents, FGC is performed upon young girls who are not old enough to consent to the 
procedure. The cutting takes place within a family structure where the exercise of parental 
control over the child impedes the child from accessing state resources, to the extent that such 
exist. This structure is endorsed by social and cultural imperatives, which afford profound 
respect to the family unit.916 The fact that the cutting occurs in an intimate context complicates 
the victim’s perception of the harm.  
 
A similar set of difficulties exists in respect of mass rape. The ICTR, in identifying rape as a 
crime against humanity, compared the purpose of rape to that of torture as intimidation, 
                                                
915 The social construction was a factor which led to the internationalization of FGC. FGC is a manifestation of a 
series of acts of harm known as harmful practices against women. See G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GOAR, 56th Sess., at 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/128 (2002). In September 1997 a legal symposium was organized for legislators and legal 
experts in collaboration with the then Organization of African Unity (the OAU) and its African Center for Women. 
The symposium resulted in the Addis Ababa Declaration, followed by the OAU convention in 1999. In February 
2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled Traditional or Customary Practices 
Affecting the Health of Women or Girls. See G.A. Res. 133, U.N. GOAR, 54th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/54/598 
(2000). In April 2000, as a meeting with the African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights, Women, Gender 
and Development Division, Legal Division and Political Department of the OAU, the Draft African Charter Protocol 
on the Rights of Women was adopted, Draft African Charter Protocol on the Rights of Women, supra note 87. This 
culminated in the adoption of the African Charter Protocol on the Rights of Women in July 2003. See Draft Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, as adopted by the meeting 
of government experts in Addis Ababa November 16, 2001, CAB/LEG/66.6/ REV.1 available at 
http://www.wcwonline.org/pdf/p-wact.pdf or 
http://www.hrea.org/erc/Library/display.php?doc_id=806&category_id=31&category_type=3 [hereinafter Draft 
Harmful Practices Protocol]. The concept of Harmful Practices against Women has many different labels. Some 
international and regional instruments and reports refer to these practices as Harmful Traditional or Customary 
Practices while others refer to them simply has Harmful Practices. I have adopted the term, ‘harmful practices 
against women’ on the basis that some of these practices are not necessarily components of a particular culture or 
tradition but nonetheless receive social and legal sanction. Draft African Charter Protocol on the Rights of Women, 
supra note 87, defines harmful practices as “all behavior, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the 
fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life, health, and physical integrity.” See article 1(e) of 
Draft Harmful Practices Protocol, supra note 642. The 1997 United Nations General Assembly draft resolution on 
Traditional or Customary Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Girls provides a tentative definition of 
harmful practices against women. It suggests that while Harmful Practices against Women arises out of the concept 
of FGC, it has come to include a broad range of harm conducted against women. See Draft Resolution on Traditional 
or Customary Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Girls, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/52/L.21 (1997) available at 
http://www.undp.org/missions/netherlands/harmreso.htm. While the term “Female Genital Mutilation” is the term 
most commonly used by advocates of women’s rights and health who wish to emphasize the damage caused by the 
procedure, it can be offensive to women in communities in which the practice is prevalent. Out of respect and 
sensitivity, many organizations have opted to use local terminology or more neutral terms such as “female 
circumcision” or “female genital cutting.” In recognition of these two approaches, CRR uses the dual term, 
FC/FGM. 
916 See Okwubanego, supra note 111, at 160-161 (describing the social structure in which FGC takes place, 
including how “a girl must be circumcised before she is socially accepted as a member of her ethnic group, free to 
enjoy all the benefits of membership, including marriage, through which her father extracts a very handsome bride 
price.”). See also Alexi Nicole Wood, A Cultural Rite of Passage or a Form of Torture: Female Genital Mutilation 
From an International Law Perspective, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 347, 374-376 (2001) (“The international 
community has tended to relegate sexual abuse to the ‘private’ or ‘domestic’ sphere, over which it has no 
jurisdiction.”) 
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degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person in a most 
intimate and personal context.917 In a sense, the act of sex intrinsically is private. Therefore, in 
order to distinguish the mass rapes from other forms of “isolated or random acts” of violence 
which fall outside the ambit of international law, the ICTR reconsidered the intimate nature of 
the sexual act. It divorced the traditional intimacy of the act from the public context in which it 
was taking place and viewed the mass rapes as constituting acts of violence against a sufficiently 
‘vulnerable’ subset of society.918  
 
The same adjustment of the perception of violence in a relationship is required. Clearly, the 
context of war is a public one, which is different from the private nature of systemic intimate 
violence. However, the objective of creating a context is to exclude “isolated or random acts” 
from the scope of the applicable provision of international law and to change the way in which 
we see the harm.919 
 
I propose that the approach of international law to FGC and mass rape is equally applicable 
to incidents of systemic intimate violence. All three examples involve acts of violence which, at 
a base level, are private or occur in an intimate context. However, as with these other crimes, 
acts of systemic intimate violence are not “isolated and random.” They are acts of violence 
committed against a subset of society who are particularly vulnerable, and their perpetuation 
occurs because of the groups’ vulnerability. Due to social gender discrimination and inequality, 
and the nature of the particular violence suffered, those women are at a greater risk of violence 
than the person belonging to the potent segments of society. 
 
In the case of systemic intimate violence where, even if the violence is visibly severe (either 
initially or after a series of more subtle incidents of harm) the abused may still not recognize the 
abnormality of the abusive behavior. The abuser may convince her that the violence is somehow 
acceptable or not serious. She also may believe her abuser’s accusations that she is responsible 
for the violence and that it is perhaps proportionate to whatever conduct allegedly triggered the 
act of aggression. Perhaps most obviously, no-one readily believes that an intimate relationship, 
which connotes warmth, support and love, could be the context in which such violence takes 
place. 
 
Given the degree of violence and the isolating effect of the action conducted within the realm 
of intimacy, the vulnerability of the victims of systemic intimate violence is acute.920 The literal 
removal of the abused from her community and her isolating imprisonment are disquietingly 
                                                
917 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 109, at paragraphs 596-598. The ICTR stated that “the central elements of the 
crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts… The Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific acts in its 
definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual frame work of state sanctioned violence. This approach is 
more useful in international law.” Paragraphs 596-598. Moreover, mass rape occurs within the particular context of 
an armed conflict. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 420-421. 
918 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 422. 
919 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2, at paragraph 422. 
920 The victim of systemic intimate violence, as in cases of official torture, mass rape, FGC, and disappearances, is 
subject to the complete control of the abuser and is either physically unable to escape or is imprisoned by the threat 
of harm to her or third parties. In this way, “marital control, physical abuse and the lack of social support interact to 
maintain women in abusive relationships.” Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1605. 
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synonymous with the structure of torture and disappearances, which use isolation both to mask 
the ferine effects of their execution and as a psychological force against the victims. It is 
arguable that within a domestic setting, the abused is attacked in isolation, much as a prisoner is 
tortured behind official doors. 
 
9 State Accountability 
 
No country has come close to achieving gender equality,  
but even those that have achieved relative equality still  
experience violence against women.921 
 
9.1 The International Obligation of States to Protect Citizens 
 
Under what circumstances does international law intervene to augment a state’s local laws? 
There generally are three circumstances where international law will intervene to address a 
state’s failure to address human rights violations: first, where the violation consists of conduct 
which crosses states’ borders, making it impossible for one state to address the harm without the 
cooperation of another; second, where the violation consists of conduct that, while contained 
within domestic borders, has externalities which spill over or have the potential to spill over into 
other countries, thereby making it impossible for the state to address the harm; and, third, where 
the violation consists of conduct that does not cross boundaries but which, for social or political 
reasons, is not regulated (or not adequately regulated) by domestic laws.922 
 
The common theme is that international law intervenes when, for one of these three reasons, 
the state is unable or unwilling to regulate the harm in question. Systemic intimate violence falls 
into the last category.923  
                                                
921 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL 
JUSTICE 77 (2006). 
922 This was not always the role of international law. For a brief synopsis of the development of international human 
rights, see HENKIN, supra note 426, at 16. Originally, the international community was concerned only with the 
conduct of states vis-à-vis other states. The conduct of the state towards its own citizens was unregulated. HENKIN, 
supra note 426, at 14-15 (“…concern for individual welfare was framed and confined within the state system. That 
concern could not spill over state borders  except in ways and by means that were consistent with the assumptions of 
that system, that is, when a state identified with inhabitants of other states on recognized grounds, and that 
identification threatened international order; when the condition of individuals inside a country impinged on the 
economic interests of other countries.” Id. at 15). Human trafficking is an example of prohibited conduct which 
crosses borders. International law will intervene in cases of torture but not homicide. Both torture and murder 
exceed a threshold of violence which is rejected by society and, therefore, criminalized. However, torture, as 
opposed to murder, is internationalized because domestic laws are inadequate or inappropriate to address the harm, 
usually because torture is perpetrated by the government, the very entity that ought to prohibit it. In the case of 
murder, though, all things being equal, the criminal justice system will respond, prosecute and punish. Moreover, the 
poor prosecution of homicide does not necessarily trigger the provisions of international law whereas in the case of 
official torture, the system itself is, by definition, incapable of redress and the international community steps in to 
fill the void. However, if there is a spate of murders where the victims all share an identifiable group characteristic, 
and the State fails to take meaningful steps to address such murders, that would change the nature of the homicide 
from a purely national issue to one that triggers international attention. 
923 The first two categories do not apply since systemic intimate violence and its externalities cannot be said to 
transcend the borders of a particular country. Therefore, while systemic intimate violence may have externalities 
which lead to global problems, it more naturally falls within the third category of regulation, namely, harm which 
 208 
 
On the basis of the principles of state accountability discussed in Part A of this chapter, when 
the fundamental and universal rights of a vulnerable individual or group are violated, states have 
a duty to take positive steps to prevent and help remedy such violations when faced with the 
knowledge of such violations. That is, states do not merely have a duty not to cause such 
violations directly. They must also, when charged with knowledge of such violations, positively 
act to help protect the rights of its citizens.924 When a state fails to satisfy that duty, the right in 
question becomes one which is enforceable in international law. 
 
This proposition is supported by the actions of states historically. As described in chapter 
four, the duty of states to take positive steps to protect citizens’ rights originated when, as the 
first incursion into national sovereignty, states were held responsible for the way in which they 
treated citizens of other countries. If a state failed to protect a foreign national living in its 
territory, it was responsible for a denial of justice. The state would be compelled in international 
law to remedy this deficiency.925  
 
Increasingly, the international community became concerned with whether governments 
protect their citizens from harm perpetrated by fellow citizens. For example, in 1969, the U.N. 
adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
which prohibits states from prejudicial conduct, and also requires states to “prohibit and bring to 
an end… racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.”926 In 1989, the Children’s 
Convention was adopted, in terms of which governments undertook “to ensure the child such 
protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and 
duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or 
her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.”927  
 
For these reasons, I propose that a state has a duty to take positive steps to enforce the rights 
of individual citizens when that state has knowledge that such rights are being violated. In the 
context of systemic intimate violence, however, I propose that states, almost categorically, have 
failed to satisfy this duty.  
 
As discussed below, there is strong evidence that systemic intimate violence is a worldwide 
phenomenon, affecting women in every country.928 This evidence arguably is known to states, 
through state actors such as the police, social workers and public hospitals, or through the 
                                                                                                                                                       
does not cross borders or affect other countries but which nonetheless triggers the provisions of international human 
rights law due to deficient state attention. 
924 HENKIN, supra note 426, at 44 (“State boundaries… are not definitive for human rights purposes. State 
boundaries do not define the moral obligations and rights that underlie human rights.”). 
925 [Note: Discussion to be expanded] [Note: Use the case law that has come before the European Court of 
Human Rights on the lack of lack of an effective remedy because the proceedings, either civil or criminal or 
constitutional, are too lengthy. See http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/6FF7A3DB-D885-41A4-9E4C-
88DDF7F22C8C/0/MicrosoftWordSUBJECT_MATTER_2004.pdf. See particularly case no. 44 in the table: 
Sorrentino Prota v. Italy (Nº 40465/98) 29 January 2004 [Section I], which deals with a prolonged non-
enforcement of an eviction order.] 
926 Article 2(d) of the Convention against Racial Discrimination, supra note 3. 
927 Article 3(2) of the Children’s Convention, supra note 7. 
928 The U.N. states that “between 20 and 50 per cent of women have experienced physical violence at the hands of 
an intimate partner or family member.” UNICEF, EARLY MARRIAGE, supra note 538, at 3. 
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reporting of non-governmental organizations. The lack of knowledge, therefore, cannot be a bar 
to the duty to protect.  
 
This section of the thesis discusses why the social gender discrimination and inequality 
affecting female victims of systemic intimate violence generally has resulted in inaction and 
apathy on the part of states to take positive steps to help remedy such violence.  States have 
failed to enact the anti-domestic violence legislation appropriate to address systemic intimate 
violence, and where such legislation exists, have failed to provide sufficient resources and 
infrastructure to enforce that legislation and help remedy such violence. For these reasons, I 
propose that the ‘state accountability’ element of the test to determine the existence of an 
internationally protected human right is satisfied. 
 
9.2 The Failure of the State to Protect Victims of Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
As discussed above, there is evidence that systemic intimate violence is a worldwide 
phenomenon, affecting women in every country.929 Almost every state, however, fails to protect 
victims of systemic intimate violence effectively.930 Many legal systems fail to punish the 
perpetrators or assist the victims.931 This alienates victims of systemic intimate violence from the 
                                                
929 The U.N. states that “between 20 and 50 per cent of women have experienced physical violence at the hands of 
an intimate partner or family member.” UNICEF, EARLY MARRIAGE, supra note 538, at 3. 
930 See UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 65, at 3 (“The global dimensions of 
this violence are alarming, as highlighted by studies on its incidence and prevalence. No society can claim to be free 
of such violence, the only variation is in the patterns and trends that exist in countries and regions... domestic 
violence [is] the most prevalent yet relatively hidden and ignored form of violence against women and girls.”). The 
report describes the magnitude of physical violence and cites data confirming “the prevalence of physical violence 
in all parts of the globe, including the estimates of 20 to 50 per cent of women from country to country who have 
experienced domestic violence. Statistics are grim no matter where in the world one looks.” page 4. See also 
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra notex, at 44 (“arguing that the failure to respond to violence against 
women in the home is not a passive act but an “affirmative political decision that has serious public 
consequences.”). 
931 See the United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the twenty-third special session of the 
General Assembly, General Assembly Official Records Twenty-third special session Supplement No. 3 (A/S-
23/10/Rev.1), 2000, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/as2310rev1.pdf, paragraph 14 
(“Women continue to be victims of various forms of violence. Inadequate understanding of the root causes of all 
forms of violence against women and girls hinders efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls. There is a 
lack of comprehensive programmes dealing with the perpetrators, including programmes, where appropriate, which 
would enable them to solve problems without violence. Inadequate data on violence further impedes informed 
policymaking and analysis. Sociocultural attitudes which are discriminatory and economic inequalities reinforce 
women’s subordinate place in society. This makes women and girls vulnerable to many forms of violence, such as 
physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering… In many countries, a 
coordinated multidisciplinary approach to responding to violence which includes the health system, workplaces, the 
media, the education system, as well as the justice system, is still limited. Domestic violence, including sexual 
violence in marriage, is still treated as a private matter in some countries. Insufficient awareness of the consequences 
of domestic violence, how to prevent it and the rights of victims still exists. Although improving, the legal and 
legislative measures, especially in the criminal justice area, to eliminate different forms of violence against women 
and children, including domestic violence … are weak in many countries. Prevention strategies also remain 
fragmented and reactive and there is a lack of programmes on these issues.”). There are cases, however, where no 
legal system can prevent domestic violence. Fedler discusses the situation where the law can provide no remedy for 
a victim. Fedler categorizes abusers according to three types. The first two abusers generally possess some fear of 
the law or have a social profile which they wish to protect. The type C abuser is one who has no fear of the police or 
the law and as such will have no respect for any court order which may be made. In such a case the victim’s only 
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law, and the law from such victims.932 This deficiency is due to two factors. The first is a 
misunderstanding of domestic violence and the dangers that privacy presents for women. The 
second is a lack of infrastructural support, which hinders the implementation of many nations’ 
domestic violence laws.933 
 
Sex-discrimination, at some point and in some way, has infiltrated, affected and, at times, 
corrupted many national laws vis-à-vis women.934 The discrimination that segregates men and 
women also distinguishes between their respective needs, with the result that certain forms of 
violence are more readily addressed by national laws than others. In many cases, with uniform 
similarity, effective remedies against systemic intimate violence are absent from such domestic 
laws. 
 
9.3 International Law and Private Relationships  
 
To effect the amplification of women’s rights in international law, one must reconcile the 
intuitive disjuncture between the extremely private nature of systemic intimate violence, and the 
distant and decidedly public nature of international law. This is difficult since, unlike ‘classic’ 
human rights violations, the perpetrators of systemic intimate violence are private individuals 
who act independently of the state. However, systemic intimate violence is sustained by a social 
structure that is larger than the individuals involved in each case.935 This structure inheres in the 
state’s failure to alleviate the invasions that occur in the protected ‘privacy’ of domesticity and 
intimate relationships.936 This will be discussed in greater detail below.937 
 
9.4 Exclusion of Law from Private Relationships  
 
Often national laws are neither the result, nor the reflection, of universal needs; they are the 
result, and reflection, of a culture, an order, a way of life.938 An adherence to law in its current 
                                                                                                                                                       
alternative is suicide. Fedler, supra note 179, at 234 and 251. In almost all countries, at each stage of the legal 
process women encounter impediments to their call for protection. SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 92 (“Yet, on the 
level of practice, it is questionable which remedies, if any, are likely to provide real protection for those women who 
are abused . . . .”). 
932 Fedler, supra note 179, at 251.  Notwithstanding the new legislation in South Africa, domestic violence continues 
rampant.  There appears to be a tragic “reality that disconcertingly elucidates the truth about domestic violence: that 
the [current domestic] law does not, cannot, prevent it.”  Id. 
933 In some countries, the official structures are conducive to or supportive of violence as a means of subduing 
female family members. Laura S. Adams, Beyond Gender: State Failure to Protect Domestic Violence Victims as a 
Basis for Granting Refugee Status, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 240 (2002). 
934 See, e.g., Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper, Introduction, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) [hereinafter Peters & Wolper] (“While men 
may care about reproductive freedom, their lives are not actually threatened by its absence . . . . ” Id. at 2.). 
935 See CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61. 
936 Therefore, “one can argue that a state’s passive attitude or even tolerance regarding human rights violations by 
private actors can be considered as ‘consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.’” CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61, at 10. See article 2(2) of CEDAW, supra note 21, stating inter 
alia, that States undertake to advance equality and the protection of women and “to take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise.”  
937 See the discussion of state accountability as a component of human rights. 
938 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2003) (demonstrating that race as a social 
factor, “colors law, crime, and community.  It shadows the performance of public and private roles.  It shades the 
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form may constitute “our deepest political myth,”939 which allows us to ignore the “‘invisible’ 
pattern of order in law,”940 a pattern that facilitates a discord between legal and actual redress for 
many harmed women. This “pattern of order” is historically hierarchical, placing the empowered 
in positions to retain power and the disempowered in a correspondingly weak position. 
According to Professor Kahn, when embarking on an analysis of legal doctrine, it is necessary to 
“examin[e] . . . the rule of law as an expression of our political culture.”941   
 
In the case of law and gender, the distinction between the public and the private sphere 
historically has correlated with the role differentiation between genders—the public sphere being 
male dominated; the private sphere allocated to women.942 Although gender differentiation may 
be denied in many legal systems today, the public/private distinction endures and thus informs 
the reconstruction of facts after they have passed through the apparently neutral filtering process 
of the legal mechanism. In many ways, current state law regulating private affairs stems from a 
culture in which, for a host of reasons, the parity of male and female citizens is still to be 
realized.  
 
If one is not an equal member of society, whether by express law or implied habits, one is not 
able to utilize the instruments of that society equally. Therefore, the existence of gender 
discrimination, be it latent or patent, affects negatively the ability of women to engage public 
assistance. In this way, female victims of systemic intimate violence are restricted from 
accessing state resources, infrastructure and assistance. 
 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that one of the prevalent misconceptions is that systemic 
intimate violence is a private affair that does not warrant state interference. Traditionally, women 
have suffered systemic intimate violence silently, believing perversely that this was a 
characteristic requirement of the relationship into which they had entered.943 This is compounded 
by the fact that the conduct between intimates is seldom open to examination or intervention.944 
                                                                                                                                                       
meaning of relationships.  And it stains the operating norms of institutions.”).  I propose that the same infiltrating 
tendency exists with respect to gender. 
939 PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA xi (1997) 
[hereinafter KAHN]. 
940 Bernhard Grossfeld & Edward J. Eberle, Patterns of Order in Comparative Law:  Discovering and Decoding 
Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 291, 294 (2003) (maintaining that invisible phenomena that influence the path 
of law include a range of tangible, intangible, intuitional or rational factors). 
941 KAHN, supra note 629, at x–xi. 
942 The role distinctions between men and women were explicitly linked to a separation between the public and 
private spheres in the past. Judith Resnik points out that while “[b]oundaries of role are . . . shifting, . . . [g]ender 
systems work through assumptions about the intelligibility of the categories of ‘women’ and ‘men,’ which in turn 
depend upon demarcations of ‘the family’ from ‘the market’ and of ‘the private’ from ‘the public.’” Resnik, supra 
note 159, at 620–621. See Susan B. Boyd, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview, in CHALLENGING 
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5–7, 9 (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
Boyd]. Boyd describes the various manifestations of the public/private dyad and refers to the example of “the state’s 
failure to deal with men’s violence against women in the ‘private’ sphere of family relations” that rests “on a 
ratification of unequal power relations between men and women in heterosexual families.”  Id. at 10. 
943 A vast array of cultures relegates the role of housekeeper and child-minder to women.  This role is associated 
with subservience and dependency. Eekelaar & Katz, supra note 92, at iii: According to academics, “[f]amily 
violence usually takes place in secret” and “[t]he sufferings of its victims take place in silence.”  
944 Sullivan, supra note 615.  The statistics and nature of domestic violence throughout the world are controversial 
and unreliable given “the extent to which the state and society conceal domestic violence.”  Id. at 132. 
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It is only recently that the law has actively begun to accept domestic violence as “a serious social 
evil,”945 understanding that “[a] psychological rationale is not sufficient to explain such a 
prevalent problem.”946 Nonetheless, systemic intimate violence rarely is perceived as a political 
concern and its intimate context has had a disturbing impact on the translation of such violence 
by legislators.947 
 
The resistance to regulating private matters stems in part from the difficulty in penetrating 
the private realm which continues to be guarded by these “invisible” assumptions.948 Progressive 
legislation (where such exists) still meets the difficulties imposed by the division, in many 
societies, between private and public and the concomitant allocation of gendered roles to the two 
spheres.949 This departmentalizing reflects a well-documented stratification that places women 
throughout the world in a weaker vulnerable position.950  
 
It is tempting to discount this phenomenon as a characteristic of the past, an abandoned mode 
of living that exited societies when inclusive and transparent governance entered. However, true 
equality, meaningful choice, and a sophisticated equivalency between men and women do not 
exist, even in the most “egalitarian” of societies. This is evidenced by a decision on November 3, 
2003, in Sweden where the Stockholm appeals court acquitted four men accused of gang raping a 
                                                
945 Preamble to South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. 
946 MacKay, Educating the Professional, supra note 290, at 204. See also Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, 
at 11-12 (describing the development of research regarding domestic violence from focusing on “deviant personal 
attributes of the man which were able to explain what he did” to the currently accepted explanation that violence 
against women is not only about the individuals involved in the immediate conflict, but also is an issue that should 
be tackled at the political level). 
947 This view is typical of many sex-based crimes.  For example, in various parts of India—and in many other 
countries throughout the world—girls who are raped refuse to report the crime since the act is deemed to shame the 
victim and her family, not the rapist.  Indira Jaising, Violence Against Women: The Indian Perspective, in WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 51, 52 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter Jaising]. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 159, at 635 (making the point that violence against women is 
perceived by some courts as falling within “a sphere of human activity inappropriate for national legislation”). 
948 Where States have taken legislative and policy steps to counteract gender inequality, a distinction is drawn 
between protection of equality between genders on a public level and the enforcement of equality in the privacy of 
the home.  The former is easier to regulate and therefore better addressed by domestic law.  However, to focus 
merely on the public realm of equality between genders, such as employment equity, equal opportunity or public 
violence is to pronounce and denounce domestic inequality to a category of harm that falls within family law but not 
criminal law.  See generally Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private, supra note 265, at 99; Dixon, supra note 
621, at 359 (demonstrating the “silence of the social and legal system” by quoting one court’s sentiments on spousal 
violence, “if no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty, nor dangerous violence shown by the 
husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forgive and forget”). 
949 Resnik, supra note 159, at 649 (indicating that in early Federal family policy, “[f]athers were identified as the 
primary wage earners; mothers were situated as caregivers”).  Resnik also cites Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Deborah 
Jones Merritt who explain that “for every one man who is illiterate around the world, two women are, and seventy 
percent of the world’s poor are women.  Women’s risk of violence, their poverty, and their high illiteracy rates relate 
to women’s roles within families.”  Id. at 658. 
950 See MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 120, at 20–24, 88–94 (2001): “The notion that women and 
men are defined as gendered by their differences from one another, and the equation of women’s so-called 
differences with inferiority or naturally lower status, has pervaded philosophy and law. . . .   Gender in most 
societies has defined women as such in terms of differences, real and imagined, from men—usually to women’s 
detriment in resources, roles, respect, and rights.” Id. at 20. 
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woman for five hours on the basis that the victim’s “prior sexual experiences led the men to 
believe that she was game for their sexual advances.”951  
 
In the following section I describe in more detail the ways in which violence against women 
is inadequately addressed by state structures, with particular reference to Mexico, Sweden, 
Nicaragua and the United States. In particular, I discuss how the systematic failure of states to 
assist victims of systemic intimate violence is evidenced by: (1) deficient laws; (2) poor police 
protection; (3) deficient judiciaries; and (4) the absence of other infrastructural protection. 
 
9.5 Deficiencies of State Laws to Protect against Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
Any special protection of rights as human rights presupposes some identification of those 




The test for determining whether an act of violence within a nation state falls within the 
scope of international law is whether the failure on the part of the state to prevent the harm is 
systematic.953 
 
Disparate treatment of women has manifested itself in almost every society in the world.954 
Almost all communities from almost all regions have transgressed or allow the transgression of 
                                                
951 See THEY SAID, SHE SAID in Swedish rape outrage, IOL, Nov. 5, 2003, at 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=3&art_id=iol1068028343530S352&set_id=1 (last visited Nov. 17, 2003). 
Judge Bengt Sjoegren responded to criticism of the decision by stating: “Even if it would be very strange for a 
woman to want to subject herself to this kind of treatment, it is still not so abnormal that the men would have had to 
realize that . . . .   Given the circumstances, we came to the conclusion that it was not clear that the men realized that 
the woman was in a helpless state. Acquittal in Swedish gang rape trial sparks uproar.” ClariNet, Nov. 5, 2003, at 
http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/ca/Qsweden-justice.Rz-q_DN5.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003)). 
952 Waldock, supra notex, at 87. 
953 See Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Esq, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 15 HUMAN 
RIGHTS QUARTERLY 36, 46 (1993) (“Evidence of a state’s failure to prosecute is not sufficient [to position domestic 
violence within the human rights framework] unless a pattern can be shown that reveals the failure to be gender 
discriminatory and thereby a violation of the internationally guaranteed right to equal protection of the law.”) 
 
. 
954 World Report on Violence and Health, supra notex, at 1 (citing intimate partner violence as “[o]ne of the most 
common forms of violence against women . . . .”) Id. See also, Jaising, supra note 637, at 51 (“The persistence in 
India of cultural practices that discriminate against girls and women means not only the abuse of but, finally, the 
deaths of countless women.”). In Pakistan, the mother of a rape victim whose perpetrators were not prosecuted or 
even charged stated that “‘[t]hese men who have ruined my daughter’s life should be hanged. Instead, they went 
totally unpunished. Why is there one justice for men and another justice for women?’” See id. at 54. Group 
delineation exists; the remaining question is whether it will be acknowledged by the powers that can help prevent it. 
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the rights of women.955 No matter how progressive a society, country, or region may deem itself 
to be, women continue to receive lesser benefits, status, and respect in the public sphere.956  
 
Moreover, the harm committed against women is not peculiar to a particular place. It is an 
active practice throughout the world. Against this backdrop of universal social imparity, the 
inadequacy of current domestic laws and legal structures in addressing systemic intimate 
violence comes a little more clearly into focus.957 Prohibiting systemic intimate violence through 
legislation is the first step governments should take to reduce such violence.958 Too often, 
generic anti-violence laws are deficient.959 
 
According to MacKinnon, international law “fosters human rights less through mandating 
governmental intervention than through enforcing governmental abstinence. In other words, if 
your human rights are going to be violated, pray it is by someone who looks likes a government, 
and that he already acted, and acted wrong.” 
 
MacKinnon’s words are harshly prerogative but not inaccurate. This complaint is one that 
emanates not only in the field of women’s rights. It is the primary theme of the movement to 
enforce socio-economic rights. There are several reasons why international law has developed in 
such a ‘hands-off’ manner. Indeed, keeping out of a government’s affairs was a seminal part of 
the development of international law post-1945, manifesting in the period of de-colonialization. 
However, both our world and its emphasis have changed; political affiliations, globalization and 
environmental and humanitarian law have all contributed to a modicum of intervention by the so-
called ‘international community’ into the affairs of individual states.  
 
                                                
955 See The Human Rights Watch, World Report of 2002:  Women’s Human Rights, (2002), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/women.html#Violence%20Against%20Women (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (citing 
Zimbabwe, the United States, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Jordan as examples in which women’s physical and sexual 
integrity is at risk). 
956 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 90–97.  See also BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS, supra note 98, at 3 
(reporting that “much of the violence faced by women in everyday life is at the hands of the people with whom they 
share their lives”); Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. 
L. REV. 1119, 1129 (1995) (“If violence against women in the home is inherent in all societies, then it can no longer 
be dismissed as something private and beyond the scope of state responsibility.”). 
957 Indeed, in many jurisdictions systemic intimate violence or domestic violence is not, in and of itself, unlawful. 
Domestic violence may be prohibited in terms of legislation; however, a criminal offence only arises where a victim 
has obtained a protection order, which is breached by the aggressor. In such instances, the aggressor will be guilty 
for contempt of court but not for the violence itself. 
958 This includes the creation of judicial remedies, such as protection orders and police protection. For a full 
discussion of what this step entails, see chapter two. 
959 See, for example, Celina Romany, Killing “The Angel in the House”: Digging for the Political Vortex of Male 
Violence against Women, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 
285, 288-289 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (maintaining that the criminalization of 
domestic violence tends to focus on the rehabilitation of the accused in the interests of family sanctity, rather than 
remedying the circumstances for the victim. She insists that the “backdrop of women’s experience” must be taken 
into account when considering the criminalization of domestic violence. She bases this on the philosophy that 
“[l]egal responsibility in no way denies the social ramifications of violence. Rather it deals with the exercise of the 
coercive power of the state to control conduct that infringe society’s shared values. The infringement of social 
norms by those under the influence of alcohol or other substances continues to be subject to coercive social control 
without contradicting their diagnosis as social ills; why should violence against women be different?” 
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MacKinnon takes this argument further and shows how it manifests in a most pernicious way 
for women who have been traditionally excluded as a group from the formulation of human 
rights violations. She maintains that as a result of this, “when men use their liberties socially to 
deprive women of theirs, it does not look like a human rights violation. But when men are 
deprived of theirs by governments, it does. The violations of the human rights of men better fit 
the paradigm of human rights violations because that paradigm has been based on the experience 
of men.”960 
 
MacKinnon identifies the stratification of women, which the state incorporates “in and as 
law. Two things happen: law becomes legitimate, and social dominance becomes invisible.”961 
Therefore, MacKinnon points out how explicit laws discriminating against women are not the 
only way in which the law violates women’s equality. Implicit violations are endorsed by gaps in 
the law, or the enforcement thereof: 
 
Structurally, only when the state has acted can constitutional equality guarantees be invoked. But 
no law gives men the right to rape women. This has not been necessary, since no rape law has 
ever seriously undermined the terms of men’s entitlement to sexual access to women. No 
government is, yet, in the pornography business. This has not been necessary, since no man who 
wants pornography encounters serious trouble getting it, regardless of obscenity laws. No law 
gives fathers the right to abuse their daughters sexually. This has not been necessary, since no 
state has ever systematically intervened in their social possession of and access to them. No law 
gives husbands the right to batter their wives. This has not been necessary, since there is nothing 
to stop them. No law silences women. This has not been necessary, for women are previously 
silenced in society – by sexual abuse, by not being heard, by not being believed, by poverty, by 
illiteracy, by a language that provides only unspeakable vocabulary for their most formative 
traumas, by a publishing industry that virtually guarantees that if they ever find a voice it leaves 
no trace in the world. No law takes away women’s privacy. Most women do not have any to take, 
and no law gives them what they do not already have. No law guarantees that women will forever 
remain the social unequals of men. This is not necessary, because the law guaranteeing sex 





                                                
960 MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, supra note 114, at 92. Now that this paradigm is open for re-
assessment, it is necessary to identify what women’s experiences are and how they should be translated into laws, 
both nationally and internationally. If the largest form of violence experienced by women is systemic intimate 
violence, this should not be omitted from the human rights framework. If it is, it simply means that once again, 
women are omitted from the process, and surely we are beyond that point. As MacKinnon says, “guarantees women 
specifically need, due to sex inequality in society, in order to live to a standard defined as human – like freedom 
from being bought and sold as sexual chattel, autonomous economic means, reproductive control, personal security 
from intimate invasion, a credible voice in public life, a nonderivative place in the world – were not considered at 
all.” (96) Once the problem has been identified, its solution should be achieved. The only reason why women would 
no longer receive the benefits identified by MacKinnon is if, indeed, those in power retain the status quo. I doubt 
seriously whether any institution that has progressive aspirations would adopt such a position and therefore, change 
is possible, of course with the necessary economic commitment. 
961 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237 (Harvard University Press, 1989) 
[hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE]. 
962 MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra notex, at 239. 
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9.5.2 Country Examples  
 
United States  
 
The ill-fit of anti-violence laws and the needs of victims of systemic intimate violence is 
evidenced in particular by four decisions of the United States courts,963 namely DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv. (hereinafter referred to as the “DeShaney case”),964 Town 
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,965 and Riss v. City of New York.966 
 
In DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court adjudicated whether a state has a duty to 
intervene in a case of acute child abuse that resulted in the brain damage of a minor child. The 
Supreme Court held that the failure of the Winnebago County Department of Social Services to 
protect a minor child from severe beatings by his father did not constitute an actionable claim 
under the due process provisions of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.967  
The court held that: “[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors. 
The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain 
minimal levels of safety and security.”968 
 
This case demonstrates a judicial reticence to impose a positive duty on states to intervene in 
the family or private sphere.969 Deshaney was confirmed in the Castle Rock decision, where the 
United States Supreme Court confirmed that “the benefit that a third party may receive from 
having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due 
                                                
963 The United States is an example of a sophisticated legal jurisdiction, renowned for its egalitarian progress.  A 
fortiori, other jurisdictions may provide considerably less protection for women. 
964 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv.,489 U.S. 189 (1989) [hereinafter the DeShaney case]. 
965 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) [hereinafter the Castle Rock case]. 
966 Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579 (1968) [hereinafter Riss case]. 
967 DeShaney case, supra note 677, at 191. The department knew of the beatings; the hospitals knew of the beatings; 
the parents knew of the beatings. Id. at 192–93. Everyone who could have prevented the brain damage of a young 
child was informed. Notwithstanding this information, there was no legal obligation on the department to assist the 
minor child nor was the department, or any other institution, held liable for the omission to prevent the battering of a 
minor child to the point of brain damage. Id. at 196–97.  The essential rationale of the court was that socio-economic 
rights are not positive rights with a concomitant positive obligation on government to deliver associated services.  
Id. 
968 Id. at 195. 
969 This case contradicts the position taken by a United States Court of Appeals nine years earlier in Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In this case, the Second Circuit recognized its jurisdiction to determine 
whether Americo Norberto Pena-Irala (a Paraguayan citizen) had wrongfully caused the death of Dr. Joel Filartiga’s 
son (Dr. Filartiga and his son were also Paraguayan citizens).  The court noted Filartiga’s claim that further pursuit 
of the action in Paraguay was futile and that there had been no credible authoritative process in Paraguay regarding 
the death of the appellant’s son.  Id. at 878.  The tenor of such a decision is an acknowledgement that acts of harm 
require a form of State intervention, either post-intervention through the judiciary, or prior prevention.  And yet, 
nine years later, when deciding the DeShaney case, supra note 677, the United States Supreme Court held that, 
notwithstanding that the authority failed to investigate and prevent the torture of a child, no-one was culpable.  In 
spirit at least, DeShaney oppugns Filartiga’s reference to “humanitarian and practical considerations [that] have 
combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their 
individual and collective interest.”  Id. at 890. 
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Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.”970 In this case, 
the claimant had asked the police several times during the course of an evening to look for her 
estranged husband who had take their children in violation of a protection order. The police 
failed to act and the estranged husband killed all three children.  
 
In Riss, Linda Riss had been stalked and threatened by a former suitor. Notwithstanding 
repeated complaints to the police, the aggressor was never apprehended and he ultimately hired a 
“thug [to] throw lye in Linda’s face.”971 The court held that it could afford Linda sympathy but 
not legal redress.972 It based its decision on resource scarcity, holding that “[t]he amount of 
protection that may be provided is limited by the resources of the community and by a 
considered legislative-executive decision as to how those resources may be deployed.”973 
However, as Judge Keating pointed out in his dissent, if there is a scarcity of resources then 
liability should be imposed on public officials for failing to provide a minimum level of 
protection for the more vulnerable members of society.974 
 
This case raises the speculation that the reticence of governments to provide a core minimum 
of laws and enforcement efforts to preventing violence against women is not only due to 
resource scarcity; it appears that the entrenched hierarchy within both law and society which 
places women on a lower wrung of the social ladder, with lesser needs and arguably, with less 




                                                
970 Id. at  paragraph 12. 
971 Riss case, supra note 679, at 584.  It is interesting to note that the court refers to the complainant as “Linda” 
whereas judicial bodies generally—and especially those dealing with mainstream human rights issues, such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia—refer to the parties not by their first names but rather by 
their legal position as either appellants or defendants.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 36 I.L.M. 908 (ICTY 
1997).  
972 Riss case, supra note 679, at 581. 
973 Id. at 581–82. 
974 Id. at 589. (Keating, J. dissenting) 
975 For a discussion of the manner in which States should be compelled to address women who are victims and 
survivors of domestic violence, see FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, Health Report Card 2001: Introduction 
and Methodology, available at http://endabuse.org/statereport/intro.php3 (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) [hereinafter 
FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND] (“This issue is critically important, because health care providers are often in 
the best position to help victims of abuse and their children, if they are trained to screen for domestic violence, to 
recognize signs of abuse, and to intervene effectively.  States can take action that will dramatically improve the 
ability of doctors, nurses and other health care providers to help victims of domestic violence.  But no state has done 
nearly all that it can in this area, and just a few states took any meaningful action in the last year.” Id.). The cases 
cited are at the very least indicative of the inadequacy of domestic law within the United States to address gender-
based crimes. While the United States is one example of a domestic legal system which is unable to cope with the 
exigency of systemic intimate violence, other regions and countries with far less accessible and transparent legal 
systems may provide even less effective legal redress for women. According to feminist theorist Gwendolyn Mikell, 
many developing States within Africa stand indicted for the systematic disregard for and opposition to women. 
Mikell, supra note 615, at 1 (describing how African women suffer lower education levels and higher levels of 
malnutrition). For a discussion of ineffective laws in other countries from GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra notex (discussing domestic violence in Russia: “The law doesn't protect women. If a woman goes to 
the police and tells them that she is being beaten by her husband or partner, the police say, "But he didn't kill you 
yet.”). 
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Systemic intimate violence is not categorized as a separate offence in Mexico but falls within 
the category of general abuse and misconduct.976 In Mexico, prior to 1997, rape between spouses 
was not a criminal offence.977 Indeed, the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice “established that 
sexual relations between spouses that are the result of violence do not constitute a crime but the 




The same is true of Nicaragua’s Criminal Code, which, as of the writing of this thesis, did not 
preclude marital rape.980 While intimacy between the victim and the defendant are taken into 
account by the court as ‘aggravating circumstances,’ it only relates to past relationships and not 
relationships that are current.981 This reinforces the social norm that women should be obedient 
to their husbands in all respects, including sexual relations, making marital rape a “well kept 
secret.”982 Even though the criminal code has been augmented to address violence against 
women, it has been criticized for its failure to “consider the particularities of violence when it 
occurs within the family.”983 
 
The Nicaraguan government has taken steps to reform its legislation, including the 
introduction of restraining orders and the criminalization of psychological harm.984 However, the 
reform has preventative and punitive deficiencies, resulting in the persistence of violence against 
women “in everyday life in both the private and public spheres.”985 Notwithstanding active non-
governmental presence and improved legislation, “women remain unlikely to press charges and 
when victims do take perpetrators to court, most receive a verdict of not guilty because of a weak 
judicial system with little experience dealing with GBV [gender based violence].”986 This is due 
in part to a lack of government will to implement the legislation.987 
                                                
976 Mexico does have a Law of Assistance and Prevention of Domestic Violence which defines violence as “an act 
of power or omission” including sexual mistreatment “denying ‘sexual affective’ needs and inducing sexual 
practices that are not desired or that harm the victim. Law of Assistance and Prevention of Domestic Violence, 
Mexico, supra note 131. However, this law ‘may only be used as a means to secure prevention’ in respect of the 
provisions of the FD Penal Code, particularly those related to sexual crimes. Article 1 of the Law of Assistance and 
Prevention of Domestic Violence, Mexico, supra note 131. 
977 Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 131, at 23. 
978 Id. According to the 1998 CEDAW Report, marital rape was penalized by this time. 1998 CEDAW report, supra 
note 204, at 34. 
979 That is the state of Querétaro. Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 131, at 23. 
980 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 14. 
981 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 14. 
982 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 14. 
983 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 12. 
984 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 13. 
985 The security measures lack a preventative component and only have a punitive effect. Both human and material 
resources are insufficient to establish the presence of psychological harm. Only ten days is given to determine the 
presence of this type of injury and this is generally considered to be deficient. There is also a lack of adequate 
forensic and medical psychologists, which contributes to the low level of enforcement of the provisions regarding 
psychological harm. While psychological harm has been criminalized, it does not lead to a specific punishment. 
OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 13. 
986 RHR Nicaragua Report, supra notex, at 120-121.  
987 Other reasons include a lack of coordination between NGOs and the government sector and difficulty in 
obtaining accurate data. RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 121. See also Maria Luiza Aboim, Brazil and 





Developed countries, such as Sweden, are not exempt.988 In a recent New York Times article, 
the extent of domestic violence in Sweden was described in the bold exposition of the “Secret 
Side of Women’s Lives.”989 While Swedish women experience a variety of forms of violence, 
“most of the violence against women in Sweden is perpetrated in the women’s own or somebody 
else’s home.”990  
 
One of the main reasons for the high level of systemic intimate violence is not a propensity 
for violence on the part of Swedish men; rather, it seems that it “has simply been easier for them 
to get away with violence against wives and girlfriends … and harder for women to get the help 
they need.”991 While Sweden has criminalized marital rape (it was one of the first countries to do 
so) and FGC/M, 992 it appears that “much of the violence inflicted on women is never reported 
since this kind of violence is quite commonly committed by a woman’s partner in their joint 
home.”993 Moreover, because domestic violence occurs in contexts about which we normally do 
not speak, namely, sex and marriage, it is even more difficult to discuss experiences, which 
victims view as an aberration of the norm. 
 
9.6 Deficiencies of State Police Protection to Protect against Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
One of the most important requirements for any victim is protection. Ideally, a victim of 
systemic intimate violence should know that the harm is a violation (which would be the result of 
an educational campaign implemented by a state complying with its international obligations) 
and, if she deems it necessary, she ought to be able to call for assistance to prevent the 
occurrence or repeat of violence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Produced by the Family Violence Prevention Fund 7 (eds., Leni Marin, Helen Zia and Esta Soler, 1998) (explaining 
that in the late 80s and 90s women victims had their lives scrutinized to find blame for the attacks of violence 
against them: “The ‘defense of honor’ although not part of the legal code, was commonly accepted by the courts.” 
10. The Supreme Court ruled this defense inadmissible in 1991. Notion of women’s police station. 11. 
988 Sweden has a reputation as a world leader in equality legislation and combating gender discrimination. Sweden 
has been recognized for its advanced position in combating trafficking in women, which it links to domestic 
violence. See OPDV Bulletin: Swedish Deputy Prime Minister Focuses on Domestic Violence, 2003, available at 
http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/public_awareness/bulletins/spring2003/swedishdpm.html. In general, Sweden is 
recognized as one of the most advanced countries in achieving meaningful equality between men and women. See 
Letter from Europe; Sweden Boldly Exposes a Secret Side of Women’s Lives, by Lizette Alvarez, April 6 2005, 
New York Times [hereinafter Secret Side of Women’s Lives] (“Sweden ranks at the top (or near it) in the number of 
women who hold public office, serve as cabinet ministers, graduate from college and hold jobs.”).  
989 See Secret Side of Women’s Lives, supra note 732 (describing domestic violence as the “one significant blot on 
the record of women’s empowerment.”). 
990 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 6. 
991 Secret Side of Women’s Lives, supra note 732. 
992 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 20. It is interesting to note that the laws 
criminalizing genital cutting allows for the conviction of a person “in Sweden of a crime committed abroad, even if 
the act is not classified as punishable in the other country.” 
993 Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 14. 
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However, this is not the norm. There are several striking incidences where police 
functionaries either have evidenced actionable neglect or, through prejudicial and accusatory 
conduct, have alienated the victim from state protection.994    
 
In the case of systemic intimate violence, victims require “immediate police action the very 
first time the man infringes the restraining order.”995 Yet, in many countries the police often are 
unable or unwilling to respond to calls for help, even if a protection order has been provided.996 
This is so even in jurisdictions where the police are legally required to assist victims of domestic 
violence and inform them of their rights.997  
 
There are several reasons why police officials are reluctant to intervene in cases of domestic 
violence. Part of their aversion stems from a common social perception that the family is a 
hallowed realm, surrounded by a barrier of privacy that warrants respect and distance.998 When a 
                                                
994 In one alarming case, due to the failure of the police to take her pleas for help seriously, an American woman 
“ended up partially paralyzed and permanently disfigured,” sustaining her worst injuries in the yard of her home 
while the police waited in their vehicle on the street. RAOUL FELDER & BARBARA VICTOR, GETTING AWAY WITH 
MURDER: WEAPONS FOR THE WAR AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 13–17 (1996).  The authors describe the abuse 
inflicted upon Tracey Thurman by her estranged husband Charles.  Id.  Due to the failure of the police to take her 
pleas for help seriously, Tracey “ended up partially paralyzed and permanently disfigured,” sustaining her worst 
injuries in the yard of her home while the police waited in their vehicle on the street.  Id. at 17. Russia is another 
pressing example of poor legislative and administrative facilities. See GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 694 (“Despite official acknowledgment that domestic violence affects the lives of thousands of 
women in Russia, the official and societal response to women's reports of spousal abuse indicates that such assault is 
considered a "family affair" rather than a problem for law enforcement. Reports gathered by Human Rights Watch 
indicate that individual police share the widely-held view that spousal abuse is a private matter in which the police 
should not or need not intervene. As a consequence, police often fail to respond to reports of domestic violence, or, 
if they do respond, take no action against the abuser. A founder of a St. Petersburg hotline for women told us: ‘It's 
traumatizing for women to go to the police. We've been studying the police and their responses to violence against 
women. They have very sexist attitudes. They think of domestic violence as the problem of women, that women 
provoke violence with their behavior. The generally dismissive attitude of the police toward reports of domestic 
abuse permits men to beat their wives or domestic partners with impunity. …  Yevgenii Riabtsev, the head of the 
ministry of the interior's public relations section… shifted the blame for the violence itself to its victims, stating, 
"After marriage, many women don't look after themselves. They let themselves go physically, and their husbands 
lose interest."”).   
995 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 36. 
996 PTACEK, supra note 275, at 143: “Before they went to court to file for restraining orders, the majority of the 
women interviewed had already sought assistance from a range of other institutions… The most common 
institutional resource sought was the police; 78 percent had called the police before seeking orders.” See generally 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58, at 33 (indicating that while there is 
increased recognition of violence against women, legal relief continues to be underdeveloped in most jurisdictions).  
997 In Sweden and South Africa, police have a legal obligation to assist victims of domestic violence. In Sweden, the 
police are “legally bound to investigate reports of assault and rape, even when the injured party objects to the 
investigation. Nor can the injured party withdraw a police report that he or she has filed. In most cases, it is the 
woman herself who reports the assault to the police.” Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra 
note 98, at 38. However, because there are no witnesses to the abuse, if the woman withdraws the complaint, the 
case is almost always closed. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 38. 
998 Many women will make a conscious decision not to ask for help in instances of violence due to a sense of shame, 
judgment and financial dependency. See for example, CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61, at 116: “For 
example, in South Asia, the dominant discourse situates women as dependent on men. In her role as wife and 
mother, ‘[A woman] is expected to possess the qualities of obedience, patience, endurance and sacrifice – failing 
which she is liable to reactions amounting to any degree of violence.’ Women may seen (sic) as deserving of violent 
treatment when others perceive that they have failed in their prescribed role in some way…. Some respondents did 
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victim calls for help, the perception that she has broken a rule of sanctity feeds the reticence of 
many police officials.999 However, police acquiescence arises from more than just perception; 
ironically, domestic violence calls are among the most dangerous police work. Because violence 
within an intimate context is so incongruous, many victims will call police only in the most 
exigent and unstable of circumstances, when they fear a complete lack of control.1000 The 
violence in these cases is indeed extreme and presents a threat not only to the victim but to 
anyone who intervenes.  
 
In South Africa, for example, while the Domestic Violence Act penalizes police officials for 
failing to comply with the Act by refusing to intervene in cases of domestic violence, the 
perception that intervention in domestic violence does not ‘constitute real police work’ 
perpetuates police apathy.1001 The same phenomenon exists in Sweden, where “women do not 
consider it to be of any use to seek help from the police by reporting the violence to which they 
                                                                                                                                                       
not identify with other women who faced marital violence, stressing that women who were beaten had disobeyed 
norms of female virtue, and had therefore brought their trouble on themselves.” (citations omitted). 
999 CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61, at 279: “Moreover, women victims of violence in general, and of 
domestic violence in particular, are still reported to face hostility when dealing with the police as well as 
discriminatory and sexist assumptions when dealing with the judicial system… As a consequence, a limited number 
of women press complaints under the law…” 
1000 CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61, at 77 (“Forms of violence that are part of many women’s daily lives, 
such as domestic violence, may be perceived as a result of women’s failure to fulfil their roles as wife or mother in 
some way.” See also Anieta Natasha Ferreira v. The State, The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Case No. 
245/03, 22 March 2004. “The appellant called for police assistance on three occasions. Only once did they arrive. 
They said the deceased was drunk and that the appellant should get him to sober up.”) Id at paragraph 25. 
1001 Section 18(4)(a) of the South African Domestic Violence Act, supra note 141. The creation of awareness and the 
education of the police are not provided for in this Act. 
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have been subjected.”1002 As a result, Sweden has a particularly low rate of reporting systemic 
intimate violence.1003 
 
There are a number of reasons for this low rate of reported abuse, including: the victims’ fear 
that the police will not believe the complaint; the victims’ intuition that the police will not be 
able to do anything; feelings of shame or guilt; fear of revenge from the abuser; resistance to 
involving the police; and fear that triggering the legal process will result in the incarceration of 
the abusive intimate. In particular, nearly half the women who do not report the violence to the 
police, did so on the basis that they feel the incident too trivial to justify police intervention for 
the reasons described in chapter two above.1004 Therefore, Sweden’s legal infrastructures, while 
impressive in comparison to many other states, remain deficient in implementation.1005 
 
In Nicaragua, only two out of every ten abused women contact the police.1006 Reasons for 
this under-reporting include: fear of further violence; shame; feelings of isolation; difficulties in 
attending the hearings (especially for women living in rural areas); difficulties in preparing 
evidentiary documents; a lack of economic resources to pay for legal representation; and the 
                                                
1002 Only 5 percent of women who experienced abuse reported the most recent incident of the abuse to the police. 
Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 54. It is interesting to note that the “propensity to make a report is low 
regardless of the kind of perpetrator i.e. whether the perpetrator was a husband, boyfriend or former husband or 
former boyfriend. However, it appears that sexual violence was the least commonly reported. Captured Queen 
Report, supra note 123, at 52 and 54. In Sweden police are disinclined to apply the law, although this varies 
dramatically between the different municipalities. Only “about 25 per cent of all violent crimes come to the notice of 
the police. It is generally thought by criminologists that many causes of violence against women go unrecorded.” 
Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 51. In 1999, 19,982 reports of violence against women were filed with 
the police. This is confirmed by Amnesty International. See Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, 
supra note 98, at 23: (“In fact, it is estimated that the number of reported violent crimes “only corresponds to 
between 20 and 25 per cent of the crimes actually committed.”) As a result, “much violent crime against women 
remains unknown to the police and the judiciary.” Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 51. One third of the 
women who reported being in or having been in a violent relationship reported that they sought help from some 
service or agency, other than the police. Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 54. Most commonly, women 
sought help from medical services, including psychiatric assistance. Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 54-
5. This indicates that most of the women view the violence as a psychiatric disorder or physical illness. It is also 
possible that women only actually seek help when the violence is so severe that it leads to acute psychological 
and/or physical effects. Other forms of assistance include family counseling services, lawyers and social welfare 
secretaries. The most satisfying form of help was from the medical sector (excluding psychiatric assistance). The 
highest level of dissatisfaction was experienced by women who sought assistance from social services. Id at 55. This 
is due in part to the location of the violence since “crimes committed indoors also tend to be reported less frequently 
than crimes committed out of doors.” Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 7 and 
24. 
1003 It is estimated that only 20-25 per cent of violent crimes in Sweden are actually reported, especially where the 
violence is perpetrated between intimates. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 
24. 
1004 Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 52. The report is based on a questionnaire which asks interviewees 
why they would not report violence and included the following reasons:  
1005 The report indicates that as of 2004, there was limited change in the actual status quo for women who survive 
domestic violence. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 44 (“it emerged that no 
major changes had been made in the work to help abused women”). 
1006 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 13. 
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failure of the Nicaraguan government to enforce protections for potential victims and to 
prosecute perpetrators.1007  
 
The lack of effective policing is particularly acute in immigrant and minority communities. 
Minority communities often view the police and prison system as external to their world. For 
example, members of enclosed religious groups such as Mormons, Mennonites or Amish in the 
United States, or Muslim and Turkish communities in Germany and France, view police services 
as alien to their society. Much of their survival as a homogenous group is dependent on a sense 
of group loyalty. Calling the police may constitute an infraction of their survival code, which is 
far worse for many religious groups than the individual violation a person may endure.  
 
Immigrant women also fear deportation if they contact authorities. Even if they are legally 
present in a country, they may be dependent on their partners for financial support and linguistic 
and cultural guidance.1008 Therefore, women of religious, ethnic or national minorities may 
suffer so-called double discrimination making the services and support the state offers 
inappropriate for their specific needs. 
 
9.7 Deficiencies of State Court Proceedings to Protect against Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
There are several deficiencies as regards the prosecution of domestic violence offenders. This 
is another factor inhibiting the effective prevention of systemic intimate violence. The crucial 
moment for a successful prosecution is at the initial stage of the investigation, immediately after 
the complaint has been lodged when evidence and testimonies are most reliable.1009 If too long a 
                                                
1007 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 13. RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 118-9. 
A Nicaraguan court refused to allow an accusation of sexual abuse against the former Nicaraguan President and 
Sandinista leader, Ortega, by his step-daughter. When an abused Nicaraguan woman sought assistance from the 
police, she encountered an affiliation between the abuser and the police, and since “he was in the military they let 
him go right away and gave him a ride back to my house. That time he kicked down my door… After that I didn’t 
know what to do. I felt trapped, a prisoner and I couldn’t escape…” Candies in Hell, supra note 122, at 1604-5. The 
fact that both officials and abusers are predominantly male reinforces the mantra of the abuser that the law will 
never help the abused.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 91 (“The reports of the many state task forces on gender 
bias in the courts have painstakingly recorded judicial attitudes of denial.”).  See, e.g., PTACEK, supra note 275, at 
169–70.  Ptacek describes how a protection or restraining order is viewed as “‘just a piece of paper’” that can be 
ripped up.  Id. at 169.  This is a view held by the abusers and often court officials.  Id. at 170. CARIN BENNINGER-
BUDEL, supra note 61, at 123: “…women are uncomfortable discussing these issue with men. Although the 
government acknowledges that the police force is predominantly male, it has not reported any steps taken to hire 
more female police officers in order to address these victims’ needs.” In Nicaragua, due to prejudicial and ignorant 
behavior on the part of the police and the judiciary, women lack confidence in the judicial response to their claims, 
especially when the abused is in a position of power. OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 14. 
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 118/01 Case 12.230 Zoilamérica Narváez Murillo 
Nicaragua October 15, 2001, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2001eng/Nicaragua12230.htm, in 
terms of which Murillo, the adopted daughter of former President Ortega and leader of the opposition party in 
Nicaragua at the time, laid charges of sexual assault and abuse against him. The charges were dropped due to 
Ortega’s claim of congressional immunity. The plaintiff and her lawyer approached the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, alleging that Nicaragua “had violated Narváez’s right to be heard by a competent court or judge.” 
(§ I). The Inter-American Commission declared the case admissible to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
1008 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 32. Sweden has implemented a new 
reform in terms of which, “women who have been abused by men may be allowed to stay in Sweden, even if the 
relationship has lasted less than two years.” 
1009 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 39. 
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period passes, the recollection of the violence may be dulled, and police and victim interviews 
may be sketchy and insubstantial.1010 There also may be a lack of documentation regarding the 
injuries sustained by the abused and long delays in summoning the injured party for an 
interview.1011 
 
In light of the cumulative nature of systemic intimate violence, often one incident of violence 
in isolation will be perceived as insufficiently serious to justify criminal prosecution, to the 
extent that criminal prosecution is appropriate. In the context of an accumulation of violence, 
physical, emotional and threats thereof, the seriousness is more obvious. It is important, 
therefore, although hardly implemented, to charge the accuser for the multiple acts of violence, 
which, as described above, creates a continuum of harm.1012 
 
However, often the claim cannot be substantiated by anyone other than the claimant.1013 In 
some instances, a claimant may be reluctant to participate in an investigation for fear that it may 
increase the level of violence against her, her children or her family, or because she feels partly 
responsible for the abuse. Finally, the abused simply may lack the financial and emotional 
support to cope with the legal proceedings.1014 If the police do assist the victim, it is rare for her 
claim to reach fruition since few reports of violence actually lead to legal proceedings.1015 
 
In 2003 in Sweden, for example, only three in ten acts of violence against women led to 
prosecution or other legal proceedings, in part because the violent crimes are hard to prove due 
to a lack of witnesses.1016 In 2003, of the 14,802 processed suspicions of acts of violence against 
women handled by a prosecutor, only 32 per cent (4,808) resulted in some sort of legal action, 
including a decision to waive prosecution.1017 Of the requests for restraining orders lodged with 
the public prosecution authorities in 2003,1018 more than half were dismissed, mostly because of 
a lack of evidence.1019 
                                                
1010 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 39. 
1011 This is problematic since many abused women engage the law only when the violence is at its most intense. 
Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 39. 
1012 See Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 59, 83 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (referring to the “Power and Control Wheel” developed by Ellen Pence and the Daluth Abuse 
Intervention Project. She then describes a case where, taking the cyclical nature of violence into account, the 
prosecutor charged the accused abuser for each independent act of abuse as a separate crime. (83-84). The Power 
and Control Wheel also shows how each incident forms part of a process that culminates in a “state of siege.” 
1013 Insufficient evidence is one of the main reasons for the dismissal of a case. Amnesty International, Intimate 
Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 39. 
1014 Id. 
1015 Id. at 35 and 23 (indicating that there is an under-reporting of violence against women in Sweden and therefore 
all statistics should be viewed as conservative figures). 
1016 Id. at 40. This is particularly problematic when compared to the rate of legal proceedings being instituted for 
crimes of violence in general, which is close to 45 per cent. In 2002, it was reported that only a quarter of reported 
assaults against women led to prosecution. Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 
35. 
1017 Id. 
1018 Id. at 36. 
1019 Legal action was taken against an average of 620 individuals a year for violating restraining orders. Id. at 36. Of 
the protection orders granted, nearly 30 per cent were violated within one year of the date of issue. Amnesty 
International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 36. Ten per cent of the reported cases of rape were 
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9.8 Deficiencies of State Infrastructures to Protect against Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
Individual gender discrimination also feeds, and is fed by, institutional discrimination. 
McDougal, Lasswell and Chen note that the “processes of government, national and local, are 
often employed to sustain and institutionalize discriminations against women.”1020 Sen also 
confirms the intersection between the structural difficulties women face and the broader social 
problems they, and others, endure (such as child mortality and infertility). This threatens not only 
individual autonomy, dignity and worth, but also the wellbeing of the social puzzle in which we 
live and hope to lead fulfilled lives.1021 
 
Therefore, “[t]ackling violence against women requires the engagement of state actors, of 
men and society at large. The cost of not engaging will be the continued cost of violence.”1022 
However, given the complexity of systemic intimate violence, the law and its officers are not 
necessarily the ideal remedy. Often, the abused needs alternative residence for her and her 
children, a source of income and security from continued threats by the abuser. However, there is 
a radical deficiency of such services in many developed and developing countries. 
 
In Sweden, for example, government agencies actually refer abused women to non-
governmental women’s shelters.1023 However, there are non-profit women’s shelters in only 150 
of Sweden’s 290 municipalities.1024 Most of the shelters have no paid staff, no professionals and 
are run entirely by volunteer staff.1025 In 2001, a particular shelter received 3,000 incoming calls 
(from both individual women and governmental agencies); they were able to assist fifteen 
women, ten children and nine girls in that year.1026 In 2002, one group of shelters recorded 
                                                                                                                                                       
dismissed immediately, without any investigation being initiated. Only six of 89 reported rapes in central Stockholm 
resulted in convictions. Id. at 37. A specific study indicated that less than 6 per cent of indoor rapes had led to 
prosecution. Between 15 and 30 per cent of the known suspects were never questioned. A lack of resources, 
insufficient knowledge and attitude problems are cited as reasons why so few cases of rape are solved. Amnesty 
International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 38. In Sweden in 2003, 22,400 cases of domestic 
violence were reported to the police, although it is recognized that this figure is probably conservative since many 
women do not report violence they experience. Sweden Debates Hitting Men with Domestic Violence Tax, supra 
note 298. 
1020 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 617. 
1021 SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 470, at 229.  
1022 The Cost of Violence against Women, supra note, at 9. 
1023 Amnesty International, Intimate Violence in Sweden, supra note 98, at 44. This is problematic, not only because 
the government is not doing its job, but also because there are not enough shelters to service the number of women 
seeking assistance. 
1024 Id. at 47. The shelters in Sweden are organized into two different national associations, namely, the National 
Organization for Women’s Shelters and Young Women’s Shelters. 
1025 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 47. 
1026 In the year 2000 the municipalities contributed a total of SEK 24 million to women’s shelters, although the 
amounts provided by individual municipalities varied and as many as “68 municipalities did not contribute at all.” 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 47. See Maria Luiza Aboim, Brazil 
and Domestic Violence and the Women’s Movement, in ENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT FROM THE GLOBAL 
FRONT LINES, PRODUCED BY THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND 8 (eds., Leni Marin, Helen Zia and Esta 
Soler, 1998): Shelters must be more than 3 meals a day and a bed. Women need a place of safety and recovery to 
ensure the victim’s ability to re-enter society. 
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12,630 requests for assistance from abused women. The shelters managed to provide 367 women 




The non-sexist society premised in the foundational clauses of the Constitution, and the right to 
equality and non-discrimination…, are undermined when spouse-batterers enjoy impunity.1028  
 
How is it possible that in such countries even seemingly progressive laws and state measures 
remain nugatory? I propose that while states may have taken positive steps, in form, to address 
systemic intimate violence, the substance of such measures remains lacking. 
 
The judicial decision- and law-making structures serve as a mechanism to filter the facts of a 
conflict, rejecting those facts that are irrelevant and retaining the ones that are relevant. 
However, historically, these legal mechanisms were based on certain assumptions that directed 
the outcome of the legal process. These assumptions included the underlying social ordering, 
which, as described above, discriminates between men and women in the provision of social 
benefits. While the broad structure of these legal mechanisms may have changed in some 
societies, the assumptions on which they are based have not. These assumptions subliminally 
continue to inform legal outcomes notwithstanding structural alterations.1029 The result is that the 
mechanism of law may appear to have changed but its composite assumptions survive and 
continue to pervade legal decisions. Therefore, under the guise of an egalitarian legal system, 
discriminatory decisions and views persist.1030 
 
Clearly the above analysis does not prove a world-wide failure of states to take appropriate 
positive steps to help prevent and remedy systemic intimate violence. However, it does indicate 
that in the cross section of societies investigated, a hegemony persists which contributes to the 
powerlessness of women with the result that women continue to suffer at the hands of men.1031 
The result is that there is weak intervention by the police, public, and other legal authorities in 
instances of systemic intimate violence, which accentuates the isolation of victims, and removes 
the nature and extent of such violence from the public eye.1032 
 
In addition, while not all domestic violence laws are ineffective, many are not suited to 
address systemic intimate violence. The current structure of many laws operate most effectively 
against a so-called ideal abuser: a sober, law-abiding, reputable man, who is classified as lower 
to middle class, attends a religious institution, is insightful, remorseful and preferably 
                                                
1027 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 47. Another group of shelters 
received 54,675 requests for assistance and they were able to assist 48,467 of these calls. They referred 1,216 
women to other places due to a lack of vacancies. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, 
supra note 98, at. 
1028 State v. Baloyi, supra note 119, at 14, paragraph 12. 
1029 See Boyd, supra note 632. 
1030 See Boyd, supra note 632, at 5–7. 
1031 See GOODWIN, supra note 594, at 54 (examining the oppression and subordination of Muslim women by Muslim 
men). 
1032 SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 12.  Schneider remarks how a colleague of hers, “after seeing a televised public 
service announcement on battering featuring photographs of women bruised and beaten, said to [her]: ‘I didn’t know 
this is what they looked like.’”  Id. 
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employed.1033 These characteristics indicate that the abuser has some type of reputation to protect 
and to some degree is concerned about his society.  In such cases, criminal sanctions may be 
effective, and the abuser may be unlikely to go on abusing his partner for fear of further legal 
and social repercussions. 
 
However, where the abuser instead has served prison time, has already increased the intensity 
of the beatings, has raped his partner, suffers from a “God-complex,” is connected to “friends in 
high places,” and/or has threatened to kidnap/hurt the children or other family members, 
“[l]awyers can never assure a woman whose abuser fits this profile that she will be safe from 
him.  Legal solutions in this case will often only inflame an already volatile situation.”1034   
 
Setting aside the nuances of domestic violence laws, the fact remains that, notwithstanding 
the nature of the harm committed against women in intimate contexts, as of 2000, only “44 
countries… have adopted specific legislation to address domestic violence.”1035  
 
Therefore, notwithstanding the heterogeneity that characterizes contemporary societies, many 
women across an array of countries continue to experience gender-based violence.1036 While the 
degree of harm varies, systemic intimate violence exists in almost every country.1037 What makes 
the suffering different is the extent to which women are able to turn to their state for protection. 
The conduct of the state and its agents in the face of this violence, therefore, is an integral part of 
the experience for women who endure systemic intimate violence.1038  
 
For the reasons discussed above, there is enough information of systemic intimate violence, 
which evidences grossly inadequate national systems, either because no such laws exist in the 
                                                
1033 Fedler, supra note 179, at 250.  This is a generalized statement.  Not all abusers who match these characteristics 
would be apprehended by the law.  The corollary is also true and abusers who do not fit this personality may in fact 
be apprehended by the law.  Id.  However, the predominant view is that this statement reflects a constant reality. 
1034 Fedler, supra note 179, at 250–51 & n.77. 
1035 UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 65, at 1. 
1036 CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 1031 (2001) [hereinafter 
DALTON & SCHNEIDER]: “The World Health Organization asserted that violence against women causes more death 
and disability among women aged fifteen to forty-four than cancer, malaria, traffic accidents, and war. . . .   In 
Kenya, for example, the U.N. estimated that 42 percent of women were battered by husbands or partners.  Kenyan 
laws do not specifically criminalize domestic violence, and offenders were seldom punished.  In Pakistan, estimates 
of spousal abuse ranged as high as 90 percent of all married women.  Despite occasional signs of 
progress . . . everyday violence and discrimination against women remained among the most flagrant and 
overlooked of human rights abuses.” Id. (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, WORLD 
REPORT 2000). See also CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61, at 123. (Identifying the three levels at which law 
may contribute to the oppression of women, namely, the substantive level - the substance of the laws themselves, a 
structural level – the structures and organizations that enforce the law, and the cultural level – the culture and beliefs 
that inform the people who comprise the society and its law makers and enforcers). 
1037 SCHNEIDER, supra note 57. DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 616, at 1031: “The World Health Organization 
asserted that violence against women causes more death and disability among women aged fifteen to forty-four than 
cancer, malaria, traffic accidents, and war.” Id. (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, 
WORLD REPORT 2000). 
1038 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 7: “It is not the structures that 
abuse women. Individual perpetrators must of course be held responsible for the violence committed against the 
woman. It is, however, also incumbent upon the state to take all the necessary measures to prevent, investigate and 
punish men’s violence against women and to prevent and combat gender-based violence in other ways. The state 
also has an obligation to provide support, assistance and protection for abused women and their children.” 
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particular state, or because, due to the social reinforcement of gender inequality, such laws do 
not fit the harm they are required to meet. This generally is because states have failed to 
conceptualize the seriousness and frequency of such violence, or otherwise have failed to make 
remedying such violence a political priority. Women suffering from systemic intimate violence, 
therefore, lack access to adequate social and legal infrastructures. 
 
On this basis, I propose that states, despite having knowledge of the nature and extent of 
systemic intimate violence, have failed systemically to satisfy their duties to take positive steps 
to help prevent and remedy the consequences of such violence. Therefore, I propose that this 
systemic failure satisfies the ‘state accountability’ element of the test for determining the 
existence of an international human right, thereby triggering enforceability in international law 
of women’s rights to be free from systemic intimate violence. 
 
10 Miscellaneous Issues 
 
My discussion above lays down the theoretical basis for the internationalization of systemic 
intimate violence. The remainder of this chapter deals with a number of miscellaneous issues 




Alston argues that human rights norms should be precise.1039 This point accords with the 
jurisprudential requirement that the law be certain so that individuals and states are able to 
foresee whether their actions will constitute a violation of law.1040  
 
However, human rights violations, such as torture and genocide, are particularly difficult to 
define, their content being the subject of much debate, speculation and nuance.1041 Therefore, it 
is arguable that Alston’s reference to precision does not require absolute certainty. Rather, it 
requires only that the norm (in this case, freedom from systemic intimate violence) should have 
clearly identifiable elements, which can be investigated and developed on a case by case basis. 
 
The fluidity of human rights norms is identified by philosopher Nickel. According to 
Nickel, human rights “range from abstract to specific (or from general to precise) according to 
how fully their parts are specified. But indeterminacy can occur not only in regard to scope and 
weight but also in regard to conditions of possession and operability and in regard to the 
addressees and their burdens.”1042 Nickels gives the example of the right to equal protection of 
the law which is “vague and abstract, but the principle it states is extremely important. The moral 
and legal roles of abstract rights are often just as significant as the roles of very specific rights, so 
we simply have to come to terms with abstractness in rights rather than proposing to get rid of it 
to achieve some philosophical ideal of precision.”1043 
 
                                                
1039 Alston, supra note 477, at 607.  
1040 Known as “nulla crimen sine lege.”. 
1041 [Note: citation to follow] Sudan; United States torture debates 
1042 NICKEL, supra notex, at 15. 
1043 NICKEL, supra notex, at 15. 
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Therefore, precision does not seem to be a general theme carried through the philosophers 
and legal theorists described in Part A of this chapter.1044 Nonetheless, I do maintain that the 
aspiration to clear and precise definitions of human rights would only help the development of 
this field. Therefore, as far as possible, I have attempted to be quite precise with the definition of 
systemic intimate violence, proposed in chapter two.  
 
As described in chapter two, there are delineated elements inherent in systemic intimate 
violence. Systemic intimate violence is repetitive emotional or physical harm, or the threat 
thereof, committed between intimates, which forms a continuum of violence from which the 
victim, due to his or her isolation and/or incapacitation, is unable to procure traditional legal 
assistance.1045 The combination of these factors creates a severe form of harm, which, in the face 
of endorsed impunity by the state, results in the systemic nature of such violence.1046  
 
For the purposes of satisfying the requirement for precision, therefore, I propose that these 
elements are no more or less precise than those of other international human rights violations and 
would be susceptible to judicial analysis and development on a case by case basis with the 
necessary certainty required in law. 
 
10.2 If It Is a Human Rights Violation, Why Articulate It Any further? 
 
10.2.1 The Tension 
 
If systemic intimate violence fulfills all the elements of an international human rights 
violation, why repeat it through specific articulation? Having established that the claim against 
systemic intimate violence is consistent with and extends from the fundamental rights recognized 
in the UN Charter, is its specific enunciation (either in a treaty or through decisions of 
international tribunals and fora) an unnecessarily duplication of international law? 
 
A tension arises: in order for an interest to be recognized as an international right, it must 
extend from one of the overarching broad principles in international law.1047 However, while the 
value in question should reflect the tenets of international law, it cannot merely repeat an existing 
right.1048 The potential problem is that if the interest does extend from an international principle 
then, by definition, the express statement of that interest at international law must be a repetition 
(at least in part) of the relevant broad overarching principle. If repetitive restatements are 
                                                
1044 Moreover, Alston himself acknowledges that this is neither a closed list of criteria nor an accurate one. His list is 
a guide of what a list of criteria “might look” like and not what such a list ought to look like. Alston, supra notex, at 
614. 
1045 See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: HANDLING THEM EFFECTIVELY, supra note 2, at 5. 
1046 As described in chapter two, the elements of systemic intimate violence include: harmful conduct, operating on a 
continuum; between intimates; and, perpetuated by virtue of state inertia. The characteristics of each element are 
described in chapter two. 
1047 Based on the hierarchy of UN treaties and treaty bodies, I consider first the U.N. Charter, supra note 508, then 
the UDHR, supra note 4, the ICCPR and ICSCER, supra note 13, followed by CEDAW, the Torture Convention, 
supra note 5, and the other principal UN rights treaties. For a discussion of the development of these bodies and 
concomitant treaties, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 493, at 27-133. 
1048 Alston, supra note 477, at [Note: citation to follow]. 
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prohibited, however, how does one demonstrate that a principle is extrapolated from the UDHR 
(or any other authoritative source) but at the same time is not a repetition thereof?  
 
A possible answer to this tension is that international law can, and should, expressly 
articulate a right which extends from one of the overarching principles of international law when 
either (1) states are failing to uphold and enforce that right adequately, and such articulation 
could remedy that failing and/or (2) states have misconceptualized that right, which undermines 
the enforcement thereof. That is, where the overarching principles of international law are 
ineffective for the purposes of enforcing that right, the international community should state that 
right separately to make clear that states are bound to recognize and uphold that right. In 
addition, where states have recognized the need to uphold the right in question, but in practice 
have misinterpreted that right, a clear and separate articulation is required. 
 
Most treaties which stem from a general principle of the UN Charter make reference to the 
question of practical enforcement. The Convention against Torture, for example, cites the UN 
Charter’s commitment to universal human rights and the prohibition against torture in the 
UDHR.1049 However, in explaining the need for a specific convention against torture, it sets forth 
the desire to “make more effective the struggle against torture … throughout the world,” thereby 
justifying the specific articulation of the torture prohibition in the UDHR through the Convention 
against Torture. 
 
CEDAW, another example, is based on the principles in the UDHR which protect equality, 
dignity and privacy.1050 CEDAW sought to create a binding instrument that would “implement 
the principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women...”1051 However, its creation was not merely a repetition of the right to equality because 
it recreated and refined equality in respect of women’s lives in a way that was absent from the 
UDHR and the principles of international law at the time. CEDAW, in other words, filled a gap. 
This is confirmed in its preamble which acknowledges that, notwithstanding the commitment to 
sex equality in the UN Charter, the UDHR and other international instruments, sex 
discrimination continued to exist,1052 and a more specific understanding of the right to sex 
equality was needed.1053 I propose the same rationale in respect of systemic intimate violence.  
                                                
1049 Preamble to the Torture Convention, supra note 5. 
1050 Preamble to CEDAW, supra note 21. 
1051 Preamble to CEDAW, supra note 21. 
1052 Preamble to CEDAW, supra note 21. 
1053 See the Preamble to CEDAW, supra note 21, stating that, while the UN Charter, the UDHR and other 
international legal instruments cite equality between the sexes, sex discrimination continues to exist and something 
more is needed:  
“Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women,  
Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the principle of the inadmissibility of 
discrimination and proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that 
everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, 
including distinction based on sex, 
Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights have the obligation to ensure 
the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, 
Considering the international conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women, 
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The Torture Convention and CEDAW are examples of my claim that a separate articulation 
of a UDHR right is possible where it achieves the better protection of a specific right. In the case 
of the Torture Convention, a treaty was needed to create a binding instrument, detailing the 
substance of States’ obligations.1054 In the case of CEDAW, a treaty was needed to facilitate 
“change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the 
family.”1055 Further examples of the specific development of UDHR rights include: the Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, stemming from the prohibition against 
slavery;1056 the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, 
stemming from the rights of detainees;1057 and the prohibition against rape as a weapon of war in 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, emanating from the international rules of 
war and the Geneva Conventions.1058  
 
For the reasons discussed in this chapter, I argue for the further specification of the right to 
protection from systemic intimate violence. While the fundamental rights of equality, physical 
integrity and dignity, on which the internationalization of systemic intimate violence is based, 
exist already in the UDHR (and other binding instruments), the existing international law is not 
serving to protect the specific manner in which these rights are violated by systemic intimate 
violence. 
 
Therefore, the failure of states in practice to enforce women’s rights to be free from such 
violence evidences either: (1) that they have misconceptualized the severity and frequency of 
such violence; and/or (2) that they have failed (whether as a result of gender discrimination or 
otherwise) to extrapolate this right from the existing international law principles. A separate and 
binding articulation of this right is required. Moreover, a similar approach has already occurred 
in the context of other forms of violence against women. 
 
10.2.2 Recent Specifications of Women’s Rights in International Law  
 
My proposal for a separate and binding articulation of women’s right to be free from 
systemic intimate violence is not unprecedented, and in fact follows a recent trend in 
international law. Mass rape and FGC have both been identified as manifestations of violence 
against women which required specific and independent attention in international law.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations adopted by the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies promoting equality of rights of men and women, 
Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments extensive discrimination against women 
continues to exist.” 
1054 See Lene Wendland for the Association of the Prevention of Torture, A Handbook on State Obligations under 
the UN Convention against Torture, Geneva May 2002, available at 
http://www.apt.ch/pub/library/A%20Handbook%20on%20State%20Obligations%20under%20the%20UN%20CAT.
pdf.  
1055 Preamble to CEDAW, supra note 21. 
1056 Trafficking Protocol, supra note 22. 
1057 U.N. Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 542. 
1058 Article _ of the Rome Statute, supra note 9. [Note: find section]  
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The ICTY’s Kunarac decision demonstrates how a norm, which is grounded in international 
law, can be extended to create a newly enunciated legal provision. Kunarac was convicted of 
sexual enslavement. Enslavement had been designated as a crime against humanity in the 
Nuremberg Trials, and was prohibited in terms of the UDHR. However, the ICTY identified 
mass rape as constituting a more narrow and precise crime, a “specific type of enslavement (i.e. 
sexual enslavement),”1059 in part because the crime in question was not considered to be 
addressed properly under the current laws.1060 
 
Another example of the specification of rights is FGC.1061 Initially, the international 
position regarding FGC was based on established norms in the UDHR, the Convention for the 
Rights of the Child,1062 CEDAW,1063 and the Convention against Torture.1064 However, 
notwithstanding that the general tenets of established international law were applicable, and 
therefore could be extrapolated, to FGC, the international community recognized that a 
deficiency remained since “international law failed to provide a strong, feasible solution for the 
eradication of the practice.”1065 
 
Based on these developments in respect of mass rape and FGC, I propose that systemic 




I propose that women’s interest to be free from systemic intimate violence is an 
international human right, enforceable in international law. The theorizing of philosophers and 
jurists reveal four elements inherent in human rights violations, namely, fundamentality, 
universality, vulnerability and state accountability. 
 
                                                
1059 See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1285. However, the tribunal’s 
categorization of mass rape as a crime against humanity was more difficult. In order to found jurisdiction, the ICTY 
determined that the rapes in Foca: took place during an armed conflict; constituted an attack directed against a 
civilian population; in that the acts of the accused formed part of an attack directed against the civilian population; 
where the attack was widespread or systematic; and the accused knew of the wider context in which the attack took 
place. For a discussion of these elements see Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra 
notex, at 1285-1290. 
1060 This is why rape was criminalized specifically, but not death by a machete, which was an unusual tool for 
genocide. The reason why a new rule against genocide by a machete was not created is because the current laws 
were sufficient to address this particular crime. For a discussion of the advancement of international law by the 
tribunal decisions, and the definitions it adopted, see Jonathan M.H. Short, Sexual Violence as Genocide: The 
Developing Law of the International Criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal Court, 8 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 503 (2003) [hereinafter Short, supra note 573]. 
1061 For a discussion of female genital cutting see FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS & POLICIES, 
supra note 57. See also Bowman, supra note 112. 
1062 Children’s Convention, supra note 7. 
1063 See Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 7] (indicating the deficiencies of CEDAW in that countries would enter 
reservations against the treaty, having been “offended by the notion that their customs and traditions are seemingly 
disposable…”) 
1064 Since the mid-1980s, the UN has made several attempts to mitigate the harm of FGC, predominantly through 
education and awareness-raising. See Bowman, supra note 112, at [ page 6-7]. 
1065 Bowman, supra note 112, at [ page 6]. Of course, it is unclear that the internationalization of FGC has achieved 
such opposition, but this will be discussed in the context of the benefit of international law below. 
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The rights violated by systemic intimate violence are fundamental. The uninterrupted 
violence, perpetrated by one individual upon another, violates the victim’s fundamental rights to 
equality, physical integrity, and dignity. In addition, notwithstanding the practice of some states 
to the contrary, the norm against systemic intimate violence is universal. Women as a group are 
vulnerable to systemic intimate violence because of ingrained sex inequality and the very private 
nature of the violence involved. Finally, the state, having knowledge of perpetual harm wrought 
upon women as a group, is required to react. Its failure to do so renders it accountable for the 
continued violence. 
 
Therefore, the four elements of international human rights pertain to the violation caused by 
systemic intimate violence. Therefore, systemic intimate violence is a human rights violation 
warranting the application of international law. What, however, does the application of 
international law actually mean? 
 
The next chapter turns to discuss the principles of state responsibility in international law. 
These principles apply whenever a state violates an international obligation, inter alia, to protect 
human rights. Having established the existence of a right in international law to protection 
against systemic intimate violence, I now address the theoretical consequences of a states’ 







State Responsibility in International Law for  
Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
 
The fury of persecution receives an impetus not only from acquiescence, but also from 
the hesitation and reserve of foreign intercession coupled with courteous admission that 








Part A: Introductory Comments 
 
 
1. Description of this Chapter 
 
This chapter analyzes the principles of state responsibility in international law and applies 
them to the notion that states have an international obligation to protect women from systemic 
intimate violence. The study of state responsibility deals with the “principle[s] which establishes 
an obligation to make good any violation of international law producing injury…”1068 
 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part: (1) summarizes the claim I make in the 
chapter as a whole; (2) provides an historical overview of the development of the law of state 
responsibility in international law; and, (3) distinguishes between primary and secondary 
obligations in international law. 
 
The second part is a discussion of the elements of state responsibility. That is, the factual 
circumstances that are necessary in order for a state to be held liable for an international 
obligation. I break the elements down into three categories: (1) conduct; (2) wrongfulness; and, 
(3) miscellaneous. I propose that where a country allows systemic intimate violence, the 
elements of state responsibility are triggered. 
 
Therefore, based on chapters two, which identifies the right to be free from systemic intimate 
violence, chapter three, providing the jurisprudential justification for the right, and this chapter, 
which argues that states have an international obligation to protect women from systemic 
                                                
1066 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (1968) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT]. 
1067 Kerri L. Ritz, Soft Enforcement: Inadequacies of Optional Protocol as a Remedy for the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 191 (2001). 
1068 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 22. 
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intimate violence, I conclude that systemic intimate violence is an international human rights 
violation. 
 




Creating a standard of state responsibility is the primary purpose of internationalizing 
systemic intimate violence. If the substance of systemic intimate violence is such that the harm 
factually falls within international human rights law, an omission by governments to assist 
abused women would fall within the purview of the rules of state responsibility.1069 States then 
would be compelled to amend their breach of international law and take positive steps to protect 
women, including those discussed in chapter 2.1070 
 
The pivotal issue, however, is whether it is possible to hold states liable for conduct that is 
perpetrated by private individuals who have nothing to do with the state. I maintain that, based 
on the progression of international legal theory, it is “now recognized that not only governments, 
but also corporations, private death squads, and other groups, as well as individuals, violate 
human rights. Most recently, various forms of violence against women by spouses, partners, and 
other family members, are recognized to be human rights violations.”1071 
 
2.2 States Should Be Responsible for the Actions of Their Citizens 
 
I propose that if a state knows that a segment of its population is subject to persistent abuse, 
and fails to prevent harm to this group of people, the state has participated in the violation of that 
segment’s human right to live without violence.1072 Moreover, if there is a type of harm that 
human beings have a right not to experience, states have the corresponding obligation to protect 
their citizens from the violation of such a right, even where the violation is caused directly by 
private citizens and not by state actors. 
 
                                                
1069 Christian Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human Rights Violations: The 
Position under General International Law, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL REPARATIONS IN 
INSTANCES OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4, (Ed.s Albrecht Randelzhofer and Christian Tomuschat 
1999) [hereinafter Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims] (maintaining that governments may be reluctant to 
accept a diminished role in international affairs and this translates into an opposition to granting individuals rights as 
subjects in international law). Crawford makes the point that the violation of a duty imposed by an international 
legal standard will give rise to state responsibility. CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 126. See also footnotes 210-212. 
1070 The principles of state responsibility maintain that only states can hold other states responsible for a breach of an 
international obligation. Therefore, the principles of state responsibility vis-à-vis systemic intimate violence would 
have top be enforced by other states. See Part Three, Chapter One of the ICL articles, supra n. 
1071 See BUCHANAN, supra notex, at 77 (“…human rights were originally conceived as being addressed to 
governments, and hence the correlative obligations were thought to be obligations of governments. There is a 
growing tendency, however, to view the obligations that human rights carry as entirely general, even if it is assumed 
that governments have the chief responsibility for ensuring that these obligations are met.”).  
1072 For authority for the notion that states are responsible for their international wrongful acts, see CRAWFORD, 
supra note 203, at 77-78 point 2. 
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To date, most international law applies to the conduct of states in respect of other states or 
the citizens of other states.1073 However, international law is transmogrifying; as it grows in size 
and stature, the realm of its application broadens and conduct that previously went unchecked is 
increasingly regulated. Through an examination of the history of state responsibility in 
international law, it is clear that the development of this area of law allows for the imposition of 
liability on states, not for their actions, but for their inaction towards repeated harm.  
 
The question, therefore, is whether one can hold the state responsible for its failure to 
provide protection to women in the face of immediate and predictable harm by their intimate 
partners. This chapter proposes that states can, and should, be held responsible in such 
circumstances. 
 
2.3 Origin of the State’s International Obligation is Irrelevant 
 
A state commits a breach of an international obligation when the act in question is not in 
conformity with what is required by that obligation. The origin of the obligation, namely, 
whether it was created by a treaty or is a principle of customary international law, is 
irrelevant.1074 The principles that pertain to state responsibility “are equally applicable in the case 
of breach of treaty obligation, since in the international law field there is no distinction between 
contractual and tortious responsibility, so that any violation by a State of any obligation, of 
whatever origin, gives rise to State responsibility….”1075 Therefore, a state may be responsible 
                                                
1073 This refers to the system of Denial of Justice. For a thorough examination of this notion, see FREEMAN, supra 
note 207 and CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (The New York 
University Press, 1928) [hereinafter, EAGLETON]. Historically, the debate regarding the role of an individual as a 
rights bearer in international law is contentious. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, The Legal Position of the Individual 
under Present International Law, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL REPARATIONS IN INSTANCES OF 
GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 231 (ed.s Albrecht Randelzhofer  and Christian Tomuschat 1999) (“Up to 
now I do not see any right of the individual under public international law being granted by customary law.” Id at 
235 point 3(a)). However, it has become an accepted norm that an individual is a subject of international law and not 
only the states acting on her/his behalf. See paragraph 5 of the Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 
5 (stating that ILC articles “apply to the whole field of the international obligations of States, whether the obligation 
is owed to one or several States, to an individual or group, or to the international community as a whole.”). 
1074 Article 12 of the ILC articles state that there “is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of 
that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.” See 
also the Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 65 and 126-127 (The rules of State responsibility 
“apply to all international obligations of States… established by a customary rule of international law, by a treaty or 
by a general principle applicable within the international legal order. States may assume international obligations by 
a unilateral act. An international obligation may arise from provisions stipulated in a treaty (a decision of an organ 
of an international organization competent in the matter, a judgment given between two States by the International 
Court of Justice or another tribunal, etc.). … The formula, regardless of its origin, refers to all possible sources of 
international obligations, that is to say, to all processes for creating legal obligations recognized by international 
law… Moreover these various grounds of obligation interact with each other, as practice clearly shows. Treaties, 
especially multilateral treaties, can contribute to the formation of general international law; customary law may 
assist in the interpretation of treaties; an obligation contained in a treaty may be applicable to a State by reason of its 
unilateral act, and so on. Thus international courts and tribunals have treated responsibility as arising for a State by 
reason of any violation of a duty imposed by an international juridical standard.”).. 
1075 Rainbow Warrior Affair, UNRIAA, vol. XX, 217, 251, para. 75 (1990) [hereinafter Rainbow Warrior Affair.  
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for the violation of a right that is articulated in a treaty, founded in CIL or that forms part of the 
range of peremptory norms.1076  
 
On this basis, while the authority for the right to be free from systemic intimate violence 
does not subsist in a treaty per se, to the extent that it exists in CIL or by virtue of an 
extrapolation of the principles of international law, or is subsequently articulated as a specific, 
authoritative and binding statement in international law, the obligation to protect women from 





The exact contours of state responsibility for systemic intimate violence are discussed 
below. As a principle, however, it is clear that the framework of state responsibility in 
international law acknowledges two factors that are essential to imputing state responsibility for 
systemic intimate violence: first, state responsibility may subsist in an omission; and second, a 
state may be responsible for an obligation emanating from various origins in international law 
and not necessarily from a treaty it has signed. 
 
I am not suggesting that each incident of severe woman abuse means that the state has 
committed an internationally wrongful act; nor that there should be a state presence in the home 
to stay the thrust of a violent fist. I am advocating merely that states have an obligation to meet 
basic standards to provide safety and the redemption of dignity for those who endure systemic 
intimate violence, including by taking the positive steps discussed in chapter 2. Indeed, the 
reader may be alarmed (and perhaps cynical) that international legal standards are necessary to 
compel states to perform even minimum steps. However, for those who experience systemic 
intimate violence, the realization is that domestic legal systems too often are apathetic, 
inappropriate and, ultimately, unavailable. 
 
3. History of State Responsibility  
 
Human society has long recognized certain rights as accruing to its members – rights 
which prescribe correlative duties on the part of others. Hodie mihi, cras tibi [what is my 
lot today is your lot tomorrow].  
 
Obligation, simply put, is the owing of a duty; and behind it, claiming the performance of 
that duty, is responsibility. 
                                                
1076 Rainbow Warrior Affair, supra note 305, at 550. In holding that both the provisions of the agreements concluded 
between France and New Zealand did not preclude the application of the customary Law of Treaties (as codified in 
the Vienna Convention) and the customary law of state responsibility, the Tribunal stated that the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention are “applicable to the determination whether there have been violations of that principle, and in 
particular, whether material breaches of treaty obligations have been committed.” (para 75 pg 550 of ILR). Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980 [hereinafter 
the Vienna Convention]. See also MALCOLM N. SHAW QC, INTERNATIONAL LAW 694-5 (2003) [hereinafter SHAW]. 
1077 The word “origin” is used in article 12 of the ILC articles instead of “source” to avoid categorizing “source” as 
something distinct from a treaty as is the case in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. See CRAWFORD, 





3.1 Regulation of State Conduct vis-à-vis Other States  
 
Historically, international law was premised on the need for states to regulate their behavior 
inter se, benefiting from a mutual compliance with rules and regulations.1079 The formulation and 
development of international law focused on state conduct with the result that only states, and 
not individuals, were considered subjects of international law.1080  
 
The global regulation of a state’s behavior was limited by the notion of sovereign immunity 
that what happens within the boundaries of a state is the exclusive concern of that state. This was 
challenged to some extent by the rules of diplomatic immunity and the ability of states to 
intervene to protect the interests (economic and otherwise) of their own nationals who were 
living and operating in another state.1081 These were the first real incursions into the doctrinal 
stronghold of sovereign immunity.1082 However, mostly, it was with extreme caution that the 
international community would intervene in the internal affairs of a state. As long as states or 
their citizens were not affected by the internal workings of a third state, it would evade the 
application and obligations of international law.1083 
 
3.2 Regulation of State Conduct vis-à-vis Its Citizens 
 
In the mid-1940s, this trend began to change with the regeneration of international 
humanitarian and human rights law.1084 According to these doctrines, a state is liable in 
international law not only for conduct committed against other states, but also for conduct 
                                                
1078 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 3. 
1079 The aspiration was (and is) that states are required to do good to one another. JANIS, supra note 206, at 2 (“That 
nations ought to do to one another in peace, the most good, and in war, the least evil possible.”). 
1080 Prior to 1945 and the subsequent Charter of the United Nations, the individual was at best the object of 
international law and not the subject. Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims, supra note 299, at 2. See also 
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 5 (describing the controversy whether or not only states but also individuals are 
subjects of the law of nations). 
1081 FREEMAN, supra note 207 and EAGLETON, supra note 303. 
1082 An argument raised in favor of the status of an individual in international law is that international law developed 
as the law of nations, governing the rights and obligations of “a surprisingly small number of artificial, politico-legal 
corporate entities known as state” and that this narrow focus should be amended to include the broader notion of 
human individuals. See JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 18 2001. 
1083 Eagleton elegantly sets the stage for the balancing test inherent in state responsibility, namely: “The 
investigation involves, upon the one hand, the control which a state, as a member of the international community, is 
expected to maintain within its own territory; and, on the other hand, the degree to which external restraints may 
have been established over that state, thereby hampering its freedom of action, and the control which it may be able 
to exercise.” EAGLETON, supra note 303 at 27. 
1084 Lauterpacht, cites the law of humanitarian intervention as one of the earliest manifestations of international 
recognition of individual rights, especially in cases “in which a State maltreats its subjects in a manner which shocks 
the conscience of mankind.” LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 32. Janis provides an important introduction to the 
notion of individuals as rights-bearers in international law. JANIS, supra note 206, at 253. 
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committed against its own citizens.1085 As a result, the international community now can compel 
a delinquent state to treat its own citizens according to the tenets of international law.1086 
 
This shift led to the question whether an individual possesses, or can possess, rights given to 
her or him directly by customary international law or by treaties.1087 Underlying this movement 
was the issue of so-called fundamental rights of the individual; rights that could be protected by 
international law as against the sovereign power of the state.1088 
 
This question reached its pinnacle after the Holocaust. The culmination of World War II 
and the revelation of the full extent of the Holocaust placed renewed and serious focus on human 
rights or the so-called rights of man.1089 Having taken humankind to the brink of inhumanity and 
beyond, the events of the Holocaust inculcated a fresh need to articulate rights of individuals and 
groups and identify corresponding obligations. This development coincided with the 
establishment of the United Nations, charged with the creation of a supra-standard of order, a 
standard to which states could aspire and on which individuals could rely.1090 The reverberation 
of “never again” resulted in the tapestry of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
19481091 and, in 1956, the two rights covenants, namely the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights1092 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.1093 
 
3.3 The Status of the Individual in International Law  
 
As the application of rights broadened, so did the question of duties. The proposition that 
individuals could be subjects of international rights triggered the corollary conclusion that they 
                                                
1085 The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the [Inter-
American] Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished and the victim’s 
full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to 
ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction. Velasquez Rodriguez Case 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Judgment of July 29, 1988 at 176.  
1086 Velasquez Rodriguez Case Inter-American Court of Human Rights Judgment of July 29, 1988 at 134 (“The 
objective of international human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are guilty of violations, but rather 
to protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages resulting from the acts of the States 
responsible.”). 
1087 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 5. Freeman argued that “[f]rom a technical legal standpoint responsibility … 
is simply a quality of relationship between a certain individual and a sanction – in other words, a state of facts 
designating that relation which arises between him who commits an unlawful act, and the sanction established for it. 
And in the international sphere, the situation is much the same instead that we are dealing with collectivities instead 
of individuals.” FREEMAN, supra note 207 at 18. 
1088 Id. 
1089 The application of public international law to individuals authoritatively began with the Nuremburg Trials. 
JANIS, supra note 206, at 259: “Crimes against international law are committed by men and not be abstract entities 
and only by punishing individuals can we enforce the law.” The corollary to this statement is that crimes in 
international law are committed against women and only protecting individuals can the law be enforced. 
1090 According to Lauterpacht “It is in the Charter of the United Nations that the individual human being first 
appears as entitled to fundamental human rights and freedoms” and that the enactment of crimes against humanity 
“constitutes the recognition of fundamental human rights superior to the law of the sovereign State.” LAUTERPACHT, 
supra note 309, at 38. 
1091 UDHR, supra note 4. 
1092 ICCPR, supra note 4. 
1093 ICSCER, supra note 13. 
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also could be the holders of international duties.1094 Some argued that unless legal duties are 
accepted as resting upon the individual being, they do not in practice nor in law obligate 
anyone.1095 Certainly, by the late nineteenth century it was recognized that there are acts or 
omissions for which international law imposes criminal responsibility on individuals and for 
which punishment may be applied.1096 
 
The prolonged debate regarding the status of an individual in international law continues 
today.1097 However, while many still maintain that an individual is not a subject of international 
law and that international law concerns itself only with states (whose interests are to protect its 
own citizens),1098 it is widely accepted that an individual is very much the subject of the rules of 
international law.1099 For example, in 1949 the International Court of Justice authoritatively 
                                                
1094 The assertion that duties prescribed by international law are binding upon the impersonal entity of States as 
distinguished from the individuals who compose them and act on their behalf would open the door wide for 
acceptance, in relation to States, of standards of morality different from those applying among individuals. See the 
preamble to the ICSCER, supra note 13: “…that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the 
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.” LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 5: “the cogency of the claim to the former 
gains by admission of the latter.” 
1095 Id. 
1096 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 565 (5th Edition 1998) [hereinafter BROWNLIE]. 
1097 This was particularly evident in European community law. In 1961 in the case of Van Gend and Loos, the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities  ruled that a community citizen had the right to see the law protecting 
her/his status respected by community institutions as well as community states. This was so irrespective of the 
wording of the rule. See Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims, supra note 299, at 8. See Andrea Francovich and 
Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357 EU: Case C-6/90 at 31 [hereinafter Francovich 
case]: “The subjects of that legal system [the legal system of the European community] are not only the Member 
States but also their nationals.” In the Francovich case the individual was granted reparations directly. This led to the 
establishment of the principle that “since the individual is deemed to be placed at the same level as the States which 
have created the Community legal order, no differentiation seems justifiable, provided that the rules in issue are 
clearly intended to benefit the Community citizen.” Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims, supra note 299, at 8. 
1098 See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change, UN SECURE WORLD REPORT, 23 (2003) available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf: “…the 
concept of State and international responsibility to protect civilians from the effects of war and human rights abuses 
has yet to truly overcome the tension between the competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to 
intervene.” For a discussion of the positivist theory of international law see JANIS, supra note 206, at 248. 
1099 Lauterpacht makes the point that the positivist doctrine that only states are subjects of international law has been 
largely rejected by the majority of international law theorists and practitioners. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, 
at 6, footnote 2 and 9: “Like various other tenets of the positivist creed, the doctrine that only State are subjects of 
international law  is unable to stand the test of actual practice.” This is enforced by the monist position that “national 
and international law both are part of the same legal order and international law can, without any specific 
transformation, be directly applied by a national court.” CARL AAGE NØRGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 25-6 (Munksgaard Copenhagen, 1962). In this sense the individual is a subject of 
international law by virtue of the fact that her/his membership in the national legal system translates into a 
synonymous membership in the international legal system. On the other hand, the dualist school maintains that 
“national and international law are two separate legal orders. International law is never applied directly by national 
courts, but must be transformed in one way or another to national law before it can be applied by national organs.” 
The position of the individual as a subject of law, therefore, is exclusively within the realm of national law. On 
However, the latter theory fails to survive the empirical reality of that individuals are treated as subjects in 
international law. 
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accepted “instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not 
States.”1100 In response to this decision, Lauterpacht maintains that by: 
 
…thus laying down, with emphatic clarity, that States are not the only subjects of 
international law the Court did as much for liberating international law from the shackles 
of an obsolete and retrogressive doctrine as did its predecessor in rejecting the view that 
individuals cannot directly acquire international rights under treaties.1101 
 
There are compelling arguments to posit the individual not only as a subject of international 
law, but also as the de facto actor in international law, deserving of protection notwithstanding 
the source of violence suffered by that individual. Support for this position can be found in 
proponents of both positive and natural law.1102 Renowned critical legal positivist, Hans Kelsen, 
argues that international law constitutes the regulation of human conduct: 
 
It is to men (sic) that the norms of international law apply; it is against men (sic) that they 
provide sanctions; it is to men (sic) that they entrust the competence of creating the 
norms of the order. If international law lays down duties, responsibilities, and rights (it 
must do so if it is a legal order), these duties, responsibilities, and rights can have only 
human conduct for content… If duty, responsibility, and right do not refer to the conduct 
of men (sic), duty, responsibility, and right would be only empty formulas, meaningless 
words.1103 
 
Lauterpacht, the preeminent expounder of natural law, maintains similarly that since 
international law: 
 
                                                
1100 The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 April 1949 at page 178 (discussing whether the 
UN constitutes a legal subject in international law). 
1101 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 23. 
1102 Hans Kelsen and Lauterpacht may be cited as authority on positivist and naturalist legal thinking respectively. 
See KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-221 [hereinafter KELSEN], maintaining that “The validity of a 
positive legal order cannot be denied because of the content of its norms… The Pure Theory describes the positive 
law as an objectively valid normative order and states that this interpretation is possible only under the condition 
that a basic norm is pre-supposed according to which the subject meaning of the law-creating acts is also their 
objective meaning.” Note: confirm that this is an appropriate extract as support for Kelsen as a positivist.  See 
also KELSEN, supra note 336, at 151: “This version of the natural-law doctrine [that the fundamental right of the 
State can be deduced from the nature of international law] is logically just as impossible as the classical version of 
that doctrine. Legal principles can never be presupposed by a legal order; they can only be created in conformity 
with this order. For they are ‘legal’ only because and insofar as they are established on the basis of a positive legal 
order. The only principle which may and must be presupposed is the fundamental principle determining the first 
constitution of the legal order, ‘constitution’ meaning the rules determining the methods by which the law is to be 
created.” Lauterpacht, on the other hand, states that “Inasmuch as, upon final analysis, they (the law of nature and 
natural rights) are an expression of moral claims, they are a powerful lever of legal reform. The moral claims of 
today are often the legal rights of tomorrow. The law of nature, even when conceived as an expression of mere 
ethical postulates, is an inarticulate but powerful element in the interpretation of existing law. Even after human 
rights and freedoms have become part of the positive fundamental law of mankind (sic), the ideas of natural law and 
natural rights which underlie them will constitute that higher law which must forever remain the ultimate standard of 
fitness of all positive law, whether national or international.” LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 74. For a more 
extensive summary of Kelsen’s positivist views vs. those of Lauterpacht see SHAW, supra note 306, at 48-53. 
1103 KELSEN, supra note 336, at 97. 
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…incorporates obligations to respect the fundamental human rights and freedoms it 
amounts to recognition of individuals as subjects of international law. These obligations 
and … their effectiveness will depend to some extent on the final abandonment of the 
doctrine of the inherently inferior status of individuals in the sphere of international 
law.1104 
 
These uniform theories from diametrically opposed jurisprudential ideologies represent a 
theme in the development of international law, which is evident from several international 
instruments. In 1980 the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties came into force,1105 
compelling states to comply with treaties, including human rights treaties that focus on 
individuals.1106 Henkin echoes this principle and maintains that the concept of human rights in 
international law requires the state “not only to respect but to ensure rights, that is, ensure respect 
for them by private persons.”1107 The result is that  
 
[e]very legal right of the individual is by definition an interest which in greater or lesser 
degree has the protection of the law. The protection is in the first instance against the 
violation of his rights by other individuals; and this is true of what we consider as human 
rights no less than of other rights.1108 
 
3.4 The ICL Articles 
 
In 2001, the International Law Commission (“the ILC”) adopted the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, (hereinafter “the ILC articles”). The 
ILC articles are an attempt “to formulate, by way of codification and progressive development, 
the basic rules of international law concerning the responsibility of states for their internationally 
wrongful acts.”1109 The arguments in this chapter are based on the ILC’s work on state 
responsibility, which has “become widely invoked evidence of general international law.”1110  
 
The ILC articles represent nearly forty years of work by the ILC guided by five special 
rapporteurs.1111 It provides a comprehensive description of the circumstances in which a state is 
                                                
1104 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 35. 
1105 Vienna Convention, supra note 306. 
1106 Vienna Convention, supra note 306, at article 18: “a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty…” 
1107 HENKIN, supra note 426, at  8. 
1108 Professor Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Legal Protection of Human Rights – National and International, in AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 83 (Sir Francis Vallat ed., Europa Publications: London, 1970) 
[hereinafter Waldock]. 
1109 Draft Articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law 
Commission of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/53/53sess.htm [hereinafter ILC articles]. 
1110 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 5 (1994). 
1111  CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at ix. Article 33 is one of the few articles to expressly reveal the role of the 
individual. Crawford points out that “a State’s responsibility for the breach of an obligation under a treaty 
concerning the protection of human rights may exist towards all the other parties to the treaty, but the individuals 
concerned should be regarded as the ultimate beneficiaries and in that sense as the holders of the relevant rights.” 
CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 209. However, as Crawford points out, para 1 of article 33 merely makes scope for 
the possibility of a claim by an individual but it does not govern it. This will be a matter for the particular primary 
rule to determine. CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 210. 
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liable for internationally wrongful acts, the duties that arise upon the commission of such acts 
and applicable reparations. While the ILC articles do not make an express link between states 
and individuals, the commentaries to the ILC articles do make it clear that states can hold each 
other responsible for internationally wrongful acts which may affect individuals as well as 
states.1112  
 
Chapter III of the ILC articles defines a breach of an international obligation with reference 
to a two step process. First, it is necessary to determine whether there is an obligation in 
international law (the primary obligation). The second question is whether the particular state in 
question has in fact breached its obligation to satisfy that primary obligation (the secondary 
obligation). If the answer to both questions is yes, there is an internationally wrongful act for 
which the state is responsible. Therefore, for the purpose of determining whether systemic 
intimate violence is a human rights violation for which states are responsible, it is necessary to 
distinguish between primary and secondary obligations in international law.1113 
 
3.5 Primary and Secondary Obligations  
 
Primary obligations of states relate to the content of a right.1114 When determining whether 
a state is responsible for a breach, the initial analysis focuses on the primary obligation “which 
has to be interpreted and applied to the situation, determining thereby the substance of the 
conduct required, the standard to be observed, the result to be achieved.”1115 The codification 
and/or enunciation of primary rules is found in the various sources of international law, namely, 
treaties, tribunal and court decisions, CIL and scholastic work.1116 Primary obligations, therefore, 
relate to a specific right. 
 
Secondary obligations of states are the “general conditions under international law for the 
state to be considered responsible for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences 
which flow therefrom.”1117 Secondary obligations, therefore, are general principles, which apply 
when a specific right has been breached. These principles are generic and apply equally in 
respect of the breach of any right. Secondary obligations, in turn, apply when a state, either in the 
form of an omission or commission, violates, or causes the violation of, an identified human 
right. Therefore, while the primary-rule analysis looks to specific aspects of the right, the 
secondary-rule refers to generic state conduct, applicable in all instances of breach. 
                                                
1112 The ILC articles do not impose responsibility on states or other non-state actors. Articles 57 and 58 of the ILC 
Articles and Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 62. However, all states are able to intervene to 
protect the violation of basic human rights. Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 66 (“Every State, 
by virtue of its membership in the international community, has a legal interest in the protection of certain basic 
rights and the fulfilment of certain essential obligations.”). 
1113 BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 436.  
1114 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 74. 
1115 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 124. 
1116 Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 10 (“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the 
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”)  
1117 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 74. See point three for the role of secondary rules. 
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It should be noted that while the seriousness of a state’s breach may be relevant when 
determining remedies, it is irrelevant for ascertaining state responsibility.1118 For example, a state 
will be responsible equally for an internationally wrongful act irrespective of whether that 
wrongful act involves the violation of a bi-lateral trade treaty by providing preferential treatment 
to its own nationals, or the violation of the genocide convention. Both acts result in the 
responsibility of a state for non-compliance with an international obligation, notwithstanding 
their marked difference in gravity. Therefore, in the context of assiduous systemic intimate 
violence, liability would attach to the violation itself, requiring the state to obviate the effects of 
the international obligation it has breached.1119 
 
The two obligations are linked inextricably and both must sustain examination in order to 
prove that systemic intimate violence is a human rights violation for which states are responsible.  
 
Chapter three provided the legal theoretical basis for why freedom from systemic intimate 
violence is a human rights at international law. That is, it discussed the basis on which states 
have a primary obligation to address systemic intimate violence. The remainder of this chapter, 
in turn, discusses the secondary obligation of states, in practice, to satisfy that primary 
obligation. The emphasis of the ILC articles is on these secondary rules of state responsibility, 
namely, “the general conditions under international law for the state to be considered responsible 
for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom.”1120 It is 
this that I now address. 
 
 




In order to establish state responsibility for systemic intimate violence in international law, 
the following elements must exist. First, there must be state conduct, either in the form of an 
omission or a commission.1121 The conduct must be carried out by the state or the conduct in 
question must be attributable to the state.1122 Second,  the conduct must be wrongful in that it 
                                                
1118 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 23 (distinguishing between the existence of an internationally wrongful act and 
the steps a State may take to remedy it). A similar distinction is drawn by both Eagleton and Freeman between the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act and the steps a State may take to remedy it. Eagleton discusses the 
distinction between state liability as a substantive imposition of responsibility as opposed to the exhaustion of local 
remedies rule which arises in the procedural component of determining responsibility of a State: “The rule of local 
redress is the dividing line between the substantive and the procedural aspects of responsibility.” EAGLETON, supra 
note 303, at 23. 
1119 This is confirmed by Crawford: “Individual breaches of international law can vary across a wide spectrum from the 
comparatively trivial or minor up to cases which imperil the survival of communities and people….” CRAWFORD, 
supra note 203, at 191-2. 
1120 Id. 
1121 Article 2 refers to “conduct consisting of an action or omission;” article 15(1) allows for a breach through a 
series of omissions “defined in the aggregate as wrongful.” ILC articles, supra note 300.  
1122 Which, according to Kelsen, is the only way in which a state can act since it consists of individuals acting 
according to a certain norm or set of rules. KELSEN, supra note 336, at 97-9. Article 2(a) of the ILC articles provides 
that conduct must be “attributable to the State under international law.” The notion of attribution is detailed in 
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breaches a primary obligation of the state.1123 It is important to note that, subject to the content of 
the primary obligation, fault and harm are not necessary to trigger state responsibility.1124 
 
The following sections discuss these elements, proposing that a state’s omission to take 
certain minimum positive steps to protect individuals from systemic intimate violence is 
“conduct”, which is “wrongful” in that it breaches that state’s primary international obligation to 
help remedy such violence. 
 
5. The Element of Conduct 
 
Finally, in so far as responsibility growing out of the uncontrollable, independent acts of private 
individuals is concerned, the rule may be thus stated: Although such acts cannot be imputed to the 






                                                                                                                                                       
chapter III of the ILC articles. ILC articles, supra note 300. For a criticism of ‘imputability’ see BROWNLIE, supra 
note 329, at 438. See also CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 4 (Confirming the notion that the conduct of persons can 
be attributed to the State). 
1123 Article 1 states that “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State;” article 2(b): there is an internationally wrongful act when there is a breach of an international obligation of 
the State. ILC articles, supra note 300. See also the Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 68 (“Two 
elements are identified. First, the conduct in question must be attributable to the State under international law. 
Secondly, for responsibility to attach to the act of the State, the conduct must constitute a breach of an international 
legal obligation in force for that State at that time.”). See also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3. (pointing out that, in order to establish the responsibility of Iran “[f]irst, it must 
determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be regarded as imputable to the Iranian State. Secondly, it must 
consider their compatibility or incompatibility with the obligations of Iran under treaties in force or under any other 
rules of international law that may be applicable.” See also the Dickson Car Wheel Company case, the Mexico-
United States General Claims Commission UNRIAA, vol. IV, p. 669 (1931), at p. 678 (noting that the condition 
required for a State to incur international responsibility is “that an unlawful international act be imputed to it, that is, 
that there exist a violation of a duty imposed by an international juridical standard.”).  
As regards wrongfulness, see the Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 71 (“The second condition for 
the existence of an internationally wrongful act of the State is that the conduct attributable to the State should 
constitute a breach of an international obligation of that State. The terminology of breach of an international 
obligation of the State is long established and is used to cover both treaty and non-treaty obligations.”). See also 
Factory at Chorzów, Merits, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 29 and Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), 
UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990), at p. 251, para. 75. 
1124 See SHAW, supra note 306, at 696-698. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 436: “…the law of responsibility 
is concerned with the incidence and consequences of illegal acts….” Harm is not a requirement in the ILC articles, 
supra note 300. See also the Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 73 (“It is sometimes said that 
international responsibility is not engaged by conduct of a State in disregard of its obligations unless some further 
element exists, in particular, “damage” to another State. But whether such elements are required depends on the 
content of the primary obligation, and there is no general rule in this respect. For example, the obligation under a 
treaty to enact a uniform law is breached by the failure to enact the law, and it is not necessary for another State 
party to point to any specific damage it has suffered by reason of that failure. Whether a particular obligation is 
breached forthwith upon a failure to act on the part of the responsible State, or whether some further event must 
occur, depends on the content and interpretation of the primary obligation and cannot be determined in the 
abstract.”). 
1125 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 27 
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5.1 Introduction  
 
State responsibility is triggered when a state commits an internationally wrongful act,1126 
which includes “conduct consisting of an action or omission.”1127  
 
Below, I discuss the following aspects of the conduct element in the context of systemic 
intimate violence: (1) for the purposes of state responsibility, state conduct includes an omission 
to protect individual citizens from the acts of other individual citizens; (2) such omissions are 
made by state officials; (3) states must be proactive and take steps to enforce both negative and 
positive rights; and (4) states which fail to ensure that state officials protect women from 
systemic intimate violence commit an internationally wrongful act. 
 




I propose that it is the conduct of the state itself, in the form of an omission, which 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act.1128 In particular, it is the state’s inertia to the 
recurrence of systemic intimate violence which constitutes “conduct” for the purposes of state 
responsibility.1129 
 
No “attribution” issue arises in this case. It is not necessary to attribute the act of the 
individual abuser to the state because the required “conduct” element is satisfied by the omission 
by the state itself.1130 As will be discussed below, conduct includes omissions made by state 
agencies, such as the police and judiciary. The notion of complicity also is not necessary to my 
argument.1131 The doctrine of complicity maintains that where a state fails to apprehend or 
punish unlawful conduct perpetrated against an alien, the state becomes an accomplice to the 
original unlawful act. On this basis, the responsibility of the state is triggered. However, I 
maintain that this doctrine is not necessary. It is potentially unwieldy, and is a product of the 
common law approach to attribution of guilt in criminal law. 
 
                                                
1126 Article 1 of the ILC articles (“Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State.”). 
1127 Article 2 of the ILC articles. 
1128 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, calls on states to take necessary and effective measures to combat 
all forms of gender-based violence, irrespective of who the perpetrator is. General Recommendation No. 19 also 
confirms that the CEDAW provisions are not restricted to actions by or on behalf of governments and that in terms 
of general international law and specific conventions, “States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to 
act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing 
compensation.” General Recommendation 19, supra note 35. 
1129 BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 453: “In international relations as in other social relations, the invasion of the 
legal interest of one subject of the law by another legal person creates responsibility in various forms determined by 
the particular legal system.” 
1130 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 77 (arguing that “the state is never responsible for the act of an individual as 
such: the act of the individual merely occasions the responsibility of the state in an illegality of its own – an 
omission to prevent or punish, or positive encouragement of, the act of the individual.”). 
1131 For a discussion of the complicity doctrine see FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 370-372. 
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The responsibility of a State does not need to be grounded in such a legal fiction. There is a 
closer, more direct and more logically sustainable basis from which state responsibility arises, 
namely the State’s omission. It is its failure to take steps to help remedy systemic intimate 
violence that is itself unlawful and there is no need to correlate the original unlawful act with the 
state.1132 The state has its own, independent conduct which amounts to an internationally 
wrongful act, namely, its failure to do justice in accordance with its duty to women. 
 
Therefore, the element of conduct is not grounded in the individual abuser’s behavior, but 
rather in the conduct, by way of omission, of the state itself. Also, given the nature of the 
primary rule and systemic intimate violence, where the state fails to satisfy its primary 
obligations to protect its citizens from such violence, that failure results directly in harm and 
damage to the victims. 
 
5.2.2 Primary Source Authority for Responsibility for Omissions in International Law  
 
International law is well accustomed to proscribing certain forms of government omissions, 
which are so pervasive and result in such objectionable harm, that the failure of states to act is a 
violation of an international legal obligation. Such government omissions include: the failure to 
intervene in cases of persecution of racial minorities;1133 the failure to apply the law equally to all 
citizens;1134 the failure to prevent acts of torture;1135 the failure to provide a transparent criminal 
                                                
1132 This is confirmed by FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 372 (“The act itself can never charge the State; only the 
latter’s independent failure to observe its repressive duties is capable of so doing.”). 
1133 See the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of  Racial Discrimination, G.A. res. 2106 
(XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969 [hereinafter the Convention against Racial Discrimination]. Article 2(1) provides that states are obliged 
to “condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races.” State failure to take 
the prescribed steps constitutes a violation of an international obligation. 
1134 Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), 
adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948 [hereinafter the UDHR], provides that “[e]veryone has the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law.” Article 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res., 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter the ICCPR] provides that “[a]ll persons shall be equal 
before the courts and tribunals.” 
1135 Article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
G.A. res. 3452 (XXX), annex, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) [hereinafter the 
Torture Convention] provides that ‘[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” 
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justice system;1136 the failure to prevent child abuse;1137 the failure to prevent the trafficking of 
human beings;1138 and, the failure to prevent mass rape.1139  
 
The ILC articles provide that “[c]onduct attributable to the State can consist of actions or 
omissions. Cases in which the international responsibility of a State has been invoked on the 
basis of an omission are at least as numerous as those based on positive acts, and no difference in 
principle exists between the two.”1140 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states parties to “take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment 
on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal 
guardians, or family members.”1141 
 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
extends the responsibility of the state to end discrimination between “any persons, group or 
organization.”1142 Moreover, the state is obliged to ensure “effective protection and remedies, 
through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial 
discrimination which violate his (sic) human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this 
Convention...”1143  
 
                                                
1136 Article 14(1) of the ICCPR provides that “[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his 
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” Article 14(2) of the ICCPR states that “[e]veryone charged 
with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” ICCPR, 
supra note 4. 
1137 Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept.2 1990 [hereinafter the Children’s Convention], 
requires states to “take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of 
discrimination or punishment…” 
1138 Article 1 of the Trafficking Convention, supra notex, requires states “to punish any person who, to gratify the 
passions of another: (1) Procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the 
consent of that person; (2) Exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the consent of that person.” 
1139 See the Rome Statute, supra note 9. Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, read together with the Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, supra notex, place an obligation on states and combating parties to refrain from and prevent “[r]ape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence 
of comparable gravity.”  
1140 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 70. The commentaries to the ILC articles cite the Corfu 
Channel case, “where the International Court of Justice held that it was a sufficient basis for Albanian responsibility 
that it knew, or must have known, of the presence of the mines in its territorial waters and did nothing to warn third 
States of their presence.” It also makes reference to the Diplomatic and Consular Staff, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at 
pp. 31-32, paras. 63, 67 (where the International Court of Justice concluded that the responsibility of Iran was 
entailed by the “inaction” of its authorities, which “failed to take appropriate steps” in circumstances where such 
steps were evidently necessary). Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 70. 
1141 “Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and 
well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so 
that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community.” Article 2(2). 
1142 Article 2(1)(d) of the Convention against Racial Discrimination, supra note 3, at 47 (“Each State Party shall 
prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial 
discrimination by any persons, group or organization.”). 
1143 Article 6 of the Convention against Racial Discrimination, supra note 3. 
 249 
The definition of torture in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment1144 includes conduct in the form of “consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”1145 It further 
requires states to criminalize “all acts of torture” including “an act by any person which 
constitutes complicity or participation in torture.”1146 
 
A similar obligation exists in the European Economic Community. In Europe, the 1992 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community enjoins member states to “take all 
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations 
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community.”1147 
 
CEDAW provides that a government’s duty to prevent discriminatory conduct extends to 
discriminatory conduct on the part of individuals, organizations and enterprises.1148 General 
Recommendation 9 stipulates that CEDAW “applies to violence perpetrated by public 
authorities”1149 and emphasizes that state conduct “is not restricted to action by or on behalf of 
governments;” a state “may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence….”1150 This 
definition undoubtedly extends the obligation of states to address the conduct of its officials, 
either in the form of harmful action or pernicious inaction. 
 
5.2.3 Secondary Source Authority for Responsibility for Omissions in International 
Law  
 
International courts, tribunals and scholars also have advocated for states to be held 
responsible for the harmful conduct of their citizens where a state has been complicit, has 
acquiesced to or has remained passive in the face of such behavior.1151  
 
In 1982 the United Nations Human Rights Committee interpreted article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment,1152 and stated that:  
 
The scope of protection required goes far beyond torture as normally understood. . . . 
[T]he prohibition must extend to corporal punishment, including excessive chastisement 
as an educational or disciplinary measure. . . . Finally, it is also the duty of public 
authorities to ensure protection by the law against such treatment even when committed 
by persons acting outside or without any official authority.1153 
                                                
1144 Torture Convention, supra note 5. 
1145 Article 1 of the Torture Convention, supra note 5. 
1146 Article 4(1) of the Torture Convention, supra note 5. 
1147 [Note: citation to follow]  
1148 Article 2(e) of CEDAW, supra note 21. 
1149 General Recommendation 19, supra note 35, at paragraph 19. 
1150 Id. 
1151 This is confirmed by CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 80. 
1152 ICCPR, supra note 4, at 52. 
1153 [Note: citation to follow]  
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The Human Rights Committee further developed the enunciation of the positive duty of 
states vis-à-vis their citizens in the context of the ICESCR: 
 
[I]t follows from article 7, read together with article 2 of the Covenant, that States must 
ensure an effective protection through some machinery of control. Complaints about 
illtreatment must be investigated effectively by competent authorities. Those found guilty 
must be held responsible, and the alleged victims must themselves have effective 
remedies at their disposal, including the right to obtain compensation.1154  
 
In the case of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, the overall inefficacy of the administration of 
justice1155 and political will to improve the status quo was seemingly absent.1156 It was this 
absence which triggered international concern, and not only the heinous nature of the killings. 
 
Authority on denial of justice and state responsibility, Freeman, maintains that a state can be 
responsible for conduct “where the original source of the injury was the act of some individual 
acting in a private capacity and where the State subsequently failed in the duties incumbent upon 
it as a consequence of an earlier wrong.”1157 On this basis, this thesis proposes that the failure of 
the state to prevent predictable and extreme harm to an identifiable portion of the population 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act.1158 
 
Therefore, the failure of the state to prevent predictable and extreme harm to an identifiable 
portion of the population constitutes an internationally wrongful act.1159 
 
 
                                                
1154 General Comment 7, supra note 357. 
1155 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, paragraph 34. Many families had requested DNA 
tests to determine and/or confirm the identity of a deceased and either waited without response or their requests were 
denied immediately. See OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, paragraph 47: “…even with a 
missing person’s report, the response was neither rapid nor comprehensive.” It should be noted, however, that the 
Chihuahua officials have taken steps to improve the facilities and capabilities of the Unit for Attention to Victims of 
the Special Prosecutor’s Office. See OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at 
paragraph 55. 
1156 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 34. 
1157 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 19 (“…whether the source of the original injury be a private wrong or not, 
international responsibility can never be anything else but direct in the sense that it can only arise after a failure on 
the part of the State organs to observe some international obligation incumbent upon them.” While Freeman makes 
this claim in rejecting the distinction between direct and indirect responsibility, he affirms my claim, namely that 
responsibility can arise by virtue of an omission and it is in fact the conduct of the State, only the conduct manifests 
itself in omission rather than a commission). FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 21. 
1158 This approach has been used in respect of trafficking. See for example, Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human 
Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 
24 Much. J. Int’l L. 1143, 1157-58 (2003) (describing the amendment of asylum laws to acknowledge the “harm 
threatened directly by non-state actors, against a backdrop of state indifference or ineffectuality in controlling the 
violence or protecting similarly situated victims.”). 
1159 This approach has been used in respect of trafficking. See for example, Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human 
Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 
24 Much. J. Int’l L. 1143, 1157-58 (2003) (describing the amendment of asylum laws to acknowledge the “harm 
threatened directly by non-state actors, against a backdrop of state indifference or ineffectuality in controlling the 
violence or protecting similarly situated victims.”). 
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5.3 The Requirement to Take Steps: Positive Enforcement of a Negative Right 
 
States are required to enforce both positive and negative rights. Historically, however, 
positive rights, such as civil and political rights, have been better enforced, requiring the state to 
abstain from action. In the case of negative rights, however, enforcement requires positive state 
action, which usually translates into providing funds and resources for socio-economic needs, 
such as health, education and welfare. 
 
At first blush, the right to be free from systemic intimate violence may appear to be a 
negative right because its enforcement requires positive state action. However, the right to 
physical safety is a negative right, a freedom from and not necessarily a freedom to. The 
immediacy and group vulnerability which are characteristic of systemic intimate violence are a 
manifestation, not only of limited resources (as is the case with the right to food or health), but 
rather of discrimination. It is arguable, therefore, that the right to systemic intimate violence is 
not a socio-economic right, but a civil and political right; a negative right, but one which requires 
positive state action to ensure its enforcement.  
 
Certain steps are required in international law to protect so-called negative rights. For 
example in 1982 the United Nations Human Rights Committee interpreted article 7 of the 
ICCPR, which prohibits torture, as including “the duty of public authorities to ensure protection 
by the law against such treatment even when committed by persons acting outside or without any 
official authority.”1160 The same committee enunciated the positive duty of states vis-à-vis their 
citizens in the context of the ICESCR, instructing states that “[C]omplaints about illtreatment 
must be investigated effectively by competent authorities. Those found guilty must be held 
responsible, and the alleged victims must themselves have effective remedies at their 
disposal...”1161 
 
In addition, international law theorists have identified the obligation of states to respect and 
to ensure respect for human rights.1162 This so-called ‘positive obligation’ applies to negative as 
well as positive rights. For example, states must take certain steps to ensure that elections are 
free and fair; and in guaranteeing free speech, the state must intervene when an individual’s right 
to speak freely is curbed unlawfully by another individual. The same notion applies to systemic 
intimate violence. On the basis that individuals have an international legal right to be free from 
systemic intimate violence, as discussed in detail in chapter three, states must take certain 
minimum positive steps – as articulated in chapter two – to uphold that negative right.  
 
International case law too has supported this approach. As early as 1923, in the more 
conservative Tellini case, the former Permanent Court of Justice acknowledged the importance 
of attributing responsibility to a state where it fails to take measures to protect its citizens: 
 
                                                
1160 [Note: citation to follow]  
1161 Report of the Human Rights Committee, Official Records of the General Assembly, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 
94–95, Annex. 5, General Comment 7 (16), (A/37/40) (1982) at 94 [hereinafter General Comment 7] [Note: check 
citation format]. 
1162 See the Preamble to the UDHR (“Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation 
with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”). UDHR, supra note 4. 
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The responsibility of a State is only involved … if the State has neglected to take all 
reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime and the pursuit, arrest and bringing 
to justice of the criminal.1163   
 
In the case of X and Y v. the Netherlands discussed above, the ECHR considered article 8 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the 
Convention”), which guarantees the right to respect for one’s private and family life.1164 The 
court described the objective of article 8 as not only protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by public authorities but “in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there 
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life… These 
obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even 
in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.”1165  
 
In the case of Mc v. Bulgaria the ECHR stated clearly that: 
 
Positive obligations on the State are inherent in the right to effective respect for private life under 
Article 8; these obligations may involve the adoption of measures even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves. While the choice of the means to secure compliance 
with Article 8 in the sphere of protection against acts of individuals is in principle within the 
State's margin of appreciation, effective deterrence against grave acts such as rape, where 
fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, requires efficient criminal-
law provisions. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to effective 
protection.1166 
 
The court held that the positive obligation to launch an official investigation into 
accusations of torturous conduct “cannot be considered in principle to be limited solely to cases 
of ill-treatment by State agents.”1167 The Court emphasized that “the obligation of the High 
Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, 
requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are 
not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals.”1168 
Therefore, within the context of rape, the ECHR held that “States have a positive obligation 
inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal-law provisions effectively 
punishing rape and to apply them in practice through effective investigation and prosecution.”1169 
 
                                                
1163 Id at 92. League of Nations, Official Journal,4th Year, No. 11, (November 1923), p. 1349. While the court held 
that acts of individuals may not be attributable to the State, it nevertheless recognized that a State could be liable for 
an omission to act in accordance with its international obligations. While this statement relates to the central issue of 
foreigners in another State, I propose it can and should be extrapolated to a State’s own citizens. The holding that 
“… a State may be responsible for the effects of the conduct of private parties, if it failed to take necessary measures 
to prevent those effects” [Id at 92 point 4] is not limited by the court to the facts of the case (i.e. how a State treats 
the citizens of another State). 
1164 X and Y v. The Netherlands, supra note 213, at paras 21-30. Article 8 of the Convention states that: “Everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” 
1165 X and Y v. The Netherlands, supra note 213, at para 23. 
1166 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 150. 
1167 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 151. 
1168 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 150. 
1169 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 153. 
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Ignoring the violation of human rights by non-state actors arguably constitutes a failure of 
states to ensure the respect for human rights within their borders and, as has been stated, any 
failure to comply with an obligation in international law is an internationally wrongful act and a 
breach of international law.1170 On this basis, a failure by states to uphold their female citizens’ 
international legal right to be free from systemic intimate violence is an internationally wrongful 
act. However, this begs the question as to who constitutes the ‘state’ for the purpose of 
determining state omissions. This issue of attribution is discussed below. 
 
5.4 Attribution: Omission by Whom 
 
5.4.1 State Organs and Officials 
 
The notion of state conduct in international law includes an omission on the part of state 
organs and officials.1171 Article 4 of the ILC articles provides that “[T]he conduct of a State 
organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ 
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions...”1172 Article 4(2) of the ILC 
articles provides that “an organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance 
with the internal law of the State.”1173  
 
According to Crawford, the general rule is that conduct is attributed to the state 
internationally where the conduct is that of “its organs of government, or of others who have 
acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e., as agents of the State.”1174 
This confirms the notion that “[e]xternally, the state speaks with one voice, and it does not matter 
from which agent the voice emanates.”1175 
 
The ambit of entities that could constitute a state organ for the purposes of state 
responsibility is wide and would include police, state lawyers and prosecutors, court 
administrative officials such as court clerks, judges, welfare departments and public hospitals.1176 
Freeman states that a “failure to provide adequate police protection against impending violence, 
inadequate steps to punish the perpetrators of crimes against aliens, or an infraction of the State’s 
fundamental duty to operate properly its machinery of judicial protection for remedying private 
                                                
1170 Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims, supra note 299, at 283, discussing the draft basic principles and 
guidelines for reparations. 
1171 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 94. 
1172 Article 4(1) of the ILC articles, supra note 300. 
1173 Article 4(2) of the ILC articles, supra note 300. See also CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 83: “In speaking of 
attribution to the State what is meant is the State as a subject of international law. Under many legal systems, the 
State organs consist of different legal persons (ministries or other legal entities), which are regarded as having 
distinct rights and obligations for which they alone can be sued and are responsible. For the purpose of the 
international law of State responsibility the position is different. The State is treated as a unity, consistent with its 
recognition as a single legal person in international law.” 
1174 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 91 and footnote 97. 
1175 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 74. 
1176 Article 11(2) of DEVAW, supra note 22. A similar approach is evident in DEVAW, which urges government, 
non-governmental organizations and individuals to implement its provisions. The notion of individual liability is 
also underscored in the preamble of the ICSCER, supra note 13: “Realizing that the individual, having duties to 
other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” 
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wrongs will entail international responsibility.”1177 In respect of courts, Eagleton maintains that 
“[t]here can be no doubt that a court, as any other agency of the state, may, through an 
internationally illegal act, bring responsibility upon its state.”1178 
 
The principles of denial of justice, which originally applied to aliens living in foreign states, 
can be used to understand the content of a stat’s obligation to its own citizens. Freeman defines 
denial of justice as “a concept designating some failure on the part of authorities charged with 
administering justice to comply with the State’s general, very fundamental obligation of 
providing an adequate legal protection for the rights of aliens…”1179 The same theory applies to 
the obligation of states to provide “adequate legal protection for the rights of” women. This is 
confirmed by Eagleton who states that, if an organ of state (in particular a court) “directly 
collides with international law, or if it is guilty of denial of justice, through fraud, excess of 
jurisdiction, improper process, or otherwise, it has committed an internationally illegal act for 
which the state may be held responsible.”1180  
 
5.4.2 Scope of activity 
 
In order to attribute responsibility of inert officials to the state, the act must fall within the 
scope of the capacity of the official in question.1181 Where a state has a duty vis-à-vis its citizens, 
the power to fulfill that obligation devolves to state officials. Therefore, where an official 
unreasonably fails to utilize this power for the protection of an individual s/he has committed an 
omission, which constitutes an omission on the part of the state.1182 This is premised on the 
notion that when 
 
the state invests such an individual [as an agent] with its authority, his (sic) acts become 
the acts of the state itself, for which the state must accept responsibility under 
international law….1183 
                                                
1177 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 27. 
1178 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 71. 
1179 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 41. 
1180 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 71. 
1181 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at point 13. [Note: get page number] According to Brownlie, objective tests of 
responsibility were applied by the General Claims Commission set up by the Convention between Mexico and the 
United States in 1923: BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 440 (In the Caire claim (1929 RIAA v. 516 at 529-31 the 
President of the Franco-Mexican Claims Commission, applied the objective test as “the doctrine of the objective 
responsibility of the State, that is to say, a responsibility for those acts committed by its officials or its organs, and 
which they are bound to perform, despite the absence of faute peremptory norms their part… The State also bears an 
international responsibility for all acts committed by its officials or its organs which are delictual according to 
international law, regardless of whether the official organ has acted within the limits of his competency or has 
exceeded those limits… However, in order to justify the admission of this objective responsibility of the State for 
acts committed by its officials or organs outside their competence, it is necessary that they should have acted, at 
least apparently, as authorized officials or organs, or that, in acting, they should have used powers or measures 
appropriate to their official character.”). 
1182 The notion of agency is summarized by Eagleton who states that “the state may be held responsible for the acts 
of any of its agents, if such acts violate international law to the detriment of a foreign state or citizen thereof. Since 
his power is put into his hands by his state, the acts performed by him in the discharge of the functions of the office 
must be attributed to his state…Externally, the state speaks with one voice, and it does not matter from which agent 
the voice emanates.” EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 73-74. 
1183 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 45. 
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All organs of state are bound by international obligations, irrespective of whether they are 
“engaged in enacting, executing, or construing the law.”1184 Article 5 of the ILC articles provides 
that where a person or entity is not an organ of state but is empowered to exercise elements of 
governmental authority, that person’s actions may be attributed to the state.1185 
 
As described in chapter two, systemic intimate violence arises when there is a grand failure 
of government to protect women from intimate violence. Freeman, in writing on the principles of 
denial of justice, notes that a state is responsible for an internationally wrongful act where there 
is a “failure of authorities responsible for law and order to take prompt and necessary steps to 
apprehend criminals; an inordinate lapse of time without offenders being brought to trial; as well 
as negligence, laxity, and undue delay in their prosecution…”1186 On this basis, this thesis 
proposes that where any person who is empowered to exercise elements of governmental 
authority – such as police, state lawyers and prosecutors, court administrative officials and public 
hospital staff – ignores incidents of systemic intimate violence and fails to take action to help 
remedy that violence, that person’s omission is the conduct of the state. 
 
5.5 Application of the Conduct Element to Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
In the Corfu Channel case Albania was held responsible for the harm caused by the laying 
of mines in its territorial waters. Although Albania did not itself lay the mines, it was held 
responsible “on the basis of knowledge possessed by that State as to the presence of such mines, 
even though there was no finding as to who had actually laid the mines.”1187 Albania’s 
responsibility was premised not on its actions but rather on its omission to advise third party 
states of the presence of mines in its territorial waters.1188  
 
I propose that these principles, and this conclusion, are directly analogous to failures by 
state actors to take steps to help remedy systemic intimate violence. Let us extrapolate this 
decision to a scenario of systemic intimate violence that took place in South Africa in 1995: 
 
My husband has always abused me… I stayed because I am Catholic and because we 
have six children, until he kicked me out. He used to tie me to the bed so I couldn’t go 
out. I wasn’t allowed to answer the phone. One time, he beat me so bad, he cracked my 
                                                
1184 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 29.  
1185 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 100. 
1186 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 378. 
1187 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) ICJ Reports, 1949, p.4; 16 AD, p.155 [hereinafter Corfu 
Channel case]. SHAW, supra note 306, at 701. Corfu Channel case, supra note 395, at 4 (“The obligations incumbent 
upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a 
minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to 
which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, 
which is applicable in times of war, but on certain general and well recognized principles, namely: elementary 
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war…”). See also the discussion in by H. 
Lauterpacht, in ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 155-170 (Ed. H. 
Lauterpacht, London, 1949).  
1188 See also Diplomatic and Consular Staff, I.C.J. Reports 1980. p. 3, at pp. 31-32, paras. 63, 67 where the court 
held Iran responsible for the “inaction” of its authorities which “failed to take appropriate steps” in circumstances 
where such steps were reasonably required. [Note: re-read case.] [Note: check citation format] 
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head and broke one of my fingers. Another time, he burned me with boiling water. Once 
he put an electric shock through my fingers. I got a peace order [restraining order] against 
my husband while I was married, but when they came to the house, the police said all 
they could do was warn my husband. Since my divorce four years ago, my husband 
harasses me all the time… The police arrested him for trespassing three times, but he was 
immediately released. The police told me that they could not do anything more since we 
were divorced. In January 1995, I went to get an interdict and the court clerk told me that 
they couldn’t give me one because “everybody’s free to walk the streets and live their 
lives.” Soon after, he threw a burning towel through the window of the house which burnt 
the curtains and started a fire. Now he is in prison for two months for damaging 
property.1189 
 
In both situations the state had knowledge of potential harm. In the Corfu Channel case the 
court held that Albania knew about the existence of mines in its territorial waters.1190 In the 
systemic intimate violence case, the South African police knew about the existence of ongoing 
and systemic bodily attacks against the narrator. Since the rules of international law provide that 
state agents include organs of government or those who have control over such organs, both the 
actors in Albania (the government) and South Africa (the police) would constitute ‘the state.’  
 
Neither case suggests that the state was responsible for the initial act of violence. Rather, 
Albania was responsible for its inaction.1191 The ICJ held that it was irrelevant who actually laid 
the mines; all that was applicable was that the Albanian government had failed to act upon the 
knowledge it surely had about the existence of the mines. Similarly, I propose that a similar 
result should hold in the case of systemic intimate violence. The police and court officials did not 
inflict violence upon the victim but they did fail to act upon their knowledge of the victim’s 
circumstances. 
 
In both instances there was a failure to act: Albania omitted to provide the necessary 
warning and the South African police failed to protect the narrator or imprison her husband.1192 
Indeed, the only time the abuser was imprisoned was for damage to property. 
                                                
1189 Interview with survivor of systemic intimate violence in Durban, South Africa, February 3, 1995, cited in 
GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, supra notex, at 383. 
1190 Corfu Channel case, supra note 395. Knowledge on the part of the Albanian government was necessary to hold 
it liable for the explosion of mines in its territorial waters. The Court held that even if there was no connivance 
between Yugoslavia (or any other party who may have laid the mines) and Albania, there was sufficient evidence 
that Albania had a view of and kept a vigil over the relevant waters, which precluded its claim of ignorance. Id at 18. 
Knowledge on the part of the Albanian government was essential in order to hold it liable for the damage and loss 
caused by the explosion of the mines in its territorial waters. The Court discussed extensively the fact that even if 
there was no connivance between Yugoslavia (or any other party who may have laid the mines) and Albania, there 
was sufficient evidence that Albania had a view of and kept a vigil over the relevant waters that precluded its claim 
of ignorance. Based on the admission of so-called “indirect evidence,” the court held that proof of knowledge may 
be drawn from an inference of facts “provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt.” Corfu Channel case, 
supra note 395, at 18. 
1191 Corfu Channel case, supra note 395, at 23: “In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to 
prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania.” Furthermore, there 
had been an exhaustion of local remedies in both cases. 
1192 Corfu Channel case, supra note 395, at 23: “In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to 
prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania.” Furthermore, there 
had been an exhaustion of local remedies in both cases. 
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In both cases there was harm. This harm could have been prevented had the respective state 
agents acted in accordance with their mandate. 
 
The most important difference between these two cases is the nature of the victim. In the 
Corfu Channel case the victims were nationals of the United Kingdom, harmed in the territorial 
waters of Albania. In the systemic intimate violence case, the narrator is a national of the state of 
South Africa, harmed by a fellow national. However, I propose that this distinction cannot 
withstand the compelling humanitarian values that underpin international human rights law nor 
the development in the principles of state responsibility that holds states liable for their behavior 
vis-à-vis their own nationals.1193 
 
Therefore, the conduct element of state responsibility applies in cases of systemic intimate 
violence because: (1) there is conduct in the form of an omission to take positive steps to prevent 
or mitigate systemic intimate violence; (2) that omission is made by state organs and/or state 
officials; and (3) that omission is made by those state organs or officials acting within their scope 
as state agents.  
 




In this section I discuss the following aspects of the wrongfulness element: (1) the definition 
of wrongfulness; (2) the due diligence standard; and, (3) the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness. 
 
6.1 Definition of Wrongfulness  
 
Article 1 of the ILC articles provides that the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
by a state “entails the international responsibility of that State.”1194  
 
An internationally wrongful act is conduct that “constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the State.”1195 A breach of an international obligation is an act of a state that is “not 
in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation….”1196 The former Special 
Rapporteur for state responsibility, Professor Crawford, explains that “an internationally 
wrongful act lies in the non-conformity of the State’s actual conduct with the conduct it ought to 
have adopted in order to comply with a particular international obligation.”  
 
                                                
1193 It is entirely plausible that the tenets of the doctrine of denial of justice in respect of aliens may be extended to 
citizens of a state too. 
1194 Article 1 of the ILC articles, supra note 300: “Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State.” At this stage, we are dealing with the responsibility of the primary State, 
i.e. the State itself which commits the human rights violation either through a commission or an omission. A further 
possibility may be imposing obligations on third party states to ensure that a state protects its citizens from systemic 
intimate violence. 
1195 Article 2 of the ILC articles, supra note 300. 
1196 Article 12 of the ILC articles, supra note 300. 
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Therefore, if a state fails to act where it has an international duty to perform, it commits an 
internationally wrongful act.1197 State responsibility for failure “to take reasonable steps to 
prevent or respond to an abuse” has been framed as a “failure to exercise due diligence and to 
provide equal protection in preventing and punishing such abuses by private individuals.”1198 
 
The analysis, therefore, is a comparative one that can be broken down into two issues. First, 
an examination of what constitutes the standard expected of a state in order to fulfill its primary 
obligation. That is, what is the level of diligence required of the state? Second, an examination of 
whether the state conformed to this expectation1199 I discuss each of these issues below. 
 
6.2 The Due Diligence Standard  
 
International law, anticipating unlawful acts by private persons,  
requires the State to fulfil certain duties in relation thereto.  
 
These duties are, generally speaking, two: the use of due  
diligence in the prevention of injury to foreigners; and  
proper measures of repressing crime, or remedying wrong,  




6.2.1 Background to the Due Diligence Standard  
 
When a state has a duty to take steps to fulfill an international obligation, it is natural to ask 
how much it should do to be deemed to have fulfilled that obligation. For example, if a state has 
an international obligation to eradicate gender discrimination, racism, or pollution, at what stage 
has it ‘done enough’ to comply with its obligations? 
 
                                                
1197 Just as the use of State power for pernicious or wrongful purposes (such as official torture) is an internationally 
wrongful act. 
1198 BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS, supra note 98, at 6 (documenting the worldwide torture of women, 
observing that “states all around the world have allowed beatings, rape and other acts of torture to continue 
unchecked”). 
1199 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 124. See also SHAW, supra note 306, at 694: Shaw points out that the focus of 
state responsibility “is upon principles concerned with second order issues, in other words, the procedural and other 
consequences flowing from the breach of a substantive rule of international law.” In considering these two 
questions, it is important to recall that the test of State responsibility arises only once a specific right has been 
identified and the origin of the substantive right is irrelevant. Id at 124: “Chapter III can only play an ancillary role 
in determining whether there has been such a breach, or the time at which it occurred, or its duration.” Rainbow 
Warrior Affair, supra note 305, at 26:  “… the attack carried out against the ‘Rainbow Warrior’ took place in 
violation of the territorial sovereignty of New Zealand and [  ] it was therefore committed in violation of 
international law. New Zealand consequently has a right to compensation for the harm which it directly suffered 
from that attack.” Assuming, then, that there is a right in international law to be free from extreme harm perpetrated 
by an individual, the next question is what type of conduct is required by the State to avoid its complicity with or 
acquiescence to such harm? It is this step that I now proceed to analyze. It is the author’s proposal that the 
composite elements of the right to be free from systemic intimate violence are synonymous with the constitutive 
parts of other human rights violations in international human rights law. Cf. Meyersfeld, supra note 349 and Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58. 
1200 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 27 
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The standard of ‘due diligence’ developed in response to this question. In 1988, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights established the due diligence standard for states, holding that:   
 
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to 
a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person…) can lead to international 
responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due 
diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the [American 
Convention on Human Rights].1201 ** 
 
In 1993, the U.N. General Assembly applied the due diligence standard in DEVAW, 
enjoining states to “[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with 
national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by 
the State or by private persons.”1202 This standard was utilized once again in respect of violence 
against women by the first Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy. In her report against violence against women, she confirmed that domestic 
violence is an underestimated cause of poor health, continued economic and social hardship and 
mortality of women. She demonstrated that the harm that is the most serious for women is that 
which has been the most neglected by states.1203 
 
In her final report to the U.N. Dr Coomaraswamy revitalized the due diligence standard as 
follows:  
 
[T]he standard for establishing State complicity in violations committed by private actors 
is more relative. Complicity must be demonstrated by establishing that the State 
condones a pattern of abuse through pervasive non-action. Where States do not actively 
engage in acts of systemic intimate violence or routinely disregard evidence of murder, 
rape or assault of women by their intimate partners, States generally fail to take the 
minimum steps necessary to protect their female citizens’ rights to physical integrity and, 
in extreme cases, to life. This sends a message that such attacks are justified and will not 
be punished. To avoid such complicity, States must demonstrate due diligence by taking 
active measures to protect, prosecute and punish private actors who commit abuses.1204 
 
6.2.2 ‘Due Diligence’ or ‘Complicity’ 
 
Increasingly, a failure to comply with a due diligence standard is being framed as 
complicity with those who perform the original act of harm. Coomaraswamy, for example, 
                                                
1201 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, case 7920, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 35, OEA/ser.L./V./III.19, doc. 13, para. 172 
(1988) [hereinafter Velásquez Rodríguez case].  
1202 Article 4(c) of DEVAW, supra note 22.  
1203 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58, at 16–18 (presenting statistical data 
on the battering of women in various countries in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1995/85 and detailing the extent of violence against women, the inadequacy of governmental and societal response, 
and providing recommendations for reform). 
1204 Id. This echoes the Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, James Crawford, who stated that “the state has a 
positive duty not to authorize or allow torture…” James Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 435, 440 (1999). For a brief discussion of the due diligence standard within the 
context of systemic intimate violence see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 
98, at 13 (describing the due diligence standard as obliging the state “to take all the necessary measures to combat 
violence against women, whoever the perpetrator may be). 
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claims that states are obliged to take basic steps to stop domestic violence and “a State can be 
held complicit where it fails systematically to provide protection from private actors who deprive 
any person of his/her human rights.”1205  
 
However, not all commentators agree. Freeman, for example, denounces the argument that 
state inertia constitutes complicity, referring to it as an “utterly fictitious theory of implied State 
complicity in what seems clearly a politico-legal effort to render more palatable the postulate of 
State responsibility in these cases.”1206 Instead, he proposes, an omission to take basic steps with 
due diligence leads to an independent internationally wrongful act.1207 
 
While moral imperatives certainly require us to view the state as complicit in acts of 
intimate violence, it is important to distinguish between the abuser’s act of violence and the 
state’s own conduct, in the form of an omission, to prevent the violence, protect the victim and, 
where necessary, prosecute the abuser. For these reasons, this thesis takes the view that a failure 
of a state to take positive steps to prevent or help remedy systemic intimate violence does not 
render the state complicit with that violence. Instead, the state’s omission itself constitutes an 
internationally wrongful act in violation of international law. 
 
6.2.3 Identifying the Failure to Conform to the Due Diligence Standard 
 
In general, states are required to be proactive within their society to guarantee and ensure 
respect for human rights.1208 The fulfillment of this objective, however, is amorphous, especially 
in the case of systemic intimate violence, where it is difficult to measure a state’s performance 
without a precise standard of compliance.  
 
The due diligence standard assists in ‘quantifying’ the fulfillment of these human rights 
obligations. The circumstances of each state, the nature of the systemic intimate violence 
involved, and the state’s response to such violence, will be different in every case. Therefore, 
there are a number of factors relevant on a case by case basis to determining the appropriate 
minimum threshold of conduct required for a state to meet its due diligence standard, and to 
indicate a failure to comply therewith.  
 
Any failure by a state to take action to meet its international legal obligations is adjudicated 
with regard to “the degree of protection required under the particular circumstances; the practical 
factors going to render such protection possible or impossible; and finally the ensuing neglect to 
                                                
1205 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58. The appointment of the Special 
Rapporteur also represented an important step for the incorporation of women’s rights into so-called ‘mainstream’ 
human rights since her appointment was mandated by the UN Human Rights Committee. 
1206 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 20. According to Freeman, citizens abroad “may fall victim to an initial wrong, 
perpetrated by a private person against whom they subsequently seek relief in the courts. For the act itself, the State 
is not answerable; but if the conduct of the proceedings in this private litigation is internationally deficient, a duty to 
make reparation for the denial of justice will arise under the law of nations.” Id. at 372. 
1207 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 24: “The responsibility of the state… is always present …but the measure of 
reparation due therefore may be diminished, even to the vanishing point, by the proof of a due diligence … .” 
1208 Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 34-6 (1994). Ignoring the 
violation of human rights, by state or non-state actors, constitutes a failure of governments to ensure the respect for 
human rights within their borders. Such a failure is an internationally wrongful act and a breach of international law. 
Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims, supra note 299, at 283. 
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undertake the requisite steps of pursuit prescribed by the law of nations.”1209 On this basis, I 
discuss below three factors which can be extrapolated from these considerations to identify the 
fulfillment or otherwise of the due diligence standard: (1) the nature of the right involved; (2) the 
practical resources and capabilities of the country in question; and (3) the repetition of aggregate 
omissions. 
 
a. The Nature of the Right 
 
The precise content of the due diligence standard depends on the primary obligation in 
question.1210 Conformity with international obligations has been described as “the provision of 
facilities, or the taking of precautions or the enforcement of a prohibition.”1211 Therefore, the 
nature of the right as described in chapter two will have to be addressed by states in accordance 
with the obligations also described in chapter two. 
 
b. The Practical Resources and Capabilities of the Country 
 
Intuitively, one must also take into account the particular resources and capabilities of a 
state when determining the level of conduct required for it to meet its due diligence standard vis-
à-vis the prevention and remedy of systemic intimate violence. Each country will have practical 
exigencies that may make it difficult to render specific protection, and this is recognized by 
international law, which “takes into consideration [ ] the impossibility of a state’s being able to 
prevent all such injurious acts… It is possible, therefore, that circumstances which might 
produce responsibility in one state would not do so in another.”1212  
 
The standards of due diligence will fluctuate depending on the circumstances of each state, 
particularly with reference to the availability of resources and social, political and/or economic 
exigencies that reasonably mitigate a state’s ability to protect women from systemic intimate 
violence.  
 
However, states will be compelled to prioritize the interests of women where it is 
reasonable and progressive to do so. For example: 
 
the degree of general lawlessness prevailing in a given community may bear with more or 
less force upon the extent and nature of the measures required of a given State in fulfilment 
of its duty; but the mere fact that in a certain nation or specific region thereof a high 
coefficient of criminality may exist, is no proof, by itself, that the government of such 
nation has failed in its duty of maintaining an adequate police force for the prosecution and 
punishment of criminals.1213  
 
                                                
1209 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 373. 
1210 According to the Commentaries to the ILC articles the standard of compliance with international obligations, 
including the due diligence standard, vary based on the context and substance of the primary obligation. 
Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 70. 
1211 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 125-6.  
1212 EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 79 (stating that international law “is concerned only to the extent of maintaining a 
general standard for the administration of justice…”). See also FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 376. 
1213 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 373. 
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This contextual caveat is necessary, both intellectually and practically, to delineate the 
nature of the liability and lend it viability and perpetuity. Each country will have practical 
exigencies that render specific protection relatively more or less possible.1214  
 
c. Aggregate Omissions 
 
Given this caveat of state resources, together with the complexity of systemic intimate 
violence, how do we carve out the content of an actionable omission? I propose that continuing 
neglect to undertake the requisite minimum steps prescribed by international law will trigger a 
state’s responsibility.1215 Often, it is not one organ but a combination of several organs of state 
that fail to protect women from systemic intimate violence, either through the alienation of the 
victim or through negligence.1216 Clearly it would be untenable to hold a state liable if its police, 
judiciary or politicians are unable to protect individuals in their society from all violence. 
However, it is the inveterate and virulent gender-based violence that calls for state consideration. 
 
Article 15 of the ILC articles allows for the breach of an international obligation to lie in a 
series of acts defined in the aggregate as wrongful.1217 The repeated omission by states actively 
to assist women who suffer systemic intimate violence may be construed as an implied sanction 
of this behavior.1218 Therefore, it is not simply one omission of a state to protect women from 
abusers but a series of omissions that trigger state responsibility. So long as a state conducts 
itself contrary to its international obligations, even where such conduct inheres in a series of 
omissions, it will be in breach.1219 
 
The isolation of victims of systemic intimate violence demonstrates that, while their abusers 
may be private individuals, the conduct itself takes place within a structure of hegemony, which 
both mirrors and incorporates the power disparity between a state and its citizens. When, with 
knowledge of protracted, generic violence, a state persistently fails to take basic steps, such as 
providing training to police officials, establishing shelters and prosecuting repeat abusers, the 
international standards of fundamental human dignity should pertain.  
 
Ultimately, the application of the due diligence standard to systemic intimate violence will 
require an analysis, on a case by case basis, of the available resources of the state in question, the 
practical factors that would be available to protect victims, the resources available to the state 
and the level of neglect. These considerations would form part of the recipe for determining 
when a state has failed to comply with its international obligation to protect women from 
systemic intimate violence. However, to the extent that a state has the ability to assist abused 
                                                
1214 FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 376. 
1215 Id at 376: “…negligent or dilatory measures in investigating the circumstances of a criminal offense, whereupon 
the culprits are never brought to justice, will justify the complaint that international law has been affronted.” 
1216 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 95. 
1217 Article 15 of the ILC articles, supra note 300. 
1218 CARIN BENNINGER-BUDEL, supra note 61, at 10: The result is that “a State’s lack of exercising due diligence in 
preventing, investigating, prosecuting and punishing violence against women at the hands of private actors can result 
in finding a State responsible for torture… .” The essence here is “a series of acts or omissions defined in aggregate 
as wrongful.” CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 141. 
1219 SHAW, supra note 306, at 697-8 (discussing the duration of the breach).  
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women, its sustained inaction constitutes a violation of its international legal obligations, which 
triggers the provisions of the ILC articles. 
 
6.3 Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness  
 
6.3.1 Types of Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness  
 
Systemic intimate violence represents one of the more complex and complicated human 
rights violations. Victims often retract their charges, and the privacy in which the violence takes 
place impedes the investigation of the violence. At times it is unclear who is the victim and who 
the perpetrator. These difficulties must also be considered when assessing the wrongfulness of a 
state’s perpetuation of violence against its female citizens because “there must be taken into 
account the circumstances, which can limit or even nullify the activity of the State.”1220 
 
Chapter five of the ILC articles identifies six instances where wrongfulness is precluded: (1) 
consent (article 20); self-defense (article 21); countermeasures (article 22); force majeure (article 
23); distress (article 24); and, necessity (article 25).1221  
 
These circumstances do not annul or terminate a state’s international obligation to take 
positive steps to prevent and help remedy systemic intimate violence, but instead provide “a 
justification or excuse for non-performance while the circumstance in question subsists.”1222 This 
was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case. 
The court, in rejecting Hungary’s claim that necessity precluded its obligation to continue work 
in accordance with its obligations under the 1977 Treaty, held that: 
 
[t]he state of necessity claimed by Hungary … could not permit of the conclusion that ... it 
had acted in accordance with its obligations … or that those obligations had ceased to be 
binding upon it. It would only permit the affirmation that, under the circumstances, Hungary 
would not incur international responsibility by acting as it did.”1223 
 
I do not discuss all six exceptions to wrongfulness. However, the following section 
addresses those that may be relevant to systemic intimate violence, namely: (1) force majeure; 
(2) distress; and, (3) necessity.1224 In respect of each one I describe the concept, summarize the 
relevant theory and apply the concept to systemic intimate violence. 
                                                
1220 This is underscored by Freeman’s citation of Huber who remarks that “penal and civil proceedings are 
necessarily dependent on the means at the disposal of the State and on the degree of authority which it is able to 
exert… It is not possible to demand the uniform application in all cases of a system of justice which satisfies the 
minimum standards, (critères minima), of international law. As in the case of preventive action, there must be taken 
into account the circumstances, which can limit or even nullify the activity of the State.” See Freeman’s citation of 
Huber in FREEMAN, supra note 207, at 373.  
1221 For a detailed discussion of these circumstances see the commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 
169. 
1222 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 169. 
1223 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, at p. 39, para. 48. 
1224 I do not deal with countermeasures, since these are acts which a state takes to ensure the compliance of a third 
state with its international obligations. Consent is a nullity since a state cannot consent to another state’s non-
compliance with obligations erga omnes  i.e. owing to everyone. Finally, self-defense is inapplicable since a state 







The wrongfulness of a state’s failure to comply with its international obligation will be 
precluded “if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of 





The Commentaries to the ILC articles describe this preclusion as a “specific case where an 
individual whose acts are attributable to the State is in a situation of peril, either personally or in 
relation to persons under his or her care.”1226 Usually, the peril that would prevent the state’s 
agent from fulfilling the state’s obligation is the “immediate [interest] of saving people’s lives” 
and “where the agent had no other reasonable way of saving life.”1227 As opposed to force 
majeure, the act is not an involuntary one but rather a choice is made, even if “the choice is 
effectively nullified by the situation of peril.”1228  
 
The evaluation of distress was raised in the Rainbow Warrior arbitration where France 
sought to justify its conduct in removing the two officers from the island of Hao on the ground of 
“circumstances of distress in a case of extreme urgency involving elementary humanitarian 
considerations affecting the acting organs of the State.”1229 According to this case, three factors 
must be shown in order to demonstrate distress: (1) “the existence of very exceptional 
circumstances of extreme urgency involving medical or other considerations of an elementary 
nature;”1230 (2) the “re-establishment of the original situation of compliance… as soon as the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the victims. If a state is under attack by another state, that would constitute one of the other preclusions, namely, 
distress, necessity or force majeure. 
1225 Article 24 of the ILC articles. The plea of distress is also accepted in many treaties as a circumstance justifying 
conduct which would otherwise be wrongful for example, “the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1046, p. 138, art V (1), which provides 
that the prohibition on dumping of wastes does not apply when it is “necessary to secure the safety of human life or 
of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.” Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 
300, at 192. 
1226 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 189. 
1227 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 189 (“In practice, cases of distress have mostly involved 
aircraft or ships entering State territory under stress of weather or following mechanical or navigational failure.”). 
The commentaries to the ILC articles interpret article 24 as “limited to cases where human life is at stake.” 
Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 192.  
1228 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 189. 
1229 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990), at pp. 254-255, para. 78. See also 
the commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 191. According to the commentaries to the ILC articles “the 
Tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior arbitration appeared to take a broader view of the circumstances justifying a plea 
of distress, apparently accepting that a serious health risk would suffice. The problem with extending article 24 to 
less than life-threatening situations is where to place any lower limit.” Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 
300, at 192. 
1230 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990), at pp. 254-255, para. 79. 
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reasons of the emergency … had disappeared;”1231 and (3) the “existence of good faith effort” to 
obtain the consent of the injured state to the non-compliance.1232  
 
c. Application to Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
If a state fails to protect the right of women to be free from systemic intimate violence, it 
would have to demonstrate the three factors cited above in order to make out a claim to a defense 
of distress.  
 
Very Exceptional Circumstances  
 
“Very exceptional circumstances of extreme urgency involving medical or other 
considerations of an elementary nature” is a very high standard.1233 A state would have to show 
that: (1) its resources were required to mitigate the “circumstances of extreme urgency;” and (2) 
the urgency was such that it absorbed all of its attention and resources. If one considers that 
systemic intimate violence manifests in a continuum, it would be difficult (although not 
impossible) to prove the existence of such extremely urgent circumstances over a long period of 
time.  
 
This element also entails a balancing investigation. Inherent in the concept of distress is the 
notion that certain interests “clearly outweigh the other interests at stake in the 
circumstances.”1234 According to a strict application of the ILC articles and commentaries, it is 
unlikely, however, that a state could claim economic or political distress as a reason for its 
failure to protect women from systemic intimate violence. It appears that the only interest which 
would outweigh an international obligation is the need to save life where “there is no other 
reasonable way” of doing so other than to pause in the fulfillment of the obligation.1235  
 
A state may not rely on emergency or exceptional circumstances if the situation was caused 
or induced by that state.1236 
 
Re-establishment of Compliance 
 
The state must re-establish “the original situation of compliance… as soon as the reasons of 
the emergency … had disappeared.”1237 Therefore, if there was an acceptable degree of urgency 
                                                
1231 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990), at pp. 254-255, para. 79. 
1232 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990), at pp. 254-255, para. 79. 
1233 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990), at pp. 254-255, para. 79. 
1234 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 194. 
1235 Subparagraph 2 (b) of article 24 of the ILC articles stipulates that distress does not apply if the act in question is 
likely to create a comparable or greater peril. This is consistent with paragraph 1, which in asking whether the agent 
had “no other reasonable way” to save life establishes an objective test. The words “comparable or greater peril” 
must be assessed in the context of the overall purpose of saving lives. 
1236 Article 24(2)(a) of the ILC articles. See also Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 193 (“As in the 
case of force majeure, a situation which has been caused or induced by the invoking State is not one of distress. In 
many cases the State invoking distress may well have contributed, even if indirectly, to the situation. Priority should 
be given to necessary life-saving measures, however, and under subparagraph (2) (a), distress is only excluded if the 
situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking 
it.”). 
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preventing the state from protecting victims of systemic intimate violence, as soon as the 
situation is over it must resume or begin compliance with its duties. 
 
Good Faith Effort to Obtain Consent for the Breach 
 
This requirement does not apply neatly to systemic intimate violence. While the content of 
the international obligation applies to individual citizens, the principles of state responsibility, 
unless determined otherwise by a treaty, apply vis-à-vis other states.  
 
It seems incongruent to require a state to obtain consent from other states for its high rates 
of systemic intimate violence. Within the context of protecting human rights, this element may 
demand that a non-complying state inform other states and request their assistance but it is 
unlikely that another state can consent to a situation in which systemic intimate violence 
perpetuates. 
 




Wrongfulness may be precluded where the omission “is due to force majeure, that is the 
occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, 
making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.”1238 Force 





Force majeure is characterized by the notion of compulsion and the absence of choice. The 
internationally wrongful act is involuntary and on this basis wrongfulness is precluded.1240 
 
Three elements must be met in order to raise a successful plea of force majeure: (1) “the act 
in question must be brought about by an irresistible force or an unforeseen event;” (2) “which is 
beyond the control of the State concerned;” and, (3) “which makes it materially impossible in the 
circumstances to perform the obligation.”1241 
 
A breach will not be wrongful if a state was prevented from compliance by “a constraint 
which the State was unable to avoid or oppose by its own means.”1242 This event must have been 
unforeseen or not of a foreseeable kind and must be linked to the “situation of material 
impossibility.”1243 Such material impossibility may be due to natural events, for example, 
                                                                                                                                                       
1237 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990), at pp. 254-255, para. 79. 
1238 Article 23(1) of the ILC articles. 
1239 Article 23(2) of the ILC articles. 
1240 See Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 183-4. 
1241 See Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 183-4. 
1242 See Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 183-4. 
1243 See Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 183-4. 
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weather, earthquakes, floods or drought, or to human acts or a combination of the two.1244 The 
essence of this requirement is that the situation “must be irresistible, so that the State concerned 
has no real possibility of escaping its effects.”1245 However, this does not include circumstances 
where the performance of the obligation has become difficult due to a political or economic 
crisis.1246 
 
c. Application to Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
Any circumstances which would preclude the wrongfulness of a state’s failure to prevent 
systemic intimate violence would have to be unforeseen and beyond the control of the state, 
making it impossible for it to comply with its obligation. The standard is high and there must be 
a material impossibility of performance.1247 Again, however, given that systemic intimate 
violence exists in a continuum, it will be rare indeed that an event of force majeure will outlast 
that violence. Once the force majeure has ceased, the state will be required again to meet its 






Necessity validly precludes wrongfulness if: (1) non-compliance is the only way for the 
state “to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril;”1248 and (2) the non-
compliance does not “seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which 
the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”1249 
 
As with force majeure and distress, the state may not rely on necessity where it has 
contributed to the occurrence of such events.1250 
 
 
                                                
1244 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 184. 
1245 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 184. 
1246 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 184. 
1247 The type of claims that might be accepted is attacks by rebels or the collapse of a government. Commentaries to 
the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 186 (“The principle has also been accepted by international tribunals. Mixed 
claims commissions have frequently cited the unforeseeability of attacks by rebels in denying the responsibility of 
the territorial State for resulting damage suffered by foreigners.”). The commentaries to the ILC articles cite the 
decision of the American-British Claims Commission in the Saint Albans Raid case (1873), Moore, International 
Arbitrations, vol. IV, p. 4042; Secretariat Survey, para. 339; the decisions of the United States/Venezuelan Claims 
Commission in the Wipperman case, Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. III, p. 3039; Secretariat Survey, paras. 
349-350; De Brissot and others cases, Moore, International Arbitrations, vol III, p. 2967; Secretariat Survey, para. 
352; and the decision of the British Mexican Claims Commission in the Gill case: UNRIAA, vol. V, p. 157 (1931); 
Secretariat Survey, para. 463. Id. 
1248 Article 25(1) of the ILC articles. 
1249 Article 25(1) of the ILC articles. See also the Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 194 (“The 
term ‘necessity’ (‘état de necessité’) is used to denote those exceptional cases where the only way a State can 
safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform some 
other international obligation of lesser weight or urgency. Under conditions narrowly defined in article 25, such a 
plea is recognized as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness.”). 




Necessity arises where there is “an irreconcilable conflict between an essential interest on 
the one hand and an obligation of the State” on the other.1251  
 
The plea of necessity was raised in the Caroline incident of 1837, where the British armed 
forces entered United States territory and destroyed a vessel owned by American citizens which 
was carrying recruits and military material to Canadian insurgents.1252 The British defended its 
actions by citing the “necessity of self-defence and self-preservation” which, it claimed, trumped 
the territorial integrity of the United States.1253  
 
Another example of necessity is the “Russian Fur Seals” controversy of 1893. In this matter 
the “essential interest” of protecting an endangered fur seal population against the “grave and 
imminent peril” of extermination caused the Russian government to prohibit sealing in the high 
seas, which was not subject to the jurisdiction of any state.1254   
 
In the in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the International Court of Justice accepted 
the principle of necessity.1255 The International Court of Justice articulated the following 
conditions for the case in question, which provide useful generic guides: “the omission must 
have been occasioned by an ‘essential interest’ of the State which is the author of the act 
conflicting with one of its international obligations; the act being challenged must have been the 
‘only means’ of safeguarding that interest; that act must not have ‘seriously impair[ed] an 
essential interest’ of the State towards which the obligation existed; and the State which is the 
author of that act must not have ‘contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity.’”1256 
 
As a result of these requirements, the necessity plea is used rarely and is subject to “strict 




                                                
1251 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 195. 
1252 See Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 196, citing respectively W.R. Manning (ed.), 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Canadian Relations 1784-1860 (Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1943), vol. III, p. 422; A.D. McNair (ed), International Law Opinions 
(Cambridge, University Press, 1956), vol. II, p. 22. 
1253 Id. 
1254 Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 197 (“Facing the danger of extermination of a fur seal 
population by unrestricted hunting, the Russian Government issued a decree prohibiting sealing in an area of the 
high seas. In a letter to the British Ambassador dated 12/24 February 1893, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
explained that the action had been taken because of the ‘absolute necessity of immediate provisional measures’ in 
view of the imminence of the hunting season. He ‘emphasize[d] the essentially precautionary character of the above-
mentioned measures, which were taken under the pressure of exceptional circumstances’ and declared his 
willingness to conclude an agreement with the British Government with a view to a longer-term settlement of the 
question of sealing in the area.”). 
1255 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7. See also Commentaries to the ILC 
articles, supra note 300, at 199. 
1256 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), I.C.J. Reports 1997, pp. 40-41, paras. 51-52. 




c. Application to Systemic Intimate Violence  
 
In order for a state to rely on necessity as a preclusion of wrongfulness there must be: (1) an 
irreconcilable tension between the needs of abused women and another interest of the state; (2) 
that other interest must be essential; (3) it must be threatened by a grave and imminent peril; (4) 
non-compliance with the state’s obligation to address systemic intimate violence must have been 
the only means of safeguarding that other interest; (5) the state must not have impaired an 
essential interest of another state; and, (6) it must not have contributed to the circumstances of 
necessity. On this basis, I propose that it will be very rare that the principles of ‘necessity’ will 
act to immunize a state against its obligation to prevent and help remedy systemic intimate 
violence. In particular, it is difficult to envisage a competing interest for which non-compliance 
with the state’s obligations in respect of systemic intimate violence will be the only way in which 
the state can protect that other interest. 
 
Therefore, in order for state responsibility to arise, both the elements of conduct and 
wrongfulness must pertain, and subject to the unlikely exceptions to wrongfulness discussed 
above, will pertain in the context of systemic intimate violence. On this basis, the next section 





7.1 Consequences of an Internationally Wrongful Act  
 
If a state commits an internationally wrongful act: (1) it remains obliged to comply with its 
international obligation;1258 (2) it must cease the conduct causing the breach and offer assurances 
of non-repetition;1259 it is obliged to make full reparation for the injury it has caused, be it moral 
or material;1260 and it may not rely on the provisions of its internal law to justify its omission;1261 
 
Part II of the ILC articles addresses the consequences of an internationally wrongful act. I 
do not address them here because they deal with issues of compensation and reparation. While 
these consequences certainly would apply to systemic intimate violence, I maintain that the 
primary purpose of understanding the international right and obligation vis-à-vis systemic 
intimate violence is its ability to change state laws to address systemic intimate violence. I 
therefore discuss the resulting consequences of an internationally wrongful omission to prevent 
and help remedy such violence in chapter five. 
 
                                                
1258 Article 29 of the ILC articles. 
1259 Article 30 of the ILC articles. 
1260 Article 31 of the ILC articles (although reparation is made to the injured state, so it is unlikely that it would 
apply to systemic intimate violence, unless states agreed to create a fund for victims of systemic intimate violence to 
which offending states would be obliged to contribute as a form of reparation). 
1261 Article 32 of the ILC articles. The government of a federal state remains responsible for the activities of its 
individual member states in international law and “the central government is unable to avoid responsibility on the 
plea of lack of control over its constituent parts.” EAGLETON, supra note 303, at 32. 
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7.2 Enforcement by Whom 
 
States’ responsibility for inaction raises the issue of enforcement. That is, can an individual 
hold her or his own state liable either at an international tribunal or at a national court?  
 
According to the ILC articles, a state is responsible to one or more states or to the 
international community as a whole.1262 However, this “is without prejudice to any right, arising 
from the international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity 
other than a State.”1263 Therefore, where a state’s international obligation is owed to its citizens, 
such citizens may enforce the principles of state responsibility themselves and that those citizens 
accordingly may enforce the principles of state responsibility and bring an enforcement action 
against that state for any breach of that duty. As discussed below, this proposition is supported at 
international law. 
 
In Steiner and Gross v. Polish State, a Czechoslovak citizen brought an action against the 
Polish State before the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal in terms of the German-Polish 
Convention of May 15, 1922.1264 The tribunal allowed the claim, in part on the basis that a 
guiding aspect of the convention was respect for private rights. Therefore, it would be 
incompatible with the tenor of the Convention to exclude a claim solely because of the 
nationality of the claimant.1265 
 
In 1926, in the case of Menge v. Polish Railway Administration,1266 the High Court of 
Danzig held that, in order to give effect to the purpose of the treaty concluded between Poland 
and the Free City of Danzig (concerning railways within the City of Danzig), it was necessary 
“to construe the provisions of a treaty regulating private rights of individuals in such a manner as 
to recognize claims grounded directly in the treaty and put forward by private persons without 
interposition on the part of their State.”1267 
 
After the Second World War, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the 
War and the Occupation, signed on 26 May 1952, incorporated a Charter allowing direct legal 
access by nationals or residents of the states or territorial entities referred to in the Charter.1268 
This was a phenomenon repeated by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal which allowed claims by 
nationals of both the United States and Iran.1269 
 
These principles have continued to be upheld recently. In 1991, in the Francovich case, the 
European Court of Justice posed the question whether an individual citizen can bring a claim in 
                                                
1262 Article 33(1) of the ILC articles. 
1263 Article 33(2) of the ILC articles. 
1264 Steiner and Gross v. Polish State Annual Digest 1927-1928, Case No. 188 [hereinafter Steiner and Gross].  
1265 See KELSEN, supra note 336, at 142, footnote 31, citing Steiner and Gross, supra note 429. 
1266 Menge v. Polish Railway Administration Annual Digest 1925-1926, Case No. 258. See KELSEN, supra note 336, 
at 143 footnote 32.  
1267 See KELSEN, supra note 336, at 143 footnote 32. 
1268 See BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 589 footnote 136. 
1269 BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 589. 
 271 
international law against its own state for failure to implement European community law.1270 The 
European Court of Justice held that, based on broad principles of state responsibility, the 
plaintiffs were entitled to redress since,  
 
(T)he possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensable 
where… the full effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on the part of 
the State… It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and 
damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the 
State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty.1271  
 
On this basis, I propose that an individual may hold her state directly responsible for its 





An element of liability under most legal systems is the delineation of fault. The notion of 
fault as classically understood in common law systems is notably absent from the text of the ILC 
articles. Crawford maintains that it is only the act of wrongfulness that constitutes liability and 
no fault element appears to exist.1272 This echoes the principle of objective liability, which 
maintains that the responsibility of the state is strict and that “[o]nce an unlawful act has taken 
place, which has caused injury and which has been committed by an agent of the state, the state 
will be responsible in international law….”1273 The competing theory is that there must be fault, 
either in the form of intent or negligence, in order for a state to be held responsible for the 
breach.1274 
 
                                                
1270 Francovich case, supra note 330, at 7(1) (“Under the system of Community law in force, is a private individual 
who has been adversely affected by the failure of a Member State to implement Directive 80/897 – a failure 
confirmed by a judgment of the Court of Justice – entitled to require the State itself to give effect to those provisions 
of that directive which are sufficiently precise and unconditional, by directly invoking the Community legislation 
against the Member State in default so as to obtain the guarantees which that State itself should have provided …?”). 
1271 Francovich case, supra note 330, at 34. While the thrust of this decision targets the ability of a citizen to sue its 
own State in the European Court of Justice specifically (as opposed to in her/his own national courts), it nonetheless 
provides stable authority for the principle that a citizen can in fact hold its own State liable for non-compliance with 
Community law. 
1272 CRAWFORD, supra note 203, at 84. However, Crawford does recognize the role of fault in international law. He 
makes the point that different primary rules of international law give rise to different degrees of responsibility, 
ranging from “due diligence” to strict liability. Id at 13. This was not the position adopted by Lauterpacht in his 
discussions of state liability and comparing state liability to tortious liability: “Any such development (i.e. extending 
tortious liability to individuals) would be in accordance with what must be regarded as a well-established feature of 
the law of State responsibility, namely, that liability is not absolute, but depends upon the existence of fault in the 
person or persons of the State organs responsible for the act or omission in question.” LAUTERPACHT, supra note 
309, at 42. 
1273 SHAW, supra note 306, at 698-9: describing the competing theories of fault in the realm of state responsibility. 
See also the Claire claim 5RIAA pp. 516-31 1929, , holding that the responsibility for acts of officials or organs of a 
State devolve upon the government of the State  “in the absence of any ‘fault’ of its own.” 
1274 See Id. See also the Home Missionary Society Claim 6 RIAA p. 42 1920; 1 AD p. 173 (holding that no 
government can be responsible for the acts of rebel groups within its borders.).  
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However, even if one accepts Crawford’s argument, and accepts that fault is unnecessary 
for the purposes of state responsibility, this proposition is relevant only to the generic principles 
of the secondary obligation. Fault, either in the form of intent or the mental knowledge of the 
breach, may well be a specific requirement of states’ primary obligation.1275 
 
It is most unlikely that any principle of law, even within the nebulous body of international 
human rights law, could omit fault entirely from the determination of state responsibility. I 
propose that perhaps it is within the notion of attribution that the question of knowledge, and 
hence fault, exists. That is, in order to impute liability, it is necessary to ask whether a state 
knows about the degree of harm (or, if a lower standard of fault is adopted, whether it reasonably 
could have foreseen the degree of harm) perpetrated upon its citizens and whether it has taken 
reasonable steps to alleviate that harm.1276 
 
In the context of imposing liability for systemic intimate violence, two competing principles 
come into play. On the one hand, it is arguably necessary to impose a form of strict liability on 
states since, given the size and structure of most government hierarchies, proving knowledge 
definitively would be an arduous task.1277 On the other hand, it could be highly problematic to 
impose liability on states for private violence in the absence of demonstrating that, at least, state 
agents knew of the violence or ought reasonably to have known thereof.1278 It is therefore 
necessary to strike a balance between holding states responsible for a valid omission as opposed 
to imputing responsibility for conduct that is fuelled by neither intention nor neglect. 
 
These issues currently are unclear in international law. However, I propose that even if an 
element of fault, probably in the form of negligence, is required to trigger the responsibility of 
states in the context of systemic intimate violence, such a requirement likely will be satisfied for 
most states. The evidence of the extremity, nature and proliferation of extreme forms of systemic 
intimate violence in almost every country worldwide is staggering.1279 On this basis, I propose 
                                                
1275 See the commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 70 (explaining that the standards of fault “vary from 
one context to another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty provision or other 
rule giving rise to the primary obligation… Establishing these is a matter for the interpretation and application of the 
primary rules engaged in the given case.”). 
1276 The commentaries to the text of the ILC articles expressly allow for either a subjective or objective approach, 
without stipulating a rule or preference in respect of either. Commentaries to the ILC articles, supra note 300, at 70. 
They do state, however, that whether “the responsibility is ‘objective’ or subjective’… depends on the 
circumstances, including the content of the primary obligation in question.” Id. 
1277 SHAW, supra note 306, at 700. Shaw offers additional support for the imposition of state liability: “Imposing on 
the state absolute liability wherever an official is involved encourages that state to exercise greater control over its 
various departments and representatives. Id. It also stimulates moves towards complying with objective standards of 
conduct in international relations.” See also BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 440: “In the conditions of international 
life, which involve relations between highly complex communities, acting through a variety of institutions and 
agencies, the public law analogy of the ultra vires act is more realistic than a seeking for subject culpa in specific 
natural persons or may, or may not, ‘represent’ the legal person (the state) in terms of wrongdoing.” 
1278 States have been held responsible, however, for ultra vires acts, i.e. conduct of officials where the officials 
exceeded the ambit of their capacity or where the State had little if any control over the activity of the officials. If 
this is the case, a fortiori a State cab held liable for the conduct of its police officials who fail to protect its citizens 
systematically, for its judges who fail to take certain claims of violence seriously and for politicians who fail to 
address high levels of violence perpetrated predominantly against one category of their population. In general see 
SHAW, supra note 306, at 702-3. 
1279 [Note: citation to follow]  
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that any government or state agent that, in the face of such evidence, fails to take reasonable 





Increasing state intervention against systemic intimate violence also raises privacy issues. 
On face value, it appears necessary to balance the victim’s right to physical safety against the 
abuser’s right to privacy.1281 Whether such a balancing of rights exercise is necessary is 
debatable. However, even if one were to insist on positing the right to privacy against the right to 
bodily integrity, life and liberty, the latter rights, at the very least, would constitute non-arbitrary 
interests that the state may protect and balance when determining whether to intervene. 
 
Moreover, I propose that a woman’s rights to bodily integrity, life and liberty should 
outweigh an abuser’s right to privacy. A person’s right to privacy is not absolute. Respect for 
privacy is a right recognized in article 12 of the UN Declaration which states that “No-one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy (sic), family, home or correspondence….” 
Therefore, only arbitrary interference is prohibited. The tenor of the right is that the state should 
be reluctant to interfere in activities which occur in private, especially where such interference 
would tarnish the honor of the occupant. However, where intervention is not arbitrary but instead 
is necessary to protect an individual from harm (as is accepted in the case of child abuse1282), not 
only should the right to privacy be curtailed, but it becomes the responsibility of the state to 
intervene. 
 
In South Africa, the right to privacy may be limited in order to protect the right “to be free 
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources.”1283 The South African 
Constitution proffers the following factors to consider when determining whether the limitation 
of a right is equitable, namely: the nature of the right;1284 the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation;1285 the nature and extent of the limitation;1286 the relation between the limitation and 
its purpose;1287 and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.1288  
                                                
1280 Note: consider this: Clarify whether or not fault is required. Be easier to prove the state is negligent or had 
knowledge that systemic intimate violence is a general problem in society, rather than to prove that it was negligent 
or had knowledge of a particular case of systemic intimate violence. Are you talking about fault on a case by case 
basis, or fault at a level of overall society – i.e. it may What’s the standard for other forms of state intervention – e.g. 
police intervention? Is fault required? I would have thought the wrongfulness would be sufficient. And if at least 
negligence or intent is required, this would rule out all one-off systemic intimate violence, and would require 
possibly knowledge on a  case by case basis or regarding society generally. 
1281 Some academics when discussing systemic intimate violence reject the employment of the competing rights 
claim in its entirety, as undermining the extremity of harm. Romany, Women as Aliens, supra note 92.  
1282 Children’s Convention, supra note 7. [Note:  get article number]  
1283 Section 12(1)(c) of the South African Constitution, 108 of 1996  [hereinafter South African Constitution]. This 
problem was identified in the case of Rutenberg v Magistrate Wynberg 1997 (4) SA 735 (C) at 753 where the court, 
when dealing with an order barring the respondent from the matrimonial home in terms of the 1993 South African 
legislation, pointed out that where such an order is a permanent one “it is tantamount to an ex parte ejectment of the 
respondent forever from what may be his or her own property.” 
1284 Section 36(1)(a) of the South African Constitution, supra note 447.  
1285 Section 36(1)(b) of the South African Constitution, supra note 447. 
1286 Section 36(1)(c)of the South African Constitution, supra note 447. 
1287 Section 36(1)(d) of the South African Constitution, supra note 447. 
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This perpetual question in constitutional law can be addressed also by describing the roles 
that an abuser and a victim play. The abuser is the aggressor and thus actively violates the rights 
of the victim. In the context of systemic intimate violence, there is no rational explanation that 
justifies the violence and the fury of the abuser remains disproportionate to the conduct of the 
abused. Where an individual so clearly abrogates her/his duties to respect the bodily rights of 
others, s/he places him or herself within the realm of criminality and state investigation. 
 
In and of itself the respect for privacy is a cornerstone of any democracy. I do not propose 
encroaching on this right. However, where an exaggerated respect for familial sanctity is cited as 
a justification for the refusal to assist women in the most egregious of situations, its integrity and 
applicability are impoverished. It is generally recognized that the right to privacy is not a non-
derogable right and may be limited where it is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and taking into account all 
relevant factors…”1289 
 
Therefore, while there are certain constitutional queries which should be considered when 
calling for a greater degree of state attention to private conduct, I propose that the potential 
limitation of the rights to privacy in the interests of preventing systemic intimate violence will 
survive constitutional muster. Indeed, failing to intervene to prevent or remedy acute harm not 
only constitutes a failure to protect, but augments the power of the violators and contributes to 





[T]he events of recent years have forced upon our attention again and again the fact that the 
protection of the individual vis a vis his fellow man is no less vital to the enjoyment of his human 
rights and freedoms than his protection against the state. 
 
Sir Humphrey Waldock1291 
 
In this chapter I claim that the principles of state responsibility, as codified in the ILC 
articles, apply in respect of systemic intimate violence. My claim is based on the fact that, if the 
right to be free from systemic intimate violence is an international human right, then states have 
an international obligation to prevent it. This constitutes a primary obligation. 
 
Where a primary obligation is breached, secondary obligations come into play, which are 
recorded in the ILC articles. The ILC articles identify two requisite elements, namely, conduct 
and wrongfulness. As regards conduct, international law recognizes both acts and omissions as 
constituting conduct, which in turn can constitute an internationally wrongful act. States are 
                                                                                                                                                       
1288 Section 36(1)(e) of the South African Constitution, supra note 447. 
1289 Section 36(1) of the South African Constitution, supra note 447.  
1290 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 309, at 38. 
1291 Waldock, supra notex, at 83-84. 
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required to take positive steps to enforce negative rights and, therefore, the omission of a state’s 
agents to assist victims of systemic intimate violence is an omission on the part of the state. 
 
To determine wrongfulness, one asks whether the state’s conduct is in conformity with what 
is required of it by the international obligation. Subject to extremely limited situations of distress, 
force majeure, or necessity, the due diligence standard is applied to determine whether the state 
has complied with its duties to protect women from systemic intimate violence. To this end, one 
takes into account the nature of the right, the circumstances of the state, and the aggregate nature 
of the omission. 
 
Having considered the principles of state responsibility, it is clear that they apply to states 
which have failed to take the necessary minimum steps, articulated in chapter two, to mitigate 
systemic intimate violence. These principles do not apply only to the protection of airspace, the 
use of maritime facilities, or the invasion of countries. They apply any time an international 
obligation is breached, including the obligation to protect individuals from the continuum of 








Benefits of Using International Law to Regulate Systemic Intimate Violence 
 
 
We are indeed witnessing a tremendous and popular movement for the advancement of 
human rights and democratic freedoms in the world. This movement has such moral 
force, that even determined governments and armies are incapable of suppressing it.  
 
It is an encouraging indication of the triumph of the human spirit for freedom. 
 
His Holiness The Dalai-Lama, Tenzin Gyatso Himachal Pradesh 1292 
 
 
Part A: Introductory Comments 
 
 
1. Description of this Chapter 
 
In this chapter I argue that international human rights law is a useful instrument to mitigate 
systemic intimate violence. I do not maintain that international law has the same force as a 
state’s domestic laws.1293 Nor do I propose international human rights law as an additional body 
of law with which states must comply. Rather I turn to international law as an institution 
designed to induce states to remedy the deficiencies within their individual legal systems.1294 
 
The chapter: (1) begins with a summary of the claim I make in this chapter as a whole; (2) 
describes the competing theories regarding the efficacy of international law; (3) based on the 
theories which maintain that international law is effective, identifies three broad functions of 
international human rights law; and, (4) demonstrates how these three functions operate in 
respect of systemic intimate violence. 
 
I divide the chapter into two parts, the first addressing the theories of co-operative 




                                                
1292 Hi Holiness The Dalai-Lama, Tenzin Gyatso Himachal Pradesh, Are Human Rights Truly Universal, in 
UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD 19, 20-21 (Proceedings of the Colloquy organised by 
the Council of Europe in co-operation with the International Institute of Human Rights, Council of Europe, N.P. 
Engel, Publisher, 1989). 
1293 Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002) [hereinafter 
Hathaway]. 
1294 HENKIN, supra note 426, at 17. 
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2. The Claim 
 
I claim that the enunciation of a norm in international law could act as a guide to be used by 
national governments to improve their legislation and policies in respect of systemic intimate 
violence. The claim is based on the proposal that international law influences the behavior of 
states and the way they treat their citizens through a cooperative rather than a coercive 
process.1295  
 
This is a contentious proposal since many theorists reject international law as a fallacy, based 
on a spurious interpretation of international affairs as legal rather than political. A fortiori, how is 
it possible to use international law for systemic intimate violence, which is less political than 
many other under-enforced human rights violations? Increasingly, however, legal scholars are 
explaining how international law operates without central law-making and enforcement agencies. 
These theories maintain that, through varying processes, international law permeates states’ 
boundaries, influencing their conduct vis-à-vis other states and vis-à-vis their own citizens.1296 
 
The latter body of theory is supported by a new phenomenon of powerful non-governmental 
actors, coupled with the benefits of technology, which has oiled the gears of international law. 
International and local organizations are working in tandem to apply human rights in local 
settings. This vertical manifestation of the international to the national, effects incremental 
changes in national legal and policy systems.  
 
Based on the theory of non-coercive state compliance, I argue that there are three ways in 
which international law serves to improve states’ standard of conduct. (1) First, international law 
has an expressive value: it stipulates norms, which define the content of rights and concomitant 
state obligations. The expressive function of international law is exemplified by the specification 
of mass rape as a crime against humanity. (2) The second function of international law is its 
implementing capability. The process of international law compels states to modify their laws in 
accordance with international standards. An example of this is the increasing number of states 
which have amended their penal systems to prohibit female genital cutting. (3) Finally, 
international law facilitates the creation of new norms and laws to address harm, for which no 
regulation currently exists. This is the expansive function of international law and is exemplified 
by the creation of the prohibition against enforced disappearances. 
 
In respect of systemic intimate violence, the expressive, implementing and expansive 
functions of international law have resulted in a certain degree of modified state behavior, which 
I describe with reference to Mexico, Nicaragua and Sweden. 
 
                                                
1295 For a discussion of the various theories in support of and rejecting this notion, see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law, supra note 496, at 2599 footnote 2. 
1296 Tarrow identifies three hypotheses explaining the rise in transnational politics: “The first is that the world 
economy is rapidly globalizing along with its attendant system of communications; the second that these changes 
open up enhanced possibilities for transnational collective action; and the third that – knit together by international 
institutions and transnational social movements – something resembling a transnational civil society is developing.” 
SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CONTENTIOUS POLITICS, 178 (1998) [hereinafter 
TARROW]. 
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I conclude that, despite the absence of an international legislature, judiciary or policing 
institution, international law is a legal structure, which does regulate state behavior, albeit 
through non-traditional mechanisms and by non-traditional agents. These processes and agents 
are not necessarily beyond criticism, not least of all because of their non-democratic nature; 
however, their existence demonstrates that using international human rights law to mitigate 
violence is beneficial and valuable, even in the most intimate of contexts. 
 




There are theories which reject international law and those which support it.1297 I apply the 
latter theories for the following reasons: (1) firstly, while it is true that international law has 
failed miserably in many instances, it is equally true that it has succeeded. The success is less 
high-profile and certainly less traditional, but it constitutes effective law making nonetheless; (2) 
secondly, as Professor Koh points out, our domestic legal systems are immensely flawed, yet we 
do not reject the entire concept of national law. By the same logic, the deficiencies of 
international law – and there are many – does not require us to abandon it as a source of law but 
rather to work towards its improvement; and (3) finally, if we abandon the internationalization of 
norms, where does that leave us as regards the impotent, the powerless, the weak? If we become 
the impotent, the powerless and the weak, would we nod our heads in agreement that, yes, 
international law is in fact a fiction and it is quite alright that we all go about the business that 
falls exclusively within our own borders. The answer to that question was a resounding no in 
1945 and continues, in my opinion, in the negative today. 
 
I now proceed to describe briefly the theories which reject and accept international law 
respectively. 
 
3.2 Theories which Reject International Law  
 
I do not turn lightly to international law as a remedy. Many perceive international law as a 
weak body of law. Such theorists argue that international law is either ‘soft law’ or not law at all 
but rather a vague and arbitrary alliance of states’ interests.1298 
                                                
1297 Traditionally, there are two divergent claims regarding international law: “on the one hand, the realist charge 
that international law is not really law, because it cannot be enforced; on the other, the rationalistic claim that 
nations ‘obey’ international law only to the extent that it serves national self-interest.” Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law, supra note 496, at 2603. For a discussion of the early development of the discussion regarding 
compliance with international law, see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note 496, at 2606-7 
(concluding that Hugo Grotius was the first to demarcate international law as something other than natural / 
religious law; rather he saw international law “as the consequence of volitional acts, generated by independent 
operation of the human will.” Id). 
1298 AUSTIN, supra note 756. Koh groups Austin’s contemporaries into four strands of thinking regarding the 
compliance question, namely, the “Austinian, positivistic realist strand, which suggests that nations never ‘obey’ 
international law because it is not really law.’ The philosophical tradition of analyzing international law obligation 
had bifurcated into a Hobbesian utilitarian, rationalistic strand, which acknowledged that nations sometimes follow 
international law, but only when it serves their self-interest to do so, and a liberal Kantian strand, which assumed 
that nations generally obey international law, guided by a sense of moral and ethical obligation derived from 
considerations of natural law and justice. Bentham… suggested a fourth, process-based strand, which derived a 
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Other legal theorists reject international law on the basis that it has no effective enforcement 
mechanism. Law without mechanisms of enforcement, according to these theorists, results in 
neither compliance nor respect.1299  
 
Still others maintain that ‘international law’ is nothing more than a coincidence of conduct. 
While it may appear that states act according to some standards, in fact this appearance is 
nothing more than states acting according to the regulation of “mutual relations of physical 
force.”1300 
 
In addition, a common mistrust of international law stems from the perception that the 
individual is too removed from international law to benefit from its precepts and that 
international law is unsuitable for national systems characterized by different cultural values.1301  
 
The rejection of international law emanates from the accurate assessment that international 
legal principles neither prevent human rights disasters nor effectively control the conduct of 
states. To a certain extent, this is accurate. Historically, there are few examples of international 
norms “successfully socialized into domestic societies without the exercise of agency.”1302  
                                                                                                                                                       
nation’s incentive to obey from the encouragement and prodding of other nations with whom it is engaged in a 
discursive legal process.” Id. 2610-2611. 
1299 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., Cambridge U. Press 
1995) [hereinafter AUSTIN] (“The law obtaining between nations is law (improperly called) set by general opinion. 
The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations; or by the fear on the part 
of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims 
generally received and respected.”) This is cited by W. Michael Reisman, How Shall We Conceive International 
Law?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 8 (W. Michael Reisman, Mahnoush H. 
Arsanjani, Siegfried Wiessner, and Gayl S. Westerman eds., 2004) [hereinafter Reisman, How Shall We Conceive 
International Law]. John Basset Moore, Fifty Years of International Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 395, 397 (1937) (“By 
international law we mean the body of rules which regulate the intercourse of nations in war and peace.”). Cited by 
Reisman, How Shall We Conceive International Law, supra note 756, at 8. A contrary is expressed by George F. 
Kennan who stated that “No one who has spent many years of his life in practical contact with the workings of 
international affairs can fail to appreciate the immense and vital value of international law in assuring the smooth 
functioning of that part of international life that is not concerned with such things as vital interest and military 
security.” Cited by Reisman, How Shall We Conceive International Law, supra note 756, at 10. Franck refers to 
globalization as a reason for promoting international cooperation. FRANCK, supra note 754, at 3-6. Cited by 
Reisman, How Shall We Conceive International Law, supra note 756, at 11. Matti Koskenniemi takes the position 
that “doubt must remain that the abstract subject celebrated as the carrier of universal human rights is but a 
fabrication of the disciplinary techniques of Western ‘governmentality’ whose only reality lies in the imposition on 
social relations of a particular structure of domination.” KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra 
note 583, at 515. See also the analysis by Hathaway, supra note 750. 
1300 This is discussed by LAUTERPACHT, FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, supra notex, at 
400.  
1301 For a discussion of this theme, see Guzman, supra note 492 (“Just as compliance with the promises at the 
domestic level requires the existence of damages, a model of compliance with international law requires a 
mechanism through which nations that violate an agreement are sanctioned… [it is possible] to generate a model of 
effective international law only if there exists an entity that can sanction those who violate international law, much 
like courts sanction domestic violations.” Id.). This theory is rejected by Hathaway, who engages the “broader 
perspective on the role that international law plays in shaping how states actually behave.” Oona A. Hathaway, The 
Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, 
228, 230 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh, eds., 2005) [hereinafter Hathaway, The Promise and Limits]. 
1302 TARROW, supra note 752, at 183. 
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However, increasingly theorists are recognizing the non-coercive influence of international 
law.1303 Its method of enforcement, according to such theorists, is by infiltration of international 
norms through national courts, legal systems and political lobbying.1304 
 
3.3 Theories which Support International Law 
 
3.3.1 Unique Nature of International Human Rights Law 
 
Many theorists argue that international law is a unique body of law, which cannot be 
compared to domestic law. They identify the uniqueness of international law in the following 
characteristics: (1) international law comprises norms which filter into national legal systems 
through a multi-faceted process; (2) international law in fact has forms of enforcement 
mechanisms which are not comparable with the enforcement mechanisms of national law. 
Therefore, the absence of traditional enforcement mechanisms does not negate the efficacy of 
international law; and, (3) the objective of international law and international bodies is not to 
impose law on nations but rather to work together with nations to improve their relations inter se, 
the way they treat their citizens, and their use of the environment; and, the deficiency of 
international law does negate its efficacy as a legal system. 
 
3.3.2 Multi-Faceted Process of International Law Infiltrating National Law 
 
There are a multitude of moments and actors within local, regional and international 
authorities that apply and implement international law. McDougal, Lasswell and Chen state that 
the literature on international law “affords little recognition of the comprehensive, 
interpenetrating constitutive processes (global, regional, national, local) which identify 
authoritative decision makers, specify basic community policies, establish necessary structures of 
                                                
1303 Koh explains this development as “characterized by the marked decline of national sovereignty; the concomitant 
proliferation of international regimes, institutions, and nonstate actors; the collapse of the public-private distinction; 
the rapid development of customary and treaty-based rules; and the increasing interpenetration of domestic and 
international systems.” Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note 496, at 2604. Michael Reisman, 
proponent of the New Haven School describes the process of international law “systematically in terms of those who 
engage in it (the participants), the subject dimensions that animate them (their perspectives), the situation in which 
they interact, the resources upon which they draw, the ways they manipulate those resources and the aggregate 
outcomes of the process of interaction, which are conceived in terms of a comprehensive set of values.” W. Michael 
Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, [86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 118 (1992)] in, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (W. Michael Reisman, Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, 
Siegfried Wiessner, and Gayl S. Westerman eds., 2004) [hereinafter Reisman, The View from the New Haven School 
of International Law] . Another theory of why States comply with international law is expressed by Kenneth W. 
Abbott in the context of international humanitarian law: “States comply with humanitarian law primarily because of 
expectations of reciprocity , though other considerations, including concern for their international reputation and 
domestic political support, also come into play.” Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International 
Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS, 324, 326 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh, eds., 2005) [hereinafter Abbott, International 
Relations Theory].  
1304 Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra notex. For a brief description of the distinction between realists 
on the one hand and liberal and constructivists on the other, see Abbott, International Relations Theory, supra note 
760, at 329.  
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authority, allocate bases of power, authorize appropriate procedures , and make provision for 
many different, indispensable types of decision.”1305 
 
In examining how decisions are made in international law, Reisman identifies a process of 
factors, including the gathering and dissemination of information about an objectionable state of 
events; the galvanizing of community intervention and regulation; subsequent prescription or 
lawmaking; the “invocation or provisional characterization of a certain action as inconsistent 
with a prescription or law…;” the application of such prescription or law to a set of events 
(which may occur in formal settings such as courts or “in informal, unorganized situations”); the 
termination or abrogation of existing norms and the social arrangements based upon them;” and 
the appraisal of the decision in relation to the community’s needs.1306  
 
3.3.3 Non-Traditional Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
As regards the U.N. specifically, Oscar Schachter identifies a long list of unique enforcement 
mechanisms used by the U.N. to implement international law: (1) reporting and supervision 
procedures for example periodic reports, review by committees, special rapporteur assessment 
and committee reports noting discrepancies between the requirements of international law and 
state conduct. This is augmented by the complaints procedure for individual or governmental 
complaints such as those brought under the optional protocol; (2) ‘facilitative’ mechanisms for 
example armed peace-keeping forces and election observers; (3) penalizing measures in the form 
of expulsion from the community of nations; nonmilitary enforcement action, such as economic 
sanctions, severing communications and breaking diplomatic relations; (5) use of armed force 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; (6) judicial enforcement by national and 
international courts and tribunals; and (7) national courts interpreting and applying international 
law; (8) public opinion, expressed through the activities of NGOs.1307 
 
In addition, “in practice, texts that are only recommendatory have as much effect as formal 
rules in channeling state conduct. ‘Codes’ that lay down standards and prescribe action, but are 
not legally mandatory, may be incorporated into domestic law by states. An example is the 
Codex Alimentarius produced jointly by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the World 
Health Organization prescribing standards ‘for all principal foods.’… The codex is a notable 
example of a formally nonbinding instrument that has become effective law for many countries 
throughout the world on a matter of practical importance to all peoples.”1308 
 
Hathaway too rejects the argument that the absence of enforcement mechanisms renders 
international law nugatory. While she maintains that states which sign human rights treaties tend 
to violate human rights more than non-signatory states, she still references the “notion of ‘self-
enforcement.’” International law, according to Hathaway, is obeyed “primarily because domestic 
institutions create mechanisms for ensuring that a state abides by its international legal 
commitments, whether or not particular governmental actors wish it to do so.”1309 
                                                
1305 WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra notex, at 66. 
1306 Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, supra note 760, at 5-6. 
1307 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 10-16 (1994) 
1308 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 5 (1994). 
1309 Hathaway, The Promise and Limits, supra note 758, at 234. 
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3.3.4 International law Working Together With and Not Against National Law  
 
Proponents of international law hold, inter alia, that international law augments domestic 
structures thereby providing greater legal redress for victims of human rights violations.1310 Tom 
Campbell notes that human rights discourse can “serve both as a potent source for radical 
critiques of actual social arrangements and also as a powerful basis for working out and 
presenting alternative institutional practices.”1311 
 
As regards international human rights law, Henkin states that: 
 
In our international system of nation-states, human rights are to be enjoyed in national 
societies as rights under national law. The purpose of international law is to influence 
states to recognize and accept human rights, to reflect these rights in their national 
constitutions and laws, to respect and ensure their enjoyment through national 
institutions, and to incorporate them into national ways of life.1312 
 
Anne-Marie Slaughter advances the liberal theory of international law from the point of view 
of liberal international relations theory. She maintains that an important function of international 
law “is not to create international institutions to perform functions that individual states cannot 
perform by themselves, but rather to influence and improve the functioning of domestic 
institutions.”1313 This echoes Henkin’s view that international human rights law is effective 
because it does not operate independently of national legal systems, but rather in conjunction 
with them.1314 He emphasizes that “… the question is not whether law is enforceable or even 
effectively enforced; rather the question is whether law is observed, whether it governs or 
influences behavior, whether international behavior reflects stability and order.”1315 
 
                                                
1310 See JANIS, supra note 206, at 174 (“International human rights law posits the direct application of international 
law to individuals and in some instances even gives individuals direct access to international legal machinery.”). 
Traditionally, there are two divergent claims regarding international law: “on the one hand, the realist charge that 
international law is not really law, because it cannot be enforced; on the other, the rationalistic claim that nations 
‘obey’ international law only to the extent that it serves national self-interest.” Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law, supra note 496, at 2603. For a discussion of the early development of the discussion regarding 
compliance with international law, see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note 496, at 2606-7 
(concluding that Hugo Grotius was the first to demarcate international law as something other than natural / 
religious law; rather he saw international law “as the consequence of volitional acts, generated by independent 
operation of the human will.” Id). 
1311 Tom Campbell, Introduction: Realizing Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 1,1 
(Tom Campbell, David Goldberg, Sheila McClean and Tom Mullen eds., Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
1312 Henkin, Human Rights in International Law, supra notex, at 25. 
1313 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS, 95, 101 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh, eds., 2005). Slaughter maintains that this is 
particularly true of international human rights law, which “precisely about structuring state-society relations to 
ensure at least minimal individual flourishing.” Id. 
1314 See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, 225-226 (cited in Foundations of International Law and Politics, 
168 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005) (Foundation Press, New York)) (“What matters is not 
whether the international system has legislative, judicial, or executive branches, corresponding to those we have 
become accustomed to seek in a domestic society; what matters is whether international law is reflected in the 
policies of nations and in relations between nations.”). 
1315 Id.  
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The underlying motivation for this ‘interactive process’ is explained by Koh’s transnational 
legal theory, which argues that states obey international human rights law because they 
“somehow internalized that rule and made it a part of their internal value system.”1316 According 
to Koh, the internalization of international law into domestic law is a 
 
process whereby an international law rule is interpreted through the interaction of transnational 
actors in a variety of law-declaring fora, then internalized into a nation’s domestic legal system.  
Through this three-part process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization, international 
legal rules become integrated into national law and assume the status of internally binding 
domestic legal obligations.1317 
 
Therefore, through an “interactive process… law helps translate claims of legal authority into 
national behavior.”1318 
 
3.3.5 Deficiency Does Not Equate to Nugatory 
 
According to Lauterpacht, international law is peculiar and its implementation is not 
analogous to municipal legal orders.1319 
 
Professor Koh analogizes this to the process of domestic law. He explains that although 
domestic laws may be violated we do not discard the entire system for its imperfection. 
Similarly, he maintains, we should approach international human rights norms which are: 
  
underenforced, imperfectly enforced; but they are enforced through a complex, little understood 
legal process that I call transnational legal process[:]… the institutional interaction whereby 
global norms of international human rights law are debated, interpreted, and ultimately 
internalized by domestic legal systems. To claim that this complex transnational legal process of 
enforcing international human rights law … exists is not to say that it always works or even that it 
works very well… But the process of enforcing international human rights law also sometimes 
has its successes, which give us reason not to ignore that process, but to try to develop and 
nurture it…1320 
 
The distinction between the divergent views of the enforceability of international law is most 
relevant to whether international human rights law will advance the cause against systemic 
                                                
1316 Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced, supra note 456, at 1400. 
1317 Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 761, at 626. See also Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law, supra note 496, at 2646 (“…such a process can be viewed as having three phases. One or more 
transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or 
enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce 
the other party, but to internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal 
normative system. The aim is to ‘bind’ that other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set. 
Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive. The transaction generates a legal rule 
which will guide future transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize 
those norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests and even the 
identities of the participants in the process.”) 
1318 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note 496, at 2618. 
1319 Lauterpacht: Function of Law in the International Community, supra notex, at 399. 
1320 Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced, supra note 456, at 1399. Koh emphasizes that the 
process may be wanting but it exists nonetheless.  
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intimate violence. Depending on the position one adopts, one’s approach towards developing 
international law will differ. If one accepts the approach of the compliance based theory, as I do, 
the focus is not on the cost-benefit analysis of what international law yields, but rather on 
“designing social, political and institutional frameworks that help internalize norms…”1321  
 
Therefore, I approach international law as a system that inculcates norms in national legal 
systems. I refer to this as co-operative compliance with international law.1322 An inextricable 
component of co-operative compliance is the role of non-state actors in international law. 
 




Reisman refers to actors “who, though not endowed with formal competence, may 
nonetheless play important roles in influencing decisions.”1323 These actors include, inter alia, 
state agents, nongovernmental organizations, pressure groups and individuals.1324  
 
This multiplicity of actors, which have the capability of incorporating international law into 
domestic law, helps to explain the co-operative compliance theories. According to Reisman 
international law is an anthropological process, and, therefore, theorists should take account of 
the “range of centralized and decentralized settings in which decisions are made, their varying 
degree of organization and formality, the extent to which they are specialized and the extent to 
which they are continuous or episodic.”1325 
 
It is possible to categorize international actors as: (1) non-governmental organizations or 
transnational social movements; and (3) international bodies. These entities have come to play a 
                                                
1321 HATHAWAY & KOH, supra note 762, at 3. For the importance of choosing a position in respect of one’s approach 
to international law, see Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, supra note 760 
(“Both the reference and content of the term ‘law’ will vary depending on whether the standpoint is that of a 
member of elite or the rank-and-file, whether the observer is a member of the system observed, is an outsider or is 
on the margin. Perception of the same phenomenon may vary depending on the culture, class, gender, age, or crisis-
experience of the observer. .. No standpoint is more authentic than another, but the scholar must be sensitive to the 
variations in perception that attend each perspective…”). Cited by Reisman, How Shall We Conceive International 
Law, supra note 756, at 3. 
1322 I use this phrase to distinguish between compliance as a result of force and compliance as a result of free will or 
self-interest. For a discussion of the motives driving States to comply with international law, see Koh’s discussion of 
the Chayeses’ ‘managerial model’ v. Franck’s fairness theory, see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 
supra note 496, at 2600-2603 (describing the Chayeses’ view which holds that “nations obey international rules not 
because they are threatened with sanctions, but because they are persuaded to comply by the dynamic created by the 
treaty regimes to which they belong.” Id. 2601. Koh describes Franck’s view as asserting that “nations ‘obey 
powerless rules’ because they are pulled towards compliance by considerations of legitimacy… and distributive 
justice.” Id. 2602). Cf. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE HEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995) [hereinafter FRANCK]. 
1323 Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, supra note 760, at 4. 
1324 Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, supra note 760, at 4. 
1325 Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, supra note 760, at 5. 
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prominent role in the creation, implementation and enforcement of international human rights 
law.1326  
 
4.2 Non-Governmental and Transnational Organizations 
 
The NGOs which have provided information to the Committee are the forces which, for 
the longest time and with the greatest persistence, have taken the lead in reporting this 
clear violation of human rights and demanding justice. They are also a source of truthful, 
heartrending testimony, criteria and evidence which are essential to the effort to shed 
light on many of the circumstances under which the crimes have taken place. 
 




This group of non-state actors includes non-governmental organizations, transnational 
advocacy networks, and transnational social movement organizations. While the specificity of 
these labels differ, for the purposes of understanding the broad role of non-state actors in 
international law I analyze them as one group and refer to them as TSMOs generically or NGOs 
specifically. 
 
TSMOs, together with academics, have been responsible for the propulsion of women’s 
rights in international law, succeeding in establishing meaningful facilities and legislation. 
Generally, they achieve this through a process of documenting and publicizing information; 
educating individuals, governments and other organizations; and, working with so-called grass-
roots organizations in implementing the norms for which they or others have lobbied.1328 This 
process is not always ideal; there are important arguments regarding the power of NGOs, their 
source of income, the agendas they pursue and the impact all of these factors may have on 
democratic values and cultural autonomy. However, in the context of systemic intimate violence, 
there is evidence of successful NGO work, which is a key driver in the argument for the 
internationalization of women’s rights. 
 
                                                
1326 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note 496, at 2624 (stating that by the 1970s and 1980s 
“[m]ultinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals reemerged as significant actors 
on the transnational stage.” Id.) See in general Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, in 
Foundations of International Law and Politics, 217, 217 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju Koh eds., 2005) 
(Foundation Press, New York) [hereinafter Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts]. McCarthy, The 
Globalization of Social Movement Theory, supra note 597, at 244 (“Social movements are ongoing collective efforts 
to bring about consequential social change… Movements are composed of a set of constituent elements, including 
activists, who devote extensive effort; … groups that provide financial and other support; and adherents, people who 
support the goals of a movement but are not active”). See also Louis Kriesberg, Social Movements and Global 
Transformation, in TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE, 
3, 4 (Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco eds., 1997) [hereinafter Kriesberg] (“Global changes 
involve powerful, large-scale social forces, and even shifts that appear abrupt are typically products of slowly 
evolving changes that develop largely undetected.”). 
1327 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, supra notex, at 40. 
1328 TARROW, supra note 752, at 186-7. See also Kriesberg, supra note 776, at 4 (describing four interactive trends 
which have caused the increasing growth in number and potency of NGOs: “growing democratization, increasing 
global integration, converging and diffusing values, and proliferating transnational institutions”). 
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TSMOs are effective players in the implementation of international law for the following 
reasons: (1) they operate on the basis of ideological commitment; (2) they obtain and provide 
information by utilizing the media and information technology; (3) they are well connected, both 
politically and with local NGOs; (4) they are creative in the development of norm-changing 





As opposed to states, non-governmental “advocates plead the causes of others … 
Keck and Sikkink 1329 
 
Ideological commitment to causes has galvanized the implementation of human rights in a 
range of countries and in respect of a multitude of issues. It has been stated that “one of the most 
successful transnational framing efforts in the recent period has been the creation of a common 
transnational conception of human rights,”1330 a code of ideological advocates who “are bound 
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and 
services.”1331  
 
Therefore, while TSMOs are slated as non-democratic bodies within international law, they 
often represent the needs of those who do not have a political voice.1332 However, there is a very 
real criticism against the ideological commitment of NGOs. Some NGOs may pursue their own 
agenda, be it religious or political, under the auspices of protecting vulnerable groups, which can 
cause additional harm. This criticism aside, TSMOs are effective due to a combination of 
ideological commitment and a seemingly endless supply of ideological causes.1333 
 
4.2.3 Information, Media and Information Technology 
 
One of the key activities of TSMOs is the transfer and free flow of information.1334 They are 
able to effect norm implementation by framing and explaining a given set of facts. By 
                                                
1329 “…they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist 
understanding of their ‘interests.’” Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 220.  
1330 McCarthy, The Globalization of Social Movement Theory, supra note 597, at 245. 
1331 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 220-221 (describing a transnational 
advocacy network as comprising those relevant actors working internationally on an issue). 
1332 Or no voice at all, as is the case, for example, in respect of the environment or non-human animals. 
1333 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 220-221 (describing a transnational 
advocacy network as comprising those relevant “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together 
by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”). Tarrow describes the 
phenomenon of cross-border diffusion as a form of transnational politics, comprising “the communication of 
movement ideas, forms of organization, or challenges to similar targets from one center of contention to another.”  
1334 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 220-221 (describing a transnational 
advocacy network as comprising those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together 
by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”). Tarrow describes 
phenomenon of cross-border diffusion as a form of transnational politics, comprising “the communication of 
movement ideas, forms of organization, or challenges to similar targets from one center of contention to another.” 
TARROW, supra note 752, at 186-7. See also Kriesberg, supra note 776, at 4 (describing four interactive trends 
which have caused the increasing growth in number and potency of NGOs: “growing democratization, increasing 
global integration, converging and diffusing values, and proliferating transnational institutions”). 
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“pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international 
standards… they contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors may have 
of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and 
ultimately to changing procedures, policies and behavior.”1335  
 
Moreover, TSMOs have access to the resources and global networks necessary to obtain and 
transmit such information.1336 This combination allows increasingly large and respected 
institutions to obtain information about factual scenarios, transmit such information to formal 
and informal authorities, and lobby for a proportionate reaction.1337 
 
TSMOs are the political organisms of the age of globalization, creating unprecedented 
support for their causes through the use of the media, and particularly the internet.1338 The 
explosive developments of “information technology and communications have greatly enhanced 
the ability of nongovernmental organizations to bring pressure to bear on governments.”1339 
 
The publication of information triggers a number of factors: government officials and other 
relevant actors become educated in the issue and how to prevent it; this creates experts who may 
                                                
1335 KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 784, at 3. For a discussion of the technique of 
framing issues for international attention, see KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 784, at 
19 (“How does this process of persuasion occur? An effective frame must show that a given state of affairs is neither 
natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or parties, and propose credible solutions.”). 
1336 See McCarthy, The Globalization of Social Movement Theory, supra note 597, at 253 (explaining that resource 
support for transnational social movement organizations include “at least the following: (1) international political 
authorities, (2) national political authorities, (3) international religious organizations, (4) national religious 
organizations, (5) INGOs, (6) NGOs, (7) foundations, (8) constituent organizations, and (9) members and 
sympathizers. The typical forms of support are direct financial aid and in-kind aid, such as office space, temporary 
grants of personnel, access to communications technology and other equipment, and public support.”) 
1337 See Chadwick F. Alger, Transnational Social Movements, World Politics, and Global Governance, in 
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: SOLIDARITY BEYOND THE STATE, 260, 263 (Jackie 
Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco eds., 1997) [hereinafter Alger].  
1338 Effective human rights campaigns by NGOs include the international boycott of Nestlé to prevent the 
corporation from promoting infant formula to poor women in the developing world. See Keck and Sikkink, Activists 
Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 222. See also Peter J. Spiro’s description of the Brent Spar episode, in 
terms of which Greenpeace opposed the scuttling of rigs by Shell in the North Sea. Although Spiro criticizes this 
particular event, he does recognize “one might doubt that oil companies will dare undertake scuttlings so long as 
Greenpeace maintains its vigilance on the issue.” Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental 
Organizations and the "Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.957, 964-965 (1996). For a discussion of 
the benefits and drawbacks of the role of NGOs in international law, see Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to 
Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
1335, 1366 (1999). See also Abbott, International Relations Theory, supra note 760, at 330 (describing the role 
Amnesty International played in its campaign against torture enforced disappearances). Tarrow provides examples 
of transnational social movements, including campaigns to stop the construction of dams, the empowerment of 
environmental and workers’ groups in the establishment of the multi-lateral North American Free Trade Agreement, 
the organization of dissident groups under the rubric of the Helsinki Accords, and the impact of Greenpeace on 
reducing pollution and environmental destruction by multi-national corporations. TARROW, supra note 752, at 178. 
An example of the impact of media reporting is the New York Times article, Secret Side of Women’s Lives, supra 
note 732, describing domestic violence as the “one significant blot on the record of women’s empowerment.” 
Finally, see Kriesberg, supra note 776, at 5 (“Movies, telephones, television, audio and video tape cassettes, fax, and 
electronic mail provide multiple sources of information … [making] rapid exchange and sustained social interaction 
possible”). 
1339 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 10-16 (1994) 
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interact with officials, dignitaries, advocates and politicians; who in turn facilitate agreement in 
formal and informal settings, from official meetings to informal discussions and agreements in 
the corridors of the U.N.1340  
 
Therefore, TSMOs facilitate the implementation of international law through “forms of 
organization characterized by voluntary reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication 
and exchange.”1341 In the context of human rights, these institutions are seminal “in situations 
where domestic access of claimants is blocked, or where those making claims are too weak 
politically for their voices to be heard… In such cases, international or foreign venues may be 
the only ones in which claims can be legitimately or safely presented.”1342 
 
4.2.4 Local and Political Connections 
 
Members of leading TSMOs are politically respected and connected individuals.1343 They 
have a great deal of interaction with government officials and, if the cause and its advocate are of 
a sufficiently high profile, governments’ attention may be obtained and circumstances altered. 
 
TSMOs are connected to and work with local organizations. This connection between 
international and local organizations benefits both entities. TSMOs provide local organizations 
with funding, networks, personnel, publicity and, if necessary, protection.1344 In turn, local 
organizations provide access to local information, local stories, individual witnesses and, in a 






                                                
1340 See Alger, supra note 788, at 265-7. 
1341 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 219. A transnational social movement 
can be described as “a collective challenge, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.” TARROW, supra note 752, at 177. According to Keck and 
Sikkink, “international and domestic NGOs play a central role in all advocacy networks, usually initiating actions 
and pressuring more powerful actors to take positions.” MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS 
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 9 (1998) [hereinafter KECK AND SIKKINK, 
ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS ]. 
1342 TARROW, supra note 752, at 190, citing Keck and Sikkink. For a discussion of the importance of activist 
organizations and individuals, see Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 217. 
1343 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 220-221 (describing a transnational 
advocacy network as comprising those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together 
by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”) See also McCarthy, The 
Globalization of Social Movement Theory, supra note 597, at 245 (“… one of the most successful transnational 
framing efforts in the recent period has been the creation of a common transnational conception of human rights.”). 
Tarrow describes phenomenon of cross-border diffusion as a form of transnational politics, comprising “the 
communication of movement ideas, forms of organization, or challenges to similar targets from one center of 
contention to another.” TARROW, supra note 752, at 186-7. See also Kriesberg, supra note 776, at 4 (describing four 
interactive trends which have caused the increasing growth in number and potency of NGOs: “growing 
democratization, increasing global integration, converging and diffusing values, and proliferating transnational 
institutions”). 
1344 See Alger, supra note 788, at 265-7. 
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4.2.5 Creative Methodologies 
 
TSMOs have developed original methodology in implementing their campaigns. Typical 
strategies include: education campaigns; conferences; direct aid to victims of injustice; public 
marches; and, changing structures directly through lobbying.1345 
 
Another important mechanism is naming and shaming. Publicizing governments’ poor 
human rights records triggers a type of international shame, especially where states “aspire to 
belong to a normative community of nations.”1346 In this sense, TSMOs provide a watch-dog 
service, reminding governments that “they are being watched.”1347 For example, in 2003, the 
Center for Reproductive Rights (“CRR”) investigated the forced sterilization of so-called Roma 
women in Slovakia.1348 The organization publicized the racial disparagement, poverty and non-
consensual forced sterilization of Roma women. The CRR’s exposure of the government’s health 
care system’s approach to Roma women triggered an international outcry. It also exposed a 
violation of the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms,1349 which resulted in an investigation into the Slovak government’s 
treatment of the Roma people and the re-evaluation of Slovak’s entry into the European 
Union.1350 
 
‘Public opinion’ manifests in institutions of civil society such as professional bodies, 
universities, and religious and communal institutions. These entities, together with international 
institutions, national and local governments, national, regional and international courts, and 
                                                
1345 McCarthy, The Globalization of Social Movement Theory, supra note 597, at 257. 
1346 KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 784, at 29. 
1347 See Alger, supra note 788, at 267.  
1348 See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, BODY AND SOUL, FORCED STERILIZATION AND OTHER ASSAULTS ON 
ROMA REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM IN SLOVAKIA, available at http://www.crlp.org/pdf/bo_slov_part4.pdf  (describing 
the conditions in which “Romani women unwittingly become victims of insidious, discriminatory behavior when 
they seek maternal health care in their public health systems. Their rights to informed consent to sterilization, 
accurate and comprehensive health information, non-discriminatory health services, and unimpeded access to their 
medical records have been blatantly violated. Romani women endure severe discrimination that is exacerbated by 
the intersection of their gender and racial identities. The inevitable results of such oppression are the extensive and 
unchecked human rights violations against them that are occurring in Slovakia today”). 
1349 The European Convention, supra note 74.  
1350 See The Slovak Government’s Response to Reproductive Rights Violations against Romani Women: Analysis 
and Recommendations, May 2003, available at 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/report_slovakiafollowup_0603.pdf. Similar concerns were raised in Germany 
in the 2004 Joint EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program / European Roma Rights Center Shadow Report, Provided 
to the CEDAW committee, Commenting on the fifth periodic report of the Federal Republic of Germany, Submitted 
under Article 18 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. The shadow report indicated that so-called Roma and Sinti women suffered forms of harm and 
discrimination which are prohibited by relevant EU regulations “The phenomenon of intersectional discrimination, 
the cumulated effects of both gender and ethnic or racial discrimination, is a particularly important factor for 
vulnerable minority groups such as Sinti and Roma women. At present, the German legislative framework does not 
provide adequate protection against intersectional discrimination. Full transposition of European Union anti-
discrimination Directives into German law through the adoption of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law would 
provide important additional protections, which would significantly help this group of women counter 
discriminatory practices.” Id. at 3-4. 
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powerful individuals, have the potential to effect improved conditions where necessary. These 
entities are the audience of TSMOs.1351  
 
4.3 International Bodies  
 
….the intervention of international human rights bodies is essential … the latter’s efforts 
and, in particular, those of the [CEDAW] Committee, are responsible for the Mexican 
authorities’ recognition of the gravity of the situation… 
 
in addition to advocating for an end to these crimes, the [CEDAW] Committee has an 
essential role to play with respect to the implementation of measures aimed at preventing 
and eliminating gender-based violence.  
 
CEDAW Committee Report on Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua1352 
 
A significant change over the last four decades is the emergence of international bodies. 
International bodies include treaty monitoring bodies, regional political organizations and the 
numerous UN institutions, ranging from committees, commissions, to special rapporteurs.1353 
Schachter notes that “a large area of international regulation has been developed b y the 
specialized [U.N.] agencies.”1354 
 
International treaty bodies monitor the compliance by states with various treaties. The most 
relevant treaty in respect of the consideration of women’s rights is CEDAW. Countries that have 
signed or acceded to CEDAW technically are bound to implement its provisions. As Hathaway 
has indicated, however, the subscription to a treaty in no way ensures a state’s compliance with 
its provisions.1355 However, while CEDAW has the highest number of reservations and is 
violated regularly by party and non-party states, it does generate change in national legal 
systems.1356  
 
One of the ways in which CEDAW can be said to have reformative effects, is through its 
reporting procedure. State parties are obliged to submit national reports, at least every four years, 
                                                
1351 For a brief discussion of the efficacy of international law from the perspective of non-governmental 
organizations, see Amnesty International Report on Intimate Violence in Sweden, 13 [Note: ] [Note: Citation to 
follow] Neuwirth’s reference to Heyns and Viljoen on how CEDAW has not been implemented by many of the 
state parties 38] 
1352 CEDAW Committee Ciudad Juárez Report, supra notex, at 40. 
1353 International actors “mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, 
pressure and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. Activists… transform the 
terms and nature of the debate.” Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 217-218. 
1354 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 5 (1994). 
1355 In fact, Hathaway concludes that countries which protect human rights may in fact have a disincentive to join the 
treaty bodies. See Hathaway, supra note 750, at 1976-1988 and 1999- 2003 (“Contrary to the predictions of 
normative theory, treaty ratification appears to be frequently associated with worse, rather than better, human rights 
practices.”). 
1356 It is very difficult to evaluate the efficacy of CEDAW and/or the extent to which it is implemented within a 
specific country without statistical data. 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at page 12, paragraph 70 (“…empirical 
data should accompany every country report.”). 
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on measures they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations.1357 Many states fail to 
change their laws, or even to submit reports. The CEDAW committee has no power other than 
exposing information, shaming and encouraging.1358 All of these are weak forms of enforcement, 
if they are enforcement at all. Nonetheless, they serve a purpose by exposing problems and, 
especially if so-called shadow repots are submitted contemporaneously, shaming states.1359 
 




How do these theories operate to improve states’ approaches towards systemic intimate 
violence? My proposal that systemic intimate violence is a contravention of international law is 
rooted in the notion that international law contributes to “a whole arsenal of methods and 
techniques” by which human rights are protected.1360 I emphasize the functions of international 
law as a persuasive force in galvanizing change through so-called “assimilative reform 
strategies,” in terms of which states are encouraged to adopt a particular practice or principle 
through a slow inculcation of the acceptance of the value without using coercive means.1361  
 
Certain forms of state conduct are more susceptible to this form of non-coercive regulation 
than others. Keck and Sikkink explain that physical violence and issues of legal equality 
                                                
1357 Article 18(1) of CEDAW, supra note 21, requires state parties to submit to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, for consideration by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, “a report on the 
legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the 
present Convention and on the progress made in this respect…” Article 18(2) allows States to justify their non-
compliance by indicating “factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfillment of obligations under the present 
Convention.”  
1358 See, for example, the CEDAW committee’s reaction to the 1984 Hungary report on the status of women where 
the representative is praised for his “sincere and frank exposition of the situation of women in Hungary and for the 
clear and thought-provoking presentation of his country’s initial report.” 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 5, 
paragraph 27. Another example is in China’s report to the CEDAW committee in the same session. 1984 CEDAW 
report, supra notex, at 18, paragraph 134: “Some members of the Committee praised the report for its frankness, 
clarity and commitment, which reflected the will of China to implement the articles of the Convention, as well as to 
improve the condition of women. It was observed that that was a major task for such a vast country but remarkable 
efforts had been made and results were already being observed.” See KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS, supra note 784, at 23 (“Moral leverage involves what some commentators have called the ‘mobilization 
of shame,’ where the behavior of target actors is held up to the light of international scrutiny. Network activists exert 
moral leverage on the assumption that governments value the good opinion of others.”). 
1359 For a discussion of the importance of ‘naming and shaming’ in international law, see Hathaway, The Promise 
and Limits, supra note 758, at 235 (“… reputational concerns often play a more significant role than do the much-
studied sanctions imposed by a treaty in states’ decisions to commit to international legal limits…”). 
1360 Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 
S.D. L. REV. 25, 36 (1959). 
1361 This may be achieved through discourse with nation-States or by working with local organizations to implement 
the value in question. For a discussion on the effect of such reform strategies in the case of FGC, see Elizabeth 
Heger Boyle, Sharon E. Preves, National Politics as International Process: The Case of Anti-Female Genital 
Cutting Laws, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 703, 713 (2000) [hereinafter Boyle] (“Fundamentally, assimilative strategies 
seek to persuade nation-states to adopt the dominant cultural model by legitimating anti-FGC mobilization and 
deligitimating support for female genital cutting.”) The idea that international law operates through several levels of 
actors and factors is evident in Kenneth Waltz’s explanation of international relations, in terms of which the 
international system, the State and individuals and groups who make up the State, operate interactively and not 
exclusively, “like a layer cake.” Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, supra note 496, at 2649. 
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constitute the most successful TSMOs campaigns.1362 Systemic intimate violence comprises both 
these components. Therefore, articulating a norm in international law prohibiting systemic 
intimate violence does not require the existence of a central legislative or enforcement agency; it 
can operate effectively through the channels described above, benefiting individuals through the 
establishment of legal and infrastructural support.1363 
 
However, a clear norm remains necessary. This is evidenced in the way violence against 
women has been addressed by the CEDAW Committee over the years. 
 
5.2 Analysis of CEDAW Country Reports Before and After CEDAW  
 
The importance of internationalizing violence against women in general, and systemic 
intimate violence, specifically, is made clear by a ‘before’ and ‘after’ analysis.  
 
I examine the work of the CEDAW Committee before and after the U.N.’s declaration on 
violence against women, DEVAW, in 1993.1364 Prior to the early 1990s, the CEDAW Committee 
makes very little reference to violence against women, including systemic intimate violence.1365 
However, after DEVAW and the increasing exposure of violence against women globally, the 
focus of the CEDAW Committee began to change – and with it, the focus of state parties. 
 
In most country reports presented to CEDAW in the mid-1980s there is very little evidence 
of violence against women. Where reference is made to violence against women, it usually is in 
the context of prostitution or rape (which are in the original CEDAW text).1366  
 
In the reports submitted to the CEDAW Committee in 1984, many CEDAW committee 
members raise the issue of lower wages for traditionally female jobs, the double workload of 
women, and facilities to encourage men to play an equal role in the family. Little emphasis is 
placed on violence in the family.  
 
For example, in 1984, in discussing the report of Hungary, the CEDAW Committee placed 
significant emphasis on the mutual support of spouses within the family.1367 Aware of the 
difficulties women face in private, the CEDAW Committee nonetheless did not include violence 
                                                
1362 KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 784, at 27 (describing two characteristics that 
appear most frequently in reformative campaigns, namely, “(1) issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable 
individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and (2) issues 
involving legal equality of opportunity”). 
1363 According to Keck and Sikkink, “(i)ssues involving physical harm to vulnerable or innocent individuals appear 
particularly compelling.” KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 784, at 27.  
1364 As discussed above, CEDAW had no provision relating directly to violence against women. While 
Recommendation 19 interprets the provisions of CEDAW as including violence against women, no prohibition 
exists in the text itself. The closest references to violence against women probably inhere in article 6 regarding 
prostitution and the trafficking of women: “State parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.” 
1365 ** 
1366 See for example, the 1986 report of Mongolio: CEDAW Forty-First Session, supra note 800, at 14, paragraph 
102.  
1367 See, for example, the CEDAW committee’s discussion of Hungary in 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 4-
10, paragraphs 18-68, 37-38. 
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in their investigation at this point. The same is true of the CEDAW committee’s discussions in 
1986 in respect of Mongolio, Ecuador, and El Salvador.1368 
 
This is not to say that violence against women never arose during this period. The Norway 
report to CEDAW is one of the few that engages domestic violence.1369 This is interesting since 
it is also one of the most impressive reports as far as progressive legislation and meaningful 
implementation of women’s rights is concerned. For example, Norway had implemented an 
incentive for affirmative action in the private sector and “the Government had introduced the 
payment of a salary subsidy for six months to firms that employed women in fields heavily 
dominated by men.”1370  
 
Within the context of a comprehensive report on improving women’s rights, it seems the 
CEDAW committee felt free to engage a less popular line of questioning that related to violence 
against women, including “violence against women both in the home and outside.”1371 
Specifically, the CEDAW committee raised “the establishment of hot-line telephones and crisis 
centres… as a great step forward” and queried whether “education on family relations was being 
undertaken with the young population. It also asked whether those telephones were available 
only in big cities or also in rural areas.”1372  
 
It is not entirely clear why violence against women would be raised by the CEDAW 
committee in respect of Norway and not other countries, especially in light of the fact that most 
of the questions posed by the CEDAW committee to state members were quite uniform. It is 
possible that Norway had a sufficiently sophisticated report that enabled the Committee to 
consider its structures vis-à-vis violence against women. For the rest it seems that violence 
against women simply was not a dominant theme at the time, and only became a more popular 
focus with the increase in dialogue regarding violence and women in 1994.1373 
 
While violence is rarely raised in the CEDAW discussions in the mid-1980s, the committee 
was not insensitive to many of the more opaque issues facing women within their private 
lives.1374 The integrity in many of the CEDAW Committee reports evidences a meaningful 
commitment to a range of issues.  
 
                                                
1368 Mongolio, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Fifth Session, 
General Assembly Official Records: Forty-First Session Supplement No. 45 (A/41/45) April 4 1986, paragraphs 69-
110, pages 10-15 [hereinafter CEDAW Forty-First Session]; Ecuador, CEDAW Forty-First Session, supra note 800, 
at 30-34, paragraphs 226-264; and, El Salvador, CEDAW Forty-First Session, supra note 800, at 40-44, paragraphs 
314-356. 
1369 For an exception to this norm, see 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 37-45, paragraph 277-338. 
1370 Id. at page 38, paragraph 285. 
1371 Id. at page 40, paragraph 301. 
1372 Id. at page 40, paragraph 301. 
1373 DEVAW, supra note 22 
1374 See for example, the 1984 report on Egypt in the 1984 CEDAW report, supra notex, at 27, paragraph 203: “As 
to the provisions regarding the family, several experts requested more information on divorce, family planning 
programmes, pre- and post-natal counseling, abortion and assistance to working mothers. In that regard, it was asked 
whether the Government understood the dual function or the double burden of women and whether it had provided 
measures to equalize the situation at home.”  
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Therefore, towards the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, the CEDAW committee 
began to raise violence against women, and domestic violence, in analyzing country reports.1375 
A wide range of countries are questioned about their domestic violence policies, including, 
Greece, Korea, Sri Lanka, and Spain. 
 
This shift in focus coincided with increasing international attention on the issue of violence 
against women during the same period. In 1993, the activism around violence against women 
culminated in DEVAW. DEVAW is a successful articulation of the needs of women as regards 
their personal safety. While it is deficient in its enforcement capabilities, there is evidence that 
DEVAW did improve states’ responses to systemic intimate violence. The improvement was 
slow and, at times, deficient; however, certain states began to improve their systemic intimate 
violence legislation and policies in the period following DEVAW.   
 
In order to determine whether this change in focus by the CEDAW Committee and states was 
related to the international pressure surrounding violence against women, I examined the reports 
of three states before and after DEVAW. The states under examination are Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Sweden. I consider both state submissions and shadow reports.  
 
The reports of all three states showed the same pattern: prior to 1993 domestic violence was a 
low profile concern. However, after 1993, it became a present and, at times, central focus of the 
reports. I conclude, therefore, that it is likely that the international evocation of a norm against 
violence against women affected the topics discussed in CEDAW Committee meetings and, most 
importantly, the changes implemented by the states themselves.  
 
The analysis is not conclusive: it is limited to a cross section of three countries and is merely 
a superficial reading of what laws existed before and after DEVAW. However, it is possible to 
glean that there were changes in countries’ public approach towards violence against women, 
due in part to the activities of NGOs, governments and/or international bodies. This substantiates 
the notion that the internationalization of systemic intimate violence may improve the manner in 
which states address systemic intimate violence, especially if one considers that change happens 
slowly and we are only in the third decade of creating laws to mitigate violence against women. 
 
It should be noted that the purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that the CEDAW 
committee did not care about violence or that it incorrectly prioritized issues such as 
employment, reproductive health or political activity over violence. This would be incorrect 
since there can be no real hierarchy of women’s rights; the violence that women face by virtue of 
domestic violence is only one manifestation of the harm they experience. The risk they endure 
through prostitution, trafficking, commodification and unequal labor standards are linked to, 
affect, and are affected by intimate violence. Moreover, even if there is a way to rank the 
difficulties endured by women, it is impossible to raise all matters, with equal attention, 
                                                
1375 See for example: Greece, CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 13-21, paragraphs 65-
129; Korea, CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 21-28, paragraphs 130-184; Sri Lanka, 
CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 28-35, paragraphs 185-237; Spain, which at the time 
had established 17 shelters for abused women, CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 35-44, 
paragraphs 238-304; and, France CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 52-62, paragraphs 
370-451. 
 295 
especially when a movement is forming a tentative inroad into a formerly exclusive arena. 
Rather, the point of this analysis is to show how CEDAW was augmented by DEVAW, how 
international law and enunciation of norms, even in non-binding statements, can be effective and 
influence the standards applied by both national and international institutions.  
 
I now turn to examine the three functions of international human rights law and how they 
have advanced human rights protection.  
 
In respect of each function I: (1) discuss mass rape, FGC and enforced disappearances, as an 
example of the function’s operability; and, (2) with respect to Mexico, Nicaragua, and Sweden, 
demonstrate how each function has furthered, and can further still, national laws against systemic 
intimate violence.  
 
 
Part B: The Functions of International Human Rights Law  
 
 




The expressive function of international law refers to the articulation of norms. This is the 
process by which international law draws a conceptual boundary around specific conduct and 
prohibits it.1376 
 
At the heart of the transnational legal process is the circulation of ideas by international 
institutions, networks and actors, which in turn have the potential to impact on the behavior of 
local authorities and communities.1377  
 
The express condemnation of certain conduct produces “cognitive ‘focal points’” around 
which international bodies, TSMOs, states and individuals can coalesce.1378 International 
condemnation of certain behavior, as described above, infiltrates national law through local and 
national politicians, activists, policy makers and citizens. For this to occur, however, the 
articulation of a norm is necessary. Without such expression by authoritative international 
institutions this function of international human rights law is impeded. 
 
6.2 Effect of the Expressive Function  
 
The expressive function is effective in three respects. 
                                                
1376 An example of this is Raphael Lemkin’s formulation of the word ‘genocide’ to articulate the loss occasioned by 
the Holocaust. See Abbott, International Relations Theory, supra note 760, at 330. TSMOs often are responsible for 
the expression of international norms. See KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 784, at 25 
(“Networks generate attention to new issues and help set agendas when they provoke media attention… this stage of 
influence may require a modification of the ‘value context’ in which policy debates take place.”). 
1377 Boyle, supra note 806, at 704-705 (discussing law’s social-construction capabilities): “law is a key ingredient in 
the social construction of reality”. 
1378 Abbott, International Relations Theory, supra note 760, at 330. 
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First, the international articulation of a prohibition changes the nature of behavior from 
acceptable to unlawful, and the articulation of a mandate changes inertia to wrongful omission. 
While the condemnation of conduct (in the form of either action or omission) by a U.N. or 
international body will not necessarily change the lawless actors into lawless ones, but it does set 
a standard. The purpose of standard setting brings us to the second purpose of the expressive 
function of international law. 
 
Second, establishing a norm in international law is useful for national and international 
litigators and activists. It is necessary for litigators and activists to have external norms, clearly 
expressed by international law, for a number of reasons. First, in states that respect international 
law, a global set of standards would allow domestic courts to instruct the government to comply 
with such norms, without risking the collapse of the separation of powers. Second, individuals 
seeking asylum may be able to rely on such norms to substantiate their claims. Third, the 
repeated enunciation of norms by foreign and international courts could motivate the judicial and 
legislative branches of states to adopt such norms into their own systems.  
 
Third, the international articulation of norms offsets the silence surrounding the violation of 
the rights of marginalized groups and individuals. Acting as a voice for the muted, international 
law is especially effective “…where governments are inaccessible or deaf to groups whose 
claims may nonetheless resonate elsewhere, international contacts can amplify the demands of 
domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the 
domestic arena.”1379  
 
Therefore, international condemnation usually occurs when “calamitous circumstances … 
shock the public conscience into focusing on important, but neglected, areas of law...”1380 This 
was evidenced by the internationalization and criminalization of mass rape against women. 
 




The mass rape of women in war is historic.1381 While rape in war has long been a prohibited 
act, it has been “given license, either as an encouragement for soldiers or as an instrument of 
policy.”1382 This is largely because, although it was actionable in theory under a broad 
construction of international law, rape was not covered by the Nuremberg Charter, nor was it 
                                                
1379 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 221. 
1380 See Meron, supra note 536. 
1381 For a detailed discussion of the background, development, elements and application of the crime of mass rape in 
international law, see: Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 57; See Meron, supra note 536, at 425-427; 
Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 109; GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra notex; Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon of War: Women’s Human Rights During the 
Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 199 (1994). 
1382 See Meron, supra note 536, at 425-427 (Describing how rape by soldiers has been prohibited by the law of war 
for centuries, and “violators have been subjected to capital punishment under military codes, such as those of 
Richard II (1385) and Henry V (1419).” Id. 425. 
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prosecuted at Nuremberg (although it received more coverage in Japan).1383 In reality, the rape of 
women was considered a side-effect of war, and remained unregulated.  
 
The international rules of war prohibit attacks upon civilians and the use of certain 
‘illegitimate’ weapons. The mass rape of civilian women violate both these principles but it was 
not until the wealth of academic and activist lobbying brought this to the attention of the world 
powers that the ICTR and ICTY recognized mass rape as an actionable offence in international 
criminal law. Primarily, it was the revelation of the number of rapes and their role in ethnic-
cleansing which “was needed to shock the international community into rethinking the 
prohibition of rape as a crime under the laws of war.”1384  
 
6.3.2 Mass Rape in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia 
 
However, for a range of reasons, the mass rape of women in Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia shocked the public conscience. The use of rape as a weapon of war, with the specific 
intent of linking sexual violence to social destruction, resulted in the prohibition of mass rape as 
a crime against humanity, a war crime and an instrument of genocide.1385 
 
The ICTY and ICTR generated a number of successful prosecutions of mass rape, not only 
for the acts of rape but also for the incitement thereof.1386 Through a process of publication, 
international lobbying, and decision-making, the harm of mass rape changed from non-
justiciable form of violence, to an international human rights violation, a crime against humanity 
and a war crime. 
 
It is useful to examine how the decisions of the temporary tribunals: (1) gave expression to 
behavior, the trauma and effect of which previously had not found expression in international 
                                                
1383 See Meron, supra note 536, at 425-427. 
1384 Meron, supra note 536, at 425. 
1385 Both the ICTR and ICTY Statutes define rape as a crime against humanity when it is committed as part of an 
armed conflict, or a widespread or systematic attack against a particular segment of a civilian population. Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, available at http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html 
[hereinafter the ICTR Statute]. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, available 
at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm [hereinafter the ICTY Statute]. The ICTR Statute defines rape as a 
crime against humanity when it is “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.” Article 3(g) of the ICTR Statute, supra note 
821. The ICTR Statute also makes reference to the violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977, which include 
“[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and 
any form of indecent assault.” See article 4(e) of the ICTR Statute, supra note 821. The ICTY Statute includes rape 
as a crime against humanity when it is “committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, 
and directed against any civilian population.” Article 5(g) of the ICTY Statute, supra note 821. 
1386 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established in terms of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 955 (1994), S/RES/955 (1994) 8 November 1994, available at 
http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/Resolutions/955e.htm (hereinafter the ICTR). See also the ICTR Statute, supra note 
821. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established in terms of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/RES/808 (808) 22 February 1993, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/808index.htm and United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 
(1993), S/RES/827 (1993) 25 May 1993, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/827index.htm 
(hereinafter the ICTY). See also the ICTY Statute, supra note 821. 
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law; and (2) led to further prosecutions for mass rape and, ultimately, the confirmation of mass 
rape as a crime in the Rome Statute. 
 
6.3.3 The Articulation of Mass Rape by the Temporary Criminal Tribunals 
 
As described in chapter one, the ICTR was the first international tribunal to try and convict 
an accused for genocide and crimes against humanity based on his orchestration and 
encouragement of mass rape.1387 The ICTR’s Akayesu judgment “paved the way for later 
prosecutions of sexual crimes by international tribunals.”1388  
 
The expression of the norm against mass rape in the Akayesu judgment led to the judgment 
of the ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v. Kunarac, which, cementing the Akayesu precedent, 
confirmed widespread rape as a war crime and crime against humanity.1389 By combining the 
provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, 
the ICTY established the requisite elements in order for certain conduct to constitute mass rape 
under international criminal law.1390 In essence, the systematic and widespread rape was linked 
to the objective of ethnic cleansing and genocide, which were prohibited in international law at 
the time, creating an understanding of how violent rape of enemy women facilitates the 
destruction of a people.1391  
 
The ICTY also established that widespread rape comprised all the elements required to prove 
the commission of a crime against humanity.1392 This culminated in the historic criminalization 
of mass rape in the Rome Statute, which, while it may not prevent the occurrence of mass rape, 
lays the groundwork for compelling international intervention and prosecution in respect of such 
crimes.1393 
                                                
1387 Prosecutor v. Akayesu. See also Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 
1272. See also Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L. 350 (2003) 
[hereinafter Russell-Brown]. 
1388 See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1272. 
1389 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2. Due to the lack of precedent and patchwork authority regarding mass rape 
in war, the ICTY was able to develop the principles of this crime based on the precedent of Prosecutor v. Akayesu. 
See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1284. 
1390 For an analysis of this process see Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 
1290-1296. 
1391 See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1271-1272. See also Kelly D. 
Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 57,  at 355 (stating that the rapes in Bosnia “were designed in large 
part to have the effect of impregnating the victim so that she would have a child that would be identified as being a 
member of the rapist’s/enemy’s ethnicity,” resulting in the “prevention of births within the particular ethnic group of 
the victim, because the victim would either bear a child that would be recognized as having the ethnic identity of the 
rapist and/or as a result of the birth or the rape, the victim would no longer be a desirable candidate for having 
children of her own ethnicity.”) 
1392 Namely, a widespread or systematic attack, directed against a civilian population, within the context of an armed 
conflict and where the accused knows that his conduct occurs within the context of a broader attack on a civilian 
population. Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1284-1291 (describing the 
reasoning of the ICTY Trial Chamber in casting widespread rape as a crime against humanity). 
1393 A similar sentiment is expressed by Richard Goldstone in respect of the International Criminal Court. See 
Richard Goldstone, Justice Now, and For Posterity, in the International Herald Tribune, October 14, 2005, available 
at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/14/opinion/edgold.php.  
[Note: Citation to follow] regarding Sierra Leone. 
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6.3.4 Consequences of the Expression of a Norm against Mass Rape  
 
By expressing a norm against mass rape and identifying its constitutive elements, the ICTY 
and the ICTR had the legal tool to hold officials responsible for their omission to protect 
individuals from mass rape, even if the accused himself had not committed the act.1394 Today, the 
express norm against mass rape can lead to criminal responsibility if a commander “knowingly 
allowed the mass rape of hundreds of [] women.”1395  
 
This will not prevent the crime of mass rape from happening in future; however, by 
establishing the clear boundaries for what is intolerable behavior, the decisions of the tribunals 
“suggest that such behavior is less likely to be tolerated or ignored by the international legal 
community.”1396  
 
This expression also developed the law regarding state responsibility and sovereign 
immunity, confirming that “a state does not have the sovereignty to massacre its people under 
any kind of international legal standard.”1397 The decisions expanded the trend of recognizing the 
legal personality and importance of individuals in international law, principles which are sourced 
in the general norms of the UDHR.1398 
 
Therefore, the persistent (and admirable) efforts of activists, lawyers and journalists 
exposed the extent and severity of the mass rape of women in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia. The publication of information and lobbying for justice placed the specific harm on 
the agendas of the judges of the ICTY and ICTY, receiving final confirmation in the Rome 
Statute. The result is that “…after Kunarac, there can be no more confusion or uncertainty 
regarding whether rape is to be tolerated or ignored as an act of war.”1399 
 
The express articulation of the norm against mass rape in international law led to the 
amendment of rape laws of member states of the European Union. In the case of MC v. 
Bulgaria1400 the ECHR held that Bulgaria’s rape laws had to be amended to take into account the 
silent shock of rape victims who display no signs of physical resistance. In the case before the 
Court, the applicant had been raped and had not cried out or struggled during the rape, resulting 
in the dismissal of the rape case by the Bulgarian courts. The applicant maintained that Bulgarian 
law was deficient because it failed to address certain forms of rape where the victim did not 
display physical resistance.1401  
                                                
1394 See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at 1272. 
1395 Id. 
1396 Id., at 1296. 
1397 Id., at 1297: “…these decisions represent a trade off between domestic state autonomy and the desire of the 
international community to effect justice following the commission of particularly inhumane crimes.” Id. 1296. 
1398 Id., at 1299. 
1399 Id., at 1304. 
1400 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256. 
1401 According to the applicant, “the prosecution of rape was only possible if there was evidence of the use of 
physical force and evidence of physical resistance. Lack of such evidence would lead to the conclusion that sexual 
intercourse had been consensual.” M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 111-113(i) (the applicant argued 
that she suffered from “‘frozen fright’” and was therefore unable to resist. Id. 70). 
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The court was persuaded that “any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, 
such as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks leaving certain types of 
rape unpunished and thus jeopardising the effective protection of the individual’s sexual 
autonomy.”1402  
 
The court substantiated its decision with reference to international criminal law, in terms of 
which “force is not an element of rape and [ ] taking advantage of coercive circumstances to 
proceed with sexual acts is also punishable.”1403 The court referred expressly to the decision of 
the ICTY that “in international criminal law, any sexual penetration without the victim's consent 
constitutes rape and that consent must be given voluntarily, as a result of the person's free will, 
assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.” 
 
The court also made the point that it is appropriate to extrapolate the law applying to mass 
rape in circumstances of armed conflict to the individual rape in question since the international 
norm “reflects a universal trend towards regarding lack of consent as the essential element of 
rape and sexual abuse.”1404  
 
Therefore, the court held that in accordance with “contemporary standards and trends in that 
area,” the member states of the European Union were obliged to penalize and prosecute any non-
consensual sexual act, including “in the absence of physical resistance by the victim.”1405 
 




If there is a supra-standard that prohibits systemic intimate violence, the tenets of such 
standard may be applied nationally through legislation and court decisions.1406 However, if there 
is no enunciated universal standard regarding systemic intimate violence, the development of 
national legal systems loses a source of law that has become most relevant in the human rights 
context.1407 It is for this reason that I turn to international law as a supplement to domestic law to 
ameliorate governments’ regulation of systemic intimate violence.1408 
 
                                                
1402 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 166 
1403 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 163 
1404 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 163 
1405 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 166 
1406 For the most part, international human rights law is implemented by and through domestic courts. See Judge 
Edward D. Re, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Effective Remedies and the Domestic Courts, 33 CAL. 
W. INT’L L.J. 137, 153–56 (2003). 
1407 DANIEL G. PARTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 824–825 (1992). 
1408 Resnik, supra note 159, at 623 (“State, federal, and transnational laws are all likely to be relevant [to pursuing 
women’s rights to safety].”).  The question of whether international law ‘works’ is widely debated.  See Koh, How Is 
International Human Rights Law Enforced, supra note 456, at 1401 (proposing that the relationship between 
enforcement and obedience is premised on the notion “that the most effective form of law-enforcement is not the 
imposition of external sanction, but the inculcation of internal obedience”). 
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Part of the value in creating legal norms against systemic intimate violence is ending “the 
international community’s willingness to tolerate sexual abuse against women.”1409 In the case of 
M.C v. Bulgaria, the ECHR drew on DEVAW and on the jurisprudence of the ICTY to embrace 
a broader definition of rape including “serious violations of sexual autonomy [which] is violated 
wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary 
participant.”1410  
 
The Court, in finding that a state has a positive obligation to conduct effective criminal 
investigations in cases of rape where there is no physical resistance, made clear its reliance on 
international precedent in stating that “the development of law and practice … reflects the 
evolution of societies towards effective equality and respect for each individual's sexual 
autonomy.”1411 
 
The Court also drew on precedent confirming that states have a positive obligation to secure 
their citizens’ rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the European Charter.1412 This included the 
obligation “to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not 
subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals.”1413  
 
Without the precedent of an express prohibition against mass rape as an international human 
rights violation, however, the doctrine of state responsibility could not have been utilized to 
advance the rape jurisprudence to include silent victims.  
 
The importance of express norms was evidenced in 1999, when the South African 
Constitutional Court pointed out that “South Africa’s international obligations require effective 
measures to deal with the gross denial of human rights resulting from pervasive domestic 
violence.”1414 The Constitutional Court determined that the imperatives of constitutional and 
international law oblige “the state directly to protect the right of everyone to be free from private 
or domestic violence. Indeed, the state is under a series of constitutional mandates which include 
the obligation to deal with domestic violence…1415 
 
                                                
1409 See Mchenry, The Prosecution of Rape under International Law, supra notex, at at 1307, citing Human Rights 
Watch, Global Report on Women’s HR, § 1, at http://www.hrw.org/about/projects/womrep/.  
1410 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 106-108 (citing Prosecutor v. Kunarac, supra note 2). The Court 
also made reference to the requirement that international criminal law no longer required the element of force for the 
crime of rape: “In international criminal law, it has recently been recognised that force is not an element of rape and 
that taking advantage of coercive circumstances to proceed with sexual acts is also punishable. …While the above 
definition was formulated in the particular context of rapes committed against the population in the conditions of an 
armed conflict, it also reflects a universal trend towards regarding lack of consent as the essential element of rape 
and sexual abuse.” Id at 163. 
1411 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 165: “That was not done in the applicant's case. The Court finds 
that the failure of the authorities in the applicant's case to investigate sufficiently the surrounding circumstances was 
the result of their putting undue emphasis on ‘direct’ proof of rape. Their approach in the particular case was 
restrictive, practically elevating ‘resistance’ to the status of defining element of the offence.” Id at 182. 
1412 M.C. v. Bulgaria, supra note 256, at paragraph 149. 
1413 Id.  
1414 State v. Baloyi, supra note 119, at 21. 
1415 State v. Baloyi, supra note 119, at paragraph 9. 
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Therefore, the value of expressly prohibiting certain conduct and delineating the state’s 
obligation in respect thereof provides a legal precedent and a more authoritative basis for 
reformative lobbying. The absence of such precedent is not detrimental to the development of 
national laws in respect of systemic intimate violence, nor is it a guarantee that nations will 
comply with the obligation; however, it fills a void and provides the basic tools for litigation, 
lobbying and policy reform in respect of protecting individuals from systemic intimate violence. 
 
6.4.2 Analysis of Domestic Violence in Mexico Before and After DEVAW  
  
The expressive function of international law has set an overarching standard for government 
and non-governmental organizations to better address this violence at the state level. This 
process is evident from the changes in the national legal systems of Mexico before and after 
DEVAW, which was the first express statement against domestic violence. 
 
In 1981 Mexico became a member of CEDAW and submitted its first report to the CEDAW 
committee in 1984.1416 In its 1984 report, Mexico makes no reference to domestic violence 
against women. At this stage, Mexico had no specific mechanism to address violence against 
women and all forms of violence, public and private, gendered or otherwise, were treated 
uniformly.1417 To the extent that violence was discussed in the 1984 CEDAW report, Mexico 
referred to the remedy of “amparo,” which was designed to protect both men and women against 
arbitrary acts committed by the state.1418 The violence women experience in private is not 
featured as a consideration, either by Mexico or by the CEDAW committee. 
 
However, in 1996, after the approbation of violence against women expressed in DEVAW, 
Mexico passed federal legislation to “establish nonjudicial procedures to protect victims of 
domestic violence and to develop strategies to prevent such violence.”1419 This included the 1996 
                                                
1416 See Parties who have signed and ratified CEDAW, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. See also Parties who have entered reservations to CEDAW, 
available at, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm. Mexico’s reservation relates to 
the manner of implementation, which will be in accordance with Mexican legislation and available resources. 
Mexico signed CEDAW on 17 July 1980 and ratified it, with reservation, on 23 March 1981. Mexico signed the 
CEDAW Optional Protocol on 10 December 1999 and ratified it on 15 March 2002. See Signatures and 
Ratifications of the CEDAW Optional Protocol, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/sigop.htm. CEDAW Thirty-Ninth Session, supra note 798, at 
12, paragraph 71 (“…there seemed to be no institution(s) to assist women in the exercise of their rights and there 
was no information on the capacity of the court system to provide remedies for women’s grievances.”). Mexico cited 
economic constraints as a reason for making a reservation in relation to article 10(c) when it ratified CEDAW. 
Reservations are a double-edged sword: they are necessary because they allow a country to enter into the circle of 
complying States. On the other hand, they lead to a weaker form of international law and, of course, potentially 
mock the virtue of universal norms. 
1417 The CEDAW committee expressed concerns regarding the difficulties women had in accessing the courts and 
legal system to enforce their rights. CEDAW Thirty-Ninth Session, supra note 798, at 12, paragraph 71 (“…there 
seemed to be no institution(s) to assist women in the exercise of their rights and there was no information on the 
capacity of the court system to provide remedies for women’s grievances.”). In general, Mexico expressed economic 
difficulties as a reason for its failure to achieve equality and to implement the provisions of CEDAW. CEDAW 
Thirty-Ninth Session, supra note 798, at 12, paragraph 69. 
1418 CEDAW Thirty-Ninth Session, supra note 798, at 14, paragraph 81. 
1419 The Law of Assistance and Prevention of Domestic Violence, Mexico, supra note 131.  
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Federal District Law to prevent and assist victims of “intrafamilial violence.”1420 The CEDAW 
committee commended the progress but admonished the Mexican government for the fact that 
while Mexico had taken a number of legislative and administrative steps to improve the status of 
women,1421 due to a lack of information and education, many women remained unaware of their 
rights and lacked the facilities to protect their rights.1422  
 
In 1997, the Center for Reproductive Rights prepared a shadow report on the reproductive 
rights of women in Mexico.1423 This included a discussion of the nature and extent of violence 
against women. The report revealed that gender-based violence continued to be prevalent, 
notwithstanding the passing of federal legislation to address it.1424 It recognized that, because 
domestic violence comprises a peculiar form of harm, Mexico’s criminal law had failed to 
protect women from this violence.1425  
 
The 1997 shadow report demonstrates two important points. First, it cites a study undertaken 
by the federal Ministry of Health containing statistics regarding the demographic and substantive 
nature of domestic violence in Mexico.1426 This investigation by the Mexican government is a 
fulfillment of article 4(k) of DEVAW which enjoins states to “[p]romote research, collect data 
and compile statistics, especially concerning domestic violence, relating to the prevalence of 
different forms of violence against women and … those statistics and findings of the research 
will be made public.”1427 Of course this does not solve the problem of systemic intimate violence 
in Mexico but it does lay the foundation of improved systemic intimate violence policies and it 
demonstrates that, on some level, Mexico was influenced by the international condemnation of 
violence against women and attempted to fulfill its international obligations.  
 
The second factor emanating from the 1997 shadow report is the acknowledgement by the 
Mexican government of the obstacles impeding the implementation of legal remedies, mostly 
due to a lack of awareness regarding the nature of domestic violence and the available 
remedies.1428 This echoes the CEDAW committee’s 1996 admonishment.  
 
                                                
1420 1998 CEDAW report, supra note 204, at 34. 
1421 See Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 131, at 24 (describing the legislative 
and judicial action such as “the 1984 amendment of the Criminal Code for the Federal District so as to maximize 
punishment for rape; the creation, in 1989, of the Attorney General’s Special Agencies to deal with sex offenses, 
which operate within various bodies around the country; and the various amendments and repeals made to the 
Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedural Code for the Federal District in 1990 and 1991 relating to sex offenses.” 
1422 Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 131, at 24. 
1423 Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 131. 
1424 In 60 percent of the cases of rape of adolescent girls, “the aggressors are close relatives of the victim, including 
the victim’s father.” Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 131, at 24. 
1425 Id. 
1426 Among women between the ages of 14 to 57 who were beaten by their partners “revealed that most victims were 
mothers between the ages of 22 and 29, and that 90 percent were beaten in front of their children. Twenty-two 
percent of the battered women were illiterate or had not completed primary school; 44 percent had finished primary 
school and/or some secondary school; and the remaining 34 percent had some post-high school education or were 
professionals. Other common forms of domestic violence in Mexico include verbal aggression, confinement to the 
home, prohibitions on seeing family members or working, and forced sexual relations.” Women’s Reproductive 
Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 131, at 24. 
1427 Article 4(k) of DEVAW, supra note 22. 
1428 Women’s Reproductive Rights in Mexico: A Shadow Report, supra note 154, at 24. 
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In the following year Mexico once again appeared before the CEDAW committee. At this 
stage, Mexico had also signed the Convention of Belem Do Para.1429 The Mexican 1998 report 
described consultations “at the local level to reform the civil and criminal codes” and the 
creation of special programs to support female victims of violence.1430 Mexico had also reformed 
its penal system “to facilitate proceedings with regard to violence against women in the family, 
including marital rape”1431  
 
The CEDAW committee praised the Mexican government for its advances, admonished it for 
the continued high rate of violence against women and suggested that the government “continue 
to work for the adoption of nationwide legislation on all forms of violence against women, 
including domestic violence, adjusting state laws to national laws.”1432 Specifically, the CEDAW 
committee suggested that the government “consider the possibility of implementing an 
integrated, long-term plan for combating domestic violence. Such a plan could include taking 
legal action, training judicial, law enforcement and health personnel, informing women about 
their rights and about the Convention and strengthening victims’ services.”1433  
 
The positive permutations of the CEDAW committee’s remarks were evident in 2002 when 
Mexico once again addressed the CEDAW committee, indicating that combating violence 
against women “was one of the State’s priorities.”1434 The National Women’s Institute had been 
established as “an autonomous, decentralized national mechanism with ministerial rank, its own 
budget and a cross-sectoral impact on all government institutions, thereby mainstreaming a 
gender perspective within national policy.”1435 An Institutional Panel to Coordinate Preventive 
Action and Attention to Domestic Violence and Violence against Women was established, which 
provided a national framework for coordinated action against violence against women. Within 
the framework, a National Programme for a Life Without Violence 2002-2004 was under 
discussion with civil society, and legislation dealing with domestic violence had been passed in 
15 states. Specific programs to deal with domestic violence in 16 states had also been created. 
Mexico also referred to various campaigns and national programs against domestic violence.1436  
 
And then there is Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. 
 
6.4.3 Analysis of the Case of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua 
                                                
1429 1998 CEDAW report, supra note 204, at 34. 
1430 Id. at 32. 
1431 1998 CEDAW report, supra note 204, at 34. The CEDAW committee reacted with praise but also criticized 
Mexico for its failure to “describe cases where the Convention had been used to support claims for women’s human 
rights.” Id. It also raised concern that “in spite of legislative measures Mexico has taken, violence against women, 
particularly domestic violence, continues to be a serious problem in Mexican society.” Id. 
1432 1998 CEDAW report, supra note 204, at 35. 
1433 In addition, the CEDAW committee suggested that “strong action be taken against persons who commit violence 
against women, and that it should be made easier for women to bring court actions against offenders.” 1998 
CEDAW report, supra note 204, at 35. 
1434 Mexico had created a National Programme for Equal Opportunities and Non-Discrimination against Women, 
“PROEQUIDAD” (the “National Programme for Equal Opportunities and Non-Discrimination against Women, 
2001-2006… the linchpin of national policy on gender”) and the National Women’s Institute (“INMUJERES”). See 
2002 CEDAW report, supra note 210, at 208, paragraph 424. 
1435 See 2002 CEDAW report, supra note 210, at 208, paragraph 424. 
1436 2002 CEDAW report, supra note 210, at 206, paragraph 414. 
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During the late 1990s, activists within and outside of Mexico brought the world’s attention to 
a spate of gruesome murders of women in Ciudad Juárez. It appeared that the local authorities of 
Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua had done very little to investigate the murders, apprehend the 
perpetrators or assist the victims.1437 This triggered wide condemnation of the Mexican 
government.1438 The rise of violence against women in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua reveals both 
the capabilities and deficiencies of international law. Nonetheless, the phenomenon does 
demonstrate the manner in which the expressive function of international law operates in respect 
of violence against women.1439  
 
At this stage, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action had articulated the existence of 
physical, psychological and sexual violence that women experience by virtue of their gender.1440 
This international process revealed that the violence in Ciudad Juárez had yet “to be understood 
as the urgent risk for women that it presents.”1441 The link between public and private violence, 
between regression and development, and between legislative equality and meaningful 
equivalency became increasingly clear. 
 
The outcry against the violence revealed that a significant number of the killings in Ciudad 
Juárez took place at the hands of the victims’ intimate partners. It was argued that the resolution 
of the killings required “attention to the root causes of violence against women – in all of its 
principle manifestations.”1442 However, the significance of systemic intimate violence had yet to 
be acknowledged by local officials.1443 Three manifestations of impunity were highlighted: the 
authorities who were responsible for investigating the crimes and prosecuting the perpetrators 
                                                
1437 For the distinctions between the violence against women in Ciudad Juárez and the level of violence in Mexico in 
general see the OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 4 (“While 
the situation of women in Ciudad Juárez shares many aspects common to other cities in the United Mexican States 
and the region generally, it is different in certain important respects.  First, the homicide rate for women experienced 
an unusually sharp rise in Ciudad Juárez in 1993, and the rate has remained elevated since that time.  Second… the 
rate of homicides for women compared to that for men in Ciudad Juárez is significantly higher than for similarly 
situated cities or the national average.  Third, the extremely brutal circumstances of many of the killings have served 
to focus attention on the situation in Ciudad Juárez… Fourth, the response of the authorities to these crimes has been 
markedly deficient.”)  
1438 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 33 (“The victims were 
killed brutally: many were raped or beaten before being strangled or stabbed to death.  A number of the bodies bore 
signs of torture or mutilation.”). 
1439 Ciudad Juárez is a living example of “violence against women, and the impunity in which most cases remain 
[showing]… that the gender dimensions of this violence have yet to be effectively addressed.” OAS Report on the 
Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 28. Furthermore, the homicide rate for women 
between 1993 and 2001 rose at double the rate as that for men. See OAS Report on the Situation of Women in 
Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 42. 
1440 “The conclusions of Beijing+5 testify to the fact that gender-based violence against women is now viewed as a 
matter of serious concern by the international community, with many forms being regarded as serious violations of 
international legal standards. This represents a significant shift in attitude from that which existed within the United 
Nations when violence against women first emerged as a matter of international concern. This shift in approach has 
set the stage for the development of important international strategies to address the various forms of violence 
against women. It has also set the stage for legal and policy change at the domestic level.” Division for the 
Advancement of Women Information Note, supra note 23. 
1441 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 12. 
1442 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 11. 
1443 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 12. 
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were reportedly negligent;1444 there was a lack of support services for the relatives of those who 
had been killed;1445 and there was a dearth of convictions or prosecutions of perpetrators. 
Advocates identified this omission as replete with “patterns of historical gender-based 
discrimination” as a result of which systemic intimate violence was not approached as a serious 
crime.1446 
 
The publication of this inertia resulted in the creation of a Special Prosecutor’s Office in 
Ciudad Juárez, to deal with the killings.1447 However, continued review by International Bodies 
and NGOs revealed that the officials in Chihuahua blamed victims for their disappearance, 
referring to their way of dress or lifestyles in a derogatory manner, revealing a lack of 
understanding regarding the exigency of economic conditions for many women, and betraying a 
sexist view regarding the choices women make and the extent to which they may or may not 
conform to the traditional roles expected of them.1448  
 
As the murders normalized, crime in Ciudad Juárez rose. As long as the officials remained 
incapable or unwilling to address the source of and motive behind the violence behind the 
murders, the killings continued, apparently without abatement.1449 
 
Towards the end of 2001, hundreds of nongovernmental organizations began contacting the 
Special Rapporteur about the situation of women in Ciudad Juárez.1450 Only after an official visit 
by the Special Rapporteur, did the state of Chihuahua promise to establish a number of 
mechanisms to improve the way in which they attended to the violence. These included: a 
telephone hotline for emergency calls for women at risk of domestic violence and harassment in 
the street; the installation of more street lighting; establishing a new anonymous complaint 
program; and, ensuring that no woman is alone on a bus or public transport vehicle on the way to 
or from work.1451 
                                                
1444 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 34. See also OAS 
Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, paragraph 48 (“Because of the lack of basic information, 
family members … have expressed a profound lack of confidence in the willingness or the ability of the authorities 
to clarify what happened or pursue accountability.”) See also OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad 
Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 54. 
1445 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 70. 
1446 “The denial of an effective response both springs from and feeds back into the perception that violence against 
women – most illustratively domestic violence – is not a serious crime.” OAS Report on the Situation of Women in 
Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 36. 
1447 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 33.  
1448 One of the problems highlight by the OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez is the fact that 
the increased jobs for women was a change in cultural patterns that led to further tensions “in a society marked by 
historical inequalities between men and women and few resources to assist in changing those attitudes.” OAS Report 
on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 40. 
1449 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 34 (“The organizations 
indicated that, because the Mexican State was allowing these crimes to remain in impunity, it was encouraging their 
persistence.”). 
1450 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 33 (“the key concern set 
forth was that the killing of over 200 women since 1993 had been left in impunity.”). 
1451 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraphs 70 and 89. See 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/chap.vi.juarez.3.htm for a discussion on the international law that 
applies to such violence. This is most useful since it formulates the right and defines the corresponding obligation of 
the Mexican state. 
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As information about the killings and concomitant impunity grew, hundreds of 
nongovernmental organizations began contacting the Special Rapporteur about the situation of 
women in Ciudad Juárez. The key concern of these lobbyists “was that the killing of over 200 
women since 1993 had been left in impunity.”1452 The Special Rapporteur visited Ciudad Juárez 
and, in response, the officials in Chihuahua promised to improve the way in which they 
addressed the violence. Proposed mechanisms included: a telephone hotline for emergency calls 
for women at risk of domestic violence and harassment in the street;1453 the installation of more 
street lighting;1454 establishing a new anonymous complaint program,1455 and ensuring that no 
woman is alone on a bus or public transport vehicle on the way to or from work.1456 
 
Moreover, both the Mexican Government and non-governmental organizations agreed that 
most of the murders related to manifestations of violence with gender-specific causes and 
consequences.1457 A substantial number were linked to domestic and intrafamilial violence.1458 
Therefore, while there was a public dimension to the murders, the violence was often also 
intimate, a fact brought out by the internationalization and subsequent discussion of the violence. 
This in turn revealed the Mexican government’s failure to devote sufficient attention to “the 
discrimination that underlies crimes of sexual or domestic violence.”1459   
 
In 2002, Mexico once again addressed the CEDAW committee, expressing its concern at the 
escalation of violence against women in Ciudad Juárez. Mexico reported the creation of a special 
commission to investigate the murders of women in the region. A panel was also created to 
coordinate Mexico’s response to the violence “with the objective of designing a plan to restore 
the social fabric in Ciudad Juárez, and to improve the living conditions of the children of women 
who had been murdered, and the city’s residents as a whole.”1460 While the evidence of violence 
is distressing, the report discusses the extent of domestic violence, its nature and the success or 




None of these factors eradicates systemic intimate violence in Mexico. Moreover, many 
theorists will still balk at the notion that systemic intimate violence is an international human 
rights violation, insisting that it falls to local authorities to prevent and punish. However, 
Mexico’s interaction with the CEDAW committee maps a very clear progression of factors, 
                                                
1452 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 33.  
1453 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 89. 
1454 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 70. 
1455 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 70. 
1456 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 70. See 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/chap.vi.juarez.3.htm for a discussion on the international law that 
applies to such violence. This is most useful since it formulates the right and defines the corresponding obligation of 
the Mexican state. 
1457 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraphs 43 and 57. 
1458 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraphs 43 and 57. 
1459 OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, supra note 369, at paragraph 11. See also part three of 
the OAS Report on the Situation of Women in Ciudad Juárez, beginning paragraph 57 (“The killing of women in 
Ciudad Juárez is strongly linked to and influenced by the prevalence of domestic and intrafamilial violence.”). 
1460 2002 CEDAW report, supra note 210, at 206, paragraph 415. 
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which today facilitate the creation, funding and support of institutions, as few as they are, which 
assist victims of systemic intimate violence. 
 
Therefore, the expression of facts and the articulation of norms are part of a process of 
factors, which operate together to bring relief to individuals. Expressing norms is not a panacea 
in and of itself. Rather the international discussion of a particular situation can expose the harm, 
import relief to the victims, and impose shame upon inert governments. Through incremental 
steps, the views of the international community seep into the activity of the state, improving its 
response to those in need. 
 
In this way, the internationalization of violence against women in Mexico laid the foundation 
for recognizing the existence and seriousness of systemic intimate violence. The violence has not 
ended completely but the power of story telling exposes the pain of victims, informs potential 
powerful actors and brings the proverbial spotlight onto an otherwise invisible harm. 
 




The second function of international law is the actualization or implementation of norms in 
national legal systems. Usually, the implementation of international principles occurs through a 
political process, which is fed by both internal and international influences.1461 
 
The actualization of international law occurs as a result of a progression of factors: the first is 
the publication by TSMOs of events, which either are recognized as a contravention of 
international law or shock the conscience of humankind;1462 these organizations propel sentiment 
and galvanize public reaction or outcries;1463 This is followed either a change in state law and 
policy or litigation in international courts, tribunals or national courts. 
 
As described above, international law may be implemented through so-called assimilative 
means.1464 Assimilative techniques include holding conferences, working with grass roots 
agencies and discussing legislative and political changes with governments.  
 
The increasing prohibition in national legal systems against FGC is an example of this 
process.  
 
7.2 Application of the Expressive Function to FGC  
 
                                                
1461 Boyle, supra note 806, at 729-730 (demonstrating that “the ruling elites of countries are playing to a larger 
global community as much as a local audience.”) 
1462 See Meron, supra note 536 (describing the new role of the media and the benefits of instant reporting from the 
field, which “has resulted in rapid sensitization of public opinion, greatly reducing the time lapse between the 
perpetration of such tragedies and responses to them.”) 
1463 This was the case in the world’s reaction to the genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia and the call for “Gender 
Justice.” See Green et al, supra note 107, at 175: “A pronounced international outcry for action to punish the 
perpetrators of these brutal abuses placed tremendous pressure on the U.N. to establish an international tribunal.” 
1464 For a discussion of these mechanisms, see Boyle, supra note 806, at 713-715.  
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Although individual organizations had struggled to combat FGC for many years, it was only 
during the UN Decade for Women, from 1975 to 1985, that the issue became global.1465 The 
procedure of genital cutting captured the attention of the international community and individual 
nations. Details were revealed of non-remedial surgery, performed without anesthetic and with 
the use of non-sterilized, rudimentary instruments. The violence caused to girls’ sexual organs 
and its range of side-effects, including death, ‘shocked the conscience of humankind.’ 
 
The international admonishment, however, triggered an intense debate regarding cultural 
autonomy and individual rights. Moreover, it exacerbated tensions between so-called ‘non-
western’ states and the international community. Local communities which practiced FGC were 
indignant at the judgment and outraged when the procedure was framed as child abuse and the 
parents, child abusers.  
 
The volley of debate between international and local players revealed the need to approach 
the issue with greater respect and understanding for the context in which the cutting takes place. 
It became clear that in many communities, the cutting could not be abandoned since an uncut 
woman is unable to marry and an unmarried woman is an undesirable status quo. The 
consequences of this are severe, for both the individual and her family. Without a husband, a 
woman is unable to experience social or economic normalcy that typifies her community. The 
practice is linked inextricably to community acceptance and its absence makes participation in 
communal life untenable.1466 
 
TSMOs recognized the component of the practice that binds women to the male members of 
their community for protection, support and respect.1467 They realized that simple solutions and 
traditional legal remedies were inadequate. The search for effective mitigation culminated in the 
implementation of a number of more creative remedies: discussions are held between local 
religious and cultural leaders and local developmental organizations;1468 alternative sustainable 
sources of income are created for women who do not want to undergo the procedure and are able 
to escape it; and, the internationalization of FGC has enabled women who fear circumcision to 
obtain asylum in the United States and other countries.1469  
 
In the case of In Re Kasinga, the practice of FGC was acknowledged as a possible basis for 
asylum due to the results of permanent disfigurement and the “risk of serious, potentially life-
threatening complications.”1470 Without the internationalization of FGC, it is unlikely that these 
steps, incremental as they may be, would have occurred. 
 
                                                
1465 See Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 6]. See also KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra 
note 784, at 20 (describing the background of the campaign against FGC). 
1466 See Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 9]. 
1467 See Annas, supra note 537, at 349-350. 
1468 See Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 9]. 
1469 For a discussion of the relevant case law and legal requirements, see Patricia A. Armstrong, Female Genital 
Mutilation: The Move Toward the Recognition of Violence against Women as a Basis for Asylum in the United 
States, 21 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 95 (1997) [hereinafter Armstrong]. 
1470 See In re Kasinga, Interim Dec. 3278, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA June 13, 1996). The basis of the Board of 
Immigration’s decision was that the claimant could not escape the FGC procedure and could not expect assistance 
from her government. See Annitto, supra note 905, at 795. 
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While the practice continues, legal and extra-legal improvements have taken place. As of the 
date of writing, most western countries and many of the 28 countries in which FGC is prevalent 
have outlawed the practice.1471  
 
7.3 Application of the Expressive Function of International Law to Systemic Intimate 
Violence 
 
An international norm against systemic intimate violence can be implemented in national 
legal systems in the following ways. 
 
The first mechanism is the inculcation of new trends by governments in to their states’ 
policies. States which adhere to the enforcement of international human rights will have the 
necessary guidance from international sources on how to respond to and assist in preventing 
systemic intimate violence. 
 
The second mechanism is national litigation. Individuals or organizations can bring claims in 
national courts to compel their governments to take steps against systemic intimate violence as 
required by international law.  
 
The third mechanism is that of advocacy. TSMOs are better able to advocate for the rights of 
systemic intimate violence victims if there is a clear international norm to which they can refer. 
This would lend greater ‘legitimacy’ to their requests to the private sector for project funding and 
to their engagement with government institutions. 
 
The fourth mechanism is international aid. States and TSMOs may appeal for international 
assistance in the form of financial aid, educational resources, and general expertise. Such aid 
assists in the improvement of a state’s institutions and is more readily available if there is an 
accepted international norm underlying the request. 
 
                                                
1471 For a discussion of the legal status of FGC/M in various regions, see Bowman, supra note 112, at [page 4], 
citing the late president of Kenya and his view of FGC/M. For a discussion of the history of opposition to FGC, see 
Boyle, supra note 806, at 708-710. A similar phenomenon occurred in respect of acid burning in Bangladesh. In 
response to high profile cases of violence against women, which received considerable media attention, Bangladesh 
revealed to the CEDAW committee that “disagreements over dowry, which was not allowed under Islam, were a 
significant source of violence, which sometimes resulted in death. The Government of Bangladesh had enacted 
severe punishments, including execution for murder of the wife. Those recent laws followed sensational media 
coverage of some cases of disfigurement by acid and violence and had considerably decreased instances of abuse 
against women.” CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 75, paragraph 565. Acid burning 
was phenomenon in Bangladesh that received international attention in the late 1970s early 1980s. This exposure 
culminated in a 1997 workshop for survivors of acid attacks and international assistance for plastic surgery 
recovery: “Acid attacks have been on the rise in Bangladesh since the first was reported in 1976. Naripokkho, a 
Dhaka-based women's activist organization founded in 1983, began in 1996 to track acid violence reported in local 
papers. The number--47 that year--surged to 130 two years later. In April 1997, Naripokkho sponsored a workshop 
for acid survivors. Bina, then 15, was among nine participants: Selina, 11, was the youngest, and Monira, 18, the 
eldest. Six girls, including Bina, were burned in incidents involving rejected suitors--the most common scenario--
while two were burned by their husbands for not obtaining larger dowries. When Nargis, 14, refused to become her 
neighbor's second wife, he sprayed her genitals with acid while she was in the bathroom that she and her brother 
shared with the neighbor's family.” See http://www.msmagazine.com/jun99/uppitywomen-jun.asp. 
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Finally, individuals can use the existence of an international norm against systemic intimate 
violence to ground asylum claims. Enunciating the right in international law creates scope for 
protection through asylum claims. A great number of asylum seekers are turned away on the 
basis that domestic violence is not state conduct and, therefore, does not qualify as a basis for 
asylum. However, if the state component of systemic intimate violence is understood by 
immigration officials, asylum could provide a further avenue of safety for women who are 
unable to escape the system of systemic intimate violence.1472  
  
This has already occurred to some extent in the United States, where domestic violence is 
listed as a type of harm peculiar to women in the INS guidelines.1473 In 1996 there was a brief 
moment when the possibility of asylum for domestic violence victims seemed possible. In the 
initial hearing of Rodi Adali Alvarado-Pena’s asylum claim, the immigration judge granted 
asylum on the basis that the claimant’s husband had abused her physically, emotionally and 
sexually, and that she could not rely on protection from the authorities by virtue of her sex.1474 
Most importantly, the immigration judge determined that the claimant’s husband believed that 
women were inferior to men and that by resisting her husband, she was challenging his opinion, 
thereby demarcating the violence as persecution on account of her political opinion and her 
membership to a particular social group.1475  
 
The decision was reversed and the claim reopened under the Convention against Torture. As 
of the date of this writing, the matter remains undecided.1476 
 
7.4 Analysis of Domestic Violence in Nicaragua Before and After DEVAW 
 
7.4.1 Historical Background 
 
The internationalization of the particularly high rate of systemic intimate violence in 
Nicaragua, led to the implementation of certain reforms, which arguably would not have 
occurred but for the global discussion of systemic intimate violence.  
 
Nicaragua’s recent history, from the poverty induced by the Cold War in the early sixties, to 
the 1979 overthrowing of the US-supported Somoza government by Soviet-supported 
                                                
1472 See Megan Annitto, Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence: Is Protection Possible After In Re R-A-?, 49 
CATH. U. L. REV. 785 (2000) [hereinafter Annitto]. 
1473 Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, printed in 72 Interpreter 
Releases 757, June 5, 1995, at 772, cited by Armstrong, supra note 902 at [PAGE 6]. 
1474 Alvarado’s husband had raped and beaten her repeatedly. “During their ten years of marriage, he had dislocated 
her jaw, attempted to cut her hands off with a machete, nearly pushed her eye out, broke windows and mirrors with 
her head, and kicked her in the abdomen. During a pregnancy, he ‘attempted to forcefully abort their second child by 
kicking her in the spine.’” See In re Alvarado, No. A73-753-922, slip op. at 13 (Immigr. Ct., South African 
Francisco, Cal., Sept. 20, 1996), rev’d, In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (BIA 1999). For a discussion of this case, see 
Annitto, supra note 905, at 801-804. 
1475 Id.  
1476 See Watch Post, Volume 13, Issue 2, Spring 2005, available at http://www.watchmn.org/pdfs/newsletterS05.pdf. 
Former attorney general John Ashcroft decided to determine the case himself but resigned without deciding it, 
leaving her status in limbo. 
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Sandinistas, has had a duplicitous effect, both empowering women and leaving them increasingly 
them vulnerable.1477  
 
Notwithstanding an emphasis on traditional gender roles, Nicaragua’s 1979 conflict was 
characterized by the dynamic and effective role played by women, who constituted thirty percent 
of the guerilla force.1478 However, after the rise to power of the Sandinista there was a decrease 
in the power, and commensurate rights, of women.1479 Reports of a disquieting rate of violence 
against women increased, with many concluding that violence against women in Nicaragua was 
a major obstacle to development.1480 Women at this point constituted approximately 88 per cent 
of the poor in Nicaragua and were subject to increasing bouts of violence.1481  
                                                
1477 RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 117. Concerned about leftist activities in Nicaragua, the United 
States sponsored anti-Sandinista contra guerillas through most of the 1980s. Free elections were held in 1990, 1996 
and 2001, all of which saw the defeat of the Sandinistas. The country slowly started to stabilize in the early 1990s 
but was devastated by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. See the CIA World Factbook, Nicaragua, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nu.html. [Note: check citation format] 
1478 Nicaragua is a predominantly Catholic country, with role allocations between men and women based, in part, on 
a culture of so-called machismo. See CIA World Factbook, Nicaragua, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nu.html (explaining that the majority religion in Nicaragua is 
Roman Catholicism). See also RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 17 (“The Nicaraguan women’s group, the 
Asociación de Mujeres Ante la Problemática Nacional (Association of Nicaraguan Women Confronting the National 
Problem, or AMPRONAC), was formed in 1977 to provide civilian support to the Sandinista platform. Women 
actively participated in the early Sandinista government; they also benefited from literacy and health campaigns, as 
well as from inclusion in cooperatives and unions” and the needs of women were targeted by specific quasi-
government groups. Id 117-118)). 
1479 Later, in the government regime following the Sandinista rule, the once powerful Nicaraguan Institute for 
Women was transformed into the generic Ministry of the Family, which was criticized for “promoting the traditional 
nuclear family and discriminating against families headed by single mothers and common law mothers.” RHR 
Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 118. This decline in attention to women’s interests was compounded by the 
economic devastation following Hurricane Mitch in 1998. RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 118. 
1480 In total, almost 30 percent of women who have been married at some point in their lives have experienced 
sexual or physical abuse. Over half of such women endured the abuse in front of their children and 36% while they 
were pregnant. Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra notex (“29 per cent of women who have been married at 
some time have suffered some form of physical or sexual abuse at some point during their lives, with 57 per cent of 
abused women saying that the children were present when the abuse occurred. Incidents of this kind, taking place in 
front of the children, occur more frequently in urban areas, accounting for 59 per cent of all those reported by 
interviewees.”) See RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 118 (describing evidence that “sexual violence 
became an endemic feature of postconflict Nicaragua, exacerbated by men returning from the war to a weak 
economy and high rates of unemployment. The post-war phenomenon of violence against women was formally 
recognized in 1992, when Nicaragua hosted a National Conference for Women in which GBV [gender-based 
violence] was identified as one of the main problems facing Nicaraguan women. Between 1990 and 1994, the 
number of reported rapes rose by 21 percent, and the number of reported attempted rapes increased by 27 percent.”). 
It is also interesting to note that women seemed to play a high-profile role in the liberation from the conflict and it 
was thought that there would be greater equality as a result. The high incidence of violence was therefore both 
problematic given the numbers and stark given the expectations. See for example, CEDAW committee Forty-
Second Session, supra note 587, at 37, paragraph 196 (“Regarding the comment that had been made on the 
tendency, in times of peace, for the progress achieved by women during wartime to slow down, the representative 
stated that she shared that opinion. Women themselves were aware of that tendency and were trying to raise the 
general awareness of the work they did, of women’s subordinate position and of the need for women to organize 
themselves to balance the unequal position of women and men. She referred to the active role that women had 
played during wartime, which had made women question their traditional roles and see the need to change their lives 
in accordance with reality.”).  
1481 The number of reported rapes between 1990 and 1994 rose by 21 percent. RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 
705, at 118. One of the reasons cited for the alarming increase in sexual violence was the exacerbation caused “by 
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7.4.2 Legal Status Quo 
 
Nicaragua is a constitutional democracy.1482 Article 24 of the Nicaraguan Constitution 
provides that every person has rights and duties within the family.1483 Article 36 ensures respect 
for the physical, psychological and moral integrity of the individual.1484 Article 48 ensures 
political equality and obliges the state to remove any obstacles that may hinder economic, 
political or social wellbeing.1485  
 
Protection of the family is an important component of the Nicaraguan Constitution, probably 
a result of the socialist imperatives in its history. So-called family rights are guaranteed by 
Chapter IV of the Nicaraguan Constitution, which obliges the state and society to protect the 
family and requires equality within the family, including with respect to domestic work.1486  
 
7.4.3 Rate of Domestic Violence  
 
As is the case with many countries, the disjuncture between the rhetoric of equality and 
reality of violence is acute. Nicaragua’s high rate of violence against women began to receive 
international attention in the early 1980s. By 1981, Nicaragua had signed and ratified 
CEDAW.1487 In 1984 Nicaragua appeared before the CEDAW committee, which, in an unusual 
line of questioning, examined the unduly high level of gender-based violence.1488  
                                                                                                                                                       
men returning from the war to a weak economy and high rates of unemployment.” RHR Nicaragua Report, supra 
note 705, at 118. 
1482 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 7. The Nicaraguan Constitution, which is supreme law 
of the country, provides for an independent judiciary. See OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 
9. 
1483 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 9. Article 24 of the Constitution of Nicaragua states as 
follows: “Toda persona tiene deberes para con la familia, la comunidad, la patria y la humanidad. Los derechos de 
cada persona están limitados por los derechos de los demás, por la seguridad de todos y por las justas exigencias del 
bien común.” See http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions/Nica/nica87.html. This can be translated as “All 
persons have duties to their families, the community, the Homeland and humanity. The rights of each person are 
limited by the rights of others, the collective security and the just requirements of the common good.” Translation 
available at http://www.leftjustified.com/leftjust/lib/sc/ht/wtp/nicaragu.html.  
1484 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 9. 
1485 OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 9. 
1486 See OMCT CEDAW Report on Nicaragua, supra note 123, at 9-10 (making reference to articles 70, 72 and 73). 
1487 On 17 July 1980 Nicaragua signed CEDAW and ratified it, without reservation, on 27 October 1981. See Parties 
who have signed and ratified CEDAW, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. See 
also Parties who have entered reservations to CEDAW, available at, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm. Nicaragua has not signed the Optional 
Protocol. See Signatures and Ratifications of the Optional Protocol, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/sigop.htm. 
1488 The CEDAW committee probed the Nicaraguan representative regarding the existence of “obsolete and 
discriminatory laws” and the remedial measures the country was taking to address the abuse of women and children. 
In response to the questions the representative stated that rape would be penalized with “a sentence of between 6 and 
12 years, particularly when the rape was considered to have been extremely cruel. An amendment of that rule was 
under consideration. She said that refuges or shelters for abused women existed in three regions of the country, 
which provided such women with counseling and psychological support.” CEDAW committee Forty-Second 
Session, supra note 587, at 37, paragraph 195 and at 35, paragraph 174. In a separate question, the CEDAW 
committee requested information regarding “any measures that had been taken to prevent or reduce the abuse of 
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In 1992, the post-war phenomenon of violence against women was recognized as one of the 
main problems facing Nicaraguan women.1489 This status quo continued well into the late 1990s, 
when the Nicaraguan government began to identify domestic violence as a serious health 
problem for women.1490 The Nicaraguan government acknowledged that the “grave 
shortcomings affecting women’s access to justice”1491 were due to domestic violence, the 
absence of a family code, cumbersome procedures, ignorance of the law, paternal irresponsibility 
and a delay in the payment of alimony.1492  
 
7.4.4 Post-1993 Change in Nicaraguan Law and Policy 
 
After 1993, however, the legal landscape changed. The Nicaraguan government began to 
implement certain policy and legislative amendments.1493 After DEVAW and Nicaragua’s 
ratification of the Convention of Belem Do Paragraph in 1995,1494 Nicaragua adopted the 1996 
Law against Aggression against Women, which criminalized domestic violence, imposed a 
sentence of up to six years and instituted the restraining order.1495 Several modifications and 
additions were made to the generic Nicaraguan Penal Code (Law 230) regarding the prevention 
and punishment of family violence.1496 In 1997 the Penal Code was reformed to prohibit family 
violence, including physical and psychological violence. The government established 
committees to combat violence against women.1497  
                                                                                                                                                       
young girls and women, including domestic violence and sexual assault, alcoholism and drug abuse, and the care of 
the victims of those social ills.” CEDAW committee Forty-Second Session, supra note 587, at 36, paragraph 184. 
This line of questioning was not characteristic of the CEDAW committee and probably arose as a result of the 
international exposure of violence against Nicaraguan women. Because CEDAW itself has no provision relating 
directly to violence against women, before DEVAW no clear prohibition existed and the CEDAW committee spent 
little time on the issue of violence in its discussions. The closest references to violence against women probably 
inhere in article 6 regarding prostitution and the trafficking of women: “State parties shall take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of 
women.” 
1489 RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 118. Notwithstanding, marital rape was not criminalized. RHR 
Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 118 (The rape laws were limited in that they did not apply to husbands, 
awarded paternity rights to rapists and sentences were as short as nine months). 
1490 Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra notex, at 15. The Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report describes the 
government’s focus on violence as a health problem in an attempt to mainstream gender issues. See Fifth 
Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 22. 
1491 Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 21. 
1492 Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 21-22. 
1493 The National Commission against Violence, an inter-institutional governmental agency was created in 1990 by 
government decree. UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, supra note 197, at 2. 
1494 Nicaragua has signed and ratified the Convention of Belem Do Para on June 9 1994 and October 6 1995. See 
General Information on the Convention of Belem Do Para available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-
61.html.  
1495 RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 119. 
1496 UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, supra note 197, at 2. This was confirmed in 2001 when the representative of 
Nicaragua to the CEDAW committee made reference to draft revisions to the penal and family codes, which aimed 
to remove discriminatory provisions (which later became law). 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 929. 
The CEDAW committee also applauded Nicaragua for its success in this regard. 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, 
supra note 929, at 74, paragraph 292. 
1497 This included the 1999-2001 Strategic Plan of the Nicaraguan Institute for Women, a steering agency for public 
policy on women, whose principal mandate is the fight against violence directed against women. The National 
Commission against Violence was charged with the preparation of a National Plan against Violence Toward 
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For the most part, NGOs played a distinct role in exposing the extent of the problem and 
instigating legislative change, awareness raising campaigns and lobbying efforts.1498 NGOs were 
also responsible for establishing shelters and services for survivors of domestic violence.1499 In 
addition, Nicaragua developed a strong male-focused movement to reduce violence against 
women, offering training workshops on machismo and its connection to violence against 
women.1500 
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, various government institutions adopted strategies to reduce 
violence against women, including the National Police Force,1501 the Ministry of Health1502 and 
the Ministry of the Family, which was responsible for formulating and coordinating government 
policy relating to the strengthening of the family unit.1503 Nicaragua established the Nicaraguan 
Institute for Women as the national machinery charged with formulating and promoting public 
policies vis-à-vis women.1504  
                                                                                                                                                       
Women, involving the integration of judicial, legislative and executive powers. UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, supra 
note 197, at 2. 
1498 RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 119 (“most of the long-standing programming has been the result of 
action by local NGOs.”) 
1499 RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 119. 
1500 RHR Nicaragua Report, supra note 705, at 120. 
1501 The police force established Consultative Council on Gender and the Commissariats for Women and Children to 
apply specific policy for addressing gender-based violence. UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, supra note 197, at 2. In 
1995 the national police force established the Office for Women and Children, which involved the creation of a 
Central Coordinating Office, the purpose of which was to implement the objectives of the Office for Women and 
Children and to coordinate with the Nicaraguan Institute for Women. The Central Office became operational in 1997 
and it was charged with the provision of “special care for cases of physical, emotional or sexual violence against 
women and children, through the criminal investigations department.” Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 
913, at 35. 
1502 The Ministry of Health had a department called the Department of Comprehensive Attention for Women, which 
conducts an Intrafamily Violence Program (1990). UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, supra note 197, at 2. In the 1998 
Demographic and Health Survey, a questionnaire based on specific methodological guidelines, was given to one 
woman, who was either married or had been married, from each home. The objective of the questionnaire was to 
assess the extent of violence against women. Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 31. (“Special 
methodological guidelines were followed in order to obtain this information, with respect both to the training of staff 
conducting the survey and to the procedures to be followed by interviewees and interviewers in the homes of women 
affected by this problem.”). Within certain regions (in León and Managua), the study revealed that on average half 
the women who had been married at some point had suffered some form of physical or sexual abuse. Within the 
preceding year, 25% of women had suffered some form of physical or sexual abuse. Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW 
Report, supra note 913, at 31. 
1503 UN 1998 Nicaragua Report, supra note 197, at 2. 
1504 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 929, at 73, paragraph 280. This institute was formed in recognition 
of domestic violence “as a violation of the right to life and the right to security of person” Fourth Nicaraguan 
CEDAW Report, supra note 923, at 17. For a more detailed account of the advances made by the Nicaraguan 
Institute for Women, see Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 35-36. While the entity responsible 
for domestic violence remained the Ministry for the Family, it did spearhead some successful activities and 
advances, including the creation of “the Women's Anti-Violence Network, an association that brings together 
organizations of civil society working to combat violence, the National Coordinator of NGOs working with children 
and young persons, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, INATEC, and the three State Authorities. 
This led to the creation of the National Commission on Violence against Women, Children and Young Persons.” 
Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 34. This was detailed in the 2001 CEDAW committee report: 
“The Government had created offices for women and children, as a result of the cooperative effort by the 
Nicaraguan Institute for Women, the Women’s Anti-violence Network, the secretariat of the National Plan to 
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In 1998 the National Commission on Violence against Women was created to plan and 
implement solutions, which would coordinate all government departments.1505 The various 
agencies remain in the process of improving the political, technical and methodological 
conditions needed to implement this project.1506 These advances realized material, albeit limited 
improvements for victims of systemic intimate violence.1507 
 
In 2001, once again before the CEDAW committee, Nicaragua acknowledged the 
disproportionate effect of poverty on women and the harmful social and cultural perceptions of 
“machismo,” which had impeded the implementation of CEDAW.1508 While, the non-equivalent 
roles of men and women undermined the legislative developments adopted by the 
government,1509 Nicaragua claimed that since its adoption of CEDAW, the role of women had 
advanced, especially in light of the development of the country as a whole.1510  
 
The substance of Nicaragua’s 2001 presentation to the CEDAW committee evidences an 
advanced understanding of systemic intimate violence. It notes the contradiction between the 
perception of the home as a place of safety and the destructive reality of a “climate of tension 
and aggression within the family [which] destroys the family's meaning as a place of protection, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Prevent Domestic and Sexual Violence (2001-2006) and the National Commission on Violence against Women, 
Children and Young Persons to address the problem. The Penal Code had also been reformed to provide greater 
protection for victims and women police stations (comisarías) had been established to combat gender violence. 2001 
Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 929, at 74, paragraph 292. Trafficking in all its forms was also prohibited by 
article 40 of the Constitution. 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 929, at 73, paragraph 285. It seems the 
project was a cross-disciplinary effort, bringing together the police, judiciary and other non-governmental 
organizations, in recognition that “the problem [of domestic violence] was the responsibility not only of the 
Government but of society as a whole.” Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, 17. According to this report, the results 
of the institutional efforts “led the Government of Nicaragua, civil society, the judicial authority and external 
partners to support the extension of this project to other areas of the country, such as Estelí, Matagalpa, Masaya and 
Granada.” 
1505 Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 6. The Commission, which consists of a number of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, was established to “help prevent, punish, and eradicate violence 
against women and children, with particular emphasis on intra-family and sexual violence, by institutionalizing 
effective coordination between the State and civil society with the creation of the National Commission on Violence, 
which will ensure that this problem is comprehensively addressed through the creation of a National Plan on 
Violence against Women, Children and Young Persons.” For a more detailed description of the Commission’s 
responsibilities, see the Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 37. At the end of 1998, Nicaragua 
began formulating this plan. Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 34. 
1506 Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 35-6.  
1507 The institutions “provided Nicaraguan women and children with a professional body which recognizes their 
rights and offers expertise in all cases of rape and physical abuse… The centres typically provide support to women 
who register their complaints. This successful work is accompanied by awareness and prevention campaigns in the 
media so that society, and especially women and children, will know when they are victims of physical or sexual 
abuse.” Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 923, at 17. 
1508 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 929, at 74-75 (expressing concern regarding the fact that men have 
replaced women in both the private and public sectors and are earning three times more than women). 
Notwithstanding the activities of women during the 1979 battle for independence, the notion of “machismo” 
continued to dominate both public and private life. 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 941, at 74. 
1509 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 941, at 74. 
1510 Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 4. While there was a lack of statistical data disaggregated 
by sex, Nicaragua had disseminated a handbook “explaining the provisions of the Convention.” 2001 Nicaragua 
CEDAW Report, paragraph 287-290, page 74. 
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security and support.”1511 In its fourth and fifth CEDAW reports, Nicaragua describes domestic 
violence as a violation of the right to security of the person and the right to equality respectively, 
revealing that “intra-family violence and sexual crimes were the leading forms of crime in 
1998.”1512 The Nicaraguan representative acknowledged the isolation inherent in systemic 
intimate violence and the debilitating effects of the process of psychological and physical 
harm,1513 factors which had led Nicaragua to develop a National Plan for the Prevention of 
Domestic and Sexual Violence 2001- 2006.1514 
 
The Nicaraguan representative admitted to and explained the limitations to its efforts to 
reduce systemic intimate violence,1515 claiming that the criminalization of domestic violence and 
the penalization of abusers, “led to a new openness in discussing and condemning domestic and 
sexual violence on the part of the Government.”1516  
 
The Nicaraguan representative described some of the advances the government had made in 
addressing systemic intimate violence. There had been an increase in the role of female 
professionals and specialists with a scientific background in disseminating information regarding 
violence against women.1517 A national program of offices for women and children had been 
created “to meet the needs of all those women who now have the courage to report situations of 
violence.”1518 There were ten national offices funded by the Nicaraguan Institute for Women and 
                                                
1511 The violence “affects the mental and emotional health of family members and their capacity to socialize with 
one another, and very often leads to the break-up of the family.” Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, 
at 30. The representative of Nicaragua commented specifically on domestic violence, pointing out that “domestic 
violence affected a large number of women in Nicaragua.” 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, paragraph 285, page 
73. 
1512 Domestic violence was addressed within the Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report in the context of the right to 
the security of person. Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 923, at 17. The Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW 
Report describes intra-family violence as “a phenomenon that affects all women around the world. It is based mostly 
on unequal relations between men and women, and is an expression of men's power over women. The violence is 
manifested at every level, whether economic, political, or social. It affects the entire family, but especially women, 
at every stage of their lives.” Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 30. According to the national 
police force, 7 66,064 crimes were recorded in the country as a whole. This was 3,436 more than in 1997, 
representing an increase of 5.5 per cent.” While property crimes made up the bulk of the reported criminal activity, 
“25,800 crimes against persons were recorded. The report refers to 15,820 cases of injury, of which 36 per cent were 
the result of intra-family violence, and of which 5,771 cases occurred in the family home. Most incidents took place 
on a Saturday or Sunday, and the aggressors were mostly drunk or under the influence of drugs at the time of the 
incidents.” Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 30. 
1513 This highlights the fact that due to the intimacy of the violence, there is often no escape from it and the home is 
not the place of safety we would like it to be. This is confirmed by the statement that “Nicaraguan homes are scenes 
of intra-family violence and sexual crimes.” Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 30. The Fifth 
CEDAW report states that, in Nicaragua, “the psychological consequences of intra-family violence have not been 
satisfactorily evaluated, because we lack the forensic and medical psychologists able to conduct such an evaluation. 
Most evaluations of the problem refer only to the physical consequences, but all physical abuse necessarily involves 
psychological abuse.” Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 30. 
1514 2001 Nicaragua CEDAW Report, supra note 941, at 74, paragraph 292. 
1515 The Fourth and Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Reports acknowledged that there were contradictions and flaws 
within the legislation that impeded women’s full access to justice, including as regards domestic violence. Fourth 
Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 923, at 8 and Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 21. 
1516 Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 923, at 17. 
1517 Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 923, at 16. 
1518 Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 35.  
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eight offices funded by local initiatives.1519 The state had also published police training manuals, 
entitled “Gender Violence and Citizen Security.”1520 Perhaps the most pertinent development 
was Nicaragua’s emphasis on the role of women and civil society in developing remedies to 




After DEVAW, Nicaragua improved its legislation and policies in respect of violence against 
women. However, systemic intimate violence persists. In part, this is due to Nicaragua’s poverty 
and the fact that many state institutions prioritize needs other than gender-based violence. In 
addition cultural reform, vis-à-vis gender roles, has been slow. This could be due to a rejection of 
western ideology, which, given the United States’ involvement in Nicaragua, is not improbable. 
Whatever the reason, though, the health and wellbeing of women is not a priority in many 
Nicaraguan communities. The state itself seems to have taken legislative steps to embrace 
women’s rights but the extent to which this has been backed up by resources is uncertain. Within 
this state of flux, international organizations and institutions continue to research, expose and 
help mitigate the very high level of systemic intimate violence against women in Nicaragua. 
 
However, one cannot ignore the progress from the 1981 silence to the current day emphasis 
on systemic intimate violence in Nicaragua. The result of this emphasis is a slow but meaningful 
shift in the internalization of the norm against systemic intimate violence.  
 




The third function of international law is its role of expanding rights and concomitant 
obligations. Certain acts of harm exist for which we have deficient language and law. These 
types of harm are peculiar and manifest in ways which appear to be remediable by existing law 
but in truth are not.  They therefore fall outside the purview of existing laws and the harm 
continues without restraint. International law identifies such harm and develops appropriate 
restraints to prevent it. 
 
                                                
1519 The report does not explain what services are provided by the offices but claims that the program “is highly 
pertinent to our country’s needs, representing a timely response to the problem of gender violence and intra-family 
violence that affect thousands of Nicaraguan families.” Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 35.  
1520 Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 913, at 38. This project was funded through the use of German 
aid. The texts are divided into five parts, namely, gender as a category for analysis for the police as an institution; 
the modernization of the police as an institution; gender and challenges to citizen security; gender violence; and 
police intervention in gender-based violence. Id at 38. 
1521 Fourth Nicaraguan CEDAW Report, supra note 923, at 19. See also page 58 of the Fifth Nicaraguan CEDAW 
Report (noting “the influence of the women university lecturers, professionals and specialists who have carried out 
research on women’s issues such as abuse, violence, laws that discriminate against women, the effect of adjustment 
policies, strategies adopted by women in response to the various development models, methods of training women, 
the evaluation of gender-based projects, the organization of projects of benefit to women, etc. This has all led to the 
publication of a great variety and number of documents on women’s issues, which are available at the Centre for 
Documentation on Women (CEDIM), at university and government documentation centres, and through NGOs.”). 
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For example, in certain circumstances, “[w]hen a government violates or refuses to recognize 
rights, individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within domestic political or 
judicial arenas. They may seek international connections finally to express their concerns and 
even to protect their lives.”1522 International law, through the efforts of TSMOs, creates a crime 
that otherwise would not exist so that the conduct in question is better addressed by national 
laws.  
 
The expansive function of international law, together with “… the effects of transnational 
activism within domestic politics may be [its] most important function. Transnational advocacy 
networks can help resource-poor actors construct new domestic movements out of combinations 
of indigenous and imported materials.”1523 
 
An example of this is the internationalization of enforced disappearances. 
 
8.2 Application of the Expansive Function to Enforced Disappearances 
 
Enforced disappearances are a peculiar harm, placing it outside the web of national legal 
mechanisms. While its occurrence has taken place historically, it has only recently been 
addressed by international law, which, through the process discussed below, has expanded: (1) 
the understanding of the rights violated by the crime of enforced disappearances; and, (2) the 
concomitant state obligation in respect thereof.  
 
The expansion of international human rights law to include a prohibition against enforced 
disappearances was initiated predominantly by the events in Argentina after the military coup in 
1976.1524 From 1976 to 1983 the so-called Dirty War in Argentina resulted in the disappearance 
of over 9000 people (although many claim the figure is closer to 30 000). At the time, no label 
existed for the curious events comprising enforced disappearances: individuals were arrested or 
kidnapped based on allegations of political dissidence; no trials were held; and, when relatives 
and friends inquired after the detainee, the official state response was ignorance.  
 
No legal remedies existed: the law against summary execution did not apply since there was 
no evidence that the disappeared individual had been killed; since an essential element of 
enforced disappearances is government denial of the abduction, “habeas corpus relief and other 
institutional safeguards to protect individuals from abuse are rendered completely 
ineffective;”1525 and, often, attempts to obtain information about the disappeared were met with 
intimidation, creating an environment of fear for those left behind. Existing laws, therefore, were 
rendered nugatory. 
 
                                                
1522 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 221. 
1523 TARROW, supra note 752, at 177. 
1524 Keck and Sikkink describe the activities of Amnesty International in demonstrating that “disappearances were 
part of a deliberate government policy by which the military and the police kidnapped perceived opponents, took 
them to secret detention centers where they tortured, interrogated, and killed, then secretly disposed of their bodies.” 
Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, extracts, supra note 777, at 223-227. Amnesty International teamed up 
with music artists U2, resulting in U2’s rendition of the actions of the Mothers of Plaza De Mayo in the song “One 
Tree Hill.” [Note: citation to follow]  
1525 Mendez & Miguel, supra note 539, at 511. 
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Over time, however, an equally curious response emerged: the mothers of the disappeared, 
finding no assistance from the authorities, turned to the world in what became a weekly parade, 
held for the first time in the Plaza De Mayo. The women, who became known as the Mothers of 
Plaza De Mayo, rallied with signs asking the outside world to help because “[e]very place is 
closed to us. Everywhere they shut us out. We beg you to help us. We beg you.”1526 International 
organizations, individuals and governments responded.1527  
 
“Framing” the harm in the manner described above, resulted in an increased understanding of 
the peculiar manifestation of enforced disappearances, for which no legal remedy existed.1528 
Knowledge of the facts and an understanding of the harm led to international discussions, with 
the result that the internationalization of enforced disappearances gave a label to a previously 
amorphous phenomenon.  
 
This led to the creation of the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearances, 
which defined enforced disappearances as:  
 
the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom, in whatever way, perpetrated 
by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, 
support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by an absence of information or a refusal to 
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the whereabouts of that 
person, thereby impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural 
guarantees.1529 
 
One of the seminal changes brought about by the expansion of law, was the recognition of 
the harm caused by the government’s failure to act, and not only by the initial positive conduct 
of abduction. Therefore, in the case of disappearances, the government is responsible not only 
for its actions, but also for its inaction and failure to take appropriate steps to remedy the array of 
violations triggered by the initial abduction.  
 
In the landmark case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights enunciated the due diligence standard in relation to governments’ obligations vis-
à-vis their citizens.1530 In response to the claims of enforced disappearances, the court held that 
the relevant acts of the public authorities consisted not the only in the state’s positive acts. It held 
that: 
 
                                                
1526 See CNN World News Story Page, Argentina’s Dirty War: An Ugly Episode that Won't Die, available at 
http://www4.cnn.com/WORLD/9803/02/argentina.dirty.war/.  
1527 “The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo marched in circles in the central square in Buenos Aires wearing white 
handkerchiefs to draw symbolic attention to the plight of their missing children. The [transnational] network also 
tried to use both material and moral leverage against the Argentine regime, by pressuring the United States and other 
governments to cut off military and economic aid, and by efforts to get the UN and the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights to condemn Argentina’s human rights practices.” KECK AND SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS, supra note 784, at 17. 
1528 For a discussion of the importance and efficacy of properly ‘framing’ an issue see KECK AND SIKKINK, 
ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 784, at 17 & 27. 
1529 Article II of the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 209. 
1530 Velásquez Rodríguez case, supra note 408, at paragraph 79(indicating that the Honduran government and 
judicial officers did not act with due diligence). 
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[a]n illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a 
State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible 
has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the 
act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it 
as required by the Convention.”1531  
 
This case began a course of jurisprudence, which, while developing slowly, is providing a 
framework within which litigants, activists and victims can claim relief from both national and 
international facilities.1532  
 
The lobbying and information-sharing on enforced disappearances led to the realization by 
the U.N. that the existing prohibitions against imprisonment, detention and extra-legal, arbitrary 
and summary executions were deficient.1533 For this reason, the UN proclaimed the Declaration 
on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, “as a body of principles for all 
States”1534 and urged “that all efforts be made so that the Declaration becomes generally known 
and respected.”1535 It acknowledged the need to expand the provisions of international law vis-à-
vis enforced disappearances because: 
 
while the acts which comprise enforced disappearance constitute a violation of the 
prohibition found in the [other] international instruments, it is none the less important to 
devise an instrument which characterizes all acts of enforced disappearance of persons as 
very serious offences and sets forth standards designed to punish and prevent their 
commission.1536  
 
In addition, the UN Human Rights Commission established the Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances,1537 which has become a global authority on enforced 
                                                
1531 Velásquez Rodríguez case, supra note 408, at paragraph 172. This was confirmed in the case of Hector Perez 
Salazar v. Peru, supra note 544, at paragraph 28 (“This situation of impunity is incompatible with the State’s 
general obligation to respect and protect human rights. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights holds in this regard that the State has the legal duty to use the means within its reach to seriously investigate 
violations committed within its jurisdiction, in order to identify those responsible, impose the appropriate 
punishment, and ensure the victim adequate compensation.”). 
1532 An example of a relatively successful outcome is Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia Judgment of 26 January 2000 before 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In January 2000, at a public hearing Bolivia formally acknowledged its 
responsibility for the disappearance in question and apologized to the mother of the victim. It also indicated that it 
was in the process of amending domestic legislation to prevent the recurrence of such events in the future. For a 
discussion of this see http://www.javier-leon-diaz.com/docs/Enforced_Case_Law.htm.  
1533 See Preamble to the Preamble to the U.N. Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 542, referring to 
the “Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment … 
contained in the annex to its resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988, and with the Principles on the Effective 
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, set forth in the annex to Economic 
and Social Council resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 
44/162 of 15 December 1989. 
1534 See Preamble to the U.N. Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 542. 
1535 See Preamble to the U.N. Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 542. 
1536 Preamble to the Preamble to the U.N. Declaration on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 542. 
1537 The Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) was established in 1980 by 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 20 (XXXVI). See http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/disappear/. 
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disappearances and its mandate includes assisting families of individuals who have been 
‘disappeared.’1538  
 
International law, propelled by TSMOs, international bodies and local organizations, 
expanded existing international law to include enforced disappearances. The internationalization 
of enforced disappearances has not compelled governments to produce disappeared dissidents; 
nor will it prevent enforced disappearances from happening, no doubt, repeatedly. However, by 
expanding the legal notion of enforced disappearances, the structure of remedies increased, 
resulting in the channeling of resources and extra-state assistance for the individuals affected by 
the violation.  
 
Expanding international law did not bring a cure to the crime; however, this is not necessarily 
the objective of international law. Its purpose includes the collaboration of powers to assist 
individuals who are vulnerable within their state. Therefore, notwithstanding that the working 
group has settled few cases, it is a significant presence in preventing new cases of disappearances 
and, at times, assisting in saving human lives.1539 
 
8.3 Application of the Expressive Function of International Law to Systemic Intimate 
Violence 
 
Systemic intimate violence and enforced disappearances are forms of harm which have 
peculiar qualities. These qualitative quirks, as discussed above, preclude the effective application 
of existing national laws. New policy and legislative mechanisms are required to circumvent 
these difficulties. 
 
The expansive nature of international human rights law has benefited systemic intimate 
violence in a manner similar to that achieved in respect of enforced disappearances. This is 
evident in the approach of Sweden to systemic intimate violence and the creation of the crime 





8.4 Analysis of Domestic Violence in Sweden Before and After DEVAW  
 
Historically, Sweden has taken an active position opposing gender discrimination. It was one 
of the first states to sign and ratify CEDAW (in 1980), objecting to several reservations made by 
                                                
1538 See UNHCHR Fact Sheet No. 6, supra note 544.  
1539 See UNHCHR Fact Sheet No. 6, supra note 544 (“Nevertheless, the extent to which the Working Group, 
through its patient and persistent contacts with the Governments concerned, may have prevented more cases from 
occurring cannot be quantified. The fact that it was able to contribute to the clarification of cases, especially within 
the framework of its urgent action procedure … and thus possibly to the saving of human lives, has been considered 
sufficient reason for its continued activity. Moreover, the mechanism of the Working Group should be seen as a 
reflection of international concern and action. It should equally be seen as forming part of a long-term process 
leading to the elimination of major human rights violations, a process which includes the creation of widespread 
public awareness of human rights-related issues and the provision of advisory services and technical assistance to 
Governments for the promotion and protection of human rights.”) 
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other state parties.1540 However, in its 1984 report to CEDAW, Sweden made almost no 
reference to violence against women. While the CEDAW committee requested information 
regarding rape and battering, Sweden did not supply this information in its response.1541  
 
In 1993, one year prior to DEVAW, Sweden once again appeared before the CEDAW 
committee.1542 This time it described significant advances in respect of domestic violence.1543 
Sweden had enacted the new Equal Opportunities Act in 1992, which established a five year plan 
to achieve equality, recognizing that “[v]iolence, battering and other forms of physical abuse 
against women were considered to be serious expressions of the lack of equality and imbalance 
of power.”1544 The Act also catered for the training of professional personnel such as police 
officers, judges, doctors and social welfare officers and improving coordination between the 
authorities at the local and regional levels.1545 The most impressive component of the Act was 
the allocation of funds to the police to “provide technical equipment and bodyguards for women 
who were subjected to threats of violence.”1546  
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden has increased the number of protection orders, 
created government institutions and committees to examine and understand the permutations of 
violence against women, and passed some of the most progressive and insightful legislation in 
respect of systemic intimate violence. Possibly the most progressive legal provision is the 
                                                
1540 Sweden signed CEDAW on 7 March 1980 and ratified it on 2 July 1980. See Parties who have signed and 
ratified CEDAW, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. See also Parties who have 
entered reservations to CEDAW, available at, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-
country.htm. Sweden signed the CEDAW Optional Protocol on 10 December 1999 and ratified it on 24 April 2003. 
See Signatures and Ratifications of the Optional Protocol, available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/sigop.htm. 
1541 CEDAW Thirty-Ninth Session, supra note 798, at 33, paragraphs 217. 
1542 CEDAW Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraphs 474 – 522. The CEDAW committee 
presented questions to the representative of Sweden regarding violence against women, and particular they asked 
about “the incidence of violence, statistics on the subject and recent trends, as well as the most frequent forms of 
violence…” CEDAW Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at, paragraph 500. The representative 
stated that 14,285 cases of assault had been reported in 1991. The response demonstrated sensitivity to the lack of 
adequate statistics, due in part to the reluctance of victims to report incidences of abuse. CEDAW Concluding 
Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at, paragraph 500: “There had been limited, inconclusive research on the 
reasons for male aggression, but there was a consensus that the overall explanation lay in the lack of equality and 
imbalance of power between men and women.” 
1543 Moreover, at this stage it is also clear that the CEDAW committee has a somewhat more holistic approach to 
violence, stating that “In a time of changing social patterns, the key questions were how to change the violent pattern 
of male behaviour and how to reach suffering women.” The CEDAW committee in fact suggested that a survey 
should be conducted among the battered women themselves. It is unclear entirely what this would involve. See 
Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 501. 
1544 Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at, paragraph 480. The Act came into force in 
Sweden on 1 January 1992. Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 477. 
1545 Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 480. 
1546 Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 480. If it was indeed carried out, it 
would contrast notably with the decision of the New York Supreme Court in the Riss case, supra note 679 (although 
this was in 1968). A somewhat less ideal provision is the increase of penalties for crimes of trivial assault from a 
fine to imprisonment for up to six months and the sentence for aggravated assault was at least one year and at the 
most 10 years. Provided that the period of incarceration is discretionary, this would be an improvement on the mere 
issuing of a fine, which is inherently disproportionate to the harm involved. On the other hand, however, 
incarceration is often problematic as is described in chapter four below. Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, 
supra note 119, at paragraph 480. 
 324 
revision of the Swedish Penal Code: Law on Gross Violation of Integrity and Gross Violation of 
a Woman’s Integrity, intended to raise the “penalty value of acts which, viewed separately, are 
relatively minor but when repeated may lead to substantial violation of the victim’s integrity.”1547 
The Social Services Act was amended to oblige social services to facilitate a change of situation 
for women who have been subject to violence in their home.1548 Sweden’s laws makes provision 
for the protection of personal data to ensure the abused can retain her information and prevent 
the abuser from accessing her information and, most importantly, from finding out her 
whereabouts.1549  
 
Notwithstanding these advances, however, the trend of violence in Sweden remained 
constant.1550 To improve this situation, at the conclusion of the 1993 session, the CEDAW 
committee suggested that the Swedish government forge closer ties with grassroots organizations 
and facilitate the reporting of the violence.1551  
 
In 1993, the Government of Sweden went on to appoint a Commission on Violence against 
Women, to review issues pertaining to violence against women and in particular “to present its 
proposals from a female perspective.”1552 The Commission proposed the establishment of a 
national center for battered and raped women.1553 In response, the government allocated funds 
for the establishment of such a center, approximately 70 kilometers north of Stockholm, to 
provide “medical examination, treatment and support to women subjected to violence as well as 
                                                
1547 The crime takes account of “the changes which a woman gradually experiences while being subjected to 
violence and of the fact that violations which may seem fairly minor when viewed separately have a grave negative 
effect on a woman when they are part of a process, thus meriting severe punishment.” Captured Queen Report, 
supra note 123, at 13. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 20. The 
number of “visiting bans granted against men increased from 62 in 1988 to 2 295 in 1999. Captured Queen Report, 
supra note 123, at 12. The visiting ban was “imposed for the purpose of protecting people from harassment and 
persecution, ‘particularly women who are being subjected to assault and other abuse.’” The Swedish government 
appointed a committee to “scrutinize all sex crime legislation, materially, systematically and technically, partly as a 
result of the Commission’s comments concerning the lack of protection for women and children exposed to 
violence.” Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 13. The Commission proposed the introduction of a new 
crime entitled “Protection of Women’s Integrity.” The proposal was adopted and termed the “gross violation of a 
woman’s integrity,” as discussed above. Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 13. Finally, the Commission 
proposed the enlargement of the definition of rape, the criminalization of the purchase of sexual services and the 
“tightening up of legislation relating to equality of the sexes.” Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 13. Rape 
is a criminal offence in Sweden and Sweden was the first country to criminalize marital rape. AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 20. Genital mutilation is also an offence in 
Sweden. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 20. It is interesting to note 
that the laws criminalizing genital cutting allows for the conviction of a person “in Sweden of a crime committed 
abroad, even if the act is not classified as punishable in the other country.” 
1548 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 21. 
1549 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 21-22. 
1550 Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 502. 
1551 Cedaw Concluding Observations: Sweden, supra note 119, at paragraph 502. 
1552 Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra notex, at 32. For an explanation of this phrase see the 
Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, at 13 (explaining that the term was clarified as “being synonymous with the 
perspective which has emerged from feminist studies of violence to women.” Apparently, the result of this initiative 
was the creation of an alliance of gender-related studies, politics and the law, which gave Sweden a “leading 
position internationally in this field of legislation.” Id at 13). 
1553 Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 985, at 33. 
 325 
counseling around the clock.”1554 The center, known as the RKC, situated at the Academic 
Hospital of Uppsala, constitutes an “expert unit within the health and medical services for 
women who have been subjected battering and sexual assaults (sic).”1555 
 
The RKC in Sweden is a self-contained clinic, with independent staff, commissioned to offer 
and develop treatment services for women who have survived battering or rape.1556 They also 
provide a consulting, educational, awareness-raising and research function.1557 The RKC is also 
able to offer a modicum of protection to victims of abuse through cooperation with the police 
and social services.1558 This assistance is viable due to an emphasis on cooperation with other 
services such as the police and immigration officials.1559  
 
In 2000, once again before the CEDAW committee, Sweden affirmed its commitment to 
gender equality and described its role in the UN adoption of the Declaration of the Elimination of 
Violence against Women and the U.N.’s decision to appoint a Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women.1560 It also described improved systems of support for domestic violence 
victims.1561    
                                                
1554 Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 985, at 33. See also the Captured Queen Report, supra 
note 123, at 22, footnote 11 ans 12. The report also includes an informative history of the development of research 
and activism regarding violence against women in Sweden since the early 1980s. The RKC receives funding from 
the Uppsala County Council, the Swedish Government, Uppsala University, and Uppsala University Hospital. See 
National Center for Battered and Raped Women PDF, supra note 988, at 3. However, it appears that this Center (the 
RKC) is most impressive for the people who might be able to access it. See  National Center for Battered and Raped 
Women, supra note 988. See also  National Center for Battered and Raped Women PDF, supra note 988, at : “By 
the end of 2002 more than 1700 patients had been given medical and psychosocial help.” [Note: check citation 
format for all these web addresses. Get proper name]  
1555 Referred to as the National Center for Battered and Raped Women (Rikskvinnocentrum, RKC). See National 
Center for Battered and Raped Women, Uppsala University Hospital, available at 
http://www.uas.se/templates/page____25859.aspx [hereinafter National Center for Battered and Raped Women]. 
Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 985, at 33. It appears that there are five shelters within the 
County of Uppsala, see National Center for Battered and Raped Women, available at 
http://www.uas.se/upload/RKC/rkc_engelsk_a5.pdf, at 6 [hereinafter National Center for Battered and Raped 
Women PDF].  It appears that there are also points of refuge referred to as “centres for victims of crime” although 
the extent to which these are used by victims of domestic violence is uncertain. See National Center for Battered and 
Raped Women PDF, supra note 988, at 6. 
1556 See National Center for Battered and Raped Women, supra note 988. 
1557 See National Center for Battered and Raped Women, supra note 988, at 3. See also  National Center for Battered 
and Raped Women PDF, supra note 988 . The RKC plays an important role regarding the obtaining and 
preservation of evidence. See National Center for Battered and Raped Women PDF, supra note 988, at 4: “Tests are 
taken to secure evidence. The injuries are photographed according to special rules. The medical examination may 
form the basis of a future legal certificate if the woman chooses to report the crime to the police so that an 
investigation and a legal process can begin.” The RKC also provides an educational facility, training professionals 
including lawyers and medical practitioners. See National Center for Battered and Raped Women PDF, supra note 
988, at 6. As a research institute, the RSK has received study visits from more than 40 countries. 
1558 See National Center for Battered and Raped Women PDF, supra note 988, at 4 and 5. 
1559 See National Center for Battered and Raped Women PDF, supra note 988, at 6. 
1560 Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 985, at 21. 
1561 As regards violence against women specifically, Sweden addresses this issue under the provisions of article 6 of 
CEDAW, supra note 21, which deals with trafficking and prostitution. Sweden indicates that violence against 
women was a priority, with reforms including “stricter penalties, procedural improvements, better support for 
victims of sexual crimes as well as preventive measures.” Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 





It was therefore disconcerting when in 2005, the New York Times reported high levels of 
domestic violence in Sweden, described as the “Secret Side of Women’s Lives.”1562 The article 
reveals that the reason for the high level of domestic violence is not a propensity for violence on 
the part of Swedish men but rather it “has simply been easier for them to get away with violence 
against wives and girlfriends … and harder for women to get the help they need.”1563  
 
At first blush one is tempted to conclude that both national and international efforts have 
failed. I proffer an alternative view: this is yet another step in the continued vigilance maintained 
by TSMOs and international bodies. True failure would be the continuation of secrecy, the 
abandonment of reform and the regression of law. The three functions of international law, 
expressive, implementing and expansive, prevent true failure. 
 
9. Summation 
                                                                                                                                                       
sexual molestation were at same time (sic) increased to 1 year (from 6 months) and two years (from 1 year) 
respectively (sic).” Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 985, at 31. Victims of violence are 
entitled to free legal support. Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 985, at 32. Amnesty 
International describes the legislation in Sweden as regards domestic violence. There are generic criminal provisions 
against assault that may be used to punish perpetrators of domestic violence. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE 
VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 18 (The punishment for assault is imprisonment for a maximum of two 
years. There is an option of a fine or imprisonment for six months for less serious offences. The punishment for 
‘gross’ assault is a minimum of one year and a maximum of ten years). Victims of the crime of domestic violence 
are entitled to request the appointment of a so-called “injured party counsel.” AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE 
VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 19. This counsel will defend the victim’s interests during the proceedings 
and provide support, assistance and accompaniment during the trial and during police interrogations. 
1562 See Secret Side of Women’s Lives, supra note 732 (describing domestic violence as the “one significant blot on 
the record of women’s empowerment.”). 
1563 Secret Side of Women’s Lives, supra note 732. In 1993, 1608 rapes were reported to the police, a majority of 
which were committed in doors. Fifth Periodic Report by Sweden to CEDAW, supra note 985, at 32. It is uncertain 
whether the reference to the location of the rapes implies that the rapes were not stranger-rapes but this is pure 
speculation and it is unclear. By the end of the 1990s, it was reported that almost every second woman in Sweden, 
i.e. 46 per cent, had been subjected to violence since her fifteenth birthday. Captured Queen Report, supra note 123, 
at 8and 10. The Captured Queen Report provides the following statistics: 46% of interviewed women had 
experienced violence committed by a man since their fifteenth birthday; 25% had experienced physical violence 
committed by a man sine their fifteenth birthday; 5% had been subjected to physical violence during the past year; 
7% of the respondents who were married or cohabiting had been subjected to physical violence in their current 
marriage/cohabitation and 3% had been subjected to violence within the past year; 28% of the women who had 
previously been married or cohabiting had been subjected to physical violence in their previous 
marriage/relationship; 22% of the women between the ages of 18-24 had been subject to some form of physical 
violence during the past year, and 56% had experienced sexual harassment. Only 15% of the women who had 
experienced had filed a police report regarding the most recent violent event. Amnesty International summarizes the 
Captured Queen Report findings. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 98, at 
25. For a summary of these statistics see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN SWEDEN, supra note 
98, at 27. Together with reports of violence and sexual abuse, the number of women in Sweden aged 18-24 who 
have been abused because of their sex totals 67 per cent. 67 per cent of all women in Sweden experience danger, 
invasion and harm. A large percentage of these women experienced this harm within the last year. Captured Queen 
Report, supra note 123, at 10. In 2003, 22,400 cases of domestic violence were reported to the police. This is 
reported as a conservative figure since many women do not the report violence they experience. Sweden Debates 
Hitting Men with Domestic Violence Tax, supra note 298. 
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Historically, international law developed as an institution to prevent cruelty committed 
against identified groups and distinction between sexes was subsumed into racial or ethnic 
categories. It was assumed that nothing as heinous as the acts of torture committed in the name 
of ethnicity could be committed in the name of gender. While this is changing, it remains that to 
hate a black person is a crime; to hate a woman is a culture. 
 
Therefore, the recognition of women’s rights in international law continues to advance but 
with several impediments. In reality the legal category of women’s rights is still marginalized 
and there is a continuing reticence to apply the generic provisions and mechanisms of 
international law to violations of women’s rights.1564 However, the careful cultivation of the law 
relating to women, including the right to be free from intimate harm, is a steady theme in 
international law and one that ought to be pursued in the interests of reducing the manifestation 
of systemic intimate violence.1565 
 
In this chapter I have argued that international human rights law is an effective body of law.  
 
I examined the theories which oppose and support international law, electing to base the 
discussion on the latter body of theory. This is because, while international human rights law is 
deficient in several respects, it nonetheless has been successful in a manner which is not high 
profile but effective. This is augmented by the role of non-state actors such as international 
bodies, NGOs and TSMOs.  
 
Based on this literature, I proposed that there are three ways in which international human 
rights law is beneficial. I argued that it has: (1) an expressive function, in naming norms; (2) an 
implementing function, in manifesting norms in local settings; and, (3) an expansive function, in 
identifying harmful conduct which is not regulated by national laws and extending the principles 
of international law to such conduct.  
 
In respect of each function I provided an example of a human rights phenomenon. The 
expressive function of international human rights law is evident in the case of mass rape, which, 
                                                
1564 [Note: citation to follow: see document regarding sexual violence in Sierra Leone] Notwithstanding the 
revolution of crimes such as rape as a weapon of genocide and forced pregnancy, mass acts of harm against women 
fail to attract the same degree of international activity as so-called ‘mainstream’ acts of violence committed against 
population groups. One example is that of Sudan. The extent of women and children suffering in the crisis is almost 
unprecedented and, at least, unquestionably clear. However, while the Genocide Convention has (rightly) been 
raised for assessment, very little discussion has taken place about the Janjaweed’s or the Sudanese government’s 
violation of the international human rights instruments that pertain to women. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
PHR CALLS FOR INTERVENTION TO SAVE LIVES IN SUDAN: FIELD TEAM COMPILES INDICATORS OF GENOCIDE, 5, 
June 23 2004, available at http://www.phrusa.org/research/sudan: “At the first sign of a Janjaweed attack, survivors 
reported that men and women fled separately. The men in some circumstances fled first in order to escape what they 
perceived to be the certain fate of death. The men left women and children to fend for themselves, knowing, as they 
reported in PHR interviews, that the women would likely be raped, but probably would not be killed. In a society 
where great emphasis is placed on gender roles and the importance of male protection, it is highly significant of the 
fear and distress imposed by the Janjaweed attacks that the men in the community were driven to abandon their 
families, risking serious stigma and harm, in order to save their own lives.” 
1565 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, supra note 58 ([Note: specific pages to 
follow].  
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after the enunciation of the norm by the ad hoc tribunals, it received international codification 
and approbation in the Rome Statute and affecting the laws against rape in national settings too. 
The implementing function of international human rights law is demonstrated by the prohibition 
against FGC, which, after a dialogue between the international and local communities, better 
facilities and laws are developing to mitigate the harm. Finally, as regards the expansive power 
of international human rights law, I looked to the phenomenon of enforced disappearances, 
demonstrating how prior to its internationalization it had been an amorphous conduct that simply 
did not fit into the framework of existing national laws. 
 
Finally, I applied each function of international human rights law to systemic intimate 
violence using the before and after evaluation of Mexico, Nicaragua, and Sweden. I described 
the way in which these states have changed their policies and laws regarding systemic intimate 
violence due, in part, to the increased international attention of domestic violence in DEVAW 
and the concomitant international events at the time. I concluded that each state demonstrated a 
remarkable change in its approach to systemic intimate violence after 1993 and that this change 
could be attributed to the internationalization of systemic intimate violence.  
 
Therefore, the further specification of this right by international authorities, the incorporation 
of systemic intimate violence into mainstream international affairs and the jurisprudential 
examination of the rights violated and state obligations triggered by systemic intimate violence, 
are not only necessary in theory, but practically can enhance the rubric of international law, 





Conclusion   
 
 
Do you know what Genocide is?... A cheese sandwich… Genocide is a cheese sandwich… 
What does anyone care about a cheese sandwich?... Genocide, Genocide, Genocide. Cheese 
sandwich, cheese sandwich, cheese sandwich. Who gives a shit? Crimes against humanity. 
Where’s humanity? Who’s humanity? You? Me? Did you see a crime committed against 
you? Hey, just a million Rwandans. Did you ever hear about the Genocide Convention?... 
 
That convention… makes a nice wrapping for a cheese sandwich.1566 
 
 
Everywhere and everything seems to say international human rights law does not work. 
Every slaughter in Rwanda and every slaughter in the Sudan confirms this. Or does it?  
 
If we accept that there is an emptiness blowing where we thought there is law, where does 
that leave us? If we see only the failure, how do we go on? If we resign ourselves to the enormity 
and futility of massive crimes, we have to live in a world where there is a greater vacuum of 
humanity than a presence of human-kind. 
 
I do not think this is our world. Neither did the Mothers of the Plaza De Mayo; neither did 
the judges of the immigration tribunal hearing In Re Kasinga; and neither did the judges of the 
ECHR considering the details of silent rape. 
 
If Hobbes is correct, that the human nature is given to violence, that the breach of peace and 
the domain of hate is the norm within our species, what do we do? Do we accept our inherent 
flaw or do we garner all that is good, positive, and powerful to mitigate this violence? I have 
argued for, and propose, the latter – for freedom from violence in our countries, across our 
borders and, not least of all, in our homes. 
 
Otherwise, all our lives can be summed up as: a cheese sandwich.  
 
1. The Argument in Summary 
 
In this thesis I have argued that certain forms of domestic violence, what I call ‘systemic 
intimate violence,’ constitute a violation of international law. Women suffer domestic violence 
disproportionately to men and it is the greatest cause of women’s ill-health worldwide. 
Notwithstanding, states uniformly fail to provide the assistance women require to escape, or deal 
with the effects of, such violence. Given the severity of the violence, coupled with the systematic 
failure of states to take the steps necessary to help remedy the violence, systemic intimate 
violence has become a global epidemic warranting national and international attention. 
 
                                                
1566 PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES, 
170-171 (Farrar Straus and Giroux, New York, 1998). 
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According to conservative statistics, 10 percent of women worldwide are living in a 
continuum of harm perpetrated by their intimates. While the geographical borders and social 
settings may differ, systemic intimate violence occurs globally; and, while the degree of official 
inertia may range, the violence progresses without effective state intervention. The pain that 
individuals face in their homes can, and does, escalate to an unconscionable level. And at this 
pinnacle of violence the state misunderstands, misconceives and turns its attentions to ‘other’ 
priorities.   
 
The state, of course, cannot prevent incidents of violence. It is not, nor ought it to be, in the 
home, ready to regulate the interaction between cohabitants. Nonetheless, there is a great deal the 
state can do to mitigate the consequences of this violence and interrupt its evolution. A victim of 
systemic intimate violence needs a place to go, a shelter that will hide her identity, provide her 
with care and accept her with her children, be they healthy or disabled; or she may need a haven 
for her companion animals or protection for her family; or she may need the presence of an 
official, the police, a community leader, to translate the unlawfulness of the violence to the 
perpetrator; she may need a state-sponsored lawyer who will obtain protection orders, 
maintenance orders, custody orders and assist her when they are breached; and she may need her 
employer to provide her with sufficient time to pursue these legal remedies. State officials, on 
the other hand, need guidance: judges must be informed and understand the peculiarity of the 
continuum of violence, the power imbalance within the relationship and the economic 
consequences of legal decisions; police officials need preparation and resources to address the 
severity of the violence and the complexity of the intimacy. And the only way in which a state 
truly can assist victims of systemic intimate violence is by connecting all these agencies. A 
‘domestic violence’ call, therefore, ought to trigger a series of options for the victim, options 
which work in tandem with the diverse needs of victims of systemic intimate violence. If this is 
achieved, systemic intimate violence really can be impeded. 
 
However, many states will not change their laws, their policies and their institutions without 
a guide from an international norm. As stated throughout this thesis, international law is not 
implemented through some global policing agent. Rather, the growing force of TSMOs, NGOs 
and international bodies acts as a colony of agents, which, with fierce dedication, facilitates the 
three functions of international law, namely, the expression, implementation and expansion of 
norms. The failures in international law – and they have been grand – do not negate the use and 
purpose of this system. Rather, the failures of this system demand our further efforts in 
remedying the deficiencies, identifying the strengths and improving the structures by which 
international law becomes local lore.  
 
Ironically, while the skeptic balks at using international law to regulate such private 
conduct, it is within the individual and the intimate that international law can be most effective. 
The developments in Mexico, Nicaragua and Sweden after DEVAW, reveals just how important 
the authoritative enunciation of a norm against systemic intimate violence is. 
 
Systemic intimate violence is different from the many forms of violence in society, which 
are not, and should not be, addressed by international law. The substance of systemic intimate 
violence, in the face of persistent state inertia, differentiates this abuse from the murders of a 
serial killer or the crime of passion. When counselors, lawyers and doctors daily encounter the 
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same stories of violence, helplessness, fear, and confusion, one has to ask what has gone wrong 
with the system. This thesis is an attempt to find that answer. It draws back from the particular 
and, in examining the universal it sees an epidemic – an international human rights violation. 
The argument supporting this claim has been mapped out in five chapters. 
 
Before I summarize these chapters, I reiterate the caveat drawn at the outset of this thesis. 
Intimate violence is not exclusively a violation of women’s rights. Men endure this violence, as 
do children, the elderly and the disabled. I do not include these groups in my argument for two 
reasons. The first is, some of these groups, for example, children and the disabled, have their 
own niches in international law, which may overlap but benefit at this stage from separate, 
distinct analyses. Second, systemic intimate violence is defined around the elements of intimate 
violence perpetrated against women specifically. This is because the experiences of women are 
colored inevitably by the backdrop of gender discrimination that permeates the approach of the 
state and society and international law.  
 
2. Chapter One 
 
The first chapter is a discussion of the current state of international law on violence against 
women and, specifically, domestic violence. The chapter claims that there is evidence of a 
burgeoning norm in international law against domestic violence, but that it is still solidifying into 
a principle of CIL. Given the debate regarding what evidences CIL, I argue that the various 
international legal developments that have occurred are evidence of the ongoing crystallization 
of a norm against systemic intimate violence, but that more needs to be done to affirm this. 
 
I argue that international law vis-à-vis systemic intimate violence is deficient for three 
reasons. First, I explain that there is no specific and authoritative statement in international law 
prohibiting systemic intimate violence. Current international law fails adequately to delineate the 
content of the right to be free from such violence, and does not, with sufficient precision, outline 
the nature of states’ obligations to help remedy it. To the extent that international law refers to 
‘domestic violence,’ such statements are subsumed into general discussions regarding violence 
against women, which is inadequate given the particular elements and nuances of systemic 
intimate violence. Second, I argue that systemic intimate violence is not yet part of mainstream 
international law. It has been dealt with only in the realm of women’s rights and, in order to 
mitigate this type of harm adequately, general international bodies must be involved. Finally, 
currently there is an inadequate jurisprudential justification for the internationalization of 
domestic violence. 
 
In the second part of chapter one I summarize in detail the existing international law on 
domestic violence and show how the prohibition against domestic violence has gained exposure 
over the last four decades. I argue that this development, together with the relatively recent 
specifications of mass rape, FGC, and trafficking in international law, indicates that the 
prohibition against systemic intimate violence is currently developing into a CIL principle. 
 
The remainder of the thesis takes on board these articulated deficiencies in current 




3. Chapter Two 
 
Chapter two describes the definitional components of systemic intimate violence and 
articulates a number of steps which I propose states have a duty to take to uphold the rights of 
their citizens to be free from such violence. 
 
I define systemic intimate violence as: severe forms of physical and non-physical harm 
(including emotional violence and threats of harm); occurring in a continuum; committed 
between intimates, predominantly against women; and, culminating in a form of harm from 
which women are unable to procure traditional state assistance. The elements of this definition 
indicate how the actual harm of systemic intimate violence is as severe as other human rights 
violations and how systemic elements of state power allow for the perpetuation of violence 
against a demarcated segment of society. 
 
Both the international community and nation-states are obliged to intervene. The 
international community needs to express an authoritative and specific prohibition against 
systemic intimate violence and incorporate the phenomenon of systemic intimate violence into 
its mainstream operations, such as asylum and torture. One of the greatest uncertainties identified 
in this thesis is the degree to which there is a norm in international law against domestic 
violence. While there is evidence of a growing movement internationally to prohibit severe 
forms of such violence, it is unclear that there is yet a right to be free from such violence in CIL 
or other sources of binding international law. A clear and binding enunciation thereof is an 
essential step necessary to place pressure on nation states to help remedy such violence. 
 
As far as states are concerned, I argue that countries are required to take three core 
minimum steps to improving their approach to systemic intimate violence. First, states must 
adopt legislation that, inter alia, prohibits systemic intimate violence, provides urgent restraining 
orders and imposes meaningful sanctions for their violation. Second, states must take practical 
steps to implement this legislation by educating the police and judiciary and imposing penalties 
for their failure to address systemic intimate violence in accordance with the provisions of 
governing legislation. Finally, depending on certain exigencies, states are required to allocate 
resources and redistribute institutional capacity to provide the infrastructural support necessary 
to help victims of systemic intimate violence by establishing shelters with facilities for children, 
crafting labor laws to recognize systemic intimate violence as a cause of legitimate absenteeism, 
and, through educational systems and campaigning, provide information about these facilities for 
women who find themselves victims of systemic intimate violence.  
 
Chapters three and four, respectively, lay down the theoretical and legal basis for why these 
practical steps are necessary; that is, why the international community and nation states are 
required to help remedy systemic intimate violence. 
 
4. Chapter Three 
 
In chapter three I provide a theoretical analysis of international human rights, and propose 
that freedom from systemic intimate violence is an international human ‘right’ requiring 
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intervention and enforcement in international law. Based on an overview of rights-theories, I 
extract four elements common to these theories that distinguish human ‘interests’ from human 
‘rights’ enforceable in international law. 
 
The first such element is ‘fundamentality’, which is the notion that human rights relate to 
some essential functioning of the human being. The second is ‘universality’ and the principle 
that, because human rights emanate from the basic denominator of being human, all human 
rights must be universally relevant across countries and cultures. The third element is 
‘vulnerability’, recognizing that international human rights law has developed in response to 
situations where a right-holder’s right is violated in circumstances where that right-holder is 
unable, as a result of societal, economic or other factors, to procure the necessary assistance to 
remedy that violation. The final element is that of ‘state accountability’, the notion that 
intervention in international law is triggered where a state is involved in the violation of a right 
of its citizens, or knowingly allows the perpetual violation of such right. 
 
Adopting these elements as a test for determining the existence of an international human 
right, I conclude that each of these elements is present in incidents of systemic intimate violence. 
First, systemic intimate violence constitutes a violation, inter alia, of women’s fundamental 
rights to equality, physical integrity and dignity, thereby satisfying the fundamentality element. 
Second, I identify the element of universality in such violence, notwithstanding the debate 
regarding the status and importance of cultural autonomy. Third, I propose that women 
particularly are vulnerable to systemic intimate violence as a result of societal gender 
discrimination and inequality generally and because of the particular circumstances of victims of 
such violence, thereby satisfying the requirement of vulnerability. Finally, I demonstrate how the 
state, through perpetual omissions, endorses systemic intimate violence. 
 
For these reasons, I conclude that the defining elements of systemic intimate violence are 
such that they constitute a human right violation enforceable in international law. On this basis, 
chapter four discusses why nation states are required under the doctrine of state responsibility to 
take the steps identified in chapter two to help remedy such violence. 
 
5. Chapter Four 
 
In chapter four I discuss the international obligation of states to intervene to help remedy 
systemic intimate violence. In particular, I apply the rules of state responsibility, emanating from 
the principles of denial of justice. 
 
The rules of state responsibility are triggered where a state commits an internationally 
wrongful act. I demonstrate that the two requisite elements, namely, ‘conduct’ and 
‘wrongfulness’, are fulfilled in the case of systemic intimate violence. As far as the conduct 
element is concerned, a state is responsible for both positive acts and omissions. Therefore, by 
failing consistently to assist women suffering systemic intimate violence, notwithstanding 
knowledge of such violence, a state has committed an act in the form of an omission. I then 
demonstrate that such an omission is wrongful in that it falls short of the due diligence standard 
established in international law. None of the traditional exceptions to this element of 
wrongfulness apply to preclude the wrongful nature of the state’s omission. 
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6. Chapter Five 
 
Chapters one through four discuss why systemic intimate violence is a violation of women’s 
international human rights, thereby requiring international intervention and enforcement. In 
chapter five I address the broader issue of whether international law is a useful tool for 
addressing such violence. I argue that it is; that international law has been, and is capable of 
being, an effective mechanism for improving the manner in which states protect women from 
violence. 
 
This is based on the theory that international law is not enforced only through traditional 
policing mechanisms. Rather, through a variety of processes and actors, it infiltrates into the 
substance of state law and lore. One of the key factors in this vertical infiltration of norms from 
the international to the local level is the emergence of non-state actors. I refer in particular to 
TSMOs and NGOs, demonstrating how their networks, information and technology expose 
international human rights violations and trigger a variety of remedial responses. 
 
Chapter five proposes that there are three functions of international law. The first is its 
expressive function through which international law gives a name and substance to specific 
human rights violations. This is exemplified by the specific enunciation of mass rape as a crime 
against humanity, a war crime and an instrument of genocide. The second is its implementing 
function. International law, through a web of international actors, including states, international 
bodies, TSMOs and NGOs, helps to implement principles of international law throughout local 
communities. I use the example of FGC to demonstrate how the interactive process between the 
international, national and local strata has led to change for individual women. The final function 
is its expansive element, whereby international law expands the notion of harm that justifies 
international intervention. I use the example of enforced disappearances to demonstrate how 
amorphous, nameless conduct was transformed into an identifiable crime in international law, 
and how this improved the lives of the individuals affected by this phenomenon. 
 
Each function of international law is evident in the improved legislative and policy 
approaches of states to domestic violence before and after DEVAW. Specifically, I focus on the 
extent to which Mexico, Nicaragua and Sweden discuss domestic violence in their CEDAW 
reports. Prior to 1993, domestic violence rarely appears in the discussions between these states 
and the CEDAW Committee. However, after 1993, with ever-increasing importance and 
specificity, domestic violence is assessed in every report. If I am correct in my conclusion that 
this evidences the efficacy of international law, then our efforts in improving international law 
should not wane. 
 
In conclusion, I believe that systemic intimate violence is far more than a cheese sandwich. 
Such violence is one of greatest plagues of harm faced by women internationally, and too long 
has been sidelined by the international community. For the reasons discussed in this thesis, I 
propose that international law can, and should, be used to place pressure on states to help remedy 
systemic intimate violence. The only barrier is one of political priority. However, I propose that 
the philosophical adherence to remedying human pain and suffering charges us to ask not why 
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between the ages of 18-24 had been subject to some form of physical violence during the 
past year, and 56% had experienced sexual harassment. Only 15% of the women who had 
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VIOLENCE THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE, 36, 41 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994): “domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in the 
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584). Battering of women by their husbands or men with whom they are in intimate 
relationships cuts across racial, class, ethnic, and economic lines. Police involvement, 
nationally, in cases of domestic violence exceeds involvement in murder, rape, and all 
forms of aggravated assault. 
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sexual violence, with 21% of ever-married women reporting all three kinds of abuse. 
Thirty-one percent of abused women suffered severe physical violence during pregnancy. 
The latency period between the initiation or marriage or cohabitation and violence was 
short, with over 50% of the battered women reporting that the first act of violence took 
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